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ABSTRACT

When Old Age Changed: Inventing the "Senior State," 1945-1975
by
Benjamin Hellwege

Advisor: Gerald Markowitz

This dissertation asks why public assistance at the federal level in the United States has become
significantly oriented towards the needs of older Americans since the New Deal era. It argues that in
effect the United States has developed an old age welfare state – a “senior state,” in other words,
which has sought primarily to protect the economic status of older Americans, and that the creation
of this “senior state” represents the end-point of a long-term project by social reformers, organized
labor, and old age advocacy organizations over the course of the second half of the 20th century to
institutionalize federal responsibility for the elderly. Unlike the controversies which surrounded
programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), contributory programs such as
Social Security and Medicare as well as noncontributory initiatives funded by the federal
government to assist older Americans enjoyed far more social and political legitimacy. My research
argues that this acceptance of programs to help older Americans was the product of a unique
alliance between government officials, organized labor, and civic organizations which ensured that
both adequate public funding and social legitimacy would be reserved to protect programs for older
Americans.
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INTRODUCTION
The sun dawned bright and clearly over Washington, D.C. on Wednesday, July 14, 1965, a
perfectly ordinary day in the nation’s capital. Cars, buses, and trucks caught in morning rush hour
traffic sat snarled at traffic lights on the city’s great wide boulevards, filling the air with the sounds
of honking vehicles, occasionally interspersed here and there with the static-riddled cackle of radios
and the chatter of construction workers and pedestrians. Even though it was not yet afternoon,
Washington’s traditionally sweaty, sticky, and generally miserable summer humidity had already
begun to suffocate the city’s gleaming white marble buildings in a merciless, stifling embrace.
On Capitol Hill, Congress had convened to consider a wide variety of major and minor
legislative proposals. For months, the 89th Congress had been debating and passing bills at a
breakneck speed that had not been seen in a generation. Already, the Congress had considered more
measures in the first six months of 1965 than had been on the docket during FDR’s celebrated
Hundred Days in 1933, and several major pieces of legislation, such as the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, the Voting Rights Act, Medicare and Medicaid (more properly, the Social
Security Act Amendments of 1965), the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 had either
been enacted or soon would be. If, as Robert Caro has observed, the United States Senate’s chief
function in the past had been to dam and hold back legislative proposals designed to deal with the
pressing social and political issues of the day, then the chamber’s busy, humming activity
throughout 1965 probably stands out as the exception which proves the rule. 1
The Senate’s busy schedule owed much to Lyndon Johnson – one of its former members –
who now sat in the Oval Office. Fresh off of a successful spring legislative session, Johnson signed
the Older Americans Act into law after a short ceremony in the Rose Garden. In many of the next
1

Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, Volume 3 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002),
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day’s newspapers, coverage of the event attracted mildly interested but perfunctory attention. The
New York Times relegated the story to its middle pages, buried near advertisements for Pan
American Airlines’ new routes to Europe and cheap men’s clothing stores. 2 The press’s lack of
interest in the story was understandable. The real legislative battle, everyone knew, was still over
the fate of the proposed Medicare and Medicaid legislation (to say nothing of the Voting Rights
Act). In the specific case of Medicare and Medicaid, liberals had been fighting for these measures
since the twilight days of the Eisenhower administration, and it had been at times a bitter conflict in
which they had tasted far more defeats than victories.
In contrast to the muted coverage of the Older Americans Act’s enactment, when the
Medicare legislation was finally signed by President Johnson on July 30, 1965 at the Harry S.
Truman Presidential Library, newspaper coverage was lavish, generous, and practically fawning.
Photographs of President Johnson signing the legislation next to a beaming but frail President Harry
Truman could be found on the front page of major newspapers throughout the country, and grateful
letters and telegrams from older Americans to President Johnson soon began to pour into the White
House at a feverish pace. Though Medicare would not actually go into operation until 1966, liberals
savored this victory over the fierce opposition led by the much-loathed and feared American
Medical Association, and confidently looked forward to the day when national health insurance for
all Americans – not just the elderly or the indigent – would become a reality rather than a fantasy. 3
Yet something happened on the way to achieving that goal. As we now know, the enactment
of Medicare and much of the other Great Society legislation – like the Older Americans Act – that
the Johnson administration had managed to steer through Congress during the brief window of

2
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opportunity provided by the 1964 landslide election would prove to be a false dawn for liberals in
the United States. For a variety of reasons – including but not limited to the disastrous war in
Vietnam, the explosion of racial unrest in many American cities, and the resurgence of the powerful
“conservative coalition” of southern Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill – the Great Society
would prove to be a high water mark for major social reform until well into the twentieth-first
century, when the hard-won enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (popularly
known as “Obamacare”) would resume some of the long-paused work of major national reform
dating back to at least the Progressive Era.
In the meantime, though, major programs like Social Security and Medicare which did get
enacted during the major moments of social reform in the twentieth century would develop in ways
that had not been entirely foreseen by their architects. Social Security, for example, was never
intended solely to be a program primarily oriented towards older Americans, though that is the path
it has taken, and that is the way we generally understand it when it is used today in our political and
social nomenclature. 4 Instead, it was designed to act in concert with other never-enacted laws to
ensure that the promise of economic security would extend to as many members of the American
family as possible, rather than just its elders. As the political scientist Margaret Weir has shown,
attempts to enact guarantees of full employment – with the federal government as the employer of
last resort – repeatedly failed in 1945 and again in 1978, and this failure has ensured that the goal of
full employment has remained more distant and aspirational than anything else. 5 It has also meant
that debates over the meaning of “Social Security” would be far more separated from debates about
employment and the “right to work” than might have otherwise been the case. The policy world in
4
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which we live in is one shaped not just by the successes but also by the failures and “might-havebeens” which did not come to pass.
Main Argument of the Dissertation
What did happen – and this is the major argument that I shall make in this dissertation – is
that the half-finished efforts to enact a broad, well-developed social welfare state in the United
States resulted instead in the creation of a “senior state,” which was increasingly designed and
driven over time by the concerns and demands of the nation’s eldest citizens and not necessarily by
its neediest. 6 This dissertation tells the story of the creation of a senior state between 1935 and 1975,
starting from the time of its origins in the 1930s and 1940s, extending into its expansion between the
1950s and the mid-1970s, and ends by offering some concluding thoughts on its development since
then. The construction of this state took place primarily during a time of self-assured economic
growth and expansion in the United States and well before the advent of protracted economic crisis
and stagnation which began in the mid-1970s. Yet even in the decades since the end of the
seemingly miraculous economic prosperity which blessed the United States and much of the
industrialized world after World War II, the senior state has continued to thrive, despite the rise of a
committed anti-statist conservative movement that found its greatest political champion in Ronald
Reagan, a bona fide “senior citizen” who had launched his national political career campaigning
against the enactment of Medicare in 1964.

6

A usual explanation for this development is the voting power of the elderly. While I do not disagree that the ability of
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A few qualifiers are in order, though, starting with how I understand and define terminology
in this dissertation. In using the term the “senior state,” I mean the collective apparatus of federal
programs, agencies, laws, and initiatives – some of them famous and well known, like Social
Security and Medicare, but the majority of them largely anonymous and half-forgotten, like the
Older Americans Act – which have been gradually erected over time to protect the economic and
social security of older Americans, who I define as people at and above the age of 65. 7 This is a
crude cut-off numerical measurement, to be sure, but it is the one which more often than not the
federal policy makers, academic experts, and other interested parties who I examine in this
dissertation used when deciding whether or not to undertake a particular action or advocate for a
certain measure, even as they themselves at times recognized the sheer arbitrariness of that number.
I have therefore adopted it in order to more closely track how policymakers debated the issues and
questions surrounding how to best use the federal government’s resources to raise and keep older
Americans above the official poverty line.
Additionally, I have deliberately placed the actions of the network of public and private
social welfare policymakers responsible for the creation of the senior state at the center of this
dissertation rather than the elderly themselves. I have done so not because the elderly are
unimportant or because they were powerless bystanders in the development of the senior state.
Rather, my decision has been guided by two factors: first, the intermittent role played by elderly
7
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people and the organizations which claimed to speak on their behalf in driving the development of
the senior state during the four decades between 1935 and 1975, and secondly by the more critical if
low-profile role played by elected and unelected policymakers in translating the recurrent episodes
of political activism and mobilization by older people into government policy. While the elderly did
play an important role in the development of the senior state – particularly during the 1930s before
and after the enactment of Social Security and again during the late 1950s and into the 1960s before
and after the enactment of Medicare, when organized political and social activism amongst older
people helped propel the issues of old-age economic security and health care to the forefront of the
nation’s domestic policy agenda, these two programs were not the sum total of the senior state.
Instead, policymakers in states and localities with a high population of resident older people
slowly constructed an infrastructure of programs and agencies to deal with a wide range of
economic, social, and health issues faced by older Americans. These programs and agencies owed
much to the sociological research undertaken by academic experts during the late 1940s and beyond
into the actual living conditions of older Americans in various communities throughout the nation,
and to the propagation of this research via state and national conferences, professional journals, and
published studies. Gradually, a small but distinctive network of public and private sector individuals
and organizations emerged that was dedicated to formulating proposed solutions to the problems
faced by older Americans, and the implementation of these solutions – especially during the War on
Poverty and thereafter – helped to justify permanent new roles for the state to play in the lives of
older Americans. My dissertation therefore emphasizes how this conjunction of state power and
policy formulation developed during the period between 1935 and 1975 rather than the role played
by old-age social and political movements. 8

8
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Historiography of the American State
In positing that the United States has a “senior state,” I am building upon a recent revival in
investigating the role of the state in American history as well as a long-standing interest in the
politics of public relief and social reform during what Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle famously
termed “the New Deal Order.” 9 As Brian Balogh, William Novak, and James Sparrow have
forcefully argued, although the United States did indeed govern differently than its industrialized
counterparts in Western Europe and elsewhere, it did not necessarily govern less. Thirty years ago
in his inaugural address as President of the Organization of American Historians, the eminent
political historian William E. Leuchtenburg surveyed the landscape of American historiography and
bemoaned the unhappy fate which had apparently befallen political history. 10 If political history had
reigned dominant in the profession during the 1950s and 1960s, it seemed by the 1980s to have
fallen on hard times as social and later cultural history came to the forefront. To a large extent, this
was a necessary corrective to historical scholarship which seemed to focus far too much on the role
2008); Jill S. Quadagno, The Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); and James Sylvester O’Leary, “Old people's social movement
organizations: Why they succeed, how they fail.” PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994.
9
Fraser, Steve and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989). For the recent revival of scholarly interest in the state’s role in American history, see James T.
Sparrow, William J. Novak, Stephen W. Sawyer, eds., Boundaries of the State in US History (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2015); Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in NineteenthCentury America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) and his more recent The Associational State:
American Governance in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). See also
William J. Novak’s article “The Myth of the “Weak” American State” in The American Historical Review 113, no. 3
(2008): 752-772, and his recently edited (along with James Sparrow and Stephen W. Sawyer) Boundaries of the State in
US History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
10
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of world-historical figures like Franklin Roosevelt. By the mid-to late 1990s, though, there was a
growing sense that the pendulum had swung too far away from political history, and that while
politics was not the only causative factor in explaining the recent and more distant past, it could not
be entirely discounted.
In its search for a new way forward that blends the best of newer approaches centered on
social and cultural history, as well as more traditional approaches concerned with political and
diplomatic history, the field has seen the emergence of hybrid fields like political culture which try
to examine political history outside of the traditional confines of elite actors and pivotal elections in
the history of the United States. Thanks to this turn (or is it return?) to politics in the last decade,
political historians have enjoyed a modest renaissance within the profession, and perhaps no school
of political historians has flourished as have historians of the American state. 11 The return of
political history as a force to be reckoned with was announced by the publication of The Democratic
Experiment in 2003. 12 Recent works by scholars such as Margot Canaday, Michelle Dauber, James
Sparrow, Brian Balogh and William Novak have done much to emphasize the importance of the
American state in twentieth century American history and to reveal just how multifaceted that state
could and continues to be. 13
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Perhaps nowhere was this proposition more apparent than in the programs, agencies, and
other measures which were created during the post-World War II era to control and eradicate
poverty among older Americans. Unlike the controversies which surrounded other programs such as
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), both contributory programs, such as Social
Security and Medicare, as well as noncontributory initiatives funded by the federal government to
assist older Americans enjoyed far more purchase and social legitimacy. I argue that this widespread
acceptance of programs to help older Americans was the product of a long-term public and private
alliance between government officials and voluntary civic organizations such as the National
Association of Social Workers and the American Public Welfare Association which ensured that
both adequate funding and manpower would be dedicated to maintaining programs for older
Americans, and to further insulate such programs from the troubles which bedeviled the architects
of the Great Society’s War on Poverty and other efforts to reform welfare in the United States.
While recent scholarship has emphasized the ways in which the American state penetrated
and permeated the lives of everyday Americans – aside from more immediately obvious ways, like
military service – it would be a mistake to overstate or mischaracterize the relationship between the
American state and its citizens during the twentieth century. 14 Decades ago, the late Barry Karl
cautioned students of twentieth-century U.S. political and social history about the fundamental
ambivalence with which many Americans have viewed the American state, and the abiding distrust
American Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of
Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003). The recent revival of “state” scholarship in American history owes much to the work done by practitioners
in the political science subfield of American Political Development; for two key monographs in this field, see Richard
Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); and Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public and Private Social
Benefits in the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
14
For a good overview of this subject, see Suzanne Mettler and Andrew Milstein, “American Political Development
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American Political Development 21 (Spring 2007): 110-130, esp. 124-125. Mettler and Milstein argue that “Americans
likely gained a powerful “sense of the state” in their lives over the course of the mid-twentieth century. Compared to the
years between the Civil War and the 1920s, the U.S. federal government’s role had shifted tremendously in scope, form,
and character” during the era of the New Deal and up through the mid-1970s.
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of centralized power and corresponding veneration of local autonomy which has characterized
American society throughout much of the existence of the modern United States. Recent events
such as the struggle to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the furious political
blowback that followed in its wake have only confirmed the power of Karl’s warning. 15
Even with these qualifications, the “state” remains a useful tool of analysis (to borrow Joan
Scott’s instantly classic turn of phrase). 16 In particular, Brian Balogh has offered in his The
Associative State a new model for students of twentieth-century American political history to
employ in their examinations of the vexed story of progress and pitfall. Balogh argues that much of
the scholarly literature in American political history remains trapped in an outdated model inherited
from Progressive Era scholars like Charles and Mary Beard in which liberals do endless battle with
conservatives. Instead, Balogh urges students of political history to focus instead on “the ways in
which Americans have braided public and private actions, state and voluntary-sector institutions, to
achieve collective goals without undermining citizens’ essential belief in individual freedom.” 17 In
this dissertation, I take up Balogh’s suggestion, in order to offer a new interpretation of the political
history of the American welfare state during the postwar era that integrates more traditional
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presidential-centered histories with the activities of the voluntary sector as well as state and local
level actors.
Next, I do not claim in this dissertation to try and explain the life experiences of all older
Americans during the period under examination (broadly defined as 1935 through 1975); rather, my
focus is on how the senior state tried to ameliorate and remedy the poverty which afflicted many
older Americans. Factors like race, gender, and class have ensured that there have always been (and
likely will always be) some elderly people who live in destitution while others enjoy luxury in old
age. My focus in this dissertation, though, is upon the halting and not always linear actions taken
primarily at the state and federal levels to improve the economic and social conditions of the
impoverished elderly.
Yet the struggles necessary to bring them into existence were not a foregone conclusion, and
nor was it preordained that the United States would, as a matter of policy preference, end up
favoring its impoverished elderly population over other presumably deserving impoverished groups.
While previous generations of scholarship have rightly emphasized the roles which race and gender
played in shaping the American welfare state, at times it has lost sight of the seemingly obvious
elephant in the room: the role age has played in shaping the American welfare state. Consider, for
example, that Medicare, which provides universal publicly subsidized health care insurance for
Americans age 65 and over, had existed for nearly two generations before efforts to expand health
insurance coverage to impoverished children succeeded in the form of the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP) in 1997. As well-informed commentators like Paul Starr have noted, the
United States is the only industrialized nation which chiefly subsidizes health care overwhelmingly
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for its elderly population, though of course the benefits which older Americans receive are nowhere
near as generous as those of their western European counterparts. 18
In addition, I focus primarily on the activities of the executive branch, specifically the
numerous presidential administrations which took hold in Washington during this time period.
While I am aware of the risks of reviving what Julian Zelizer has termed the “presidential
synthesis,” whereby American history is reduced simply to the story of its Presidents, I believe that
this particular realm of domestic policy making is worth further scholarly exploration for several
reasons. 19 First, while the Constitution has traditionally afforded the President a freer hand in
foreign rather than domestic policy, during the course of the twentieth century, the executive branch
became more deeply and permanently involved in social welfare policymaking than it had ever been
before, and that shift is reflected in part by the long-term, bipartisan consensus which gradually
developed around the senior state. As it becomes clearer that we are living in a hyper-partisan
period in which policymaking has become increasingly centered in the Executive Branch due to the
dysfunctionality of the legislative branch, it seems worthwhile to consider the past track record of
presidential administrations in this vital if sometimes overlooked area of policy reform.
Secondly, because I have been able to gain access to papers and archival sources that were
previously unavailable due to donor or classified national security restrictions, this dissertation can
add to the sum total of knowledge available to other scholars who may wish to tackle this subject
and to make new arguments. Thirdly, I believe that there is more to the story of presidential
administrations as historical actors than the actions of the presidents themselves, and therefore that
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the presidency as an institution is worthy of study as an actor in domestic policymaking. 20 As I will
detail in this dissertation, the actions of administration officials, advisors, and aides helped to set the
course of the federal domestic policymaking, and focusing on them thereby has the potential to offer
considerable insight into the development of the senior state.
Finally, I have undertaken this dissertation because of the unique demographic moment
which the United States is currently passing through at the present time. As a 2012 U.S. Census
Report has noted:
Between 2012 and 2050, the United States will experience
considerable growth in its older population. In 2050, the population
aged 65 and over is projected to be 83.7 million, almost double its
estimated population of 43.1 million in 2012. The baby boomers are
largely responsible for this increase in the older population, as they
began turning 65 in 2011…The projected growth of the older
population in the United States will present challenges to policy
makers and programs, such as Social Security and Medicare. It will
also affect families, businesses, and health care providers. 21
As federal policymakers now and in the future wrestle with the numerous, intertwined issues
involved with how to best deal with the largest elderly population in the history of the United States,
an examination of the actions undertaken by their predecessors may offer some guidance or caution.
While it is true that the aging of the population will have wide-ranging implications for the country,
this is not the first time that Americans or their government have had to confront the question of
how best to care for aging, frequently economically insecure people. During both the New Deal and
the Great Society, policymakers wrestled with many of the same problems that continue to bedevil
their successors.
20
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However, focusing primarily on the activities of the federal government has other significant
limitations. What we understand as the “federal government” is in reality a mishmash of numerous
agencies, commissions, departments, subgroups, and very nearly every other kind of organization
split across three different branches of government, some of which not infrequently operate at crosspurposes with each other. Additionally, the United States is governed not just at the federal level,
but also by fifty different and distinct state governments, to say nothing of the innumerable
territorial, local, and special governmental bodies which also exercise jurisdiction within the United
States. By necessity, then, this study is a selective one.
Review of Relevant Literature in the field of U.S. Social Welfare History
Recent scholarship has suggested that it is possible to study the presidency as an institution
without necessarily focusing solely on individual presidents. As Brian Balogh writes in Recapturing
the Oval Office: New Historical Approaches to the American Presidency, “now is a propitious time
to integrate the presidency into cutting-edge historical scholarship because we know so much more
about the context in which presidents operate and the structures that guide, and often limit, their
actions and beliefs.” 22 Of course, this is not the first study that tackles the issue of how the
presidency or the federal government more broadly defined has wrestled with the momentous issue
of poverty in the twentieth century. James Patterson’s America's Struggle Against Poverty in the
Twentieth Century examines this subject from the onset of the Progressive Era at the turn of the
twentieth century through the end of the 1990s. 23 Patterson’s scope in his study, though, is broader
than the one I have set in this dissertation. For example, while Patterson considers a wider range of
time and encompasses far more groups in his work than this dissertation does, both our studies share
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an emphasis on the federal government’s efforts during the War on Poverty and its aftermath. By
defining a narrower focus in this dissertation, I hope to offer other scholars a new way through
which to view federal efforts to ameliorate poverty, and to thereby draw attention to facets of those
efforts which have not hitherto received in-depth study.
Likewise, my work is also in conversation with Alice O’Connor’s Poverty Knowledge:
Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History. 24 O’Connor traces
the development of poverty as a subject of intense academic study at institutions such as the
University of Chicago to its integration as a tool of federal policymaking during the War on Poverty
and the Great Society. As O’Connor writes, “the idea that scientific knowledge holds the key to
solving social problems has long been an article of faith in American liberalism. Nowhere is this
more apparent than when it comes to solving the “poverty problem.” For well over a century, liberal
social investigators have scrutinized poor people in the hopes of creating a knowledge base for
informed social action.” 25 Despite this faith in scientific knowledge, though, the application of
“poverty knowledge” has not only failed to eradicate poverty in the United States, in the specific
instance of the War on Poverty, it inadvertently made things worse by placing the onus of poverty as
a personal moral failure on the individual poor rather than on broader, more deep-seated social
problems like discrimination in the workplace and upward income redistribution through constant
revisions to the nation’s tax code. In O’Connor’s powerful telling, there is a fairly straight line from
the War on Poverty to the political and social counter-reaction to the War on Poverty during the
1970s and into the 1980s, as political conservatives seized upon the failures of the individual poor to
in effect blame them (or more abstractly, fault “culture”) for the persistence of poverty.
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Finally, during the 1970s and into the 1980s, there was a pronounced rise in the scholarly
literature of studies which dealt with the role of special interest groups in influencing the
development of social policy, especially at the federal level. In the particular case of the federal
government’s approach to matters concerning the elderly, the most influential study was Henry J.
Pratt’s The Gray Lobby, which emphasized the rise and power of organizations like the AARP in
the federal policymaking process. 26 According to Pratt, a coherent nexus of lobbying groups had
emerged during the post-World War II era, and that the outpouring of federal legislation concerned
with the elderly during this period was the result of much more effective organized lobbying by the
AARP and other like-minded organizations. While I agree with Pratt that the AARP and other oldage advocacy groups played an important role in pushing for federal legislation on behalf of the
elderly, I believe he under-emphasizes the role played by state and local officials as well as private
philanthropies in building the political consensus necessary for such federal legislation. Pratt is right
to argue that the AARP was better organized and has lasted longer than the Townsend Movement of
the 1930s, but it also benefitted from a favorable political and social climate in which voluntary
organizations once more took the lead in setting the parameters of action, a role that they had
temporarily lost due to the Great Depression. Furthermore, while some old age advocacy groups –
especially the National Council of Senior Citizens during the early 1960s – played a crucial role in
getting legislation like Medicare enacted by generating significant grassroots support among the
elderly for the measure, the AARP spent much of its early years fighting against the enactment of
such legislation.
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While historical scholarship explicitly focused on the general American state has gone
through cycles, the literature on social welfare policy in America has flourished over the course of
the last thirty years, and has been greatly enriched by the searching examinations of scholars attuned
to issues of race, class, and gender, as well by the interdisciplinary contributions from economists,
political scientists, and sociologists. 27 The work of political scientists Frances Fox Piven and the late
Richard Cloward critiqued the American welfare state from a New Left perspective; in their telling,
public welfare provision in the United States was motivated chiefly by the desire by political and
economic elites to maintain social control by ensuring that a sufficient amount of public support was
made available in order to mollify social discontent. 28
Scholarship in the field of social welfare really took on a more pressing urgency, though,
during the increasingly racialized political struggles over the place of “welfare” in American life
which took place during the 1980s and 1990s. 29 In contrast to the rhetoric of politicians like Ronald
Reagan about purported welfare fraud, the late historian Michael Katz and others emphasized the
stinginess of the American welfare state as a constancy dating back to the institutionalization and
27
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persistence of the English “poor law” system in first colonial and later early national America. 30
Soon, Katz’s voice was joined by those of Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol,
who in their edited collection of essays in The Politics of Social Policy in the United States situated
the then ferocious debates over welfare in the 1980s within a larger historical context dating back to
the New Deal era. 31
Subsequent scholarship has amplified many of their key arguments, including the
disproportionate role of undemocratic “southern economic and social elites to affect national
polices” at a time of mass disenfranchisement of African-Americans in much of the American
South, with fateful consequences for the reach of programs like Social Security and the GI Bill. 32
Skocpol’s work, in particular, blended history and sociology, and helped to redefine the
periodization of the American welfare state by arguing that the United States had developed a de
facto welfare state long before the coming of the New Deal, and that the shape of American welfare
was determined not simply by the New Deal and the Great Depression but also by the lingering
aftereffects of the struggles by turn of the twentieth century Progressive reformers to purge
corruption from the American body politic. 33
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After the sociological turn in social welfare history, the field began to be influenced more
and more by the path-breaking work of Linda Gordon and Alice Kessler-Harris during the early and
mid-1990s. In particular, both Gordon and Kessler-Harris put gender front and center in their
examination of American social welfare policy. In her work, Gordon posited that gender
considerations had led the architects of the Social Security Act to favor white men under the rubric
of social insurance, a category of social programs which enjoyed broad social respectability and
acceptance. 34 By contrast, programs which largely favored women and racial minorities fell under
the category of public assistance, and the recipients of aid under these programs (which included the
now defunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children program) were stigmatized on the whole by
society, and their programs were and remain under near-constant political siege. 35 While Gordon
was not the first student of social welfare to argue that the United States had developed a two tiered
welfare state, her work focused more on the network of welfare advocates (chiefly college-educated
white men and white women) who helped devise and influence public social welfare in the United
States between the Gilded Age and the New Deal era, and by her own admission, largely excluded
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persons “whose primary contributions to the cause [of welfare reform] were made as elected
officials or as philanthropists.” 36
While I agree with Gordon that gendered notions of family and work influenced the
development of the public American welfare state before, during, and after the enactment of the
Social Security Act, my study questions the extent to which Social Security’s social insurance
program truly enjoyed a privileged, first-tier status. For most of its first two decades of existence,
Social Security did not succeed especially well at its task of preventing economic insecurity; indeed,
the failures and limitations of the program helped to spur a colossal struggle between organized
labor and corporate management during the late 1940s over retirement security.
The inadequacy of Social Security also, as I argue, helped make possible the resurgence of
old-age pension movements at the state and local levels of governance, and created a growing social
and political vacuum which private welfare policymakers and elected public officials tried to fill,
with varying amounts of success. The limits of Social Security – and the concerted efforts by
organized labor, elected officials, and social reformers to expand it – also helped to feed into the
emergent anti-statist critique made by the proponents of American conservatism during the postwar
period, most of whom publicly alternated between gritted tolerance and outright hostility towards
Social Security and other attempts to expand the American welfare state’s public provisions. 37 Had
it not been for the persistent fear of pension movements and organized labor gaining a permanent
upper hand in collective bargaining agreements, though, it was just as possible in the late 1940s that
Social Security would have been largely relegated to irrelevance due to its limited number of
enrollees and scope of benefits.
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Complementing Gordon’s scholarship, Alice Kessler-Harris in her landmark work In Pursuit
of Equity: How Gender Shaped American Economic Citizenship examined how “policies that appear
neutral on their face emerge from deeply embedded belief systems that accentuate particular
politics,” and like Gordon, traces how a “gendered imagination” on the part of both male and female
policymakers (Kessler-Harris’s words) influenced the course of social welfare policy development
by effectively institutionalizing shared assumptions about the connections between gender, family,
and work (to wit: that men should be the primary breadwinner for the family, while women’s work
should be treated – at best – as an adjunct to the male breadwinner role). 38 Unlike sociologists such
as Theda Skocpol who emphasized “differences in administrative and political structures” to explain
the unique development of the American welfare state, Kessler-Harris argued that culture more
“effectively predicts the outcomes of social legislation across national borders.” 39
While I agree with Kessler-Harris that “gendered imaginations” shaped how federal
policymakers, I err more on the side of Skocpol’s emphasis on administrative and political
structures. While the efforts by policymakers in the postwar era to address old age dependency
certainly drew upon ideas of gender, the unexpected growth and popularity of Social Security’s old
age assistance program as well as state level pensions between 1935 and well into the 1950s spurred
deep fears among elected officials, corporate leaders, and policymakers that the social discontent
which had powered the Townsend Movement to national prominence, and which had seemed so
threatening to American democracy during the 1930s, might reappear. Consequently, these groups
forged an uneasy alliance to develop a hybrid public-private infrastructure capable of not only
offering strengthened economic support to older Americans, but also one which sought to help
38
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define a new, positive role for older people to play in American society. These efforts, though, were
limited by past policy choices, especially those made by the architects of the 1935 Social Security
Act.
The analyses of the American welfare state’s development produced by Gordon and KesslerHarris were soon amplified in two important ways, beginning in the late 1990s: first, by growing
attempts to place the development of the American welfare state in a comparative, transnational
context, and secondly by a more expansive definition of the “welfare state” to include the massive
private welfare state largely constructed after World War II, a scholarly development made possible
by the awakening of the long dormant field of business history.
Perhaps the most important scholarly work which places the development of the American
welfare state in a transnational perspective is Daniel Rodgers’ Atlantic Crossings, in which Rodgers
argued that Progressive Era reformers in the United States learned from the examples of their
counterparts in Western Europe, and that many of the agenda items on the Progressive Era policy
wish list were shaped by this transmission of ideas across the Atlantic. 40 While Rodgers was not
solely focused on the development of the American welfare state, his signature contribution was to
show how many of the ideas and assumptions which American reformers relied upon when devising
public provision programs were not demarcated solely by the boundaries of the American nationstate; rather, many of these reformers looked to Europe (and especially to Great Britain and
Germany before World War I) for inspiration and examples worthy of imitation. The New Deal, in
Rodgers’ telling, represented the fullest flowering of the transatlantic transfer of ideas about social
reform, an argument which sharply differentiated Atlantic Crossings from other accounts such as
40
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Elizabeth Sanders’ Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, which focused
exclusively on endogenous sources of American reform efforts. 41
Along with the growing scholarly interest in placing American history in a transnational
context, students of the American welfare state began to shift their examinations of this subject
away from discussions and arguments about the nature of “welfare” and back towards closer
examinations of “the state.” The two most important works which mark the emergence of this new
subfield are Jacob Hacker’s The Divided Welfare State and his Yale colleague Jennifer Klein’s For
All These Rights. 42 Hacker’s work demonstrated that prior discussions of the American welfare state
were, quite simply, inadequate if they failed to take account of America’s private welfare state, a
curious creature unique among industrialized nations. Instead of looking solely at major laws like
the Social Security Act of 1935 or Medicare in 1965, Hacker explored how the use of taxation and
regulatory policy helped usher in the private welfare state, in which an employment-centered model
of social provision took root and which remains (much as the struggle over the Affordable Care Act
in 2009-2012 revealed) very much at the center of present-day discussions and fights about how to
provide adequate and equitable social provision.
While Hacker is a political scientist and not a historian, his methodology in The Divided
Welfare State was at heart historical: by relying upon “path dependence” (a model of policy
developed first formulated by Paul Pierson), Hacker showed how the American welfare state – at
least insofar as health insurance and old age social insurance are concerned – took a winding,
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frequently unpredictable path in which public provision either stood at the center or at the periphery
of subsequent private social welfare provision.
Unlike Hacker, my focus in this dissertation is upon old-age assistance rather than old-age
insurance programs, which Hacker mostly skips in favor of Social Security’s social insurance
program. I focus on old-age assistance because – at least for the first two decades of Social
Security’s existence – old age assistance remained the larger and more popular of the two programs.
The choice to emphasize Social Security’s old-age insurance program over its old-age assistance
program came about in large part because of the inability of state and local officials to adequately
support a growing population of older Americans during the late 1940s. As the number of older
Americans receiving public relief rose during the late 1940s, policymakers turned once more to
Social Security’s old age insurance program and expanded it after it became clear that Social
Security’s old age assistance program was encouraging fiscally unsustainable economic
“dependency” by older Americans.
While Hacker tackled the development of health insurance and old age social insurance
between the era of the New Deal and up through the 1990s, Jennifer Klein’s For All These Rights
reached back further to the Progressive Era and extended through the late 1950s, with a decided
emphasis on the New Deal and immediate post-war (and post-New Deal) period. 43 For All These
Rights explored the attempts by unions, fraternal organizations, and other voluntary groups to
construct an economic security system separate from employment. These attempts, while enjoying
some limited success in the 1930s and 1940s, were ultimately subsumed by the employment-
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centered model of social provision during and after World War II, when private employers regained
the upper hand in such policy developments. 44 In effect, Klein shows how private employers
(especially private commercial insurers) were able to seize the New Deal’s language of security and
make it their own, and in so doing were able to begin the process of rolling back the interruption
into traditional managerial prerogatives which the New Deal’s labor reforms had brought about in
the 1930s. 45
My dissertation builds on Klein’s work and adds private voluntary organizations as well as
state and local officials to the mix. Klein’s study puts these two groups largely to the side in her
depiction of the struggle over political economy in the postwar United States. While discussions and
conflicts about political economy and the character of the American welfare state in the postwar era
were undoubtedly influenced and shaped by the struggle between labor and capital as well as the
legacy of the New Deal in national politics, they were also informed by the careful observation of
state and local level developments, especially in places like California and New York City, both
traditional hotbeds of social unrest and reform movements.
Finally, in recent years, the vibrant new scholarship produced by students in the fields of the
American state and American social welfare has begun to overlap more frequently. In 2005,
political scientist Jacob Hacker, following the lead of Theda Skocpol a generation earlier, called for
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scholars to “[bring] the welfare state back in.” 46 While happily surveying the tremendous increase in
scholarly attention paid to the American welfare state, Hacker also drew attention to an increasing
fragmentation in such studies; in his words, “a notable absence of explanatory integration”
characterized many recent scholarly studies of the American welfare state. In order to remedy this
scholarly fragmentation, Hacker proposed that future studies pay more attention to long-term
processes of social policy development. 47 In essence, Hacker pleaded for renewed efforts to build a
new, comprehensive and coherent narrative about the development of the American welfare state
that could incorporate studies about the influence of race, gender, business, and indirect methods
such as taxation on the American state’s efforts to promote social policy goals without merely
starting from the premise that the United States has had a “weak” state and trying to work
backwards through time to explain why the American welfare state paled in comparison to those of
Western Europe and Japan.
As of yet, no one has taken up the intimidating gauntlet demanding a more synthetic
approach that Hacker threw down more than a decade ago. Instead, there has continued to be a
fruitful cross-pollination between students of the American state and American social welfare.
Perhaps spurred by the acrimonious debate surrounding the enactment of the Affordable Care Act in
2010, recent scholarship has revisited how earlier generations of reformers confronted a hostile
array of opponents determined to undo attempts to restructure the American welfare state. 48 In this
line of inquiry, Michele Landis Dauber’s The Sympathetic State, like Theda Skocpol’s Protecting
Mothers and Soldiers, extends the chronology of the American welfare state backwards into the
nineteenth century. Unlike Skocpol, though, Dauber’s narrative shows how New Deal lawyers and
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proponents marshalled a wealth of legal precedent and case law to defend the Social Security Act
and other important pieces of New Deal legislation rather than emphasizing how the institutional
legacy of largely forgotten programs like the Civil War veterans’ pension system hampered later
efforts at social and political reform.
In sum, over the past fifteen years, there has been a remarkable revival of scholarly interest
in both the American state as a subject worthy of study in its own right as well as the origins and
development of the American welfare state, both public and private. I have tried to borrow and learn
from the best insights and models that previous scholarship in these two fields has produced.
Consequently, this dissertation is not a comprehensive history of any one particular government
program like Social Security or Medicare, or historical profile of any single voluntary group like the
American Association of Retired Persons, or biography of a single influential government official
like former Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Wilbur Cohen. 49 Instead,
I have tried to meld together different elements in order to tell a necessarily selective story about
how the attempts to create and later to reform public and private provision for old age economic
security evolved from the 1930s to the 1970s.
Organization of the Dissertation
I have endeavored to organize When Old Age Changed: Inventing the Senior State, 19351975 largely along chronological lines, though I have not always been rigidly dogmatic in doing so.
In Chapter 1, entitled “Social Insecurities, 1925-1939,” I trace how the efforts of old-age pension
advocates remained largely stalled until the onset of the Great Depression, when protracted
economic crisis thrust the issue of old age economic insecurity into the center of American politics.
For a variety of reasons, unlike in western European nations like Germany and the United Kingdom,
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the old-age pension movement remained peripheral to the concerns of most social reformers in the
United States during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Consequently, no movement
for a permanent universal old-age pension system at the national level emerged, and the few U.S.
states which did develop old age pension systems were few in number and largely happy to leave
such systems small and (usually) underfunded. In many U.S. states, the system of poorhouse relief
which originally descended from Elizabethan-era Poor Laws in Tudor England remained more or
less in effect, and the advocates who sought to reform this state of affairs found that their calls for
change were met largely with indifference or opposition.
Instead, due to the historical weakness of the national American state in the realm of social
welfare, the private sector emerged as the primary staging ground for debates, with private
corporations largely taking the lead in formulating a distinctive welfare capitalism during the
Progressive Era and into the 1920s, which sought to provide workers with benefits like old-age
pensions as a gesture of paternalistic concern and obligation and to sap the appeal of labor unions to
industrial workers. These efforts were more successful in some industries and in some individual
companies than in others, but overall they were far from universal, especially for the millions of
Americans who were not industrial workers. In much of the United States, old-age relief remained
largely the province of local governments, mutual-aid societies, and in-kind family assistance. The
relatively small and widely dispersed distribution of older Americans in the United States also
helped to militate against the emergence of a national old-age pension movement.
The Great Depression entirely upended this state of affairs. Suddenly, individual states,
which had previously shown marginal interest in devising old-age pension systems, now rushed to
enact them as older Americans began to crowd and overburden the limited infrastructure of public
poorhouses and rural county poor farms. In many instances, old-age pensions were justified as a
way to preserve the “dignity” of older Americans and to update the social welfare infrastructure of
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the United States to the standards that had become prevalent in much of the rest of the industrialized
world. Reformers skillfully argued that pensions represented a more “modern” way to support older
Americans, and that American society had progressed beyond the need for such punitive and
retrograde institutions as the poorhouse. Such arguments proved to be persuasive in the context of
the Great Depression. Strikingly, more individual states enacted old-age pension laws between
1929 and 1932 than had during the preceding thirty years, though many of these laws remained
more declarations of sentiment rather than practicable steps to the actual eradication of the
poorhouse as the primary public bulwark for destitute elderly and unemployed people.
Meanwhile, at the national level, efforts to create a new old-age pension system faltered.
While proposals like the Dill-Connery bill, which was designed to help individual states defray the
costs of old-age assistance, were debated on Capitol Hill, the Roosevelt administration chose a more
restrained approach which would ensure that it, rather than Congress, would ultimately be in charge
of the legislative process. Instead of using its considerable political capital to back proposals already
circulating on Capitol Hill, the Roosevelt administration deferred the matter for further study and
planning to the Committee on Economic Security, a presidentially-appointed board whose
membership primarily consisted of academic experts who did not answer directly to Congress or
other potential political rivals to the Roosevelt administration.
The delayed reaction of the Roosevelt administration to the growing social discontent among
many older Americans, though, encouraged the emergence of popular alternative movements, the
most prominent of which was the Townsend Movement in California, to seize the initiative and to
press for an agenda (the Townsend Plan) centered on the enactment of a national system of
universal, exceptionally generous, and non-contributory pensions for all older Americans. The
Townsend Movement drew its strength from a core membership which largely consisted of nativeborn, white, Protestant middle-class citizens, and its appeal ran strongest and deepest in those parts
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of the United States such as the rural Midwest and southern California where this group
predominated in raw numbers (its appeal was decidedly lessened among white Southerners due to
fears that the Townsend Plan would offer support to African-Americans). 50
Despite these racial, ethnic, and geographic limitations, the supporters of the Townsend Plan
(or “Townsendites”) frequently presented themselves as the true herald of all older Americans. This
claim was not actually true, given the fact that the Townsend Movement’s core membership largely
consisted of native-born, white, Christian, middle-class Americans residing in the Midwest and
throughout the western United States, but as the sociologist Edwin Amenta has argued, the
Townsend Movement “helped the elderly to see themselves as a national political group with
legitimate needs and demands.” 51 Despite widespread condemnation of the Townsend Plan as
fiscally unviable, the Townsend Movement enjoyed significant and growing support in much of the
nation, though its promise of universal eligibility regardless of race or gender stymied its popular
appeal in much of the American South. The grassroots pressure from the Townsend Movement and
other old-age advocacy groups helped to create the conditions necessary for the enactment of the
Social Security Act of 1935, but the Townsend Movement’s ham-handed tactics allowed the
Roosevelt administration to outmaneuver it and prevent the enactment of the Townsend Plan. The
establishment of the Social Security system, though, did not immediately resolve the issue of
providing economic security in old age, and the Townsend Movement continued to soldier on at the
state and local level, hoping to regroup and wait for the right opportunity to press its agenda once
more.
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This opportunity never came, though, due to America’s entry into World War II and the
return of a governing legislative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill
which steadfastly hostile to both the Townsend Plan and the Social Security program. Consequently,
the fight over how to provide economic security in old age remained at an impasse, and would
remain largely fixed in that position for the duration of the war. The return of full employment
during the war and the end of Depression-era economic conditions temporarily dampened the appeal
and strength of old-age pension advocacy groups, but the resumption of peace and the failure of
Social Security at the national level to adequately accommodate the economic needs of older
Americans began to reignite contentious fights at the state and local level over old age pensions.
These fights were most pronounced in western states like California, Colorado, and Washington,
where the Townsend Movement’s most important legacy had been to demonstrate that older people
could be organized and mobilized behind the cause of publicly-supported, non-contributory old age
pensions. While the Townsend Movement continued to exist in a loosely organized form after the
end of World War II, its prewar example helped to motivate successor organizations like George
McLain’s League of Senior Citizens in California to organize older Americans and to educate them
to see themselves as a distinctive group in American society that merited special attention and
assistance from the state. 52
In Chapter 2, “In Townsend’s Shadow: Reconstructing Old Age Security, 1939-1950,” I
explore how this multifaceted struggle in a widening variety of different arenas – including but not
limited to collective bargaining agreements, conflict between organized lobbying groups like the
American Medical Association and federal officials produced a stalemate at the federal level, which
increasingly led state and local officials, as well as private voluntary organizations, to explore and
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develop solutions at the subnational level of government. In particular, welfare officials in New
York City and the state of California proved to be among the most innovative in their approach to
the issue of providing sufficient economic security to older Americans. State and local level fights
over old-age pensions, as well as the mounting problems associated with the Social Security system
catapulted the issue of old-age economic security to the forefront of the nation’s political life once
more. Attempts to broaden the Social Security system made by organized labor did not succeed, and
while unions like the United Auto Workers remained publicly committed to the expansion of Social
Security to include all workers, they focused more energy on securing the benefits that would have
come from an improved Social Security system via collective bargaining agreements.
For its part, corporate America acceded to the demands for improved pension and benefits in
the belief that lightly regulated private pension systems would remain much more firmly under the
sway of managerial prerogative than the public Social Security system, and also because corporate
interest groups like the National Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.) and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce successfully persuaded individual employers that private benefits and pensions could be
used as a tool to educate workers and gradually persuade them to be more sympathetic to corporate
rather than organized labor’s side in collective bargaining disputes. Additionally, after the battle at
the federal level in the late 1940s over the question of national health insurance resulted in a defeat
for the advocates of a universal national health insurance program, these advocates adjusted their
strategy and sought to enact universal national health insurance program solely for older Americans
in the hope that such a program might one day be extended to all Americans.
In Chapter 3, “Adding Life to Years, 1950-1961,” I examine the tension between advocates
of national health insurance for the elderly and officials within the Eisenhower administration who
sought to erect an alternative framework for dealing with the economic problems of older
Americans. This period witnessed the emergence of an uneasy alliance between advocates for
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national health insurance and the coalition of local officials, social workers, and academic experts
who argued in favor of expanded government services on behalf of the elderly. While efforts to
enact national health insurance for the elderly became an increasingly prominent issue at the
national level due to rising health costs and the paucity of affordable health insurance options for
older people, other problems such as unaffordable housing, growing social isolation, and diminished
employment opportunity became part of an expanding social agenda pursued at the state and local
level by public officials and their partners in the private social welfare community. A new alliance
which emphasized cooperative efforts between the public and private sector to address the problems
of older people, with private philanthropies providing funding at the local level in New York City
and elsewhere as local officials devised experimental programs to assist their elderly residents.
These programs would later form the basis of future federal, state, and local state-building efforts
once the federal government began to fund existing programs and promote the creation of new local
programs after 1965. This development owed much to the gradual expansion of the Social Security
system during the 1940s, which prevented Social Security from becoming a more fully-fledged
social welfare system capable of solely providing economic security to older people.
As a result, older people turned to other existing sources of public assistance, a development
which upended political affairs in numerous states and cities and helped highlight the inadequacy of
old-age relief in the United States. The growing financial costs of supporting older people helped to
build public support for new government programs to subsidize the financial risks and costs of oldage, with Medicare emerging as the preferred solution due to the relatively high costs associated
with medical care in old age. Eventually, rising costs forged an alliance between academic and
government experts and newly created old-age interest groups which sought to organize the elderly
and apply sufficient pressure on the Congress and the Eisenhower administration to support the
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enactment of Medicare, a policy solution which enjoyed substantial support because it promised to
address rising health costs for America’s growing older population.
In Chapter 4, “The War on Elderly Poverty, 1961-1966,” I investigate the efforts by officials
in the Kennedy and Johnson administration to develop a more effective apparatus at the federal
level to deal with the economic and social problems of older Americans. These efforts both
preceded and intersected with the War on Poverty announced by President Johnson in January 1964,
and were marked by protracted internal struggles as differing federal agencies and officials warred
over how to best address the topic of elderly poverty. Ultimately, while a new set of federal
programs and agencies were created with the explicit purpose of dealing with elderly poverty, these
efforts remained piecemeal in comparison to efforts expended on behalf of Medicare and Medicaid.
By focusing on providing health insurance coverage on a universal basis to senior citizens, Johnson
administration officials hoped to eradicate elderly poverty and to relieve the mounting fiscal
pressure placed by rising elderly poverty rates upon local and state governments as well as
individual families, which threatened to completely subsume other social welfare priorities.
Efforts to focus the Office of Economic Opportunity to devote more resources in the War on
Poverty to combatting elderly poverty, though, were far less successful, despite mounting criticism
of the War on Poverty’s conduct and aims. Frustrated by the unresponsiveness of the OEO,
congressional critics latched onto the Older Americans Act as an alternative mechanism for funding
local and state-level efforts to combat elderly poverty and to coordinate federal efforts in this field,
but their efforts to strengthen federal efforts via the Older Americans Act’s Administration on
Aging met with indifference and disinterest on the part of the Johnson administration, which shared
their goal of reducing elderly poverty but not their enthusiasm for the Administration on Aging.
In Chapter 5 “Entitled But No Longer Pitied, 1966-1975,” I examine how, after the
successful implementation of Medicare and Medicaid, Johnson administration officials shifted focus
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and began to explore additional ways in which the federal government could be used to improve the
lives of older Americans. Partly, these efforts were in response to lower-profile issues like age
discrimination by private employers, but they also reflected an effort by the administration to
reformulate the increasingly controversial War on Poverty in a manner that would be more
politically viable. Beginning in 1966, the Johnson administration recruited outside experts to serve
on newly-formed Executive branch task forces. The administration then used these task forces to
formulate and drive the development of new policies and programs which it believed would enjoy
sufficient social and political support in order to be sustainable over the long-term.
However, these efforts were stymied by the administrative chaos which frequently resulted
from the continuing conflicts among differing federal agencies and departments and the competing
goals that the Johnson administration sought to accomplish. Some initiatives – primarily those
which aimed to replicate social roles for older Americans or to sustain their overall health – were
enacted, but broader reforms which would have unduly interfered with existing labor market
conditions were placed to the side. After wading through a morass of proposals and significant
internal dissension, the Johnson administration ultimately chose to improve the existing Social
Security system, and to lay the groundwork for potentially more radical and universal reforms to the
chaotic structure of the nation’s chaotic social welfare system such as guaranteed annual income for
families and individuals at or near the federal poverty level.
The Johnson administration’s tentative explorations of guaranteed annual income were,
somewhat surprisingly, picked up by the incoming Nixon administration in 1969. Though the
administration’s embrace of a guaranteed annual income plan was born in part from its hostility to
Social Security’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) – more commonly labeled as
“welfare” and other government programs which it perceived to be unduly solicitous of
“undeserving” members of American society – officials within the Nixon administration believed
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that they had a rare opportunity to radically restructure social welfare policy in the United States.
The signature policy goal sought by the administration was the Family Assistance Plan (FAP),
which would have replaced much of the nation’s existing patchwork of social welfare programs
with a new guaranteed annual income program.
An unusual right-left coalition prevented the enactment of FAP, though, and instead the
Nixon administration secured significant, lasting improvements to the Social Security system which
included the creation of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) plan. SSI was a scaled down
version of FAP that provided income assistance to impoverished elderly people (its original targeted
primary audience). These efforts signaled a consolidation of the senior state at the federal level, as
they demonstrated the federal government’s willingness to support and expand public assistance to
older people even as it tried to consign the War on Poverty’s signature Community Action Programs
to a bureaucratic scrapheap. In line with its goal of devolving political power from the federal
government back to the states, the Nixon administration also greatly amplified the amount of
funding that the Older Americans Act had provided to various state and local programs, thus
solidifying the cooperative alliance between federal, state, and local officials which had begun to
take shape three decades prior.
Finally, I conclude by briefly examining the fate of the senior state since the mid-1970s.
While other parts of the American welfare state – most notably, the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program – have been repealed or otherwise subject to withering cuts, the
programs and initiatives for older Americans have remained largely intact. While this outcome owes
much to the emergence of well-funded lobbying organizations like the AARP and their ability to
protect existing programs and promote new ones, the senior state owed its existence to more than
the presence of increasingly mobilized older voters or well-organized interest groups to lobby on its
behalf. After all, the Townsend Movement had successfully educated and persuaded older
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Americans during the 1930s to see themselves as uniquely deserving of a generous old-age pension
to be supplied by the federal government, but attempts to convert this grassroots mobilization into
the Townsend Movement’s desired outcome had repeatedly failed at the national level, and its
ultimate goal of a universal, generous, guaranteed monthly pension for all older Americans
regardless of gender, race, or other backgrounds was never enacted.
Though the Townsend Movement failed, it left behind an important legacy: it had organized
thousands of older people, perhaps for the first time, to demand government action on their behalf.
Ironically, the old-age advocacy and interest groups which followed in its wake during the 1940s,
1950s, and into the 1960s were made possible because the Townsend Movement had failed. Many
of the same drivers of social and economic insecurity that had unexpectedly propelled the Townsend
Movement to nationwide importance had merely been exposed by the Great Depression, and would
remain at work long after the Depression had ended in the early 1940s.
Rather, the senior state owed both its design and its longevity to the larger needs of
American society as it evolved over the course of the twentieth century. As the nation transitioned
from an agricultural and rural society to an industrial and urban society during the course of the
twentieth century, the effects of such dislocation became apparent first in New England and the
Great Plains, two areas that witnessed a significant outmigration of residents. 53 These changes
disrupted existing family patterns as younger and more able-bodied people left rural communities,
which then found themselves increasingly bereft of the traditional sources of in-kind family
assistance which had formerly existed to support older generations. As younger workers left
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agricultural communities, traditional systems of old-age relief like county poor farms and
poorhouses proved to be increasingly inadequate to meet the demands placed on them. The decline
of American agriculture also lessened the employment opportunities for older people in rural
communities and further isolated them, even as significantly longer lifespans meant that there was a
growing mass population of older people that had not previously existed. 54
As rural communities entered an accelerated pattern of long-term demographic decline,
urban flight helped to concentrate poverty in American cities, especially for older people who
lacked adequate financial resources to move to nearby suburbs but who now found themselves
increasingly isolated from younger family members who had already done so. Additionally, the
population of older Americans – both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the general U.S.
population – had risen considerably since the onset of the twentieth century. 55 In cities like New
York and Chicago, elderly poverty was already becoming an issue of concern by the end of World
War II, and suburban white flight in the decades that followed the end of the war further
exacerbated this issue. Increasingly, state and local officials found it necessary to develop new
programs which would re-integrate older people back into the communities in which they lived.
In order to develop these programs, officials turned to academic researchers and private
social welfare agencies, and thereby helped forge a new cooperative partnership that united the
public and private sectors. This partnership was already nascent in 1950 at the first National
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Conference on Aging; subsequent national, regional, and state conferences over the course of the
next twenty years would further cement and solidify into a coherent bloc.
As this grouping of public and private welfare officials became better organized and welldefined, so, too, did the overarching task that they faced: namely, to leverage the resources of
government and the expertise of private experts at the local, state, and finally federal levels to
expand the amount of public assistance available to older Americans, but to do so in a manner that
did not risk running afoul of the nation’s historically skeptical attitude towards support for groups or
classes of its citizens seen as “undeserving.” While older Americans may have been viewed as
“deserving” in the eyes of some social reformers, that sympathy was not sufficient to secure
enactment of the Townsend Plan, nor was it sufficient to ensure that state-level old-age pensions
enacted in western states like California and Colorado during the 1930s and 1940s would go
unchallenged.
Starting in the late 1940s and extending into the early 1950s, reformers sought a new way
that would enable them to provide needed government services to older people without risking stillpotent fears that old-age pensions represented a potential corruption of American democracy. The
solution they devised – in conjunction with their colleagues in private social welfare organizations
as well as academia – was to emphasize social services rather than generous old-age pensions, and
to provide services that might have been previously provided by private families. This formulation
provided a modicum of protection to older, at-risk persons, created and fueled continuing demand
for a new generation of social workers, gerontologists, and other experts on the problems of older
people, and did so in a manner that did so in a manner which did not seriously impinge upon
existing distributions of power or wealth within the United States. Ultimately, it produced a unique
welfare state structure that was far more solicitous of the needs and demands of older people than it
was of other needy groups, but which still did not provide true economic and social security for
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many older Americans, despite the best intentions and high hopes of its original architects. How this
structure came into being is the story that I wish to tell in these pages.
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CHAPTER I
Social Insecurities, 1929-1939
Between 1929 and 1939, the issue of individual economic security in old age moved to the
center of American politics and society. Fueled by the record mass unemployment and social
discontent that the Great Depression had engendered, individual states, corporate employers, private
advocacy organizations, and the federal government grappled over the question of how to best
support a small but growing population of older and impoverished people. During the three decades
prior to the Great Depression, this issue, by widespread social consensus, had remained largely out
of the public realm. A combination of broadly inherited suspicions about the nature of centralized
governmental power, fragmented governmental authority, and long-standing beliefs about the nature
of public assistance and its recipients militated strongly against limited and unsuccessful efforts
during the Progressive Era to fashion a new national order or consensus. 1 Instead, old-age economic
security remained nearly the exclusive provenance of private welfare or philanthropic organizations,
individual families, and mutual-aid societies. 2 Despite the pointed arguments of some social
reformers that the United States had fallen behind other western industrialized nations like the
United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada in how it approached the issue of old-age economic
security, these criticisms remained confined within small circles of academic and social welfare
experts.
1
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The Great Depression fundamentally challenged this state of affairs. Large portions of the
existing but fragmented private social welfare system buckled and collapsed under the
unprecedented duress of prolonged economic crisis and social instability. As the Depression
deepened and worsened, individual states, led by New York State, rushed to enact public old-age
pension programs in the hope that providing a modicum of financial assistance to their older,
usually male unemployed workers would spare them the indignities of the public poorhouse or from
becoming dependent upon their children and extended families. 3 As a consequence of the
Depression, public assistance for older workers gained a new social and political legitimacy, and
this fundamental shift represented the beginnings of the senior state that would evolve over the
course of the next four decades. Moreover, the pattern set in the 1930s would be repeated again
during the 1940s, the 1950s, and into the 1960s. As the needs of older people changed, new
solutions would be devised primarily at the local and state level, sometimes in response to popular
grassroots pressure and organizing, and sometimes as a result of proactive measures taken by social
welfare officials to investigate and survey the actual living conditions and economic needs of older
people.
The specific economic and social conditions of the 1930s, though, forged the initial
character of the senior state, and its emphasis on addressing economic insecurity. Surveying the
failure and inability of existing private and public institutions to effectively provide a sustainable
model of economic security in old age, public officials soon found themselves confronted by the
3
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prospect of organized social discontent that seemingly threatened to radically rearrange existing
balances of power and wealth in American society. Their response – the Social Security Act –
represented a compromise between competing interests on Capitol Hill, and its two major titles
related to economic insecurity in old age sought to simultaneously bolster state-level efforts while
also carving out a new role for the federal government to play in providing individual economic
security in old age through collective effort.
The Social Security Act only partially fulfilled its main goal of supplying broad-based
economic security, though, because of the limited scope of categories of workers eligible for
inclusion under its old-age insurance program and because of largely successful efforts by its
opponents to permit it to be broadened and expanded further. Consequently, the half-finished
scaffolding erected by the Social Security Act failed to adequately resolve the issue of economic
insecurity in old-age for many Americans, and compelled other institutional actors within American
society – especially state and local officials in conjunction with a resurgent private welfare sector –
to take a more proactive role in developing solutions that could preserve the dignity of older people
without threatening fiscal insolvency and the ability of states and local communities to provide
needed services and assistance to other groups.
Despite the limitations of Social Security, the incipient senior state benefitted from the law’s
infusion of federal funds, which supplemented existing state-level public welfare administration
infrastructure and laid the groundwork for future expansion of public efforts to assess how the needs
of older people could best be handled. The Social Security Board’s annual reports would also serve
a crucial role in supplying vital information about the program’s recipients, which would help to
guide future decision-making processes. In essence, the enactment of Social Security defined the
parameters for subsequent debate around the issue of economic security in old age. The senior state
owed its existence to the enactment of Social Security, and future initiatives to expand government
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involvement in providing economic security and other forms of public provision to older Americans
would, by necessity, have to wrestle with its incomplete legacy.
The Second Annual Meeting of the National Conference on Old-Age Security
In a short article published in its April 21, 1929 edition, the New York Times reported on the
upcoming second annual meeting of the National Conference on Old-Age Security, which was
scheduled to be held on April 26, 1929 in New York. The meeting promised to bring together a
wide variety of speakers on the subject of old-age security, a topic which had become the lifework
of Abraham Epstein, the National Conference on Old-Age Security’s founder. 4 Indeed, everyone
who had gathered at the Community Church on Park Avenue and Thirty-Fourth Street in New York
City for the conference likely believed there was a pressing need for old-age security, but that was
probably the totality of their agreement. Even in the radiant prosperity of 1920s America, there was
a growing recognition in both the private and public sectors of American life that while abject
poverty persisted, millenarian hopes for its abolition might yet be fulfilled. 5 The question, therefore,
was not whether collective efforts needed to be undertaken to address the problem of elderly
impoverishment, but rather what shape and form those efforts should take. In April 1929, no
satisfactory answer to that question was obvious, or at least it was not evident to the men and
women who had gathered for the day to discuss the subject under the Community Church’s
resplendent Victorian Romanesque flying buttresses and vaulted ceiling.
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The conference attendees could scarcely be blamed, though, for their inability to produce
anything other than a bland consensus. Given the diverse variety of fields they represented, such as
(but not limited to) organized religion, municipal government, and the labor movement, it was
perhaps a minor miracle that the conference had been able to get them to gather under one roof.
Some of the attendees, like Thomas Kennedy of the United Mine Workers of America, represented
the nation’s besieged labor movement; some, like Frances Perkins of the New York State
Department of Labor, served as the ambassadors of still-curious and uncommitted state and local
governments; and others, like Bishop Francis J. McConnell, bore witness as the last stewards of the
Social Gospel, a once-fiery movement which had roared out of America’s churches at the turn of the
twentieth century and demanded the amelioration of social injustices of an industrial capitalist order,
but which now burned slowly and dimly on its last dying embers.
Notably absent from the conference were any attendees from the many powerful
corporations based in New York, many of whose Midtown Manhattan headquarters were within an
easy walk of the Community Church. Corporate America was not alone in its absence, though. Also
missing were any official emissaries from the newly-inaugurated administration of President
Herbert Hoover. Such absences were not unintentional. In its brief preview of the conference, the
New York Times reported that U.S. Secretary of Labor James J. Davis had sent a noncommittal letter
to the attendees which broadly “endors[ed] the movement to secure pensions for the aged,” but
which made no promise of succor or action on the part of the Hoover administration to that end. 6
The relative apathy with which the Hoover administration treated the conference, though,
was not solely the product of indifference on the part of the President or the federal government
more generally. In truth, it reflected deeper ambivalences which had long-marked the manner in
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which public relief had been dispensed in the United States. For example, a “solution” to the
“pressing need of old-age security” which the National Conference on Old-Age Security sought to
address already existed – and had for quite some time. That solution was the municipal poorhouse
and its rural cousin the county poor farm, both of which were long-established and well-known
features on the American landscape. As the late Michael Katz observed, “throughout the century
before the New Deal, the poorhouse dominated the structure of welfare – or, as it was called then,
relief…. [and] American welfare has remained within the shadow of the poorhouse.” 7 Like their
counterparts in Elizabethan and later Victorian England, American poorhouses (or almshouses)
were designed to be unwelcoming places, in order to ensure that whomever was sheltered within
their walls would not wish to remain terribly long. By offering living conditions that were scarcely
better than begging and sleeping in filthy refuse-encrusted streets, many nineteenth century
reformers believed the morality of poor and working-class individuals would be sustained and
uplifted through honest work rather than permanently corrupted by dishonorable idleness which
misguided public charity supposedly enabled and sustained.
The notoriously poor conditions of poorhouses occasionally led elderly people to take extreme
measures to avoid ending up in them. In June 1887, for example, the New York Times reported that an elderly
couple residing in Union Hill, New Jersey (now part of Union City, New Jersey), had committed suicide
rather than being “removed to the County Almshouse at Snake Hill.” 8 While the New Jersey dual suicide

was an extreme case, it spoke to the dread of many older people at ending up as impoverished
residents of public poorhouses. Nevertheless, the poorhouse aimed to replace the traditional publicly
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supported “outdoor relief” system in which direct assistance was provided to needy individuals, a
method of supplying relief that many nineteenth century reformers had long decried as too
expensive and ineffective at arresting poverty and preventing its contagious spread among working
class people.
Yet alongside its function as a deterrent to sloth among the poor and working class, the
poorhouse was also designed to serve a more charitable function of sheltering orphans, the mentally
insane, the elderly, and other individuals who could no longer work. These twin missions of
deterrence and compassion may have been compatible at some early point, but by the mid- to late
nineteenth century most American poorhouses had largely shifted in favor of deterrence, despite the
fact that the poorhouse as an institution had also failed in its mission to replace outdoor relief, which
persisted in many localities throughout the United States.
Perhaps nowhere was this ambivalence about public welfare and its functions truer than in
New York City and its environs, which daily blended the splendors of a technologically superior
industrial order with the shocking squalor of extreme human deprivation. Jacob Riis’s photographs
of New York’s Lower East Side neighborhood had scandalized the nation when they were first
published at the turn of the twentieth century, and the intervening three decades between their
publication and the slow coalescing of institutions and individuals which had brought forth the
National Conference on Old-Age Security had witnessed at best only modestly successful attempts
to improve the living conditions of the city’s poor, especially its elderly poor, who not infrequently
discovered that the municipal almshouse on Blackwell (now Roosevelt) Island to be their one and
only option of last resort when they could no longer afford to keep the landlord or the bill collector
at bay.
It was precisely this problem – the inadequacy of the public poorhouse to meet its stated aim
of providing real, meaningful financial security in old age without humiliating those who dwelled
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within its walls – that had brought together the assembled attendees of the National Conference on
Old-Age. But it was also the determined efforts of Abraham Epstein, the passionate founder of the
American Association for Old Age Security, who had long pined for the United States to take the
sort of decisive and positive actions in the realm of social welfare which he believed best
characterized the most civilized nations of western Europe during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Described by his most recent biographer as “an intense little man,” Epstein had
committed himself to the cause of old-age pensions with the fanatical devotion of a true believer. 9
To this end, he had spent nearly his entire life savings in order to start and get the American
Association for Old Age Security organization up and running, and had also spent a considerable
amount of time forging working relationships with New York’s well-established private charities,
voluntary societies, and religious groups committed to alleviating the plight of the city’s poor. 10 The
annual conferences, which the American Association for Old Age Security sponsored in the late
1920s, were very much his brainchild, but their gradually increasing prominence in New York’s
reform circles suggested that the cause of old-age security was not solely the vanity project of a
single man.
Indeed, New York’s deeply-rooted system of private welfare and philanthropic organizations
was already well aware of the limited ability (and perhaps limited desire) to minister to the city’s
poor, even if they preferred not to publicly acknowledge it too loudly or too frequently. The New
York branch of the international Charity Organization Society, for example, kept detailed records on
the many families (including numerous elderly denizens) sprinkled throughout the city’s poorest
neighborhoods, and its case workers meticulously tracked and commented upon the impoverished
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individuals they encountered on a day-to-day basis. 11 Such social work activities were hardly
limited to New York City. Other American cities in the Midwest and New England also featured a
growing density of voluntary societies dedicated to the eradication of poverty in their midst.
Abraham Epstein’s work to drive and build attention for the cause of old-age security was therefore
hardly original, though his efforts did have the salutary effect of encouraging a traditionally
fragmented community of private welfare and charitable organizations to begin to see the benefits of
setting aside doctrinal and territorial disputes in order to coordinate with each other. Though neither
Epstein nor the other attendees at the 1929 conference could have possibly predicted it, their efforts
to build public support for reforming old-age security in the United States would, in just a few short
months, receive the devoted attention of officials from across the nation. 12
If the numerous charities, mutual aid societies, and other private organizations in New York
remained at an impasse on the question of how best to reform old-age security in the United States,
such vacillation was markedly absent in the upper echelons of corporate American management.
Awash in both confidence and capital, the masters of Wall Street betrayed no vexing qualms over
how best to solve the problem of old age poverty. Speaking in June 1925 at the Colorado Bankers’
Association, William E. Knox, the President of the American Bankers’ Association, publicly
11
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decried the “old age pensions and other forms of charitable compensation” sponsored by wellmeaning (and unspecified) industrial corporations to support retired workers. 13 Instead, Knox
pointedly argued that “in principle, they [the pensions] are wrong and contrary to the purposes of
democracy…what we want is an organized plan that will direct working people toward
independence, and no system of industry can lay claim to complete success that does not
contemplate the financial independence of every employee.” 14 More specifically, Knox emphasized
the need for American employees to have “a broad cooperative plan for systematic saving” – an
unsurprising stand, perhaps, from the leader of a major trade association for savings banks, but one
which encapsulated widely-held public sentiments on the subject. As Knox suggested in his
remarks, old-age pensions were “contrary to the purposes of democracy,” an oblique reference to
the scandals associated with the pensions granted to Civil War veterans in the decades after the
war’s formal conclusion in 1865.
As Theda Skocpol argued in her Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, the disproportionately
generous expansion of old-age pensions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had
successfully welded aging northern Civil War veterans to the electoral apparatus of the Republican
Party in many key Northern states such as Indiana and Ohio. 15 Such a combination had helped to
secure the Republican Party’s dominance of the nation’s politics for the first half-century after the
Civil War, a fact made all the more obvious by the long, unending parade of largely interchangeable
Republican Party functionaries and middlemen who occupied high offices at both ends of
Pennsylvania Avenue. This politically fecund union between veterans and the Republican Party,
though, had come at the high price of fatefully damaging old-age pensions as a cause célèbre for
13
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social reformers. Indeed, in the eyes of many Progressive reformers in the United States who, during
the first decades of the early twentieth century, sought to dislodge the patronage-laced “state of
courts and parties” (to employ the political scientist Stephen Skowronek’s phrase) which had
existed continuously in one form or another since the deeply divisive days of Andrew Jackson’s
administration, old-age pensions were nothing less than corruption of the democratic process writ
large. 16
Fatefully, unlike the drive for workmen’s compensation laws, women’s suffrage, or the
temperance movement, the push for national old-age pensions never attracted the depth or breadth
of institutional and popular support sufficient to cross the many constitutional barriers in its path.
While some largely rural, lightly populated, and not especially wealthy states like Kentucky and
Nevada had, at least on paper, committed themselves to the cause of old-age pensions for their
citizens, in reality, such mandates remained unfunded and unloved, the perennial budgetary
stepchildren of more than one state legislature and the recipient of constant attention only from
devotees like Abraham Epstein. 17 Important industrialized states like Massachusetts – a traditional
state-level spearhead of social and political reform – had commissioned investigations to evaluate
the merits of state-provided old-age pensions, but had ultimately remained happily uncommitted on
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the subject, and were largely content to let the issue be resolved by either local municipalities or by
the mysterious machinations of the labor market. 18
The combination of popular and elite disinterest in old-age pensions remained alive and well
long after the number of Civil War veteran pensioners had dwindled to statistical insignificance.
The New York Times could editorialize in June 1927 – sixty-two years after the end of the Civil War
– that “the so-called old-age non-contributory several States are not strictly pensions but are simply
another form of public relief – outdoor relief instead of institutional relief.” 19 Such public relief
efforts, the Times observed, were “not stipends to which specific services in the past give claim,”
nor were “they offered even in return for a general social contribution by the recipient.” 20 Yet even
the Times could sense that something was wrong with the poorhouse as the last refuge of the elderly.
Observing in the same editorial that “poorhouses have become, for the most part, homes for the
aged,” and the consignment of the elderly to such institutions was to effectively abandon them to
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“the callous neglect of dehumanized poorhouses,” the Times held out hope that some kind of betterdesigned pension system might break the cycle of elderly poverty in the future. 21
If the Times was hoping that a satisfactory answer to the question of eliminating elderly
poverty would soon present itself, it did not have to look very far beyond the environs of the great
corporate headquarters littered throughout Manhattan. In the first decade after the end of World War
I, employer-sponsored welfare plans had spread throughout the industrial and commercial sectors of
the American economy. The expansion of these plans reflected in part the unprecedented weakness
of the American labor movement at this moment in time. But they also depended upon an
environment of sustained economic growth, which would enable companies to promise future
pensions contingent to a good extent on present-day profits.
The halting of economic growth during the Great Depression which began in 1929, though,
upset this increasingly precarious financial house of cards for many companies. 22 The business
community, which had formerly embraced welfare capitalism partly as a method to limit the appeal
of unions to their workforces and partly out of a sense of social responsibility on the part of some
corporate leaders, now dispensed with such initiatives in a time of economic crisis and growing
mass unemployment. 23 Faced with the prospect of having to provide ruinously expensive financial
support to armies of newly unemployed workers, formerly benevolent businessmen now
increasingly heard liability instead of responsibility whenever the subject of pensions was broached
21
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in public. In short, the rapidly changing economic circumstances in depression-era America helped
propel a dramatic shift in the financial calculus of many corporate leaders, who rapidly began to
distance and sever themselves from any sense of social obligation to their benighted former
charges. 24
Instead, as John Edgerton, the president of the National Association of Manufacturers in
1930, observed,
[t]he real responsibility for their [the unemployed] poverty…lay with
the jobless themselves. “If,” he [Edgerton] asked, “they do
not…practice the habits of thrift and conservation, or if they gamble
away their savings in the stock market or elsewhere, is our economic
system, or government, or industry to blame?” 25
Edgerton’s argument that poverty and unemployment was the fault of the individual failings
enjoyed wide purchase in the United States, and it was not until the onset of double-digit
unemployment during the Great Depression that it began to be challenged. While mass
unemployment metastasized into a dangerous, cancerous growth on the nation’s body politic during
the first four years of the Depression, perhaps no group of Americans experienced firsthand the
perils of desperate unemployment and unwelcome destitution in a more pronounced fashion than
millions of older people, many of whom confronted a world in which their life savings had been
permanently erased, their employment terminated, and their prospects for individual economic
salvation to be precarious at best.
As the Depression deepened and economic recovery seemed more and more a mirage, the
underpinnings of social stability in the United States started to come undone. William Leuchtenburg
has further observed that “many believed that the long era of economic growth in the western world
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had come to an end…[f]or the first time in three centuries, the curve of American population growth
was leveling off; an economy accustomed to the demand of a swiftly expanding population would
have to adapt itself painfully to a stationary population.” 26 Chief among those who were stationary
were older workers, who now found that a shrinking economy and empty public and private coffers
afforded them precious little protection from life’s darkening vicissitudes. The 1932 presidential
election reflected this growing social discontent and the deeply unsettled political conditions in the
United States.
Without having to delve too deeply into policy specifics or proposals while on the campaign
trail, Franklin Roosevelt, like Herbert Hoover before him four years prior, was carried into the Oval
Office courtesy of an electoral tidal wave. While older Americans were not yet characterized as a
distinct voting “bloc” (as they would be by the 1936 election), it seems reasonable to presume that
many, like their fellow citizens, opted to take a chance on the New York Governor with the famous
last name rather than remain bound to the failed presidency of Herbert Hoover. 27 In the
“interregnum of despair” between the November 1932 election and Roosevelt’s scheduled
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inauguration in March 1933, older Americans began to write the Roosevelts in the hope that they
might be able to help, and to plead for some sort of government action on their behalf. 28
Franklin Roosevelt and New York State’s Response to the Great Depression
Their belief that their worries would now find a sympathetic hearing in Washington, D.C.,
may have been informed by Roosevelt’s modest record of state-level action on behalf of older
people while in Albany. As Governor, Roosevelt had taken an unusually strong interest in old age
insurance as a solution to the mounting problem of poverty and dependency among New York’s
thousands of older citizens, many of whom had found themselves among the first casualties of the
Great Depression’s onslaught. 29 Even before Roosevelt had become Governor of New York,
though, there were numerous indications at the state level that a new public consensus was
beginning to build in favor of public pensions as a needed social reform to replace “antiquated” state
almshouses. During the 1920s, the New York Legislature had repeatedly considered bills to do so,
and important institutions like The New York Times had offered wholehearted support to such
efforts. 30 In late September 1929, the New York Commission on Old Age Security, a special
investigative body consisting of a select group of state legislators, heard numerous witnesses testify
that “neither private charity nor group insurance and industrial pensions were adequate to cope with
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the problem of old age dependency”; rather, “economists, statisticians, and representatives of
charitable and relief agencies insisted that old age pensions was the only method of dealing with the
problem satisfactorily.” 31 This remarkable shift in public sentiment on the question of old-age
pensions suggested an increasing recognition on the part of New York’s private welfare community
that existing methods to support the elderly were not adequate to accomplish that feat. The moment
that social reformers like Abraham Epstein had long crusaded for seemed to be at hand: if a major
industrial state like New York could be persuaded to adopt old age pensions, then perhaps the
movement for state-level pensions, which had ultimately sputtered and stalled out during the 1920s,
might be revived and expanded. 32
Ultimately, the New York Commission on Old Age Security recommended in February
1930 to the New York State Legislature that “a State and county system of pensions for the needy of
70 years of more” be established. 33 The high age qualification which the commission recommended
– and the conditions it attached to receipt of pensions (“receipts of relief would have to be citizens
and residents of the State for the preceding ten years for whose support no financially able person
would be legally responsible”) suggested that the old, lingering suspicions about old age pensions as
nothing but a thinly (and poorly) disguised dole had not been entirely banished, but more
importantly, the commission for the first time gave official approval to the argument which Epstein
and other reformers had been advocating for years. Speaking on behalf of the commission, state
Senator Seabury C. Mastick observed:
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I feel that by the introduction of these bills a revolutionary step has
been taken in the policy of the State in regard to the discharge of its
responsibility toward the needy aged. We have had in mind constantly
the desirability of extending this assistance, not in the form of charity
administered in a humiliating manner in institutions but in the form of
aid extended in the home where the recipient will remain in contact
and in association with his or her loved ones. The commission feels
that it has here a sound plan which will stand the test both of the
courts and of public opinion. 34
In other words, the public old-age pension – far from destroying or weakening the moral fiber of its
recipients – was instead a humanitarian measure, designed to protect families by keeping them
whole (and by extension, keeping the elderly out of public almshouses). After factoring in financial
and residency requirements, the anticipated 51,000 recipients of the old age pension represented
only a fragment of the total elderly population in the state: by the commission’s own accounting,
there were approximately 350,000 persons aged 70 or over in New York State as of June 1929. 35
However limited in scale and scope were the commission’s recommendations for New
York’s old age pensions, they could not have come at a better time. In March 1930, the New York
Times reported that rapidly rising unemployment in the state was “driving an unusual number of
persons to public and private lodging houses and increasing the number of aged poor in the care of
public institutions.” 36 In New York City, municipal lodging houses experienced a nearly 20% rise
(from 137,032 in 1928 to 159,155 in 1929) in the number of nights’ care provided, which had led to
34
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“serious overcrowding” problems. 37 Within two months’ of the commission’s report, Franklin
Roosevelt signed the old age pension bill into law. As he did so, he made clear his preference for a
social insurance model of financing old age pensions by characterizing the newly-enacted measure
as “a mere extension of the poor law” because it merely gave the “aged food and a roof over their
heads” and noted that “my hope is that someday we can have a system to encourage savings that
will provide ease and comfort as well as food and shelter.” 38 Essentially, Roosevelt opposed using
general tax revenues to support the new old-age pension system, and he believed that a contributory
model for financing it would have the preferred outcome of avoiding the creation of a permanent
financial burden on the state budget. 39
The law met with a sustained and positive response on the part of New York’s elderly
citizens. Within the first week of open enrollment for the old-age pension system in early September
1930, 2,609 people over the age of 70 in New York City alone had applied for coverage under the
new law, a figure that significantly outpaced what state officials had originally expected would be
the case. 40 By November 30, 1930, 25,000 applications had been received, but only 1,656 had been
approved by the New York City Department of Public Welfare. 41 Once he became President,
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Roosevelt would have the opportunity to create the “system to encourage savings,” which he had
publicly pined for in 1930. No doubt relying on his experience as Governor of New York State with
old age pensions, Roosevelt maintained an active interest in the subject after he became President in
1933. As Frances Perkins later recalled, “before his Inauguration in 1933 Roosevelt had agreed that
we should explore at once methods for setting up unemployment and old-age insurance in the
United States.” 42 Roosevelt had been carried into office over Hoover in part because of his promises
to undertake some manner of reform to get the country out of the Depression, and so it was not too
surprising that older Americans hoped to grab the new President’s attention with numerous
telegrams and frantic letters.
While Roosevelt and his advisers were aware of just how desperate economic circumstances
had become for many Americans, they had not unreasonably decided to spend the administration’s
early days halting the cascading bank failures in major states like Michigan, Illinois, and New York
which threatened to bring about an economic apocalypse. The decision to prioritize badly needed
banking industry reform, though, would prove to have fateful consequences for the course of social
welfare policy development in the United States, especially with respect to older and increasingly
indigent people. Though Franklin Roosevelt announced in June 1934 his intention to push for
legislation to provide “for the security of the men, women and children of the nation,” increasingly,
older people had begun to look elsewhere for succor and the promise of salvation. 43
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The Emergence of the Townsend Movement
They soon found it, albeit from some unlikely sources. As the Depression continued to
deepen during Roosevelt’s first term, numerous older Americans, like many of their fellow
Americans, soon began to gravitate towards organizations and individuals who offered possible
solutions to the protracted economic crisis of the Great Depression. Indeed, the deeply unsettled
politics of economic crisis during the 1930s permitted (if briefly,) the emergence of various
dissident ideologies throughout the United States. To borrow Alan Brinkley’s phrase, these “voices
of protest” were heard from nearly every part of the American political spectrum, ranging from the
growing strength enjoyed by the German-American Bund and other fascist-friendly organizations
on the far-right to the resurgence of the Communist Party of the United States on the American left.
Perhaps no voices were louder, than those of the Reverend Father Charles M. Coughlin and
Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana, who had both succeeded in converting roiling social discontent
into significant popular support for their respective “National Union for Social Justice” and “Share
Our Wealth” organizations. Students of American history have rightfully emphasized the pivotal
role played by both men in shaping “the dissident ideology” of the 1930s and its attempt to hold
back the unruly forces of modernity which had been reshaping the United States for decades. 44 Both
men had initially sought accommodation and alliance with Franklin Roosevelt, and both had
become bitter, implacable foes of the Roosevelt administration when it became clear the President
had no intention of affording them privileged access to his administration for any longer than was
necessary for survival in the fickle politics of the early 1930s. Instead, Roosevelt had merely sought
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to placate them, and had studiously stroked both men’s egos just enough early in his administration
to avoid a damaging public confrontation with them and their supporters. 45
To some extent, Roosevelt had the good fortune of seeing the national movements that Long
and Coughlin purported to lead sputter after Long was assassinated in September 1935 and
Coughlin veered deeper into the paranoid embrace of anti-Semitism in the late 1930s. Yet while
Long and Coughlin were perhaps the two loudest and energetic voices of protest during the 1930s,
other quieter, but still powerful voices, appeared in the chorus of discontent. Chief among them was
Dr. Francis Townsend, a retired doctor who resided in Long Beach, California. Unlike Huey Long
or Father Coughlin, Townsend lacked the brash personal energy and established media platform for
spreading his message. Despite Townsend’s lack of charisma or a radio program, for many older
Americans, his Townsend Movement soon became the preferred vehicle for voicing their
frustrations and demanding sweeping changes in how America should handle the problem of
economic security in old age. 46 The Townsend Movement had come into being after Townsend had
written a letter to the editor of a local Long Beach, California newspaper in September 1933
highlighting his plan of guaranteed old-age pensions as a way to end the Great Depression by
retiring and supporting all Americans aged sixty or older with $200 monthly pensions as “surplus
workers” no longer necessary for economic growth and production. 47
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Figure 1. Dr. Francis Townsend (r) pictured with U.S. Senator Sheridan Downey (D-CA). Photo courtesy of the U.S.
Office of War Information, National Archives.

Somewhat improbably, that letter soon attracted hundreds of replies, a clear and obvious
indication that Townsend’s proposal had inadvertently struck a chord with a wide audience. This
reaction of mass interest and support had caught Townsend off-guard. In Robert McElvaine’s
words, “he had planned no concrete action following his original letter,” but “Townsend quickly
rose to the task.” 48 Notwithstanding his unsteady first steps into the public arena, Dr. Townsend
soon proved himself far savvier than his detractors would have wished him, as evidenced by the
surprisingly resilient structure of the “Old Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd.” (OARP) corporation he
quickly formed with several business partners in order to convert this unexpected audience into a
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more organized political force capable of applying sufficient political pressure on elected officials to
enact the Townsend Plan’s centerpiece objective of publicly sponsored old age pensions.
From its unlikely origins, the OARP or Townsend Movement soon grew into a classic
grassroots organization, grounded in the support of local Townsend Clubs scattered throughout the
nation, though most sprang up in Townsend’s home state of California and in the Mountain and
Midwest states. 49 By 1935, local Townsend Club members had started to bombard congressional
and state legislative offices with letter-writing campaigns demanding favorable legislative action on
the Townsend Plan. 50 Students of the Townsend Movement have generally identified two key
reasons for the movement’s sudden and rapid growth. 51 First, like Dr. Townsend himself, many of
the Movement’s members came from a native-born, middle-class Midwestern background, and the
Movement’s milieu would eventually be shaped by a shared set of cultural and social reference
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points of its members, who identified closely with Dr. Townsend. 52 Additionally, it is probable that
the simplicity of the Plan’s math made it intuitively easier for its grassroots members to understand
and support. As Robert McElvaine has written, the Townsend Plan
proposed to pay every American citizen over the age of sixty $200
each month, provided that he or she had never been convicted of a
crime, agreed to give up all other income, and pledged to spend the
$200 within thirty days. Townsend contended that his plan would end
the Depression and benefit young as well as old. The aged would no
longer compete with younger people for jobs, the economy would be
stimulated by all the purchases the elderly would make, and everyone
would live happily ever after. 53
Of course, in reality, everyone would not live happily ever after. The Townsend Plan’s funding was
predicated upon a massive, regressive “transaction tax” that would penalize the everyday
transactions of American consumers. 54 The Plan would therefore “help one poor group (the aged) at
the expense of another (working-class consumers)…the rich would be unharmed, the economy unhelped.” 55 The amount of economic havoc that the Townsend Plan would have wreaked upon a
debilitated economy is probably incalculable, but such concerns were almost secondary in the
frenetic atmosphere of the Great Depression. What mattered, as McElvaine has observed, is that
Townsend offered the American middle class – particularly its older
members – a panacea, and he presented it in terms they could
understand. It was very attractive. A married couple, both over sixty
years of age, would be given $4800 a year. What this meant can be
fully appreciated only when it is realized that 87 percent of all
American families had annual incomes below $2500 in 1935. That
fact in itself indicates that the plan was unworkable. 56
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Despite widespread support in the Midwest and the West, the Townsend Plan did not enjoy much
support from most of the established players in American politics, regardless of their place on the
political spectrum. Indeed, condemnation of the Townsend Plan made for the strangest of
bedfellows in an already topsy-turvy political climate: politically right-leaning organizations such as
the New Deal-loathing Liberty League and National Association of Manufacturers denounced it; as
did the avowedly left-wing Communist Party of the United States of America, the Socialist party,
and the politically cautious American Federation of Labor. 57
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Figure 2. Townsend supporters rally in Columbus, Kansas in May 1936. Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Yet this lack of obvious institutional support did little to deter Dr. Townsend or his
supporters, and may have actually helped bolster Townsend’s public image and appeal to his
followers as a selfless servant of older people who could be trusted to act in their best interests
regardless of what politicians in Washington, D.C., or elsewhere desired. In Robert McElvaine’s
words, “the sandcastles that Dr. Townsend built were very pretty and his movement flourished.” 58
Moreover,
Public sentiment was ripe for a plan to aid the aged. When asked in
December 1935 whether they favored government old-age pensions
for needy persons, a whopping 89 percent of a cross section of
Americans answered affirmatively…In 1936, Townsend Club leaders
claimed a nationwide membership of 3.5 million. In only three months
Townsendites collected over 20 million signatures on their petitions.
This represented one-fifth of the adults in the United States…Two
1936 public opinion surveys showed even greater support for the
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doctor’s scheme. Approximately one-half of the Americans surveyed
early in 1936 favored the plan. 59
Despite all of the condemnation and mockery which the Townsend Plan had received, its supporters
remained firmly anchored in place. New York journalists and Washington politicians may have
chortled at him, but Townsend was confident that he had the necessary popular support to press
forward with his agenda. Such growing confidence probably owed much to the letters from elderly
Americans which he received from across much of the nation. Just as they had once largely turned
to Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt for succor, now the letters from older Americans to the
Roosevelts revealed an increasingly ominous change in mood and tone. As a “tak payer [sic]” from
Manistique, Michigan wrote to the Roosevelts in March 1936:
Do you think that a man of the age of 60 or 70 years old can do the
work that a man can do at the age of 25 he can not he would collapes
[sic]. When old age creaps upon you. you come incontact with all
kinds alments akes pains nerviness sleepless and sightless. There is
know [sic] 60 per cent of the W.P.A. workers over 60 years old. The
younger class seems to forget the forefathers. And denie the old age
the $200. a month old age pention something that would give the old
age a little pleasure for the last few years they have to live. Such
pention [sic] plan is the only thing that will brin back this cuntry [sic]
to normal and prospairty a decint liven and liveing wages. 60
Moreover, while the appeal of publicly sponsored old age pensions to impoverished older
Americans might seem obvious in retrospect, such pensions also appealed to the younger family
members of older Americans who frequently now found themselves more burdened by the need to
support elderly parents or relatives. As “Mrs. J.S.” from Akron, Ohio, wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt in
February 1936:
A few weeks ago, I heard your talk over the air, on the subject of the
Old age pension [sic], and I got to thinking what a blessing it would
59
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be to my mother, if it was possible for her to receive that pension, if
the bill should pass…I thought as long as I lived there was no need to
worry about her being taken care of, but I never dreamed of a
depression like we have had well it changed the whole course of our
lives we have suffered, and no one knowes [sic] but our own
family…I am in position to do the right thing for mother, I cant [sic]
give her anything but her living… 61
Other voices echoed the sorrows of Mrs. J.S.’s letter. 62 The extraordinary strains of the Great
Depression had placed a new financial burden upon middle and working-class families throughout
the nation, and consequently mothers, daughters, and wives began to write more persistently to
Eleanor Roosevelt to plead the case for old-age pensions to help their elderly relatives. Such women
might have been able to take care of older relatives in happier days – and indeed, many had – but
the Great Depression was unforgiving to such arrangements. In the brave new world of the
Depression, a perfect storm had brought about the collapse of innumerable private charities, the
dissolution of family bonds, and shattered the ability of state and local governments to adequately
deal with the crisis of mass unemployment.
Faced with the choice between supporting their children or their parents, many Americans
could only despair and hope for a miracle – “a gift from heaven” (as Mrs. J.S. put it) – to save them.
Given such conditions, the broad appeal of the Townsend Plan’s publicly sponsored old age
pensions to older Americans and their families is not hard to fathom. The economic climate of the
Depression had created an environment in which publicly supported old age pensions no longer
seemed like a venal corruption of American democracy; more and more, they appeared to be a tool
to safeguard and protect the economic security of the indigent elderly. 63 State legislatures which had
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once been reluctant to even go through the formality of setting up a commission or a council to
investigate the subject now energetically leapt into the fray, and long-beleaguered old-age pension
advocates like Abraham Epstein could almost feel the winds of change beginning to blow in their
favor. 64
The Townsend Movement and the New Deal
Though the Townsend Plan and its founder were subjected to derision, in truth such mockery
betrayed nervousness on the part of anxious New Dealers like Frances Perkins. 65 As Perkins later
recalled in a 1962 speech on the origins of Social Security, the growing strength of the Townsend
Movement had necessitated inclusion of old-age public assistance provisions to the Social Security
Act, which sought to alleviate pressure on members of Congress who were on the receiving end of
the Townsend Movement’s concerted fury. 66 Specifically, Perkins recollected that
The Wagner Lewis bill in the Congress covered only unemployment
insurance, but there was a great demand for old-age insurance also. It
was easy to add this feature – and politically almost essential. One
hardly realizes nowadays how strong was the sentiment in favor of the
Townsend Plan and other exotic schemes for giving the aged a weekly
income. In some districts the Townsend Plan was the chief political
issue, and men supporting it were elected to Congress. The pressure
from its advocates was intense. The President began telling people he
was in favor of adding old-age insurance clauses to the bill and
putting it through as one program. 67

new states had enacted old-age relief legislation, a development which brought the total number of states with old age
pensions to twenty-five (i.e., a majority of the then forty-eight states).
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While influential New Dealers and established social commentators might have believed the
Townsend Plan was a form of magical thinking which required suspension of disbelief in order to be
remotely plausible, grassroots support for the Townsend Movement remained palpable throughout
the 1930s. This support eventually compelled the Roosevelt administration to try and blunt any
potential impact the Townsend Movement might have on federal policies designed to address the
impoverishment of formerly middle- and working-class older Americans, and to ensure that neither
Townsend nor his movement could threaten the long-term viability of the Roosevelt administration.
In June 1934, therefore, the Roosevelt administration announced the appointment of a
Committee on Economic Security charged with carrying out the President’s “pledge to insure the
future social well-being of the United States” by studying “almost every phase of economic and
social hazard from old age and unemployment to the ‘economic aspects of maternity.” 68 The
Committee, which consisted primarily of academic economists, social welfare experts, and federal
and state officials hastily borrowed from across the country, soon went to work at a breakneck
pace. 69
By November 1934, the Committee on Economic Security had begun to consider which
legislative proposals it would recommend to the President, who had made known his desire for a
“comprehensive program for economic security” that he could then present to Congress at the start
of its session in January 1935. 70 In the December 1934, Barbara Armstrong, a University of
California economist and consultant to the Committee on Economic Security, offered strong
implicit evidence of the impact of the Townsend Movement’s ability to organize older Americans
68
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into a potentially powerful political force on the Committee’s deliberations. Writing in the New
York Times, Armstrong observed that the existing social welfare infrastructure of poorhouses and
county poor farms had proven to be woefully ineffective and financially inefficient in assuring
impoverished older people some modicum of economic security without humiliating them in the
process. Keeping her cards close to the vest, Armstrong highlighted the laggard pace of the United
States compared to the United Kingdom and other industrialized nations in providing for the
indigent elderly, and hinted that reforms to replace the humiliation and deprivation of the poorhouse
and poor farm would soon be forthcoming from the Committee on Economic Security’s
recommendations. 71
When the Committee’s report arrived on the President’s desk in January 1935, its
recommendations on the subject of old-age economic security were threefold: first, that the federal
government subsidize existing state-level old age assistance programs; second, that “a national
compulsory old age insurance system to cover the major number of the nation’s industrial workers”
be enacted; and finally, that “a national system of voluntary individual old age annuities for person
not covered by either of the other measures” also be set up. 72 Aside from its three major policy
recommendations, the Committee’s report asserted that “State action alone cannot be relied on to
provide either adequate or universal old-age insurance…although twenty-eight States and two
Territories have old-age assistance laws, many of these are not functioning, and others have cut
benefits below a proper minimum and have long waiting lists.” 73
In essence, the Committee on Economic Security was proposing to solve the problem of oldage economic security by means that were both compulsory and voluntary, and to buttress existing
71
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state-level relief efforts with the might of the Federal treasury. 74 While it avoided singling out any
one particular state or Territory for censure, the Committee on Economic Security’s report made
clear that state-level efforts to provide old-age assistance were simply inadequate, and by
establishing a federal system, the Committee’s members hoped to move the shift of economic
security away from state and local level governments permanently. 75 Such a major shift of social
responsibility – and in an area of domestic policy in which the federal government had traditionally
not played an overt role – was sure to provoke political controversy and opposition, and it was not
immediately clear how such legislation would get through Congress, even though the President did
enjoy the luxury of lopsided congressional Democratic majorities.
Taking stock of the report, the Roosevelt administration began to plan its strategy for getting
the Committee’s report translated into law. Speaking before a joint session of the Senate and House
on January 4, 1935, Roosevelt told the Congress that the “Federal Government must and shall quit
this business of relief,” a goal he meant to accomplish by “providing 3,500,000 jobs on public
works projects for the nation’s idle ‘employables.’” 76 Alongside measures to provide public
employment for “employables,” Roosevelt promised Congress a set of recommendations for “social
security, covering unemployment insurance and old-age pensions” among a plethora of items which
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the Committee on Economic Security had identified as crucial to reducing “dependency and
illness.” 77
Within two weeks of the President’s Message to Congress, the administration submitted the
Committee on Economic Security’s report for the consideration of Capitol Hill’s sachems. 78
Sensitive to the possible objections of Southern Democrats to a strengthening of Washington’s role
in social welfare, Roosevelt let it be known that the proposed Social Security program was designed
“to assist States in every way in setting up their own social security systems,” and that any
assistance to states in “meeting the immediate emergency problems of the indigent where States
have pension plans now in operation” would be on a strictly temporary basis. 79
While liberals in the House immediately sought “to broaden the proposed legislation,” the
Roosevelt administration remained coolly noncommittal on the subject of expanding the Social
Security legislation beyond what had already been proposed to Congress. The word from the White
House, on both Social Security and other measures of pending legislation, was caution, with the
President himself describing the administration’s legislative agenda as not of “a drastic nature.” 80
The administration’s strategy of caution was a deliberate one. The proposed Social Security Act did
not enjoy much support on Capitol Hill; instead, members of Congress seemed more and more
attracted to the siren song of the Townsend Movement. Writing in the New York Times, Arthur
Krock observed in mid-January 1935:
Unless the members of Congress are almost unanimously ignorant of
the national state of mind, people who would seriously damage or
destroy the economic security program offered by the President today
would simply be letting the country in for calamitous alternatives. If
Senators and Representatives accurately describe the feeling in their
77
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districts and the testimony of their correspondence, then the defeat or
extreme dilution of the Roosevelt proposals will mean the ascendancy
of the ideas of Huey P. Long, Dr. Townsend, or both.
While Krock proceeded to mock the pretensions of both Long and Townsend to high political
power, he conceded that “a glance at any Senator’s correspondence will demonstrate [that] many,
many people – perhaps several millions – believe firmly in the practicability and justice of the
Townsend Plan.” 81
Despite Krock’s attempts to portray the Roosevelt administration’s approach as the only
reasonable choice, the administration’s foes could not be placated. The National Association of
Manufacturers (N.A.M.) declared itself to be in favor of “the general objectives of the program but
unalterably opposed to the payroll tax through which it is to be financed,” on the grounds that the
tax would have an overall deflationary effect on the economy be removing far too much money
from active circulation. 82 While N.A.M.’s objections to the Roosevelt administration’s proposals
were not always fairly made, on the issue of Social Security’s financing, N.A.M. had a point: Social
Security’s payroll tax would remove money from circulation, and it would have a deflationary effect
at a time when more rather than less money pumped into circulation by the government was the
preferable solution as John Maynard Keynes and other economists had argued.
For the moment, though, the Roosevelt administration was far more concerned about the
possible effect that Townsend Movement’s growing numbers might have on Congress than it was
about N.A.M.’s opposition. In mid-February 1935, Dr. Townsend had appeared before a hostile
Senate Finance Committee to try and persuade them of the rightness of his proposed $200-a-month
old-age pension plan. Peppering the elderly doctor with questions about the Townsend Plan’s
financing that he was unready or unwilling to answer, the hearing soon devolved into a carnival-like
81
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atmosphere, with each of the assembled senators taking turns baiting and berating Townsend. An
unsmiling Townsend parried with most of the senators, who made clear that they thought him little
more than a confidence man. Instead, Mississippi Senator Pat Harrison made clear at the Townsend
hearing that the Senate Finance Committee would focus its energy and attention on the Roosevelt
administration’s Social Security program proposal, even though, as Senator Harrison later confided
to Marion Folsom, he wasn’t entirely sure what the Committee on Economic Security was asking
Congress to do. 83
Despite the subdued reception that greeted the proposed Social Security bill on Capitol Hill,
it turned out there was one constituency that the Roosevelt administration found it could count upon
to shepherd the legislation through Capitol Hill: the South. If southern legislators had no great love
for New Deal programs like the Works Progress Administration, the same was not true for the
Social Security Act, especially its title providing for Old Age Assistance – in effect, a kind of
federal-state matching grant program designed to temporarily provide non-contributory pensions for
older Americans who would likely be ineligible for the provisions of Old Age Insurance. 84
In essence, the Social Security Act’s two main titles were designed to deal with old-age
economic security in a way that distinctly disadvantaged African Americans. First, it excluded from
eligibility two of the major categories of work that employed African-Americans (especially in the
still largely agricultural Southern states). Secondly, it offered matching federal funds to supplement
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existing but underfunded state-level pension plans in the Southern states without exercising direct
oversight of state-level authorities as to how those funds would actually be administered.
In other words, both Social Security’s Old Age Insurance and its Assistance titles were
altered to placate the demands of white Southerners that little if any old-age relief would ever reach
impoverished African-American communities. 85 Despite Roosevelt’s obvious distaste for direct old
age assistance – which he viewed as being far too similar to the sort of “dole” that good government
reformers had been fighting to render extinct since the turn of the twentieth century – he acceded to
Southern demands. Doing so ultimately permitted the enactment of the overall Social Security Act,
including Roosevelt’s favored method of contributory old age social insurance. Unlike the Old Age
Assistance title, the Old Age Insurance title was significantly less popular with both parties on
Capitol Hill because it was not scheduled to go into effect until 1942, and therefore would do little
to calm congressional jitters about the Townsend Movement’s threats to dislodge them from
office. 86
The South and Social Security
Southern Democrats had good reason and the necessary political standing to demand the
non-contributory pension funds proffered by the Old Age Assistance title of the Social Security Act.
In Oklahoma and Texas, for example, between forty-three and forty-five of every one hundred
people aged 65 years or older received old-age assistance, with the federal government responsible
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for supplying a considerable amount of the funds necessary to support this assistance. 87 As a later
Federal Security Agency report on Social Security’s old age assistance program noted,
great variations are to be found among the States in the number of
recipients of old-age assistance in relation to aged population. In
December 1949 the recipient rate ranged from 67 per 1,000 in
Delaware and New Jersey to 829 per 1,000 in Louisiana...In general
the States that are predominantly rural – and consequently have the
least protection from the old-age and survivors’ insurance system –
have the highest recipient rates. 88
Of the states with the ten highest Social Security Old Age Assistance program recipient rates, seven
were in the South (Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Georgia, South Carolina, and Alabama), while
three were outside the South (Oklahoma, Colorado, and New Mexico). By contrast, none of these
states ranked among the ten states with the highest old age insurance recipient rates, nor did any
Southern state. 89 Furthermore, G. Calvin MacKenzie and Robert Weisbrot observe that
[t]he Democratic Party was the only party in nearly every part of the
South and all of that region’s representatives in Congress were
Democrats. Because southern incumbents were rarely defeated in
primaries, and never in general election, they amassed seniority much
more effectively than representatives from other regions. And when
the Democratic Party found itself in the majority in the House after
1930, southerners in large numbers reaped the benefits of their
accumulated seniority. 90
Because of its strong position within the now-dominant Democratic Party, the South was now newly
empowered in the nation’s politics in a manner that it had not been for generations, and its
representatives on Capitol Hill were unafraid to wield a legislative cudgel on behalf of their region’s
interests. Any legislation of major significance had to pass through the South’s committee-heavy
87
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legislative gauntlet on Capitol Hill, and even Franklin Roosevelt at the height of his power and
popularity was obliged to respect Southern prerogatives (even as he occasionally sought ways to
shortcut them).
Social Security’s Old Age Assistance title allowed the South to have its cake and eat it too:
the federal government would pick up the tab of subsidizing the South’s elderly (white) citizens
because the administration and disbursement of old age assistance (not old age insurance) monies
were left up to the individual states to decide eligibility criteria and disbursement methodology. 91
Such allowances were crucial to winning the support of firmly entrenched white Southern powersthat-be, who made no pretext of doling out federal old age assistance funds in a racially equitable
manner to the great masses of impoverished Southerners. 92 The Jackson Daily News of Mississippi
spoke for many white Southerners when it declared that “the average Mississippian can’t imagine
himself chipping into pay pensions for able-bodied Negroes to sit around in idleness on front
galleries supporting their kinfolks on pensions, while cotton and corn crops are crying for workers
to get them out of the grass.” 93
Such hostility had helped defeat the efforts of the Townsend Movement to expand and
organize in Southern states; for many white Southerners, however deep the appeal of the Townsend
Plan’s generous, guaranteed old-age pension plan may have been, the prospect of elderly AfricanAmericans also receiving such pensions made Dr. Townsend a persona non grata in much of the
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South, despite early and repeated attempts by the Townsend Movement to organize older white
Southerners into local Townsend clubs in the region. 94
Thus, in Ira Katznelson’s fitting phrase, Social Security’s provisions for old age assistance
was a classic case of “when affirmative action was white”: the traditionally wary South had
acquiesced to new, unprecedented federal legislation in the form of the Social Security Act, but had
done so on terms that could hardly have been more favorable to its rulers. 95 If the Social Security
Act had any sort of impact on reducing old age dependency for the next two decades of its
existence, it came as a result of the most politically regressive region in the nation demanding a
virtually no-strings attached federal subsidy for its elderly citizens, a result that the New Dealers –
with their earnest commitment to eradicating the poorhouse and the county poor farm system (and
their heartfelt concern for preserving the “dignity” of elderly individuals and their families) could
hardly have desired or foreseen, but that they largely acquiesced to as the devil’s due. 96
While it is tempting to solely locate the blame for Social Security’s early deformities on the
backs of racist white Southerners – and they were certainly not blameless in this respect – such a
judgment overlooks the fact that non-Southern New Dealers – including Franklin Roosevelt himself
– were also directly responsible for Social Security’s shortcomings. As Daniel Rodgers has
observed, “the puzzle of the Social Security Act is not why the New Deal Congress should have
addressed the economic hazards of unemployment and old age, but why it should have done so
94
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through insurance.” 97 The method of financing Social Security’s old age insurance system, in
particular, financially penalized the minority of American workers who were eligible for coverage
in the late 1930s. As Robert McElvaine has written,
The [old age] insurance system was based on payroll taxes, as
Roosevelt had insisted. The regressive nature of such taxation is
obvious: the lower-income workers paid a far larger percentage of
their wages in social security taxes than did those whose incomes
were above the maximum taxable level. 98
Roosevelt’s insistence on payroll taxes to fund the Social Security system had been politically
motivated; possibly because he still shared the old Progressive disdain for noncontributory pensions
or possibly because he understood that the Social Security system would have to endure withering
attacks from both within and without the federal government in the future. As Roosevelt later
explained, the Social Security payroll taxes were
[n]ever a problem of economics. They are politics all the way through.
We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors
a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and their
unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician
can ever scrap my social security program. 99
Whatever the reason, the eventual cornerstone of liberal action to expand and develop future federal
old-age policy and programs would be based upon a program that depended upon a regressive rather
than progressive tax structure to fund it. 100
While the Roosevelt administration eventually succeeded in preventing the Townsend
Movement from exerting too much influence on the legislative design of Social Security, it could
not entirely prevent the Movement’s demand for immediate, guaranteed public assistance for the
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elderly from having some impact. While the President and the Committee on Economic Security
plainly favored the old-age insurance provisions of the Social Security Act, these measures were not
especially popular on Capitol Hill or elsewhere, for both good reasons and bad. Critics of the
administration questioned the efficacy of the old-age insurance system in solving the problem of
economic insecurity in old age, given that it was not designed to go into effect until 1942 (seven
years into the future), and even then would only cover certain categories of workers. 101 For many
representatives and senators, the far more popular option was Social Security’s provisions for oldage assistance, a program under which the Federal government effectively matched and subsidized
existing state-level old age pension systems, and under which assistance would flow much sooner
from federal to state coffers (and thenceforth to voters). 102
In the legislative wrangling that took place over the course of the spring and early summer of
1935, the Roosevelt administration and its allies on Capitol Hill eventually forged a modus vivendi
on Social Security, under which concerned congressional representatives got the administration to
acquiesce to the inclusion of old-age assistance under the umbrella of Social Security (that the
President had opposed as little better than setting up a government dole), with the understanding that
old-age assistance would be a temporary program and would be discontinued once the old-age
insurance system was up and running at full speed. 103 In return for its acquiescence, though, the
administration was able to keep Congress in line and prevent favorable action on the Townsend
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Plan, despite the pressure the Townsend Movement exerted, especially on representatives from
western and midwestern states where its membership was most pronounced and active. 104
By the time Social Security was signed into law in August 1935, the vituperative fight over
its enactment had lent it the interesting distinction of being bitterly and publicly opposed not only by
the Townsend Movement but also by representatives of the nation’s industrial community, who had
managed to prevent the enactment of the proposed voluntary old-age insurance annuity program
which the Committee on Economic Security had pushed for in January; private insurers and their
allies had regarded it as an existential threat to the long-term viability of the private commercial
insurance industry. 105 Such attacks on Social Security were not without some merit. The architects
of the Social Security Act, in particular, were well aware that it was barely sufficient to meet the
crisis of poverty and mass unemployment and that much work remained to be done to improve the
law. 106 As former Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins later recalled,
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[i]t was evident to us that any system of social insurance would not
relieve the accumulated poverty. Nor would it relieve the sufferings of
the presently old and needy. Nevertheless, it was also evident that this
was the time, above all times, to be foresighted about future problems
of unemployment and unprotected old age. It was never, I think,
suggested by any reasonable person that relief should be abandoned in
favor of unemployment and old-age insurance, but it was thought that
there could be a blend of the two. 107
Though the New Dealers hoped that Social Security would one day be a universal program –
Franklin Roosevelt himself had repeatedly expressed his wish that “every child, from the day he is
born, [should] be a member of the social security system,” the Social Security Act was inherently
debilitated at the moment of its birth. 108 As William Leuchtenburg observed, “the law was an
astonishingly inept and conservative piece of legislation…in no other welfare system in the world
did the state shirk all responsibility for old-age indigency and insist that funds be taken out of the
current earnings of workers.” 109
The Townsend Movement Regroups
While the business community licked its wounds after losing the high profile fight over
Social Security, the Townsend Movement also moved to reorganize and to expand its national
grassroots support in the hope that the Social Security Act was not the last word on the subject of
public old-age economic support. 110 As the Roosevelt administration moved to smooth the business
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community’s ruffled feathers after the enactment of Social Security, it offered no such comfort to
the Townsend Movement. 111 Instead, the Roosevelt administration worked to reach out to individual
states to try and speed up their participation in the Social Security program at the earliest possible
moment. 112 As Frances Perkins, Eleanor Roosevelt, and other Roosevelt administration officials
unofficially campaigned on behalf of Social Security, the Townsend Movement continued to
organize and gather its strength in its native California and elsewhere. 113
The Townsend Movement’s objectives for doing so were not mysterious. With both eyes
clearly focused on the coming presidential election in 1936, Dr. Townsend hoped to be able to flex
far more political muscle against the Roosevelt administration, which it not unreasonably suspected
of maneuvering behind the scenes to prevent Congress from considering the Townsend Plan. 114
Throughout the fall of 1935 and winter of 1936, the Townsend Movement sought to organize
support on Capitol Hill, and enjoyed some modest success in doing so: by the end of December
1935, the Townsendites were loudly trumpeting the support of thirty-nine congressmen (roughly ten
percent of the House of Representatives), and were openly working to court both political parties. 115
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By the time Congress reassembled in early January 1936, though, it was clear that the
gathering senators and representatives were in no mood to entertain Townsend’s proposals,
whatever magnetic attraction such plans may have held for state and local politicians in the states
where the Movement was strongest. 116 The strained relationship between the Movement and
Congress, which had begun with Congress alternating between fearful worry behind closed doors
and open derision and mocking of Dr. Townsend at public hearings, now veered into more
treacherous waters. In late February 1936, leaders of the Townsend Movement declared their
intention of contesting three hundred congressional seats in the upcoming 1936 election; not long
thereafter, Congress began investigating Dr. Townsend and his close associates for possible
fraudulent use of the OARP’s funds. 117 As Congress began to investigate the OARP’s finances,
other unflattering revelations began to inflict damage on both Dr. Townsend and the OARP’s
credibility as selfless advocates on behalf of the nation’s older citizens. A May 1936 New York
Times article revealed confidential correspondence sent by Dr. Townsend in which he had boasted
that he had “the world by the tail with a down-hill pull,” an arrogant claim that was backed by
increasingly scant evidence of the OARP’s ability to actually persuade Congress rather than merely
try to intimidate it into submission. 118
Eventually, as William Leuchtenburg relates, the OARP began to splinter under the pressure
of hostile congressional hearings, which revealed that Townsend’s business partner Robert
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Clements had reaped tremendous personal financial gains from the organization. 119 Townsend and
Clements broke off relations, and without Clements at the helm of the OARP, the organization
swiftly fell apart at the national level. Townsend later joined forces with Father Coughlin and
Gerald L.K. Smith, a former protégé of Huey Long, to form a new third party on a quixotic quest to
oust Franklin Roosevelt from the White House in 1936. 120 Franklin Roosevelt was instead re-elected
in one of the largest single landslide electoral victories in the history of the United States.
Though congressional offices were no longer drowned by a deluge of mail from the
Townsendites after 1936, the Movement’s goal of a broad and generous guaranteed old-age pension
continued to animate the actions of its members. 121 Despite the miscalculations made by Townsend
and other senior leaders of the OARP about the organization’s ability to secure passage of its
agenda, the Townsend Movement continued to enjoy substantial popular support, courtesy of the
numerous local, grassroots Townsend Clubs scattered throughout the nation. Alan Brinkley has
observed that “the Townsend Clubs survived and prospered, developing into a large and vibrant
national movement, infiltrating the fabric of insurgent politics in nearly every region of the country,
and encouraging the hopes of those who believed a major new force was establishing itself in
American public life.” 122 As one elderly Michigan woman wrote to the Roosevelts in late January
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1936, while the Townsend Plan “looked like a fairy tale or the Milinium [sic] at first yet as we think
of it + examine its details we believe it is workable if really tried.” 123
In the first year or so after Social Security’s enactment, though, it appeared that Franklin
Roosevelt and the key architects of social policy in the New Deal like Frances Perkins and Harry
Hopkins had been successful in sapping just enough of the Townsend Movement’s energy and
grassroots strength to largely defang it at the national level. The fact remained, though, that that
Townsend Movement continued to exert substantial influence at the state level, especially in
California. 124 In the words of William Leuchtenburg,
…Townsend’s strength reached its apex after the passage of the Social
Security Act; in fact, he gained recruits precisely because of the
inadequacy of the New Deal pension system, which left millions of
elderly Americans unprotected. 125
The Social Security Act’s social insurance provisions, while promising to alleviate elderly poverty
in the future, did little to address it in the present, as most of its intended beneficiaries were already
well past their prime working years. 126
As a consequence, unlike Father Coughlin’s National Union for Social Justice or Senator
Huey Long’s “Share the Wealth” movements, the Townsend Movement soldiered on despite its
repeated defeats at the national level. While George Murray, a Chicago journalist associated with
the Movement from 1938-1945, somewhat incredulously claimed that 12,000 Townsend Clubs
123
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remained in active operation when he took the realms of the Movement’s newspaper in 1938, it was
true that neither the defeat of the Movement nor the enactment of Social Security had put the issue
of publicly-supported old age pensions to rest. 127 A 1936 report by the Twentieth Century Fund, for
example, while castigating Dr. Townsend and his plan as little better than hucksterism writ large,
pointedly conceded that “the strength of the Townsend movement, despite its fallacies…has
undoubtedly focused the attention of the country upon the fact that the richest nation of the world
has not yet provided adequate economic protection for old age.” 128
In other words, despite the enactment of Social Security the year before the Twentieth
Century Fund’s report, well-informed social welfare experts continued to believe that the problem
of old age economic security remained only partially solved. Whatever its other failings as an
organization, the Movement had succeeded in focusing national attention on the issue of old-age
economic security. The splinter and successor groups which emerged in its wake inherited many of
the Movement’s politicized supporters, who continued to press for state-level publicly funded oldage pensions in the late 1930s that were capable of providing a level of economic security that
Social Security could not.
The State Level Struggle over Old-Age Economic Security
In particular, these successor groups would prove to be most influential in Colorado and
California. 129 The November 1936 elections brought the re-election of Franklin Roosevelt, but it
also brought victory and near-victory for old-age pension groups in those two states. 130 In Colorado,
voters failed to remove a $40 a month pension system, despite its potentially adverse effects on the
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state’s treasury, while in California, old age pension advocates successfully mobilized their
supporters to secure the election of a pro-pension Governor and U.S. Senator, despite narrowly
losing a popular referendum on a guaranteed state-level $120 a month old-age pension system. 131 In
other states like Oregon and North Dakota, similarly mixed messages from the electorate were also
in abundance: while both states’ voters defeated referenda on proposed state-level pension systems,
they also were happy to elect new representatives to Congress who had publicly committed
themselves to expanding Social Security. 132
Such state-level agitation continued throughout the late 1930s, even after the Supreme Court
upheld Social Security as constitutional in 1937 and the Roosevelt administration began to
cautiously call for the expansion of Social Security in the wake of the Court’s decision, a move that
also enjoyed the support of influential think tanks like the Twentieth Century Fund. 133 While the
Roosevelt administration moved tentatively to bolster Social Security, the popular discontent that
had powered the Townsend Movement to national prominence continued to register its displeasure.
In Colorado, leading elected officials received threatening mail ahead of a pending vote on an oldage pension bill, while in California, old age pension advocates accelerated their efforts to place a
new referendum on public pensions before the state’s voters at the earliest opportunity. 134
The California movement, which backed a ballot proposal formally titled the “Retirement
Life Payment Plan” but more widely known by its colloquial nickname of “Ham and Eggs,” did
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eventually succeed in placing its proposed pension on the November 1938 ballot in California. 135
However, it failed to persuade a majority of voters to endorse “Ham and Eggs,” and subsequent
attempts in 1939 and 1940 also met with failure. Likewise, the political wrangling over old age
pensions in Colorado reached a fever pitch in 1938 and became the marquee issue for both elected
state and federal politicians in that state. 136 Even in eastern states like New York – where the
Townsend Movement had never enjoyed comparably strong grassroots support – there was growing
evidence that existing social welfare measures remained insufficient to address the problem of
providing economic security in old age. 137 The November 1938 midterm elections revealed that the
question of old-age pensions remained a pressing one in many western and Midwestern states. 138 In
Colorado, voters overwhelmingly chose to retain the state’s $45 per month old age pension law,
while the “Ham and Eggs” movement’s old age referendum was defeated by Californian voters. 139
Elsewhere, state campaigns on behalf of old age pensions in North Dakota, Oregon, Washington
State, and Minnesota were showing evidence of growing support which, even if not fully realized in
1938, threatened to ripen into full-fledged social movements in the future. 140
Observant federal administrators like Arthur J. Altmeyer, the chairman of the Social Security
Board, were sufficiently alarmed by these state-level developments that they began to push for
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accelerated implementation of Social Security’s old age insurance provision and for an extensive
broadening of old age assistance payments already been made by the program. 141 The New York
Times took note of the political developments out west, observing in late October 1938 that “not
long ago the Townsend Plan was thought to be as dead as Huey Long’s Share the Wealth
scheme…but a Washington dispatch in Sunday’s TIMES showed that the doctor’s plan or some
modification of it is to be submitted to the voters in seventeen states.” Reading the tea leaves, the
Times noted that “[congressional] candidates are easily pressed…Nearly a fourth of the last House
[of Representatives] was in favor of a bill for a Federal old-age pension of $50 a month…In the next
House another demonstration for fatter old-age pensions is plainly to be expected.” 142 While Dr.
Townsend himself opposed the various 1938 state pension proposals – possibly in a pique of anger
that the Townsend Movement’s thunder had been stolen by other old-age pension advocacy groups
– his rejection of them apparently did little to blunt their popularity. 143
Instead, despite repeated defeats at the ballot box, such groups refused to disappear from the
nation’s political scene. This surprising resilience owed much to the continued poor economic status
of many older Americans, who, as critics of Social Security had predicted, continued to find little if
any succor to alleviate their woes from the Social Security program or from other existing public
measures. 144 The dire economic conditions faced by many older Americans was borne out by a
March 1938 report commissioned by the Social Security Board which revealed that only 33% of the
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aged – defined as people aged 65 and over – were self-supporting; the two-thirds majority continued
to depend heavily on “public, private, or family aid.” 145
In response to the continuing tumultuousness of state-level fights over old age pensions as
well as growing concerns that the disparate old-age pension advocacy groups might yet coalesce
into a national movement once more, the Roosevelt administration announced its intentions in
January 1939 to push for a major extension of the Social Security Act as rapidly as possible. 146 In its
coverage of the administration’s move, the New York Times reported that
In a passage generally interpreted as an attack on the Townsend and
similar plans the President said: “I cannot too strongly urge the
wisdom of building upon the principles contained in the present Social
Security Act in affording greater protection to our people, rather than
turning to untried and demonstrably unsound panaceas.”
To a large extent, the President was moving in accord with public opinion; a February 1939 Gallup
poll revealed that an overwhelming 94% of surveyed voters favored government old-age pensions,
and that most voters believed that “the present Social Security Act falls short of providing…an
adequate old-age pensions system at this time.” 147 Alongside its interest in the growing public
support for increases to Social Security, the Roosevelt administration also tested the waters for other
solutions to the problem of old age economic insecurity. In March 1939, a Department of Labor
special committee studying the problems of older workers (defined as 40 years or older)
recommended that the “federal government lead the attack on the problem of unemployment for
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older workers by abolishing age limits for entrance into the government service except for positions
requiring physical strength and endurance.” 148
The committee’s recommendations came and went without any action by the Roosevelt
administration, but they did represent a new approach to the problem of economic insecurity in old
age. If Social Security could not be increased to a sufficiently high level to keep older people out of
poverty, then perhaps an alternative solution which kept them employed in the labor market longer
could have the same salutary effect. Members of the Social Security Board were already becoming
concerned that the costs of raising benefits to Social Security would continue to rise an at
unsustainable rate; as one March 1939 Social Security Board report detailed, the total amount
expended for old-age assistance between 1937-1938 stood at $360,239,000, with the federal
government supplying nearly half of that sum ($174,085,000). 149 While this percentage only
represented approximately 2% of the federal government’s entire outlays for fiscal year 1938,
federal officials and outside observers worried that that proportion could potentially grow much
higher if monthly benefit payments were substantially increased or if the number of people enrolled
in the Social Security system grew too large. 150
As the same 1939 Department of Labor report argued, the political pressure to raise old-age
assistance levels would possibly permanently undercut the rationale for social insurance.
Consequently, the Social Security Board recommended that old-age assistance funds should be
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allocated only to the truly financially needy elderly rather than made into a universal entitlement for
all older people above a certain age, as the Townsend Movement and its successor organizations had
advocated for. 151 In order to achieve this outcome, though, the Social Security Board urged that
Social Security’s social insurance system be made as universal in coverage as possible, or else the
temptation to liberalize and raise old-age assistance payments at both the state and federal levels
would soon prove irresistible in the near future. 152
The brewing political fight over old age pensions in 1939 ultimately resulted in the
enactment of amendments to the original Social Security Act that raised benefits, accelerated the
payment of old age benefits by two years from January 1, 1942 to January 1, 1940, and extended
coverage of Social Security to more groups of workers. 153 The amendments also “added two new
categories of benefits: payments to the spouse and minor children of a retired worker (so-called
dependents benefits) and survivors benefits paid to the family in the event of the premature death of
a covered worker.” 154 As the official legislative history of Social Security observes, “this change
transformed Social Security from a retirement program for workers into a family-based economic
security program.” 155
The enactment of the 1939 amendments soon after the original Act was passed, though, was
not exactly a planned event. Mounting criticism of Social Security from both the political right and
the left convinced the Roosevelt administration of the need to speed up the dispensing of Social
Security benefits, a process which was originally scheduled to begin in 1942 but which began
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instead in 1940 after the 1939 amendments were passed. 156 As Sung Won Kang has argued, this
development would not have been possible without continuing pressure from the Townsend
Movement on Congress and the Roosevelt administration. 157 In particular, the Movement’s clubs
continued to organize older Americans and to persuade supportive Congressmen to submit its bills
for consideration in the U.S. House of Representatives. While these bills usually never made it out
of committee, the Townsend Movement’s persistence – as well as the increasingly widely
acknowledged problems surrounding Social Security, which congressional opponents of the
Roosevelt administration were all too happy to publicize – persuaded the architects of the original
Social Security Act that additional legislation was necessary to relieve some of the still-obvious
economic and social discontent among older Americans. 158
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Figure 3. A Social Security Poster featuring an old man. Photo courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

These improvements, which the Roosevelt administration and most educated observers had
hoped would be sufficient to dampen the appeal of the revived old-age pension movements scattered
throughout the United States, achieved only limited success in accomplishing that objective. 159
Observing the continued agitation over old age pensions, the Times noted that, in stark contrast to
the 1935 fight over Social Security, “practically no opposition arose in Congress to the proposals for
liberalizing the old age security plan” because of “the tremendous pressure…exerted upon the
members as the result of the Townsend and general welfare pension movements, together with the
159
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accentuated public interest in the general subject of social security.” 160 By expanding Social
Security, congressional leaders hoped both to stave off the Movement and to continue sharing the
costs of public assistance for the elderly; under Social Security, such costs were shared between the
federal government and the individual states, but if the Townsend Plan were enacted, such costs
would fall almost entirely upon the federal government. While New Dealers like Frances Perkins
were acutely aware of Social Security’s incomplete nature, they hoped that expansion of the
program would in time lessen the appeal of the Townsend Movement and other similar groups to
insignificance. 161
Instead, despite the 1939 improvements to Social Security, the pension movements
continued to soldier on in California and elsewhere, including Capitol Hill, where the backers of the
Townsend Plan succeeded in forcing a vote on its adoption. 162 The overwhelming defeat which
these backers suffered – a 302 to 97 loss – seemed to have little effect in deterring the revived
Movement; if anything, as the New York Times noted, “it seems likely that Townsendite agitation
will continue so long as the country contains a large body of unemployed and the national income
level remains below the level where economists say it can go.” 163
Events throughout 1939 soon bore out the Times’s prediction. Though it had been defeated
again in Congress, the Movement and other old-age pension advocacy groups continued to press
their case in various western states. 164 In November 1939, the Times reported on special elections
being held in California and Ohio to determine the fate of proposed publicly supported old age
pension plans in those states, and hinted that similar movements were underway in New England
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and New York State. As the Times editorialized, “the general belief…is that the country is still some
years away from general pension legislation, but the ranks of those who predict that the country
never will accept a general pension program are being decimated by the unceasing gunfire of the
pension advocates.” 165
Unexpectedly, though, the old-age pension proposals fell short in the special state elections
held in November 1939. California’s voters rejected – again – the “Ham and Eggs” plan, while
voters in Ohio similarly declined to endorse a guaranteed old-age pension for state residents. 166 In a
rare showing of bipartisanship, representatives of the leadership in both the Democratic and
Republican parties openly celebrated the defeat of the proposed pension plans, as did Abraham
Epstein’s American Association for Social Security. The Townsend Movement did not take its latest
loss well; speaking before a public audience in Boston the following spring, Dr. Townsend bitterly
assailed the New Deal as a “failure,” heaped particular scorn on the Social Security Act as “the
worst of all,” and expressed his belief that Social Security would be repealed by 1941. 167
Even as the official establishment in Washington rejoiced once more in the defeat of the
Townsend Movement, the poor economic conditions which the New York Times had identified as
the primary cause of the continuing social discontent among older Americans showed no signs of
abating. While Social Security’s expansion would help some retirees, its acknowledged inadequacy
meant that many more remained dependent upon other public, private, or family aid. The
improvements to the Social Security Act, though, allowed the Roosevelt administration to make
long-desired changes to other New Deal programs. In December 1939, after a public fracas with
Governor A. Harry Moore of New Jersey over the dismissal of workers aged 65 years or older who
165
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had been employed by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in New Jersey, President
Roosevelt personally repudiated the suggestion of a Labor Department committee made earlier in
1939 that the federal government abolish age limits in federal employment as a way to ensure that
older workers would find it easier to remain in the workforce. Instead, as the President wrote in his
letter, since older workers were eligible for assistance under Social Security’s provisions, the
limited number of jobs which the WPA had to offer should be reserved instead for unemployed
persons who were not eligible for such assistance. 168 In the view of the Roosevelt administration,
public employment should be reserved for younger, able-bodied workers, while older, less
physically able workers should vacate jobs at the WPA and elsewhere for them. 169
The Roosevelt administration’s reasoning for barring older workers from public
employment, while strongly protested by Governor Moore and by other state officials, bore the
marks of how the persistent economic crisis of the Great Depression had reshaped beliefs and
assumptions about the role which older people should play in the nation’s political economy.
Ironically, like the Townsendites, the New Dealers had, by the end of the 1930s, come to embrace
the belief that the place of older workers was in the home – not the old persons’ home – but rather
that the precious limited economic opportunity available in a stagnant economy be reserved for
people who had families to support. New Dealers assumed – not entirely without reason – that older
people did not have young children to support, and that the combination of Social Security, other
public or private assistance, as well as traditional forms of family-based in-kind assistance would be
sufficient to keep the majority of elderly people out of poverty, while also making room in the
workforce for younger workers who could not fall back on public assistance as easily. Without
intending to do so, Social Security’s emphasis on ushering older workers out of the labor force
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would make it more difficult for future generations of federal officials to rectify elderly poverty
because nearly all future solutions to deal with the issue would, in some way, be obliged to conform
to the model of social insurance which the architects of Social Security had preferred and would
work diligently to place at the center of the American welfare state during the 1940s and into the
1950s. 170
For the moment, though, the fight in statehouses and on Capitol Hill over the fate of old-age
pensions entered a period of uneasy stasis beginning in late 1939. The problem of providing
economic security in old age remained far from solved, as the constant drip of articles from the
Times revealed, but no major action on the subject would be taken by federal or state officials for
several years. 171 This diminished activity was a direct result of rising domestic employment as the
federal government began to ramp up the production of war materials in the expectation that it was a
merely a question of when and not if the United States would again be engaged in large-scale
foreign wars. Former Townsend Movement manager George Murray later recalled that “the
[Townsend] movement was at its height just before the war and went downhill after that. It lost its
momentum. The Townsend Plan was a Depression movement. Now it became a pie-baking
movement, just old people.” 172
As was the case for most Americans, older Americans greatly benefitted from the advent of
World War II, not the New Deal, which largely eradicated the scourge of mass unemployment from
the land. Already Social Security was becoming the centerpiece of the New Deal’s reforms. Despite
its shortcomings, the Social Security Act was a potent sign of the New Deal’s commitment to the

170

For contemporary coverage of the implementation of the 1939 Social Security amendments, see Delbert Clark, “Era
of Social Security Begins for the Worker,” The New York Times, December 31, 1939.
171
R.L. Duffus, “Old Age: Old Age,” The New York Times, December 17, 1939.
172
Terkel, Hard Times, 316.

101

mythical “forgotten man” whom Franklin Roosevelt had discussed in an April 1932 radio address.
As Robert McElvaine has observed, the Social Security Act
[w]as a significant achievement in that it at last acknowledged a
modicum of societal responsibility for the care of the aged,
unemployed, handicapped, and impoverished. It was also important as
a symbolic gesture to demonstrate that Roosevelt’s heart was in the
right place, no small accomplishment with a presidential election little
more than a year away. Although the Townsend organization
continued to thrive for more than a decade, Social Security deflated
the movement as a threat to Roosevelt. 173
However, while Social Security may have deflected Franklin Roosevelt and his administration away
from the popular discontent of some older Americans, it did not actually resolve the problem of
widespread economic insecurity in old-age. That insecurity would soon be obscured by the booming
wartime economy in which essentially full employment became a fact not a fantasy. The
unanticipated changes wrought by mass mobilization on the home front during the course of World
War II would revive the question of public responsibility to impoverished older Americans after the
war’s conclusion, and re-open a national debate once more on what role – if any – Social Security
should play in alleviating elderly poverty and the supply of workers in the labor force.
In sum, while Huey Long’s antics and Father Coughlin’s bombast would devour far more
drums of newspaper ink – and consume far more of Franklin Roosevelt’s attention and concern
during the 1930s – it was the Townsend Movement that ultimately left a far deeper legacy at all
levels of government by helping to organize older middle-class Americans into a mass movement
committed to their collective betterment on the basis of their age. 174 Summarizing the Townsend
Plan, William Leuchtenburg has observed that it “represented the conviction of millions of
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Americans that they had to take action themselves in order to restore the country to its former
prosperity, and that, if the right formula could be found, they could lift themselves by their own
bootstraps.” 175 Eventually, the Townsend Movement became largely irrelevant as a force in national
politics – a change brought about more by the return of widespread employment opportunities for
older Americans during World War II, rather than by Social Security’s old age insurance and
assistance titles.
Still, its rise and fall would serve as a guidepost and warning to successor old age lobbying
groups, including the as-yet unborn American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), whose own
name echoed Dr. Townsend’s Old Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd. (OARP) organization (the
incorporated name of the Townsend Movement). 176 As William Leuchtenburg has noted, the
ultimate effect of the Townsend Movement was to unleash “a new force in American politics: the
old people...[b]uffetted by the depression…they found in the Townsend clubs a home; in the
movement, a sense of unity with other elderly people; in the plan, a cause; and in the crusade, a
newfound sense of their political power.” 177 This newfound sense of power did not diminish with
the national downfall of Dr. Townsend, but instead persisted at the local and state levels, especially
in western states like California and Colorado. The scaffolding erected during the New Deal to
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secure the economic security of older people and to prevent them from falling into penury remained
incomplete and unfinished. However, the return of near-full employment as the United States
mobilized for entry into World War II camouflaged and obscured this fact. As soon as the wartime
demand for labor began to slacken after Japan’s surrender in 1945, the concerns which Townsend
and his compatriots had helped to give at least semi-coherent form and organization would have the
opportunity to resuscitate once more, and thereby force anew arguments about the role of the state at
all levels of government in providing provision to older Americans.
By 1939, the effects of the Great Depression had laid the groundwork for the emergence of
the senior state. While Social Security proved to be pleasing to both the Roosevelt administration
and to its Southern congressional allies, it offered limited succor to many older Americans, not a
few of whom were unlikely to benefit from the old-age insurance program scheduled to go into
operation in 1942, seven years after the enactment of the Social Security Act. The Townsend
Movement therefore continued to feed off the discontent among older Americans in economically
unstable conditions, despite the enactment of amendments to the Social Security Act in 1939, which
accelerated the scheduled payment of monthly benefits under the old-age insurance program, as well
as the payment of enlarged state-level old-age pensions under Social Security’s old-age assistance
program. The Townsend Movement continued its efforts to mobilize and organize older Americans,
and achieved its most notable successes in California, where voters authorized a new state-funded
old-age pension in addition to benefits created by the Social Security Act.
By the close of the 1930s, therefore, an uneasy environment had come into being in which
mass social discontent among many older Americans remained, despite the creation of Social
Security and the expansion of state-level efforts to provide more economic security in old age.
Additionally, the economic and political crisis of the 1930s had necessitated federal intervention in
old-age economic security, as well as increased federal and state cooperation on this issue in order
104

to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the private social welfare system and extended mass
unemployment. From these building blocks, over the course of the 1940s, the architects of the senior
state would seek to expand Social Security into a truly comprehensive public system that would be
at the center of the nation’s social welfare apparatus.
In so doing, they believed the time had come for lasting reform of social welfare in the
United States, and that the remnants of the old order – its poorhouses and its county poor farms –
would be permanently swept away by a new, more humane system, which could preserve the
dignity of older people without bankrupting individual families or the public treasury. To
accomplish this goal would first require the expansion of Social Security, and second the
cooperation of state and local officials in the administration of Social Security. The senior state in
1939 remained half-formed and incomplete, and its future direction, liberal reformers believed,
would naturally lead to the growing assumption by the federal government of its new-found
responsibilities in the realm of providing sufficient security in old-age for more and more
Americans.
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CHAPTER II
In Townsend’s Shadow: Reconstructing Old Age Security, 1939-1950
On the eve of America’s entry into World War II, some of the building blocks of the senior
state had come into being, but the coordination between federal, state, local, and private welfare
officials that would become its hallmark remained inchoate. With the enactment of Social Security
in 1935 and subsequent legislative amendments in 1939, the federal government had begun to play a
role in providing old-age economic security to a degree that had not been true since its sponsorship
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of thousands of pensions for northern Civil War
veterans. The Roosevelt administration had purchased this new role despite its costly price tag;
namely, despite the aspirations of New Deal reform-minded liberals, the Social Security system
remained far from universal, and its coverage and benefits remained uneven with significant
differences among the states. 1
Moreover, the enactment of Social Security had spurred a ferocious response from much of
the Republican Party, important segments of the business community, as well as the Townsend
Movement and other old-age pension movements in the western United States, which had continued
to flourish after 1935. 2 Though the Social Security Act had passed constitutional muster by the
Supreme Court in 1937, it remained unclear what the next steps in its evolution would be. 3 Popular
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support for the New Deal’s reforms had begun to ebb by this time, as evidenced by the willingness
of voters to deliver both houses of Congress back to the traditional ruling conservative coalition of
southern Democrats and Republicans after the 1938 primary and general elections. 4 Surveying the
situation in December 1940, John Winchell Riley of the New Jersey College for Women observed
in the New York Times that “there has been a steady relative increase in the number of older persons
in our population…[a]nd as a nation we haven’t yet learned what to do about this. We have set up
old-age pensions and retirement funds, and still we are plagued by the Townsend Plan and its
variations.” 5
At the state and local level, officials wrestled with the demands of voters who continued to
agitate for comprehensive action. 6 Public opinion seemed to militate in favor of more relief for older
people: a Gallup poll released in November 1939 revealed that 90% of surveyed voters believed in
government old-age pensions and that Social Security benefits be made payable at age 60 rather
than 65 (the actual threshold set by the architects of Social Security). 7 Such sentiments were not
limited to formal surveys or polls. In 1938, one million California voters supported a ballot initiative
to pay older state residents $60 per month; likewise, in Ohio, nearly half a million voters supported
an unsuccessful measure to pay state residents aged 60 years or more a pension of $40 per month; in
Arkansas, the state courts vigorously debated the constitutionality of a proposed old-age pension
plan; and in Washington state the Washington Old-Age Pension Union campaigned vigorously for
an expansion of state welfare programs. 8
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Feeling the budgetary pinch, state and local officials from Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New
York pled their case in January 1938 to federal officials in Washington for further assistance with
public assistance rolls, which had continued to rise despite the enactment of old-age and
unemployment insurance. In New York alone, statewide relief cases had risen from 268,139 in
November 1937 to 304,711 in December 1937. 9 This increase proved especially distressing to New
York state welfare officials, who had regarded needy persons past the age of 65 not as “permanent
charges” but rather as individuals “who might be expected to return to self-support when jobs were
available.” 10 Further west, state officials in Wisconsin reported in the spring of 1938 that Social
Security had failed to reduce old-age dependency and enrollment in county poor farms, where
enrollment had remained steady at 40,000 people between 1935 and 1938. 11
The continued poor economic conditions and dependence of thousands of older people upon
state and federal assistance thereby nudged local, state, and federal officials into close cooperation.
In some localities like New York City and Westchester County, New York, federal funding
accounted for 75% of all old-age assistance funds disbursed to recipients by 1941, and state and
local officials were loath to lose access to such funds. 12 With no obvious end in sight to the
Depression, local, state, and federal welfare officials had come to appreciate the virtues of
cooperation, especially given the looming specter of popular discontent. Noting that New York City
had benefitted from such cooperation, New York City Welfare Commissioner William B. Hodson
observed in November 1937 that “the first thing that the Federal, State, and city partnership has
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done is to enable us to care for nearly twice as many aged persons without any increase in the sum
appropriated by the city.” 13 Indeed, New York City benefitted as well from generous W.P.A.
allocations, which ensured that over 80,000 older New York City residents – almost entirely
workers aged forty years and older – remained employed on the W.P.A.’s rolls. 14
The growing alliance among public welfare officials on the local, state, and federal level – at
least on the question of old-age economic security – also drew strength from the refusal by some
surviving private welfare agencies to offer much assistance to the destitute elderly. As William H.
Matthews, the director of New York’s Community Service Society observed in April 1939, “[the]
private agencies were doing little to aid the aged because they regarded them as a government
responsibility.” 15 In New York State, at least, private welfare agencies had considered public oldage pensions to have released them from their obligations to the elderly poor; the long-established
Association for Improving the Conditions of the Poor, in particular, had previously celebrated the
enactment of New York State’s old age pension in 1931 as a tremendous lightening of the financial
burdens it faced in trying to assist the growing population of needy elderly people in the state. 16 The
enactment of Social Security and the assumption by the federal government of these burdens further
shifted the responsibility away from private welfare agencies and local authorities, who seemed
relieved and delighted by the federal largesse. 17
In sum, some of the senior state’s elements were becoming more coherent. On the one hand,
there was now newly created federal authority and funding for old-age economic relief; on the other
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hand, this new federal funding soon found its way to existing state and local welfare offices and
programs, though this interaction between federal, state, and local authorities was probably most
apparent in New York City. 18 Yet the range of problems faced by the elderly that were addressed by
this growing cooperation remained limited: older people were still primarily a budgetary problem,
and the best solution to that problem remained finding a way to support them that did not bankrupt
the state or threaten to rob self-dignity away from now indigent but formerly middle-class older
people. Other issues such as ensuring access to regular medical care or long-term assisted care were
scarcely mentioned.
The development of the senior state thus was uneven during the 1940s, both in terms of
geography (New York City and California already had an extensive public welfare system, but
Louisiana and Mississippi did not), funding, and range of services. 19 These limitations were not
necessarily seen as permanent features; indeed, welfare officials and academic experts confidently
assumed that Social Security’s further expansion would take place in due time, and that the issue of
providing economic security in old-age would become the near-exclusive provenance of public
welfare, with issues of funding, responsibility and administration divvied up among local, state, and
federal authorities. But the failure to expand Social Security and the continuing inadequacy of
Social Security, state old-age pensions, and other extant mechanisms for providing economic
security in old age would necessitate public welfare authorities reaching out to their private sector
counterparts in order to supplying assistance to vulnerable elderly people.
In late November 1945, the New York Times held a radio forum on the needs of older people
in New York City. The program, which was broadcast live throughout the five boroughs, gathered a
18
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variety of social welfare experts and public officials, some of whom were battle-tested veterans of
the New Deal while others were still fresh from the halls of academia. The panelists suggested that
the needs of older people could not be met solely by increasing their economic security and
purchasing power as mass consumers. 20 Instead, older people wanted “better housing facilities,”
“more recreational facilities,” and “a new public attitude recognizing their individuality” in order to
make their lives worthy of being lengthened. 21
Such concerns were both longstanding and novel: on the one hand, rising public disgust at
the condition of public poorhouses had helped lay the groundwork for the rise of the old-age
pension movement in the 1930s; on the other, the interest in “recreational facilities” and a new
public attitude towards the elderly were two issues that had not previously been a major subject of
concern for either old-age pension advocates or their opponents. The Townsend Movement had
primarily conceived of the elderly as an overlooked audience of citizens and consumers who, if
given sufficient purchasing power via pensions, would be able to initiate a virtuous economic cycle
in which their spending would stimulate new sources of market demand for consumer goods while
simultaneously ensuring that new jobs for younger Americans would be available, either due to
economic expansion or because such positions had been vacated by now-pensioned elderly people.
While this emphasis on the elderly as consumers did not dissipate entirely in the postwar era,
social workers, public welfare officials and academic experts increasingly focused on the elderly as
a group of individuals who merited the expansion of social service programs and agencies in both
the private and public sectors. This long-term shift away from considering the elderly solely as
economic actors was partly a delayed reaction to one of the major grievances of the Townsend
Movement and other old-age advocacy groups: namely, that if the elderly lacked sufficient
20
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economic power, they would also lose social stature in time. To turn Linda Gordon’s phrase, the
elderly supporters of Dr. Townsend wanted to be entitled but not pitied: they wanted guaranteed
old-age pensions as well as respect from other, younger members of American society. The repeated
defeats of the Townsend Movement at the national level had not eradicated this desire. If anything,
it had shifted it to the state and local levels, where the intense struggle over public and private
provision for the elderly would heat up to a degree in the late 1940s that it had not reached since the
nadir of the Great Depression in 1933.
In particular, these debates would increasingly occupy center stage in three separate arenas:
academia, national politics, and labor-management relations, and ultimately, they would help to
catalyze the construction of the senior state at the local and state levels of government by a
coalition of elected officials, voluntary welfare organizations, and other interested parties who
wanted to ensure social stability by providing the elderly with a role in society that did not impinge
too heavily upon the ability of private employers to nudge workers toward retirement or place the
public treasury in too great a danger of imminent bankruptcy due to unsustainable pensions.
Essentially, during the 1940s, the sluggish, limited reforms made at the national level and the high
stakes clashes between organized labor and corporate management eventually helped facilitate the
haphazard creation of new programs for older Americans at the state and local levels. As I will
address more fully in a subsequent chapter, these efforts were most pronounced in localities like
New York City, where city and state officials grew increasingly concerned that the growing
population of older people represented an unsustainable financial burden upon local welfare
resources. In response, New York officials sought new solutions to the problem of old-age poverty
including the construction of subsidized public housing and enactment of legislation to curb agebased discrimination in employment in New York State. Similar efforts were undertaken elsewhere
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– particularly in California, which, like New York, had a large resident concentrated population of
older people that dwarfed the population of numerous other U.S. states. 22
Back to the States
In order to understand the development of the senior state at the local and state levels of
government, though, it is necessary to put it within the context of larger national politics. Ironically,
the failed efforts at the national level during the 1940s to enact national health insurance, along with
slow, piecemeal expansions of Social Security, helped to broaden and transform the policy agenda
for older Americans sought by the emerging coalition of academic experts, elected officials, and
voluntary organizations. Previously, long-time old-age pension advocacy groups as varied as
Abraham Epstein’s American Association for Social Security and the Townsend Movement had
emphasized the enactment of old-age pensions as a panacea which would eradicate old-age poverty
while guaranteeing true economic security and protection from the vicissitudes of old-age,
disability, and unemployment. The enactment of Social Security in 1935 and its accelerated rollout
in 1940 offered partial relief on this issue.
However, rising health care costs greatly strained the ability of many older people to pay for
such care, and the Social Security Act’s prohibition against its funds being used to pay for costs
associated with lodging in public poorhouse left them, their families, and their communities with
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limited options. 23 Increasingly, during the 1940s and into the 1950s, the main objectives sought by
the senior state’s architects broadened to include both income and health security in old age. Other
goals – including better housing, access to adult education programs, and expansion of long-term
care facilities – would eventually become part of this agenda, as city and local officials debated how
best to provide government services to older people in a way that did not debase them by appearing
to be undeserved charity. Taken collectively, these goals added up to a dedicated effort to secure the
economic and social independence of older people without sacrificing other social welfare
objectives.
In essence, the senior state’s creators sought to enact a broad agenda that would prevent the
needy elderly from becoming “dependent” upon public assistance, but to do so in a way that did not
place too onerous a burden upon limited local and state resources. In this pursuit, they would be
only partially successful, and would turn to other community and voluntary organizations such as
private philanthropies and organized labor to help fund and administer local initiatives. 24 In areas
where state and local officials could find and establish strong partnerships, such as New York City
and Chicago, these efforts were relatively successful. In other, less developed parts of the country –
23
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in particular, much of the American South – such efforts were much more limited, and Social
Security’s old age assistance program remained the primary source of publicly available old-age
economic support. This turn to local solutions and improvisations, though, drew much of its urgency
from the underdevelopment of the Social Security system and the failure to enact national health
insurance in the late 1940s, a turn of events that led local and state officials to seek alternative
arrangements.
The senior state’s evolution during the 1940s and 1950s, was unexpected, given the
trajectory which New Deal (and later Fair Deal) liberals had originally hoped for during World War
II and in the immediate aftermath of the war. For their part, New Deal reformers continued to hope
that a more complete expansion of the Social Security Act’s old-age social insurance provisions
would permanently put the issue of economic insecurity in old age to rest. Elite opinion reflected
this worry. When the first Social Security checks were mailed in February 1940, the New York
Times commented that
Yesterday, when elderly men and women who had established their
claims received their first checks from the Government, the Federal
old-age pension system was launched in earnest. It is a curious fact
that, though, the legislation establishing the plan was passed nearly
five years ago, and though tax payments have been building up the
reserves for it for three years, the Townsendites, ham-and-eggers and
other old age pension extremists have been conducting their
propaganda just as if no such actual plan were in existence or in
contemplation. The actual flow of checks, let us hope, will bring this
situation to an end, and future discussion will recognize the realities. 25
Essentially, the Times considered the subject of old-age pensions to be settled, and that Social
Security’s enactment and its implementation to have been the final word on the matter. Yet there
were nagging hints that the Times had been perhaps overly optimistic in its 1940 assessment of the
situation. A year later, the Times conceded in a July 1941 editorial that “no doubt it would be a
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better country if all elderly Americans enjoyed economic security without being obligated to their
children. But until the Hitler problem is disposed of the country can bear up under the reproach that
a considerable number of elderly Americans…have to turn for help to a son or go to live with a
married daughter.” 26
The NRPB and the Senior State
As its own editorial suggested, the New York Times believed that resolving the issue of oldage pensions would need to be postponed until global affairs were more tranquil. Even though the
United States was not officially at war when the Times published its editorial on old-age pensions in
1941, the Roosevelt administration had already begun the process of ramping up defense
production, which resulted in plummeting unemployment rates. As the acrimonious pre-war debates
about social policy increasingly took a backseat to wartime preparations, the Roosevelt
administration kept an eye on the need to plan for the postwar period. In September 1941, the New
York Times reported on the activities of the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), a small
advisory council originally established in 1939 by the Roosevelt administration. In its initial reports,
the NRPB argued for the need to plan for full employment, but to do so in a way that would not
require “the aged” to work, should they so desire to leave the workforce. 27 Sparse details were
supplied to the Times’s reporter about how the NRPB planned to provide for elderly people who no
longer wished to work but did not want to starve, either.
In the coming months, the NRPB and the Roosevelt administration began to fill in some of
the details. At the end of September 1941, President Roosevelt announced his intention to “send a
special message to Congress soon requesting that the social security program be enlarged to provide
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protection for a much greater number of individuals than are now covered.” 28 In what would later
become a catechism of postwar liberalism, the Roosevelt administration asked for favorable
Congressional action to expand Social Security to include more workers, and also asked for
Congress to expand Social Security’s old-age assistance program to raise the pensions received by
elderly residents of poorer, more rural (and generally Southern) states. 29
Congress, though, declined the President’s request. The regnant conservative coalition on
Capitol Hill saw no reason to act favorably on the President’s message, and instead ignored it. The
President chose not to press Congress on the subject, opting to defer the matter to another day.
Roosevelt’s cautious approach to Congress did not seem to alarm liberals, some of whom boldly
believed and hoped that a return to the New Deal’s reforming heyday was at hand. Boldly setting
forth “the outlines of an expanded program,” first and second generation New Dealers like Arthur J.
Altmeyer, I.S. Falk, and Wilbur J. Cohen, seized upon Franklin Roosevelt’s words in 1942 reaffirm
the necessity of social security. Prophetically, though, this coterie of New Dealers argued that
Social security cannot be achieved wholly by formal, government
disciplines just as it cannot be achieved wholly without those
disciplines. The failure of non-governmental programs of social
security to meet the major depression of the early 1930’s must not be
accepted as indicating they have no place at all in the American way
of life. As a matter of fact, attention should be drawn to the fact that
the possibilities of encouraging and fostering group programs of
social security have been almost completely overlooked in the
landslide of legislation and administration which has resulted from the
great depression. 30
By acknowledging that “non-governmental programs of social security” should have a role in the
“American way of life,” these New Deal liberals were extending an olive branch to voluntary
organizations and charities, though it was predicated upon the understanding that a broader social
28
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security system would be first among equals in the postwar social welfare order. As the authors of
War and Post-War Social Security noted, “security in the availability of employment is the heart of
the security problem. If the problem of maximum production is solved, most of the other social
problems of security are capable of solution. If the problem of full employment cannot be solved,
none of the others can be adequately solved.” 31 Fatefully, the problem of “full employment” would
only be partially solved. 32 Despite spirited attempts by liberals in Congress to enact legislation that
would provide for a broad expansion of Social Security as well as meaningful federal guarantees of
full employment, such attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, and the development of Social
Security into a broader program was in essence halted. 33
This turn of events, though, was scarcely foreseen by liberals during World War II, who
confidently assumed that the Roosevelt administration would ultimately throw its considerable
weight behind a concerted effort to expand Social Security and other elements of the New Deal’s
reform agenda. The NRPB’s increasingly numerous reports urging the postwar establishment of “a
new bill of rights” including “the right to security, with freedom from fear of old age, want,
dependency, sickness, unemployment, and accident” probably lent considerable weight to this
belief. 34 In particular, the reports, while bearing the imprint of the entire board, were in reality
largely the work of Dr. Eveline Burns, a British émigré and trained economist who had been a
professor of social work at Columbia University. Burns, who had also served on the 1934
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Committee on Economic Security which had been responsible for the authorship of the original
Social Security Act, had been deeply influenced and impressed by the development of the British
welfare state, and believed that the time was opportune for the United States to adopt broader social
welfare policies to secure and strengthen the New Deal’s promise of economic security. 35
From her position as the chief of the NRPB’s Economic Security and Health Section, Burns
was ultimately responsible for the NRPB’s most important report, entitled “Security, Work, and
Relief Policies,” released in 1942. “Security, Work, and Relief Policies” proposed a sweeping
reconstruction of the American welfare state in a manner similar to the framework drawn up in the
United Kingdom by Lord William Beveridge, an academic economist and social reformer. The
Beveridge Report was released in November 1942 and quickly enjoyed substantial support from the
British public, who viewed the Report’s proposed reforms as a worthy future reward for the trials
and travails of wartime Britain.
The American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) cautiously added its voice to the NRPB’s.
A.F.L. President William Green increasingly began to sound the alarm that “an inadequate social
security program would mean that at least one-half of the population would be ‘on the dole,’” a
message which was soon echoed by voluntary organizations in New York and elsewhere. 36 In a
lengthy January 1943 letter to the editor of the New York Times, W.H. Matthews, the Director of the
Community Service Society of New York, expressed similar arguments, observing that
[a]s our national security administrators and others who sit in high
places plan for a society where security shall be assured to every one
[sic] in this world from ‘the cradle to the grave’ one can but wish that
they would come down to earth long enough to make life a bit more
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livable to our present aged people…The vision of future Utopias
should not blind us to unjust, harmful realities of the present. 37
Matthews and other leaders of private voluntary organizations did not have to wait much longer to
find out just what the “national security administrators and others who sit in high places” had
planned for American society.
Unlike the positive response that Lord Beveridge’s plan had received in Britain, though, the
NRPB’s report met with a cool reaction from the Roosevelt administration, which released it
without much fanfare in March 1943. 38 It was perhaps unsurprising that the response from both
Congress and the general public was decidedly underwhelming. Moreover, the Congress that
received the NRPB’s report, though, was a far different beast than the one which had ratified the
Social Security Act in 1935. In 1942, conservative southern Democrats and Republicans had scored
important victories in the midterm elections held that year, which had simultaneously weakened the
administration’s ability to push for more liberal domestic legislation and increased its dependence
upon southern Democrats for passage of defense spending and other measures related to American
involvement in World War II. Energized congressional conservatives had succeeded in pressuring
the Roosevelt administration to dismantle the celebrated Work Projects Administration (W.P.A.)
even before the new Congress met in January 1943, and had their eyes set on eliminating other New
Deal agencies and programs. 39 Though the NRPB was a small agency, its ideological kinship with
the New Deal’s reformist impulse made it a prominent target for members of Congress who were
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eager to remove and dismantle any New Deal programs which envisioned a continuing role for the
federal government to play in planning the nation’s political economy.
Consequently, when Congress did eventually respond to the NRPB’s reports, it acted not to
implement them but rather to cut the NRPB’s funding down to the bone. 40 As the New Yokr Times
noted in its coverage of Congress’s response, “the temper of Congress is such that it is in revolt
against what it calls “government by directive.” 41 Within a month of FDR’s transmission of the
NRPB’s report, the NRPB was engaged in a fight for its very existence. The House of
Representatives’ Appropriations Committee had voted to eliminate its funding in February; now the
Senate appeared to be poised to concur with that action. 42 Ultimately, the Senate relented, but only
partially; instead of its previous annual appropriation of $1.4 million, the NRPB would now have to
make do with $200,000 instead. 43 Having narrowly escaped the fate of the Works Progress
Administration (WPA), the NRPB thereafter pressed on, now significantly emaciated for lack of
funds and muscular support from the Roosevelt administration, which seemed almost too eager at
times to bury and forget the half-dead agency. 44
The Townsend Movement, Redux
As Congress moved to squelch the NRPB, developments elsewhere in the nation were
bearing out the warnings sounded earlier by the A.F.L. and other organizations with a vested stake
in seeing the federal government make significant improvements to the nation’s social security
40
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system. In the ten years since the emergence of the Townsend Movement in 1935, California had
remained a focal point in the struggle by the Townsendites and other old-age pension advocacy
movements to enact a state-level old-age pension. 45 This continuing struggle remained largely
confined to California, but it continued to attract attention from concerned observers that successful
enactment of an overly generous old-age pension in California might inspire older people in other
states to organize and campaign for similar measures elsewhere. 46 After repeated defeats at the
ballot box between 1938 and 1942, California’s motley coalition of old-age pension advocacy
groups shifted tactics and instead worked to exert pressure on the state’s legislators to improve the
state’s old-age pension system.
These efforts succeeded in May 1943, when the California Legislature approved a bill that
increased the state’s monthly pension maximum by roughly 25%, from $40 to $50 per month. 47
Governor Earl Warren signed the measure into law, but the state’s organized and still-restive oldage pension movement remained unsatisfied with the improvements. This development served only
to fuel the fears of the state’s political establishment, which remained seriously concerned that the
state would have to face once more the return of a Townsend Movement-style political drama. 48
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Their fears were well-grounded. By late October 1943, California was paying approximately
$90,000,000 per year (approximately $1.2 billion in 2016 dollars) to support its needy aged citizens,
a sum that greatly exceeded that spent by New York State or Ohio, both of which were more
populous than California. 49 Moreover, the wartime tightening of the labor market in California had
had only a limited effect on lowering the demand for old-age pensions. In December 1941, 158,723
elderly Californians had received old age pensions; this figure had dropped to 151,412 in May 1943,
but had rebounded back up to 153,412 by October 1943, and was continuing to rise. 50 A year later in
October 1944, California voters defeated an attempt by re-organized members of the Townsend
Movement to enact a new, higher pension for citizens aged 60 or over that would have provided a
guaranteed $60 per month, largely due to the pension’s proposed funding mechanism, which would
have instituted a new 3 percent gross income tax. 51
California was not the only place in which signs of restlessness among organized old-age
groups were becoming more apparent. Back on the East Coast, the Welfare Council of New York
City had reported in June 1943 that “a half million aged persons in New York are being neglected,”
and that old-age assistance monthly cash grants were continuing to rise due to the city’s increasing
elderly population. 52 Thus far, this growing population of “neglected” elderly people had not
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attempted to organize and press for a more generous old-age pension – as had happened in
California – but it remained an issue of concern.
As the A.F.L. had predicted before the submission of the NRPB’s report to Congress,
though, the problem of old-age economic dependency was already reasserting itself. While the
heightened demand for labor during World War II provided older Americans, especially those still
in or trying to re-enter the workforce, with unexpectedly bountiful employment opportunities, it had
only obscured for a time the fundamental weaknesses of the Social Security system in providing
adequate income maintenance to older people. 53 Evidence of the temporary effect of labor shortage
during World War II on employment patterns among older men were revealed in a postwar report
produced by the U.S. Department of Labor. Between 1890 and 1940, the percentage of older men
aged 65 and over in the workforce had declined from nearly 70 percent to just over 40 percent. But
between 1940 and 1945, this figure rose back to 50 percent, and then resumed its long-term decline.
By 1950, the figure had dropped once more to approximately 45 percent. 54
Additionally, of the approximately 825,000 men over the age of 65 who were eligible to
receive Social Security benefits in 1941, 585,000 – roughly 71.1% of the total – had deferred
acceptance of Social Security in order to remain at their jobs, suggesting that most eligible older
men preferred to remain employed full-time rather than retire and receive Social Security
payments. 55 Even though the Roosevelt administration had set the NRPB’s report aside, its
arguments reflected just how dramatically participation in World War II had altered perceptions of
53
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the American economy. Instead of the “mature” economy thesis which had formed the central
assumption of many New Dealers during the Great Depression, the NRPB’s members optimistically
reported instead that the United States could “plan for a dynamic expanding economy on the order
of 100 to 125 billions national income…It has taken total war to reveal to us the capacity of our
production machine, once it is fully energized…Little vision is required to see that our production
machine can be made to produce plenty for peace as well as plenty for war.” 56 As part of its broad
set of proposals to the President, the NRPB recommended “extension of coverage of Old Age and
Survivors Insurance and continuing efforts to provide more adequate minimum benefits” as well as
the “creation of an adequate general public assistance system through Federal financial aid for
general relief available to the States on an equalizing basis and accompanied by Federal
standards.” 57
Implicitly, these recommendations recognized and acknowledged the deficiencies of the
Social Security system as it then existed: namely, it did not cover enough people, and the people
who were eligible to receive support from it did not receive nearly enough to sustain meaningful
economic security. As the NRPB had noted in the “Equal Access to Economic Security” section of
its 1943 report, “although social insurance programs now protect a substantial proportion of the
population against loss of income due to temporary or permanent impairment of earning power, we
have failed to make full use of this convenient and popular security device.” 58 In other words, the
federal government was doing relatively little to combat economic insecurity in old age, despite the
fact that such a goal had been at the heart of the New Deal’s rhetoric to boost collective economic
security through the use of state power.
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Perhaps aware of this discrepancy, Roosevelt had publicly shied away from further specific
comment on the NRPB’s fate or the broader subject of economic security until January 1944, when
he publicly committed himself once more to using the federal government’s resources to wage the
great fight for economic security for all Americans, including the elderly. 59 In his 1944 State of the
Union Address, in which he famously called for a second Bill of Rights focused on economic
security, Roosevelt pointedly listed “the right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old
age, sickness, accident, and unemployment” as one of the key rights and “economic truths” which
he described as “self-evident.” 60 While soaring in rhetoric, the President’s words failed to have
much of an effect on Congress, which continued to ignore the President’s proposals. By the time of
the President’s death in April 1945, the fate of his proposed second Bill of Rights remained opaque
at best.
What was becoming clear in the months that followed was that the return of peace also
meant the return of unemployment for millions of surplus war workers, who were no longer
necessary to keep the blast furnace of industrial production burning at a feverish pace. 61 The
underdevelopment of Social Security as a mechanism for preventing economic insecurity – and
thereby arresting the impoverishment of older people who were no longer actively employed – was
becoming obvious by 1946. 62 Only 33 per cent of the aged in the United States could be classified
as self-supporting; the remainder was “either helped or supported by relatives and friends and by
59
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public agencies or private philanthropy…most homes for the aged, both private and public, have
staggering waiting lists.” 63 That figure of dependent elderly people was the same as it had been in
1941, when Social Security was entering its first year of operation, and its persistence suggested that
Social Security was having a marginal effect at best on lessening poverty among older people. 64
In response to this fact finding, public attention began to turn once more to the issue of how
to best preserve the economic security of older Americans. At times, these discussions took on
alarmist tones. The New York Times portrayed the growing number of older people as a looming
threat to the vitality of American society. This threat was the prospect of a rapidly aging population,
courtesy of “a comparatively slow population growth,” which could lead to population decline in
the long-term. 65 The Times, though, was not alone in fearing the worst if nothing was done. As J.C.
Capt, the Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, warned in 1946, “the principal change will be
in the character of the dependency problem rather than its size. The shift from young-age to old-age
dependency calls for careful planning of ways and means to discharge the altered responsibility
efficiently, economically, and equitably.” 66 In order to prevent “the dependency problem” from
metastasizing, Capt urged the adoption of “programs of retraining for older workers, special job
placement services, and possibly publicity campaigns aimed at fuller utilization of this segment of
the labor supply.” 67 In addition, as the Times editorialized in December 1946, “the present [social
security] system needs a fundamental overhauling to make it universally operative on a basis that
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will enable aged persons to retire and keep body and soul together without the humiliation of
applying for supplementary relief.” 68 In its annual report two months later, the Social Security
Board concurred with the Times’s findings, and urged Congress to extend Social Security to more
workers and make its provisions more generous. 69
Congress’s response was to increase the amount of aid funneled to poorer states under Social
Security’s old age assistance provisions. While this action benefitted largely rural and Southern
states, it did little to help California or other states facing a restive and resurgent old-age pension
movement. 70 The unresolved impasse over providing economic security in old age through Social
Security and other public means soon contributed to the resumption of protracted conflict in labormanagement relations, which organized labor had, under duress from the federal government,
largely suspended during the course of World War II. Walter Reuther and other labor leaders had
labored mightily to navigate the perilous shoals of public opinion, the wartime Roosevelt
administration, and newly energized corporate management as they tried to ensure that workers in
the wartime labor force received a fair return for their efforts. 71 The holding pattern which resulted
lasted for the duration of the war, as organized labor feared alienating its sometime allies in the
Roosevelt administration by risking any sort of large-scale action to demand higher wages or better
68
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compensation. Such concerns were deferred, a development that would later come back to haunt
Reuther and other labor leaders.
Postwar Developments
The political and social situation during the first few postwar years therefore remained
fragile. At the national level, both labor and management had benefitted from the ramped up
defense needs of the nation during World War II, but business had arguably benefitted more because
it had been able to restore much of its ability to shape the currents of American politics. Moreover,
the impasse at the national level over programs like Social Security merely meant that the still
unresolved issue of economic insecurity – especially for older Americans – was left at the doorstep
of individual states, local communities, and other actors, of which the organized labor movement
was the most prominent. As J. Douglas Brown, a Princeton University economist and one of the
chief architects of the 1935 Social Security Act argued in a 1946 interview with the New York
Times, “the great cause of bitterness in labor relations today was not wages as such, but the sense of
insecurity felt by workers as human beings.” 72 According to Brown, “problems such as sickness
benefits, medical care, pension plans and dismissal payments remain fundamental causes of rancor
in bargaining negotiations, despite the Government’s social security program.” 73
Deeply cognizant of the very real limitations of Social Security to promote broad economic
security, various factions within the organized labor movement attempted to use their newly
strengthened position within the nation’s political economy to push for a more fully developed
welfare state, the broad contours of which had been outlined by Franklin Roosevelt and other New
Dealers. Despite unprecedented membership strength, organized labor’s ability to challenge the
wartime alliance forged between the federal government and a revitalized business community was
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considerably more limited than labor leaders probably wished it to be. 74 Sensing that the political
winds were shifting after the end of World War II, Walter Reuther and other labor leaders publicly
made the case for higher wages as a necessary component of the nation’s political economy to
ensure that mass purchasing power would not be weakened, lest the factors which had made the
Depression possible begin to take root once more. 75
Moreover, “the wartime economic experience had discredited the Depression-era idea that
the U.S. economy had become ‘stagnant’ or ‘mature’ and replaced such pessimism with a vision of
limitless postwar growth.” 76 As Robert M. Collins has written:
The coming of World War II resolved the ambivalence of the
Depression era, tipping the balance decisively away from the
economics of scarcity and toward economic expansion. The goals of
balance and recovery gave way to the pursuit of all-out production
and full employment. 77
In other words, the economic conditions that had contributed to the on and off partnership between
organized labor and the New Deal had been replaced by a political order in which organized labor,
which had benefitted from the New Deal’s emphasis on restoring “balance” in arranging the
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nation’s political economy, now faced a world in which the need for such balance seemed far less
compelling or necessary. Realizing that their window of political opportunity was swiftly closing,
Reuther, Philip Murray, and other labor leaders struggled mightily to forge a tripartite pact between
the federal government, labor, and corporate management, which would stabilize relations among
the three and make it possible to create “the sort of democratic corporatism that came to characterize
countries like Austria, Sweden, and Germany in the 1950s and 1960s.” 78 This pact, which Reuther
eagerly yearned for, did not materialize, in part because of divisions among trade unionists, and also
because the administration of President Harry S. Truman offered lukewarm support at best to this
effort, a reflection of the administration’s frustration with organized labor after a series of strikes
shook the nation between 1945 and 1946. 79
Above

all

else,

the

strident

opposition

of

corporate

America

prevented

the

institutionalization of an American form of democratic corporatism in the late 1940s. As Nelson
Lichtenstein has observed,
The CIO had profoundly misjudged the tenor of the postwar business
community. The progressive industrialists with whom the industrial
union federation hoped to achieve an accord…were in fact a relative
uninfluential minority. Key business spokesmen were the practical
conservatives who presided over the core manufacturing firms in
steel, chemical, electrical, auto, rubber, and transport
industries…These industrialists had emerged from the war with
enormous sophistication and self-confidence…They felt little need for
the kind of state-sponsored labor-management collaboration that
78

Ibid., pg. 226. See also Kevin Boyle’s analysis of this period in his The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism
1945-1968 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pgs. 1-9, which, while partly agreeing with Lichtenstein’s analysis
of Walter Reuther and the UAW in The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit also challenges it by positing that “Walter
Reuther and his supporters…were not the harbingers of the postwar liberal order but rather the inheritors of the social
democratic ideological and political formations Steve Fraser has so effectively traced for the 1930s and early 1940s. The
UAW leadership did not abandon this social democratic agenda in the late 1940s. On the contrary, Reuther and the
UAW leadership continued to promote democratic economic planning and an expanded welfare state throughout the
1950s and 1960s. They did so, moreover, at the highest levels of government.” (Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of
American Liberalism, 4). In Boyle’s interpretation, it is the continuing power of Southern Democrats and their ability to
neuter or outright block progressive legislation sponsored by a UAW unhappily housed within the same umbrella of the
Democratic Party which was largely responsible for the UAW’s valiant but ill-fated attempts to successfully advance a
social democratic policy agenda. (Ibid., 5).
79
Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, pg. 227.

131

helped legitimize a mixed capitalist economy in Germany, France,
and Italy in the immediate postwar era. 80
Flush with confidence and enjoying a near-miraculous rejuvenation in their fortunes not seen since
before the onset of the Great Depression, most corporate leaders saw no reason to parley with
Reuther, Murray, or any other labor leader. Instead, “executives of corporations at the core of
American industry sought the restoration of the managerial prerogatives that wartime conditions had
eroded in the areas of product pricing, market allocation, and shop-floor work environment.” 81
Consequently, “they were intensely suspicious of the kind of New Deal social engineering favored
by labor, and only with some reluctance did they accommodate themselves to the modest degree of
economic stimulation that would later go by the name “commercial Keynesianism.” 82
Instead, corporate leaders sought to “be free of government or union interference in
determining the wage-price relationship in each industry.” 83 Eager to avoid being in situation where
a savvy labor union leader like Reuther would have a real say in setting the terms of the “wage-price
relationship,” corporations like General Motors and the Ford Motor Company instead acceded to
union demands for improved benefits and private pensions, provided that those pensions remained
firmly under the control of corporate management. The pattern of postwar collective bargaining was
thereby set: organized labor and corporate management would periodically do battle over private
welfare benefits, an arena in which corporate leaders gradually realized could be turned to their
advantage. As Joshua Freeman has written:
Private and public welfare benefits were intimately linked. The Auto
Workers’ and Steelworkers’ drives for company pensions stemmed
from the inadequacies of Social Security. Inflation had eaten away at
the spending power of federal retirement payments, which in 1948
averaged only $25 a month, and nearly half the country’s workers
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were not covered by the program at all. Business opposition had
blocked repeated efforts to improve benefits by raising taxes. The CIO
unions, by demanding that employers provide retirement benefits
above and beyond Social Security payments, created an incentive for
business to drop its opposition to improving the government system. 84
The CIO’s overriding economic policy priority in the immediate postwar years was to support
“extensive governmental action” in order to prevent economic stagnation.

85

Realizing the

increasingly high stakes in its fight with management over how best to provide economic security
for older workers and retirees, organized labor recognized that Social Security would be insufficient
to fulfill this purpose. 86
As Harry Becker, the Director of the UAW-CIO’s Social Security Department observed in a
December 1949 speech before the American Economic Association and Industrial Relations
Research Association:
The retirement problem can be quite simply stated. We have an aging
population with the proportion of old to young increasing; the
expectations of living longer are increasing; and the cost of living
longer is sharply upwards in trend...The economic impact of the
problems is accentuated by the lack of an organized and universal
program assuring financial security to the worker when he is no
longer able to work whether the reason be primarily age or
incapacity. 87
The “lack of an organized and universal program” which Becker highlighted in his speech was
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an obvious reference to the Social Security Act. As Becker continued,
When the Social Security Act was passed in 1935 there were hopes
that public social insurance legislation was the solution to the
problem. These hopes have not been realized. Those who framed and
supported the Federal social security program had conceived of this
legislation as the foundation for an integrated approach to provide
economic security for those who had served industry and society. 88
Instead of serving as a permanent solution to the problem of old age economic insecurity, Social
Security had, as Becker then suggested, contributed to its further irresolution. As he noted, Social
Security’s Old Age Assistance program, which had been “conceived as a stop-gap and auxiliary
program” had instead become “the basic approach to the problem,” and that “county and state poor
relief” remained “the only universal provision for incapacity.” 89
After having painted Social Security and other old age assistance programs as fragmented,
piecemeal, and ultimately inadequate, Becker then enunciated labor’s proposed solution, which
would remain at the heart of its postwar political strategy for the next several decades. What labor
wanted, in Becker’s words, was a
[t]wo-way drive for social security…a drive on the legislative front
and a drive on the collective bargaining front. Labor’s position is that
to the extent that adequate security for workers is not provided
through governmental programs the problem of workers’ security will
be taken to the collective bargaining table. Economic security for the
worker when he is no longer able to work is as fundamental a concern
of the Union as wages and working conditions. 90
As Becker fatefully observed, “security for union members only or for members of those Unions
with sufficient economic strength to win their collective bargaining demands is not an adequate
solution because the problem of insecurity is common to all segments of our society.” 91 If organized
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labor wanted to continue to speak credibly on behalf of all American workers – regardless of
whether or not they were union members – then it had to continue to fight for “inclusive Federal
legislation and good public administration” so that “all workers in America can be assured of an
equitable retirement income based upon employment, whether it be in industry or in other economic
pursuits. The basic retirement income program must provide protection for all workers in the
economy. Protection must be more stable, continuous and broader in scope than can be achieved in
private and isolated pension plans.” 92
While Becker painted an ominous picture in his remarks about the state of security for older
workers approaching retirement, his conclusion, that “the purposes for which the [Social Security]
legislation was enacted in 1935 have been in large measure negated for the millions of aged persons
who are without any means of support when their pay checks stop,” was supported by the
continuing discontent in California, where old-age pension advocates and opponents battled over
that state’s pension plan, and by similar rumblings in Colorado. 93 Corporate leaders like C.E.
Wilson, the President of the General Motors Corporation, had also taken note of the increasing
inadequacy of Social Security, and had at least publicly expressed some measure of support for
strengthening the Social Security system. 94
Believing that labor and management had therefore reached a rare place of agreement and
accord about the need to increase the economic support available to older and retired workers,
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Becker outlined the UAW’s position on private pension plans. 95 Namely, the UAW held that they
should be “formulated and administered by a Board of Administration on which the Union and
Management have equal representation and that this Board should have an impartial chairman
selected from the general public.” 96 But joint administration of private pension plans was a bridge
too far for most corporate managers, who had traditionally viewed such plans as their sole
prerogative and not open to negotiation or question. Unions like the UAW-CIO wanted joint
administration not only to “assure democratic administration” of such plans, but also to ensure that
there would be a “degree of employee participation and identification with the program that would
not otherwise be possible.” 97 For much the same reason, management wanted to ensure that unions
would have no say whatsoever in the administration of private pension plans. In essence,
management hoped to use such plans to inculcate the values of corporate management among its
workforce, while unions wanted to use such plans as a way to make sure that workers would be sure
to associate pensions as a hard-won right exacted by collective bargaining rather than a generous
and benevolent gift on the part of management.
Ultimately, though, the UAW hoped that the need for private pension plans which Becker
repeatedly referred to as “supplementary,” would be rendered largely obsolete by improvements to
Social Security. 98 “As public programs are strengthened during the next few years the pressure for
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supplementation through collective bargaining will be lessened.” 99 The CIO-UAW’s embrace of
private pensions was therefore guided by the hope that they would be a short-term, stop-gap fix and
not a long-term, permanent solution to the problem of economic insecurity in old age. Ironically,
then, while organized labor had been lukewarm and somewhat distant in its relationship to Social
Security when it had first been enacted in 1935, it had now come to embrace the program in a much
more wholehearted way.
Failing to Revive the New Deal
As organized labor and corporate management struggled to define the terms of economic
security during the early postwar years, liberals within the Democratic Party hoped the return of
peace would revive the New Deal’s reformist impulse. 100 As they soon found out, reviving the New
Deal was easier said than done. Consequently, the fight over the New Deal’s incomplete legacy took
place on many different fronts during the immediate postwar years, with the battle over national
health insurance occupying perhaps the most bitterly fought-over ground. That conflict, which
erupted between the Truman administration and the American Medical Association during the late
1940s, would inadvertently contribute to the rise of the senior state. The calamitous political defeat
that liberals eventually suffered would prod them into an embrace of a more limited version of the
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welfare state than they had originally hoped for, with the thin consolation that perhaps one day it
might serve as the foundation for a more expansive one.
In 1945 and 1946, though, it was not yet clear how the fight over national health insurance
would turn out. Liberals in the Democratic Party and elsewhere believed the cause of national health
insurance was self-evident – provided the public was properly educated about the benefits that
would accrue from national health insurance. Leading the charge for national health insurance was
the Federal Security Agency within the Truman administration. However, the Truman
administration’s seemingly halfhearted commitment to the legacy of the New Deal gradually
became a source of frustration for many liberals, who became increasingly concerned that the
impasse at the federal level over social and economic policy was amplifying problems at the local
and state level. In a December 1947 column in the New York Times, John J. Corson, the Director of
the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Bureau of the Social Security Board and one of the architects
of the original Social Security Act, observed that one in three people over the age of 65 was
receiving public aid, and that this figure was expected to continue growing, despite the return of
sustained economic prosperity in the late 1940s. 101 Corson argued that it was the responsibility of
the “government…[to] guarantee each family a minimum of well-being,” which he defined as
meaning “every man, woman or child who can’t work and is without wages be assured a definite,
minimum cash income; and second, that every family, without regard to its ability to pay…be
assured medical care and decent housing,” instead of allowing fragmented and duplicative public
assistance programs in states and local communities to continue growing at an unchecked rate. 102
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Corson’s public plea for a revival at the federal level of New Deal-style economic security
measures signaled to the Truman administration that it needed to shore up its liberal flank before the
upcoming presidential election. The administration thus began making efforts to woo disaffected
New Deal liberals back into the fold during the winter and spring of 1948 with broad public gestures
designed to demonstrate that it had not forgotten the New Deal’s unfinished work. 103 Specifically, in
May 1948, President Truman recommended a comprehensive expansion of Social Security that
advocated adding 20,000,000 workers under the program’s umbrella, a measure that was highly
symbolic, at best, given the fact that the Republican-controlled Congress was unlikely to embrace
any such measure. Alongside its muscular embrace of Social Security, the Truman administration
had already begun to publically espouse the cause of national health insurance with a vigor that
surprised many liberals.
The administration’s new tack had begun in the fall of 1947, when President Truman had
asked Oscar R. Ewing, a corporate lawyer and longtime Democratic Party official in New York
State, to serve as the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency (FSA). 104 While Ewing lacked
any formal training or experience in the practice of medicine, he did bring an evangelical fervor and
a lawyerly tenacity to his new position, which helped to reestablish the administration’s bona fides
with disaffected liberals. Late in January 1948, Truman publicly charged Ewing with the task of
“undertak[ing] a comprehensive study of the possibilities for raising health levels,” an innocuous-
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sounding command that would have tremendous political ramifications for the administration. 105
Ewing dutifully carried out the President’s request, and presented his final report “The Nation's
Health: a Ten Year Program,” in early September 1948 to the President. 106 Ewing had worked hard
to build a broad base of support in the nation’s medical and health community for the
administration’s program, and had managed to garner the begrudging participation of the American
Medical Association (A.M.A.), the main lobbying organization and professional membership
society for the nation’s doctors.

Figure 4. Oscar R. Ewing (center) is sworn as Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, August 27, 1947.
Photo courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library.
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The A.M.A.’s participation in the administration’s study of the nation’s health needs,
though, had not lessened its opposition to the administration’s desire for a new national health
insurance system, potentially along the lines of the recently enacted National Health Service in the
United Kingdom. Ewing, characteristically, refused to back down from his pursuit of this goal.
Speaking before the American Medical Association’s House of Delegates meeting in Cleveland,
Ohio, he made the case for national health insurance. At the same time, he extended an olive branch
to the assembled physicians by expressing his hope that the Federal Security Agency and the
A.M.A. might yet find common ground on other issues, such as support for “more and better
medical education, for more hospitals, for local diagnostic clinics, for local health officers.” 107
Ewing’s attempts to conciliate the AMA fell mainly on deaf ears, as he later bitterly recalled:
[t]he American Medical Association wanted to be the exclusive
sovereign of medicine. They didn't want the Government to have a
thing to do with medicine. … They raised the awful specter of
Government control. As a matter of fact, Government didn't want
control, I know, because I was in the driver's seat at that time. 108
Though the Truman administration would, in conjunction with Congress, later enact legislation
providing for greatly increased medical research, such laws were merely a consolation prize when
considered against the goal of national health insurance. Ewing would labor valiantly over the
course of 1948 to generate support from a motley coalition of private voluntary organizations
willing to support the Truman administration’s domestic policy programs, but more often than not
such efforts yielded limited results. 109
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Shifting from Health Insurance for All to Health Insurance for Some
Ultimately, Ewing and the administration’s efforts to secure the enactment of national health
insurance would not be entirely in vain. After the President’s proposed national health insurance
plan had been defeated in Congress in 1949, liberals like Ewing and Wilbur Cohen began to
examine ways of gradually securing enactment of national health insurance, albeit in a gradual and
incremental fashion. 110 One promising area in which Ewing and his colleagues began to focus on
was the issue of health care solely for older Americans. As John Thurston, a senior aide to Ewing
later recalled, the administration’s study of the nation’s health needs throughout 1948 “brought into
relief many problems related to our aging population. As a result, Mr. Ewing asked me to establish
an [a]gency committee to review the situation and to report to him on how adequately existing
programs were meeting the need of older people.” 111 As Thurston related, this informal committee
helped lay the groundwork for the Truman administration’s National Conference on Aging held in
the summer of 1950.
By focusing on the health needs of the elderly, Ewing and his colleagues hoped to enact a
partially universal national health insurance that would include only the elderly, but which could
serve as an experimental model of sorts to demonstrate the virtues of a national, universal health
FDR’s Four Freedoms, albeit in a minor key. Ewing’s proposal, while evident of the continuing hold such aspirations of
using the federal government to safeguard individual economic and social security, sank without much of a trace in
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insurance system encompassing all Americans. That assumption, of course, rested on the success of
the initial program aimed at older Americans. Assuming such success, Ewing hoped that future
administrations would be able to build on it and expand it over time, and that universal national
health insurance would be achieved in a slow but sustained manner, much as Social Security had
gradually been expanded to include more classes of workers, as well as more groups that previously
had been excluded.
Ewing and the Truman administration’s shift to prioritizing the health care of elderly people
may have also benefitted from the popular discontent among older Americans that had begun to
emerge once more during the late 1940s. In late May 1948, the New York Times reported that Dr.
Francis Townsend had resumed speaking tours throughout the country. Backed by the support of a
numerically diminished base of supporters, Townsend’s tours hinted that the underlying conditions
of economic insecurity among older people in the Great Depression that had fueled the growth of
the Townsend Movement during the 1930s had begun to reassert themselves. The continuing
viability of the Movement owed much to the continuing inadequacy of the Social Security system.
As the New York Times observed in late 1948, after President Truman’s upset victory in that year’s
presidential race,
Congress had been urged repeatedly to broaden and change the
Federal Social Security program. During the presidential campaign
just ended leaders of both political parties added their voices to this
plea. And there can be no doubting the need. A good many aging
people in this country face the dismaying fact that the Social Security
system cannot keep the wolf from their doors. 112
The net result of congressional inaction, though, was to effectively shift the problem of managing
economic insecurity among older people shifted back to the states and localities, many of which
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lacked either adequate resources or infrastructure to actually accomplish the goal of controlling the
spread of elderly poverty.
Despite lacking adequate resources, the desire of some state and local politicians to garner
votes had led them to once more embrace the cause of state-financed pensions for older people. In
December 1948, at the annual meeting of the Americana Public Welfare Association (A.P.W.A.),
the major professional gathering of leading public welfare administrators in the United States,
APWA Director Howard L. Russell expressed alarm that an increasing number of states had
instituted pension plans for persons over the age of 65 with loose eligibility requirements. As
Russell publicly fretted, “we believe the aged should receive adequate help, but the whole picture of
welfare services must be considered…[s]tates with pension programs use up so much of their
welfare resources for the aged that they bankrupt themselves where other welfare services…are
concerned.” 113 Russell’s alarm was echoed by J. Douglas Brown, a Princeton economist and one of
the architects of the original Social Security Act, who warned in April 1949 that “unless
contributory social insurance is strengthened and enlarged now, it may be displaced ‘by its more
demanding step-sisters, assistance and relief.” 114
Russell’s and Brown’s concerns did not go unheeded by Ewing and other liberals in the
Truman administration. In their eyes, the surprise election results in November 1948 that returned
Harry Truman to the White House seemed to be nothing less than an ex post facto vindication of the
embattled administration’s domestic policy agenda. 115 Flush with victory in the months following
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Truman’s victory, Ewing took to the stump to campaign on behalf of the newly reinvigorated
administration. The time had finally come, in Ewing’s mind, for the resumption of the reforms
promised or even tentatively outlined in the New Deal’s waning days. 116 Moreover, by enacting
these reforms, the United States would be able to demonstrate its commitment to the sort of broad,
sweeping rethinking of the social compact that had become de rigueur in much of war-torn Western
Europe. 117 On June 20, 1949, Ewing spoke before the New York Public Welfare Association to rally
its support for the administration’s proposed improvements to the Social Security system. 118 Though
Ewing repeatedly emphasized the cooperative nature of federal social welfare efforts, his words
appear to have had little effect in generating favorable press coverage or swaying public opinion in
favor of the administration’s proposals.
Instead, by late 1949, public opinion on the issue of old-age pensions was approaching a
degree of volatility not seen since the halcyon days of the Townsend Movement fifteen years earlier.
The New York Times’s coverage of the labor-management strife in the steel and automobile
manufacturing industries and the fights over old-age pensions in California and Colorado,
contributed to an increasingly feverish atmosphere. 119 As John J. Corson, one of the original

Oscar R. Ewing, Speech – Women’s City Club, Boston, Massachusetts, December 7th, 1948 folder, in the Box 41, the
Papers of Oscar R. Ewing, Federal Security Agency, Speeches and Articles – 1950, HSTL.
116
Ibid. See also Ewing’s article “More Security for You,” in the January 1949 issue of The American Magazine in
Oscar R. Ewing, Article – “More Security for You,” The American Magazine, January 1949 folder, in the Box 41, the
Papers of Oscar R. Ewing, Federal Security Agency, Speeches and Articles – 1950, HSTL.
117
See Tony Judt, Postwar: Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2006), for a further treatment of this subject.
Ewing in essence wanted to rekindle the sort of “Atlantic crossing” which had marked American reform before World
War II, and his commitment to a transnational variety of social reform was demonstrated by his and other FSA staff
member visits to Western Europe (particularly Great Britain) during the late 1940s in order to learn more about the new
social welfare systems then being designed and implemented in that region. See Rodgers’ discussion of the New Deal in
Atlantic Crossings, 415-417.
118
Oscar R. Ewing, Address before the 79th Annual Dinner Meeting of the New York Public Welfare Association, June
20, 1949, Speech – New York Public Welfare Association, Lake George, N.Y. (June 20, 1949) file, Federal Secur.
Agency Subj. File, Federal Security Agency – General Correspondence, Box 29, Papers of Oscar R. Ewing, HSTL.
119
See, for example, Seymour E. Harris’s article “What to Do With 18 Million Aged?” The New York Times, July 10,
1949, which argued that “Social Security may make a contribution but so far the Government’s insurance program has
been niggardly and unresponsive…surely a sensible approach is a Social Security program for the aged which will
eventually cost $20 billion, with (say) two-thirds to be paid by the workers or their employers and one-third by the
general taxpayer…this is the way to counter the semi-crank movements – the Townsend Plan and the extreme Rankin

145

architects of the Social Security Act observed in the pages of the Times, “Americans must appear
pension mad to the world at large,” partly because “existing [pension] arrangements are not
satisfactory…the problem of the aged is relentlessly growing.” 120
In order to solve this “relentlessly growing” problem of economic insecurity (and by
extension, increasing dependency) on the part of older Americans, Corson could only offer cold
comfort to political liberals. Arguing that “there is little evidence that Congress proposes to adopt a
rational system of public old-age security that will fit the needs of the aged as well as the bounds of
our economy,” Corson argued, instead, for a piecemeal expansion of Social Security, in the hope
that doing so might prevent state governments from “forego[ing] the temptation to make political
capital of assistance for the needy aged,” a temptation which Corson suspected state officials, in
order to secure votes from grateful older voters, had given into. 121 Corson cautioned Times readers
that “this prescription must be taken promptly if we are to meet rationally, and without tempting
national bankruptcy, the unavoidable problem of old-age dependency.” If it was not, Corson
warned, pro-pension organized groups would eventually “force through a pension for everyone at
65…with staggering costs to the national economy or the stronger unions will win relatively high
pensions for a favored group of employees, and more money will be poured into the relief method
of caring for the aged.” 122
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Corson’s warnings were not merely idle or solitary threats. In subsequent issues of the
Times, other social welfare experts chimed in, echoing his concerns. New York City Welfare
Commissioner Raymond M. Hilliard argued that existing Social Security benefits were
“preposterously insufficient,” and that “this country might not be facing strikes in the steel and other
industries if adequate social security benefits had been put into effect.” 123 At its annual conference
that year, the Western Governor’s Conference went on record “in favor of ‘broad extension’ of
Social Security and liberalization of benefits under a contributory plan” and declared “such a
program to be ‘much preferable’ to the present old age assistance afforded only after persons
become destitute,” a remarkable feat, given that the delegation of twelve state governors at the
conference was neatly and evenly split between the two major political parties. 124
A few months after Corson’s column appeared in the Times, California’s voters, in yet
another round of that state’s seemingly endless war over old-age pensions, cut back much of the
state’s existing old-age pension rolls by increasing eligibility requirements needed to qualify for
public assistance. 125 While the November 1949 electoral results in California undoubtedly reassured
anxious elected public officials in that state and elsewhere, a deep and growing sense of unease
persisted in the business community, which remained deeply divided on the merits of publicprovided old-age pensions.
From his perch as Treasurer and Director at the Eastman Kodak Company, Marion B.
Folsom, a stalwart member of the Republican Party’s eastern wing and one of the drafters of the
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original Social Security Act, began to sound the alarm over what he perceived as the rising threat of
fiscally unsustainable state pensions. At a late November 1949 meeting of the National Industrial
Conference Board, Folsom argued that
unless steps are taken very soon to strengthen the contributory
insurance plan, the country faces the grave danger of losing this plan
by default and adopting the charity approach entirely. The aim should
be to extend the insurance program as soon as possible to all those
gainfully employed and then to shift the Old Age Assistance entirely
to the states for those who cannot be covered adequately under the
insurance program. 126
In essence, Folsom was trying to make the case to his fellow corporate executives that it was in their
self-interest to support expanding Social Security. In his concluding remarks to the assembled
conference attendees, Folsom pointedly stated that
businessmen now have a great opportunity to assist in solving the
problem of providing economic protection for the aged…they should
first support early Congressional action to extend the coverage of the
contributory Old Age Insurance Plan to most of those gainfully
employed and to bring the benefits more in line with present living
costs. Secondly, companies without pension plans should study their
particular situation to determine if a supplementary plan is necessary
to provide adequate protection for the worker who has spent his
lifetime in industry. 127
If businessmen undertook these two tasks, Folsom assured them “these plans, both government and
private, if kept on a reasonable basis should not be considered as conflicting with the private
enterprise system. On the other hand, they should prove to be strong adjuncts to it.” 128
Folsom’s viewpoint was not particularly popular in the business community. In contrast to
Folsom’s argument for an enlightened corporate liberalism, the historically anti-union National
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Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.) vigorously denounced the promotion of the “welfare state”
and “statism” on the part of the Truman administration a few weeks later at an annual meeting. 129
Seemingly against Folsom’s enunciation of the need for corporate leadership in the realm of social
welfare, the assembled speakers at the N.A.M. meeting instead “charged that business, big and
small, had failed to make its case understandable or convincing, either nationally or among its own
neighbors and friends.” 130 As Lee H. Bristol, president of the Bristol-Myers Company, stated in his
remarks, “communications is a two-way street and we’ve got to see that we are effective from our
end of it,” and urged that management instead do more to communicate to its employees, lest they
“follow the false gods and carry all of us to the precipice.” 131
The mood at the N.A.M. meeting was that one of combativeness rather than cooperation,
with most of the assembled business leaders more inclined to do battle with organized labor.
N.A.M.’s attitude on the question of expanding public assistance of any sort – whether through the
Social Security system or otherwise - was part and parcel of the larger struggle over public and
private pensions that roiled the politics of the late 1940s and into the early 1950s. Despite the hopes
and original intentions of the architects of the 1935 Social Security Act, the law’s old age assistance
program rather than its old age insurance program had become increasingly ensconced as a
permanent feature of the nation’s public welfare system. The limited breadth of old age insurance’s
eligible worker categories and the meager benefits that it offered meant that much of the burden of
supporting retired workers fell chiefly upon either private industry, old age assistance, or western
states like California, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Oregon in which old-age advocacy groups had been
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able to successfully utilize popular referendums to enact statewide old age pension systems. 132
Howard L. Russell, the director of the American Public Welfare Association, charged that these
groups represented “a very serious threat to good public welfare administration.” 133 California’s
enacted old-age pension stood at $75 per month in 1949 for all residents over the age of 63, which
led to fears that older people would move to the state in order to take advantage of its relative
generosity. 134
Unlike New York’s old age pension system, with its more stringent requirements,
California’s pension made no stipulation that family members of pension recipients were obliged to
provide support as well, and it included a modest prior residency requirement of only five years,
rather than ten or fifteen. 135 As a result, the cost of old age pensions in California had risen to 17%
of the state’s overall billion-dollar budget, and was projected to continue rising, sparking fears that
the pension system might eventually bankrupt the state. 136 Likewise, in Washington State, Governor
Arthur B. Langlie publicly warned that “the state may face bankruptcy unless welfare aid is reduced
drastically,” with publicly-supported pensions accounting for 43% of Washington’s state budget in
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1949. 137 Unsurprisingly, in November 1949 a conference of western governors had urged a “broad
extension” of Social Security and “liberalization of benefits under a contributory plan” in the hope
of shifting the costs of old-age economic security off of their ledgers and to the federal government
and workers contributing into Social Security’s national old-age insurance program. 138
Strengthening Social Security?
The developing national crisis around old age economic insecurity had, by the end of 1949,
led to an emergent recognition among Federal and state officials that Social Security’s old age
insurance system needed to be greatly augmented. 139 As the New York Times reported in December
1949, approximately 1 in 4 people over the age of 65 was receiving public assistance of some sort,
and the cost of supporting them stood at roughly nine times what it had been in 1936, the last year
before the enactment of Social Security. 140 Signs of alarm were not limited to federal and state
policymakers. The commercial insurance industry, for example, which had long been in the
vanguard against Social Security, had come to begrudgingly embrace Social Security’s old age
insurance system, in part because its actuarial calculations had unsurprisingly revealed that neither
the federal nor the state governments would be able to adequately shoulder the burden of old age
dependency if the number of older people in need of assistance continued to rise at an exponential
rate. 141 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, recognizing that unions would continue to push for
pension plans so long as Social Security remained inadequate, suddenly found religion on the
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subject and began to dampen (though not entirely withdraw) its criticism of the program as one
more step on the slippery slope towards socialism. 142
Likewise, nine months after its fiery 1949 annual meeting, the N.A.M. had taken stock of the
generous contracts which the UAW and the USWA had won from the Ford Motor and Bethlehem
Steel companies. As an internal N.A.M. report observed, “1949 saw pension proposals assume the
status of major demands as some unions exerted industry-wide or nation-wide power and sought to
impose a standardized benefit plan package on various industries.” 143 Consequently, the N.A.M.
recommended that its member companies make a “full exploration” as to whether or not they should
adopt a private pension plan; in N.A.M.’s words, “although the many legal complexities
surrounding compulsory bargaining on pensions seem to impose stumbling blocks in the way of
employee initiation of plans, the several advantages which can accrue as the result of the
establishment of a sound program may outweigh these difficulties.” 144
In other words, N.A.M. was advising its members that it was in their best interest to develop
a private pension program or else run the risk of having one thrust upon them during collective
bargaining agreements that might give far too much power to labor unions. 145 By linking such plans
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with Social Security, corporate managers could avoid having to carry the entire cost of a
noncontributory pension program and possibly generate and earn employee loyalty by offering such
plans as a preemptive tactical move in the ongoing battle with organized labor. 146 As N.A.M.
described it, private pension plans should “be constructed so as not to place an undue burden on the
company during years of poor earnings but at the same time provide for employees as they retire in
a fashion that, when added to social security, will give adequate retirement income.” 147 In N.A.M.’s
telling, private pensions were neither paternalistic nor necessarily reflective of an enlarged sense of
social responsibility on the part of management; rather, they were a tool or a device which, if used
properly, could help to wean workers away from the clarion call of union solidarity. Hinting at the
continuing communications benefits a private pension plan could offer, N.A.M. observed that
“during the years of employees’ participation in the plan, there is considerable necessity for reselling it because the details become vague as employees are unaware of the continuing cost to the
company and because such benefits sometimes are taken for granted.” 148
While N.A.M. and its constituent members debated how best to approach the dual issues of
private pensions and the question of whether or not to support expanding Social Security, Ewing
and his allies within the Truman administration found themselves grasping for a new way to
approach the issue of national health insurance. After the highly publicized defeat of the Truman
administration in the fight over national health insurance at the hands of the American Medical
company and the needs of the employees can be a strong antidote to unreasonable union demands.” (Underlining in
original).
146
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Association in 1949, Oscar Ewing and other senior level administrators decided to try a different
method to build public support for national health insurance. 149 On June 7 1950, with President
Truman’s blessing, Ewing announced that the Federal Security Agency was inviting experts on
aging to convene in Washington in two months’ time in order to explore “the various problems
incident to our increasingly older population.” 150
Ewing’s colleague Clark Tibbitts, to whom Ewing largely delegated the administration of
the conference, thereafter traveled to various universities in order to drum up further interest in the
academic community for the federal government’s efforts, while Ewing reached out to the
administration’s organized labor allies. 151 Tibbitts, a pioneer in the field of gerontological research
at the University of Michigan’s Institute for Human Research, where he and his colleague Wilma
Donahue had planned and executed pioneering studies of Washtenaw County, Michigan’s older
population that had begun to supply badly-needed economic and social information to local and
state officials in Michigan. In addition to his connection to the University of Michigan, Tibbitts had
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been a student of the famed sociologist Ernest W. Burgess at the University of Chicago, and had
extensive contacts within the growing community of academic gerontologists, social welfare
experts, and elected or appointed public officials who were interested in taking a more active
approach to the needs of older people.
Ewing and Tibbitts recognized that while the Social Security’s old age and survivors’
insurance provision was designed to address economic security for older Americans, its limited size
and benefits meant the public assistance rolls would continue to rise with the rising population of
older Americans. A fiscal crisis thereby loomed on the horizon for both the federal and state
governments if measures were not taken to halt and reverse the growing financial dependency of
older people on federal and state grants-in-aid under the Social Security system. 152 In a June 1950
speech to the United Textile Workers of America Convention, Ewing made the case for the
necessity of the aging conference, observing that
I do not think any of us are so limited in our thinking that we would
be ready to assume that Social Security benefits could possibly solve
all the problems arising from the aging of our population…The dream
of every man and woman is to be able to live a full and happy life, and
to grow old gracefully, with security, contentment, and dignity. 153
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As both Ewing and Tibbitts realized, the issue of expanding federal protection for older Americans
had to be handled gently, for fear that too swift government action might provoke cries of
encouraging older Americans to become overly dependent on the federal welfare state. 154 Instead,
Ewing and the Federal Security Agency stressed the conference’s necessity based on demographic
changes such as the large-scale shift from a rural to a more urban population, and the extended life
span of older Americans. By emphasizing these factors, Ewing hoped to position the conference as
apolitical as possible, despite the obvious fact that its hoped-for recommendations would generate
proposals for governmental action at the local, state, and federal levels. 155
In August 1950, the first ever National Conference on Aging convened in Washington,
D.C. 156 In his well-publicized opening message to the conference attendees decrying the evils of
arbitrary age limits on retirement, President Truman expressed his hope that the conference would
produce recommendations for his and future administrations to act on in order to combat the
creeping increase in poverty among older Americans. 157 Truman emphasized the dangers of forcing
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skilled workers out of employment “at a time like the present when we need increasing production
to insure our national security.” 158 In his letter to the conference attendees, he asserted that
Arbitrary age limits deprive us of some of our best workers…I would
like to emphasize that the work of this Conference is of great
significance to the strengthening of our democratic way of life. Our
country is committed to the proposition that there should be
opportunities for every citizen in it to use his abilities to the utmost as
a member of his community. As we increase the opportunities for our
older citizens to stand on their own feet, and live out their lives in
self-respect, free from fear and want, we shall be helping to fulfill the
promise of our free society. 159
While the President’s message to the conference did receive significant and largely favorable
newspaper coverage, neither it nor the conference itself succeeded in moving the dial of public
opinion in any meaningful way. 160
In part, this negligible effect may have reflected the ambivalence and indecision on display
at the conference itself. While the various panels agreed that there were many problems facing older
Americans, the delegates seemed conflicted as to how the government could best help older people
in declining neighborhoods and communities scattered across the nation. Was it best for the federal
government to improve the eligibility and benefits available to retirees under the Social Security
system, an approach the President seemed to strongly support, even as it ran the risk of arousing the
still virulent critics of the administration who claimed it would undermine American individual selfreliance, a claim that the administration had never properly addressed or rebutted? Or was it best to
encourage private employers to retain older workers rather than compel them to retire at age 65 (or
some other age), thereby provoking the attention of the N.A.M. or other like-minded business
organizations, which would likely oppose any intervention by the administration in the affairs of
158
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private companies as symptomatic of an out-of-control federal government slouching towards
socialism? No good answers were apparent, nor did any appear on the horizon.
The conference’s limited objectives also seemed to be designed to avoid controversy, and
tended toward the banal, such as the need “to stimulate the exchange of ideas among persons of
varied experience, with a view to solving problems of the Aging through voluntary and public
organizations in each State, city, and community” and promotion of research on the problems of
older people “in fields [such] as employment, health, education, recreation, rehabilitation and social
and psychological adjustment.”
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Assuming an almost defensive tone, Ewing assured the

conference attendees on opening day that “the Federal Government has merely undertaken to
provide the services and machinery for this conference…the thinking, the discussions, and the
conclusions of the next three days will be the product, not of government, but if private citizens who
have gathered here as experts and authorities in their personal and professional capacities.” 162
Qualifiers aside, Ewing ensured that the conference would be as open to the press as possible in
order to generate interest in the proceedings. The press responded with half-hearted concern; the
war in Korea, not surprisingly, provided much more compelling copy for newspapers in the late
summer of 1950.
The Aftermath of the 1950 Conference
Despite being largely drowned out by the press coverage of events in Korea, the
conference’s official findings would have growing importance in the years to come for local, state,
and federal officials as they wrestled with the issue of old age economic insecurity. The various
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working groups assembled under the conference’s aegis marshalled some arresting statistics that
suggested just how much mass suburbanization was beginning to alter the structure of many
American families. 163 Increasingly, the conference found, many older Americans lived in “smaller
families” largely consisting of aging couples separated from their children and grandchildren. 164 Of
course, there were plenty of widows, widowers, and unmarried elderly people. Attendees repeatedly
– and incorrectly as it turned out – argued that the American population would likely fall in the
future due to a declining birth rate. Statistics later provided by the 1950 Census would reveal a
dramatically different portrait of America’s changing demography, courtesy of the postwar Baby
Boom.
The emphasis on a shrinking population added a sense of urgency to the conference’s final
report. Many of the attendees seemed inclined to believe that the nation’s overall population would
stagnate whilst its elderly population would continue to increase at a disproportionately high rate,
courtesy of improvements in nutrition and medical care, and that this rising number of older people
would eventually place a yoke around the younger generations of Americans who still remained
active participants in the nation’s labor force and the chief source of its tax receipts. In essence,
while the attendees did not believe that the nation was facing a demographic crisis just yet, they
believed that it was fast approaching on the horizon, and that steps needed to be taken – quickly – to
ensure that the nation’s institutions (public and private) would be ready to handle it. As a conference
summary later stated, “older people constitute the most rapidly growing portion of our
population.” 165 Using data from prior Census reports, the delegates had calculated that the number
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of Americans aged 65 years or older constituted 4.1% of the overall U.S. population (and numbered
approximately 3 million individuals), and that these figures had risen to 7.6% of the overall
population (and numbered approximately 11 ¼ million individuals) by 1949. 166
Also striking were the conference attendees’ frank acknowledgments that they frequently
lacked sufficient information to adduce solutions to the problems of an aging population. 167 As a
summary report of the conference bluntly stated:
Very little is known about the number of aged persons with income
from other sources, i.e., insurance annuities, private retirement
systems, investments and other types of savings, contributions from
friends or relatives, etc. There is only scanty information, also, on the
extent to which income is received from more than one source.
Surveys indicate that generally speaking, the larger the aged person’s
income, the larger the number of sources from which it is derived. 168
What the attendees at the National Conference on Aging did know, though, was that “the surveys
made by the Social Security Administration of the income, assets, and living arrangements of oldage and survivors insurance beneficiaries suggest that half or more of the commercial and industrial
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workers who have retired in recent years have some assets but that such assets are typically
small.” 169 Based on the limited information at hand about the inadequacy of most people’s
retirement assets, the conference delegates agreed that that the best way to reduce possible future
financial burdens which supporting older people might place upon the federal treasury was to
“enabl[e] the aged to do productive work in accordance with their capacity.” But the delegates
realized that “this would mean change, change, change” because “nothing in our present cultural
institutions…is adequate to deal with the consequence of this new development of the increasingly
aged.” 170
Essentially, the conference delegates had concluded that existing levels of public and private
support were adequate to sustain most people in their old age, and that the best way for older people
to support themselves was to continue working for as long as they could. Encouraging older workers
to remain in the labor force, though, undermined the assumptions that governed the Social Security
Act and most private employers pension systems: namely, that most workers would exit the
workforce at or around the age of 65, and that their re-entry would be at most on a part-time basis,
limited by the penalties which Social Security applied to annual earnings above a certain threshold.
While the conference delegates expressed their belief that “there are no insuperable obstacles to the
employment of older people” because “management, labor and Government working together,
could do the job,” it was not entirely clear by what mechanism this objective could be
accomplished. 171
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Although the conference ultimately seemed more of a trial balloon to test public opinion
than anything else, it did have the salutary effect of assembling for the first time a wide range of
academic experts, elected officials, and appointed public servants from across the country to discuss
and debate the issues of older Americans, and also of drawing press attention. 172 For these reasons,
Oscar Ewing pronounced it “an unqualified success.” 173 This theme of increasing state action
referred to in the following quote from Representative Sidney Yates (D-IL) during a congressional
debate over his bill to create a House Select Committee on Problems of the Aging,
[E]ver since the National Conference on Aging called by the Federal
Security Agency more than a year ago there has been a quickening of
interest all over the country in creating a more satisfactory
environment for aging people. My own State of Illinois set up a
commission last year. My neighboring States of Michigan and
Minnesota have set up study committees this year…All of these states
and many others are desperately in need of information that will tell
them the nature of the problems they face and how to go about
meeting them. 174
In addition, Congressman Yates pointed out that “scores of local communities and organizations are
trying to go ahead without waiting for State leadership. They, too, are besieging the Federal Security
Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and other Federal agencies for guidance and assistance.” 175
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It also reflected an emerging transformation in the federal government’s approach to the
problem of old age security. Whereas the Roosevelt administration during the New Deal had
labored mightily to encourage the retirement of older workers from the labor force – even going so
far as to remove older workers from the W.P.A.’s employment roster in New Jersey – the Truman
administration increasingly embraced the retention of older workers where possible. As Oscar
Ewing had observed in his remarks to delegates assembled at the National Conference on Aging,
“when all is said and done…I think most of your will agree that the question of continued
employment – for those who desire work – reaches close to the heart of this whole problem of the
aging.” 176
Ewing’s statement was in line with the Truman administration, which had begun to promote
university and private philanthropic studies that sought to counter social stereotypes about older
workers as less efficient and more costly than younger workers. Underlying this new approach to
the problem of older people in a rapidly changing society was the unspoken argument that private
employers could do more to keep older workers on rather than compelling them to retire at a defined
age. 177 Retaining older workers would also counteract the limited resources available to many
retired workers, including those who were eligible to receive Social Security old-age insurance
benefits. Those benefits remained quite low: In 1950, the average monthly benefit paid to 384,000
Social Security eligible was $33.24, or $332.45 in 2016 dollars. 178
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The Aftermath of the 1950 Conference
Roughly a year after the conclusion of the 1950 Conference on aging, Oscar Ewing was in
San Francisco to address the annual convention of the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.). In
his remarks, Ewing mentioned his recent proposal to the President to “supplement the present cash
benefits under old-age and survivors insurance by also providing to beneficiaries hospitalization
insurance covering up to sixty days a year.” 179 Ewing hoped, as he put it, that the assembled A.F.L.
delegates would “give it very serious thought” as a “simple, logical advancement of the traditional,
pay-as-you-go, self-respecting, common-sense American idea of social insurance,” a wordy
description which, nonetheless demonstrated the boundaries in which public discussions about
Social Security and public responsibility for the elderly could operate in September 1951. 180
By that point, the Truman administration’s ability to shape national politics had been greatly
weakened by Joseph McCarthy’s relentless attacks on the State Department from the Senate floor,
as well as withering criticism over the president’s handling of the conflict in Korea. The amount of
political capital left to spend for someone like Oscar Ewing was thus quite sparse. It is not clear if
Ewing believed that his proposal had a realistic possibility of being enacted, or if he expected the
A.F.L. to embrace it as truly the next logical step in Social Security, a program which had hitherto
not been directly involved in providing health insurance to its beneficiaries. 181 All the same,
Ewing’s public announcement marked a new step in the continuing evolution of the senior state,
which would rapidly come to embrace what historian Tamara Mann Tweel has aptly labeled the
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“Medical Security Solution” to old age in America, both for reasons of practicality and growing
ideological alignment. 182 It remained true, as Ewing conceded during an October 1951 Voice of
America radio broadcast discussion on Social Security, that roughly 1 out of 6 workers in the United
States still lacked access to Social Security and other related social insurance plans, and that the
administration’s aspirations for expanding Social Security’s scale and scope to embrace as many
workers as possible remained incomplete. 183
In December 1951, a year and a half after the 1950 conference, President Truman authorized
the creation of a “President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation.” 184 The newly formed
commission consisted primarily of physicians and hospital administrators, but also included such
luminaries as labor leader Walter Reuther of the UAW and Chester Barnard, the president of the
Rockefeller Foundation, Ollie A. Randall, a longtime consultant to the Community Service Society
of New York City as well as New York State’s Joint Legislative Committee on the Problems of
Aging, as well as Gunnar Gundersen, M.D., a member of the American Medical Association’s
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(A.M.A.) Board of Trustees. 185 The administration’s defeat by the A.M.A. had demonstrated that
the A.M.A.’s opinion on the subject of national health insurance could not be disregarded, and Dr.
Gundersen’s inclusion quietly reflected the Truman administration’s recognition of the A.M.A.’s
power to make or break its health policy agenda.
Learning from their earlier missteps, Ewing and other administration officials altered their
strategy of trying to enact national health insurance on a universal basis and opted to push for
publicly subsidized health care for older Americans. They did so in the hope that a more limited
program would rebut the argument that government intervention in the field of medicine was
unwarranted. In pursuit of this goal, the President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation
met several times throughout 1952. At its July 1952 meeting, Lucille Smith, the Public Health
Administrator for the U.S. Public Health Service, succinctly defined the Commission’s limited
objectives, which notably did not make any visible mention of providing institutional support for
national health insurance:
I think it is very important that we identify immediately the fact that
in the United States the problem of chronic illness is not identical the
problem of care of the aged since chronic illness affects all age groups
and it is exceedingly important that we spend our efforts on the
preventive aspects and begin long before people are old. 186
Smith’s opening statement was a pushback against long-held beliefs in the medical community (and
throughout American society) that age and chronic illness were intrinsically linked, and that age
itself was a form of illness. Specifically, her remarks reflected how the changes in the biological
understandings of age, which had been pioneered at the University of Chicago and at the University
of Michigan over the course of the previous decade, were beginning to seep into policymaking
185
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circles, and would soon allow the case to be made for enacting broader social policies on behalf of
older Americans. After all, if it was possible to become old without necessarily becoming
chronically ill, that suggested that old age was merely a phase of life and not the result of some
disease, as many medical practitioners had believed since the start of the twentieth century. As
Smith observed, “ten years ago [in 1942], chronic illness was thought to be a problem of old age;
today it is wisely recognized as a problem in all age groups.” 187
It also meant that appropriations on behalf of the elderly, such as providing health care,
would not necessarily be a waste of money if it kept at least some elderly people healthy enough to
continue working or being productive members of society rather than pointlessly prolonging the
suffering of chronic invalids. While the quiet revolution in defining old age that had begun roughly
ten years earlier would still require time to be acknowledged by the academic and scientific
community, evidence of growing acceptance could be found in the increasing number of studies
sponsored by private philanthropic foundations, state governments, and universities to determine
what exactly happened to the human body in old age.
As Smith further pointed out in her testimony, the evolving understanding of old age was
also accompanied by a changing understanding of chronic illness. As she observed:
In the year 1946 there began a very important national movement in
planning for the chronically ill…when the American Public Welfare
Association decided that it was high time they called to the attention
of the people the fact that chronic illness was a major part of
dependency and whereas unemployment had been in the thirties, in
the forties chronic illness was the major thing bringing people on
relief. The welfare people realized that they could not solve this
problem but they also realized that unless somebody solved it the cost
of relief would continue to mount. 188
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Here lay the continuity between the New Deal’s war on economic dependency in the 1930s and the
attempts of the Truman administration to address the nation’s health needs in the 1940s. World War
II had inadvertently revealed just how uneven decent health care coverage was in the United States;
in many parts of the South, the West, and in impoverished communities nationwide, medical care
barely existed at subsistence levels. The A.M.A., aware of this spotty coverage, had happily joined
hands with President Truman when his administration had sought to expand the number of hospitals
and medical training facilities in underserved areas. The thorny issue of assigning responsibility for
the cost of relief (i.e., paying for health care) would end the hitherto happy alliance between the
Truman administration and the A.M.A. As Smith pointed out,
chronic illness has a much higher incidence in the aged than in any
other group…therefore, the aging of the population is producing an
also very rapidly increasing volume of chronically ill people and
disabled people…that increase in volume is at such a rate that it will
force the attention of the public and of the professions on this
problem. The mounting volume is such that society will simply have
to find some way of dealing with it. 189
In other words, the undeniable fact that health care costs were continuing to rise compelled the
Truman administration and the A.M.A. to remain working partners, as their cooperation on the
President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation suggested would be the case. As social
policy consultant Ollie Randall dryly observed during the same meeting, “I do not think it takes a
very vivid imagination to realize that the maintenance of the health of this group [the aged] presents
serious problems to the individuals themselves as well as to many people who are in the younger
age groups who are carrying the responsibility of many older relatives.” 190 Consequently, she added,
“the health problems of the aged and the aging are an integral part of the nation’s health problem,
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[and] the older age groups do require special attention…the solution to their problem cannot be
found if they are entirely segregated from services to others or isolated from the community.” 191
The solution, Randall believed, was threefold: first, to acknowledge the need to expand and
improve the nation’s infirmaries and nursing homes, and second to enhance the training of medical
nursing and custodial care personnel. 192 Along with these improvements, Randall emphasized the
inadequacy of current old age assistance programs to pay for medical care for the aged. As she
observed,
the economic status of a great majority of old people is such that
adequate medical care can be provided for most of them only through
substantial use of public funds…about a third of people over [the age
of] 65 or about 4 million people are totally dependent upon public
funds, [and] another third are estimated to be partially dependent upon
either public resources or assistance from relatives. 193
In essence, the growing number of dependent elderly people in the United States was
simultaneously becoming too heavy a burden upon both the public treasury and individual families,
and a vicious cycle of dependency was taking root and growing stronger. As more families had to
support their older relatives, it became more likely that such families might find their own economic
resources stretched to the breaking point and beyond, and result in growing impoverishment not just
for elderly individuals but for members of younger generations as well.
Though Randall left it unsaid in her testimony, it was clear to the other assembled members
of the Commission that the question of how to address the growing number of chronically ill had
191
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reopened the questions of how best to provide collective economic security which had vexed the
New Dealers two decades beforehand. At the previous meeting of the Commission in May 1952, its
assembled members had conceded as much when they resolved that “the health and welfare needs
of the older citizen are inseparable…not only physical but also social, economic, psychological, and
other factors must be combined in a “wholistic” approach to the problem.” 194 In keeping with this
approach, the Commission recommended that the responsibility for meeting the needs of older
citizens be shared by “the community – local, state, or national…through private enterprise,
voluntary organizations and governmental effort.” While acknowledging that it would be necessary
to work together with the nation’s private social welfare organizations, the insistence that
government had a necessary role to play in solving the question of old age economic dependency
revealed the continuing legacy of New Deal-era reform liberalism.
Throughout the last days of the Truman administration, Oscar Ewing remained as busy as
ever campaigning on behalf of the causes that he and other New Deal liberals had long held dear. In
September 1952, he spoke before the first annual conference of State Commissioners on Aging in
Washington, D.C. 195 Like the 1950 conference, the state commissioners’ conference brought
together officials from various state social welfare departments, many of which were still incipient
in nature. 196 In his remarks, Ewing greeted the assembled delegates from the fifteen states which
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had dispatched them to Washington, and emphasized the federal government’s role in facilitating
the conference. 197 “We are here not to read set speeches or to make reports,” he said, adding later
that “we expect you to do the talking…the Planning Committee has been meticulously careful to
avoid imposing its own ideas of what this Conference should discuss,” an indirect reference to
Ewing’s proposed program to provide health insurance to some Social Security recipients, and a
sign as well of the perilous political landscape through which the Truman administration was still
carefully navigating. 198 By this point, Ewing was complete anathema to the A.M.A. along with
many members of the powerful conservative congressional coalition of Southern Democrats and
Republicans, and so his activities had become increasingly limited to advocating on behalf of causes
which did not necessarily require congressional input or command high profile press attention.
Within this more limited ambit of movement, though, Ewing remained determined to act. As
he observed in his address to the commissioners, “two years ago there were not more than two
official State Commissions or Committees functioning in this field”; now, he noted, there were
fourteen state commissions, with more being planned. 199 Ewing interpreted this development as
tangible proof of progress. Implicit in his remarks was his satisfaction that, even if action at the
federal level had been frustrated by the AMA and congressional hostility, there might still be hope
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for meaningful solutions at the state and local levels of government, where the partisan rancor
seemed practically somnolent in comparison to Washington, D.C. Underscoring his nascent faith in
the power of individual states and local communities to carry out needed reforms, Ewing noted that
while “there [were] many things the Federal Government can do” to help solve the economic and
social problems of older Americans, ultimately “the real job must be done by the States and
communities – by individuals and groups helping their own neighbors.” 200
Ewing’s emphasis on the need for subnational units of government and local community
action to “solve the problems of older Americans” reflected an emerging belief among some reformminded liberals that efforts to use government power on behalf of older Americans would not be
successfully achieved solely at the federal level in the near future, given the strident opposition of
the A.M.A. and other powerful centers of organized political resistance. Instead, if such efforts were
to succeed, they would require the active participation of state and local officials as well as local
community organizations. This pivot in favor of using local governance to achieve a national goal
marked a quiet shift in tactics utilized by reformers who sought to strengthen the nation’s social
welfare net for older Americans. Repeated efforts to push through change at the national level had
been stymied for a variety of reasons, including the resurgence of a conservative governing majority
in Congress and the unwillingness of the Roosevelt administration to challenge conservative
legislators after the disastrous 1938 and 1942 midterm elections, which had reduced the number of
Democratic congressmen and senators who were able to support more progressive legislation. This
blockade did not lift after Harry Truman’s upset electoral victory in 1948, which had also restored
Democratic, though not progressive, control of Congress. Instead, the Truman administration’s rout
200
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at the hands of the A.M.A. in the multi-year battle over national health insurance, as well as the
resurgent popular fear of centralized state power that characterized the early years of the Cold War,
helped to paralyze further efforts at national reform and narrowed the range of possible legislative
policy outcomes.
Faced with staunch resistance at the national level, social reformers like Ewing and Wilbur
Cohen, as well as labor leaders like Walter Reuther, had instead settled upon a more limited and
ultimately fragmented course. Organized labor, largely blocked in its attempts to win a meaningful
expansion of the welfare state after the end of World War II, made a separate peace with a resurgent
corporate leadership. Disastrous midterm election results in 1946 and 1950 deeply cut into the
number of surviving congressional liberals on Capitol Hill. As a result, the Truman administration’s
liberal coterie, led primarily by Oscar R. Ewing, opted to lay the groundwork for a scaled back
version of the broader welfare state, which had first been outlined by Dr. Eveline Burns and the
NRPB during World War II. This more limited welfare state consisted largely of adjustments to
Social Security and a universal health insurance plan limited only to older people. This shift in
strategy explicitly aimed to utilize favorable social attitudes towards older people as a way to
advance stalled social reform policy goals – in effect, to try and mobilize elderly people (and their
families) as well as broader public opinion as an effective counterweight to the power of the A.M.A.
and other organized medical and business groups hostile to any significant expansion of existing
public social welfare programs.
In order to build the case for the necessity of public health insurance for older people, the
Truman administration had turned to the select group of academic experts and researchers who had
begun during the late 1940s to investigate the changing social and economic conditions of older
Americans in various urban and rural communities scattered throughout the nation. Through
conferences like the 1950 National Conference on Aging, as well as regional and state conferences,
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academic researchers, social welfare experts, and public officials forged a cohesive policy
community that sought to investigate the many dimensions of old age in America. Chastised by
defeat at the national level, this community sought to implement programs and initiatives at the
local and state level. These efforts were accelerated by growing popular discontent in places with
concentrated populations of older people such as southern California and New York City, where
local officials increasingly struggled to understand the full dimensions of the problems faced by
their older constituents. With limited financial resources, these officials welcomed partnerships with
private philanthropic organizations to fund social science studies, thus cementing a new alliance
between academic researchers, local officials, and social welfare experts.
Conclusion
Demand for expertise resulted in the growth of new organizations such as the National
Coalition on the Aging, an outgrowth of the long-established National Social Welfare Association,
and a stronger intermediary role for more established voluntary social welfare organizations like the
American Public Welfare Association. These voluntary sector organizations played a vital role in
supplying the necessary expertise to local and state officials as they adapted and developed new
government services to assist older Americans that would balance the competing demands of
limited funds and rising popular demands for assistance. Ultimately, as national programs for older
Americans like Social Security remained decidedly modest and private pension plans favored
certain categories of workers over others, public officials increasingly turned to the voluntary sector
to devise policy solutions that would replicate the previously private social and economic functions
performed by individual families in meeting the needs of older people that Social Security and
private pensions were unable to cover. These efforts achieved significant success, but as the cost of
medical care, hospitalization, and prescription drugs continued to rise during the 1950s, this
infrastructure would increasingly be directed towards the enactment of national health insurance for
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the elderly as a way to alleviate the growing financial strains which the costs associated with
providing health care coverage to older people had begun to place on families and local and state
governments.
Nevertheless, the expansion into providing health insurance to older people risked obscuring
the continuing problems with the Social Security program, which had mainly been designed to
provide older and retired male workers with a form of economic support in retirement that did not
negate their previously prominent status as the primary family wage-earner or necessitate their
becoming a financial burden upon their families or the public. In essence, the earnings received
under the old-age insurance program would replace both the poorhouse and public assistance
without replicating the least desirable features of either. Despite Social Security’s original intent, by
1946, twice as many people received payments from Social Security’s noncontributory old-age
assistance program as drew monthly benefits from its contributory-based old-age insurance system,
an imbalance that was nearly the reverse of what Social Security’s architects had intended. 201
Moreover, while Social Security’s framers had assumed that old-age assistance would be a
temporary federal salve to lighten the financial burdens upon states and localities during the
economic crisis of the 1930s, its southern supporters in Congress saw no reason to wind down the
program once near-full employment and steady economic growth were restored after the end of
World War II. For many southern states, Social Security’s old-age assistance program generously
supplemented meager existing state old-age pension programs but distributed the costs of doing so
on a nationwide basis because the revenue to support the program was collected from general
federal taxes rather than earmarked payroll taxes. Southern politicians therefore saw no reason to
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shift the program’s footing back towards contributory social insurance because such an alteration
had the potential to divert significant federal monies.
Alongside their assumption that Social Security’s old-age assistance program would be a
temporary measure that would be jettisoned once the Social Security old-age insurance program was
fully operational, liberal New Dealers and other reform-minded individuals had expected that the
expansion of Social Security into a fully-fledged, modern public welfare system was only a matter
of time. However, this development did not materialize, as the unfortunate fate of the National
Resources Planning Board vividly revealed. Instead, defense spending during World War II had
reduced unemployment to levels not seen since before the onset of the Great Depression. That turn
of events had helped weaken the arguments once advanced by New Dealers on behalf of the Social
Security program. It demonstrated that the United States did not have a stagnant “mature economy”
in which mass unemployment would be a persistent feature, with a fixed number of jobs that had to
be rationed, and thereby government intervention in order to ration limited employment and
financial resources was a matter of national survival.
As the ideological case for the New Deal’s reforms weakened over the course of the 1940s,
so, too, did the impetus for further action. The enactment of an incomplete Social Security system,
state old age pensions, and improved economic conditions proved to be sufficient during the course
of the 1940s in diminishing the mass appeal of the Townsend Movement and its facsimiles in other
states, though not entirely, as the continuing battle over public old-age pensions in California,
Colorado, and Washington State revealed. Reform liberals like Dr. Eveline Burns had hoped that
government domestic policy planning for the postwar world would pick up where the New Deal had
left off in 1938-1939, and that a more comprehensive, rational public welfare system, on the model
of Great Britain’s Beveridge Plan, perhaps, would ensure that an economic catastrophe like the
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Great Depression would not be possible again, and that the social and political instability that had
followed in the wake of the Great Depression would be relegated to the past. 202
The failure to complete the development of Social Security into a more comprehensive
program at the national level during the 1940s, created an opportunity for other actors to once more
take the stage, and inadvertently helped to build the case for the senior state. Because the Social
Security system remained underdeveloped, many state and local authorities still found themselves
frequently compelled to deal with the issue of economic security for older people whether they
wanted to or not, and this issue became more pressing after the war ended and the nation returned to
a peacetime economic footing, with the expectation that older workers would retire, leave the
workforce, and be replaced by younger workers. It was no accident, that New York’s pioneering
Joint Legislative Committee on the Problems of the Aging was established in 1947, or that its scope
and functions were expanded in 1949. As New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey observed in his
1949 message to the New York legislature, the Federal Old-Age and Survivors’ Insurance program
had “failed” to create a financially sustainable welfare system because of its limited coverage and
even more limited benefits. Thus, the impetus had shifted back to individual states like New York to
try and forge a workable solution to the problem of providing economic security in old age. 203
But solutions to this problem were not immediately forthcoming. The social and political
atmosphere at the end of World War II and into the early Cold War years was not conducive to
further expansion of state power, as the failure of Franklin Roosevelt’s proposed Second Bill of
Rights and the dramatic defeat of the Truman administration’s proposed national health insurance
program demonstrated. Beleaguered proponents of the welfare state like Federal Security Agency
Administrator Oscar Ewing, Associate Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, and historian
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Henry Steele Commager attempted to defend the welfare state as a necessary safeguard against the
temptations of more radical political alternatives like communism, but the balance of public opinion
seemed more inclined towards the position articulated by the American Medical Association, which
decried expansion of the welfare state as a pernicious threat to individual liberty in the United
States. 204
State and local officials who sought to deal with the issue of old-age economic insecurity
therefore faced a quandary: how to provide needed economic and social support for a category of
citizens without running afoul of rising anti-statist sentiments or running the risk of supporting
programs that would be financially unsustainable for limited state budgets. Solutions varied
according to variables of geography, wealth, and ideology. In less wealthy southern states, local
officials remained content to rely upon Social Security’s old age assistance program, which
effectively funneled federal funds to older southern whites. In some wealthier northern states like
New York and Illinois, state and local officials began to explore partnerships with the private
welfare community, both as a way to access additional funding and to increase the reach of limited
social programs.
This public and private cooperation was born of necessity, but as the 1950 National
Conference on Aging revealed, state and local welfare administrators were hungry to forge new
partnerships that would enable them to assess the needs of a growing elderly population and devise
policy solutions that could be implemented without having to depend upon federal action, since
dramatic federal action on Social Security and national health insurance seemed a distant possibility
at best. Finally, in some western states like California and Colorado, popular agitation and
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organization of older people into mobilized voters by old-age pension groups continued to roil state
politics and alarm observers elsewhere, who worried that a revival of the Townsend Movement or
something similar might elevate a demagogue to high national power.
While public and private officials wrestled with the issue of economic security in old-age,
the failure to enact national health insurance in the late 1940s, and the subsequent deliberate strategy
by liberal reformers to try and secure its enactment via the backdoor of adding health insurance for
the elderly to the existing Social Security system, would set the agenda and accelerate the
construction of the senior state in the 1950s and 1960s. Health insurance via the Social Security
system would become a focal point of liberal reformers during the 1950s, despite (or perhaps
because) the Social Security system’s existing mechanisms to provide economic security in old-age
remained grossly inadequate for achieving that purpose.
The solution, liberal reformers like Wilbur Cohen hoped, would be a new approach to social
welfare that embraced the public and private sector. In practice, this meant accepting newly revived
instruments of retirement security like private pensions in order to fill the financial gap left by
inadequate Social Security benefits. It also meant new connections to the private welfare sector,
which had begun to pay more attention to the possible economic and social implications of a
growing aging population in the United States. Over the course of the 1950s, these links would be
strengthened further, in part by the Eisenhower administration, which favored non-interference on
the part of the federal government in social welfare matters, and also by liberal reformers and labor
organizations, which stepped in to fill the gap left by the federal government.
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CHAPTER III
Adding Life to Years, 1950-1961
By 1950, a new pattern was beginning to emerge in how federal, state, and local officials
dealt with the issue of providing economic security in old-age. The Social Security system remained
incomplete, and the development of a new privatized system of pensions and fringe benefits
provided by many employers which had begun to take shape during World War II had begun to
accelerate. However, this new private welfare system remained uneven in its reach. While some
industries – notably automobile and steelmaking – witnessed the expansion of generous new private
welfare benefits as employers begrudgingly sought to accommodate themselves to the presence of
organized labor, this development did not extend to all employers. As a result, the level of economic
security in old age that older Americans could expect to receive varied widely, with race, gender,
class, and employment status playing determinative roles.
Consequently, social welfare officials at the local, state, and federal level increasingly found
themselves confronted during the 1950s with the reemergence of economic insecurity in old age as a
pressing issue of political and social importance that required active intervention and inventive
policymaking. However, unlike during the Great Depression, when mass unemployment had made
it easier to advance the ideological arguments necessary for the development of a more universal
system like Social Security, unemployment and poverty after the end of World War II was
increasingly concentrated among groups that were not benefitting as much from the postwar
economic surge in private sector employment.
The failure during the Truman administration to secure a significant expansion of the
welfare state – and the increasing unlikelihood that such expansion at the national level would be
forthcoming in the near future, given the chill of the Cold War on domestic politics in the United
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States – shifted the center of action back towards individual states, local communities, and new
voluntary organizations which began to appear during the decade between the 1950 National
Conference on Aging and its successor the 1961 White House Conference on Aging. During the
Eisenhower administration, this tendency was especially pronounced, as senior members of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare tasked with examining and studying the problems
and needs of the nation’s growing older population emphasized an advisory and consultative role for
the federal government in this field rather than an active and interventionist one, as had been the
case during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.
The lack of substantive action on the part of the federal government and the limited ability of
state and local governments to fully resolve a fundamentally national problem left a vacuum in the
nation’s social welfare system that different actors competed to fill during this period. Older but still
mobile individuals and couples living on fixed incomes, encouraged by the prospect of cheap newly
developed private housing and overall lower costs of living than in the Northeast and Midwest,
began to move to Florida and other southern and western locales, a process which would continue
during the rest of the twentieth century. 1 Unions like the United Steelworkers of America
experimented with new programs designed to improve the quality of life of their retired members. 2
These new experimental directions in social welfare policy for older people aimed not to provide
economic security, but rather to offer a kind of social security that reconnected older people to the
communities in which they lived or had worked. If the emphasis during the 1930s and 1940s had
been on providing a modicum of economic security in old age, by the 1950s this vision had also
1
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begun to encompass the belief that guarantees of economic security were no longer sufficient, and
that problems of old age were not solely limited to inadequate individual or family financial
resources.
However, the issue of economic security in old age had never entirely receded. During the
1950s, this issue became increasingly tangled with the broader issue of health security. After 1950,
senior officials in the Truman administration and later congressional liberals and union leaders had
begun to focus on amending the original Social Security Act in order to provide health insurance to
Social Security recipients. Their purpose in doing so was to shift the battleground in the long
running war over national health insurance in the United States by stressing the health care needs of
older Americans, whom they assumed would be a far more appealing constituency for such a bold
expansion of public assistance. Essentially, it was a deliberate move designed to make the expansion
of the federal government’s role in facilitating collective economic security seem far less
controversial to skeptical public opinion and wary opponents like the American Medical
Association (A.M.A.).
At the same time, the tactical shift to emphasizing publicly subsidized health care coverage
was not only the product of a strategic decision made by its proponents. It was also a response to a
financial problem that had already begun to roil labor-management relations and to upset public
finances as well as state and local politics. In 1955, for example, a California state report noted that
“the medical needs of Old-Age [Social] Security recipients and the manner of meeting them
constitute a problem which is increasingly predominant,” and as Dora L. Costa observes, “state and
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local expenditures on vendor medical payments rose by almost 130 percent between 1950 and
1956” in the United States. 3
It was perhaps no accident, then, that California would again prove to be the launch pad for
another large-scale old-age advocacy organization with national ambitions. Twenty years after the
Townsend Movement had spread out far and wide from Long Beach, California, the American
Association of Retired Persons (or A.A.R.P.) founded by Dr. Ethel Percy Andrus in 1957 would
discover unexpectedly high mass demand for its new voluntary group health insurance plan
originally aimed at its core membership of retired white middle-class teachers. In a short period of
time, the A.A.R.P. went from a small, regional organization to national prominence, a transition that
was partly facilitated by the Eisenhower administration and by some members of the business and
medical community who were eager to offer a compelling and viable alternative to the proposed
expansion of the Social Security system to include health insurance advocated by some
congressional Democrats, local and state welfare officials, and organized labor leaders. Though
access to affordable health insurance was only part of the A.A.R.P.’s original founding purpose –
namely, to permit older people to lead independent lives without requiring public or private
assistance – the organization’s emphasis on expanding social and community services as a
necessary component of active senior living harkened an evolution in how federal, state, and local
welfare officials would approach the intertwined economic and social problems of older people in
America.
In sum, the senior state underwent the first of its two major postwar shifts during the 1950s.
In a semi-coordinated fashion, state and local welfare officials, along with their counterparts in the
private voluntary sector and the organized labor movement, had come to appreciate the limitations
3
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of the existing Social Security system and the growing number of private pension systems, both of
which continued to offer meager financial assistance to selected categories of workers. As rising
medical and hospitalization costs outstripped the economic resources of individual retirees and their
families and threatened to overwhelm the overall fiscal stability of corporate, labor union, and
public budgets, expansion of affordable coverage – whether by private insurance companies or by
public means – became a paramount goal for the architects of the senior state. They worried that if
such costs were not arrested, the expenses associated with providing health care coverage would
require a more dramatic restructuring of welfare programs at a time when such funds were both
limited and increasingly needed to meet other social needs associated with the dramatic postwar
population expansion in the United States. In the late 1940s, the problem of economic security in
old age had been conceived of in terms that were almost entirely financial in nature; ten years later,
that problem had been redefined to include not only economic security but also health security as a
fundamental right for older Americans.
The Golden Years?
If, as Eric Hobsbawm has written, the thirty years immediately following the end of World
War II were “golden years” of increasingly widespread affluence and growing prosperity for the
developed, capitalist nations of Western Europe and North America, economic growth during this
period did not necessarily spread its blessings evenly. 4 After the end of World War II, older workers
were frequently dismissed in order to open up employment opportunities for returning World War II
veterans. 5 Leaving the workforce, though, also meant losing access to a steady source of income
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sufficient to adequately maintain a household. As a University of Chicago-sponsored study of
Kansas City’s older population published in 1952 observed, “the problem of financial security in old
age is not an ordinary “poverty” problem. Many of the impoverished aged have [sic] had substantial
middle-class incomes during their active lives. Public assistance cases occur in all parts of the
city.” 6 Invoking the specter of the Cold War, the Kansas City study intoned that “the United States
and Western Europe have aging populations; the Communist countries do not. National survival
may depend in part on our ability to utilize older workers at a time when the young are called to
military service…in short, an aging population is not only a moral and humanitarian problem, but
also a utilitarian problem of great importance.” 7
The solution, according to the study, was “to change the conditions that produce economic
dependency, social isolation, and long-term illness in old age; and we also need to assure the
welfare of those who become dependent.” 8 Statistics collected by the federal government on old age
poverty supplemented the findings of the Kansas City study, and shed light on the growing number
of older people who were increasingly turning to public assistance due to inadequate personal
financial resources. Of the approximately 12 million older people in the United States in 1950
(defined as persons aged 65 years or older) only slightly more than half had income support from
either continued employment or social insurance. Additionally, approximately 23% of all older
people were receiving some form of public assistance exclusive of Social Security payments or
income received from private pensions. 9
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The growing number of postwar studies conducted on the economic and social needs of
America’s growing older population had its origins in academic research conducted at the
University of Chicago by a loose, informal network of trained sociologists and statisticians. In 1948,
University of Chicago sociologists Ernest W. Burgess, Ruth S. Cavan, and Robert J. Havighurst
undertook a study of older Americans in order to determine “what interests these people may have,
of how they are spending their time, or the kind of work they do.” 10 Burgess, along with his
colleague Robert E. Park, had founded the famed Chicago School of Sociology, and had conducted
pioneering studies of urban life, crime, family, and marriage in American life. With the assistance of
his colleagues at the University of Chicago and elsewhere, Burgess now sought to undertake a
groundbreaking study of aging in American life.
Though Burgess and his collaborators were not the first sociologists to professionally
address the subject, there was a growing urgency to his study. As Burgess and his colleagues knew,
the number of older Americans was rising in a twofold manner: first, in terms of aggregate
population, and second, the percentage of Americans who could be classified as “older” had also
increased significantly during the 1940s. Despite this shift in the nation’s demographics, the amount
of scholarly research available to help the nation’s policymakers make informed decisions about its
growing older population was surprisingly limited.
Instead, in many instances policymakers were making decisions based on educated
guesswork. In perhaps the most famous instance of such guesswork, the architects of the Social
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Security Act had arbitrarily selected the age of 65 as the age of benefit entitlement. 11 Burgess’ study
spearheaded at the University of Chicago would therefore begin the process of filling in the gaps
about the lives of older Americans. The questions that the study sought to answer were difficult. At
its base, the study wanted to know who older Americans really were, where they lived, and how
they conducted their lives. These and other questions remained to be answered, as public officials,
private philanthropies, and other interested parties tried to decide how best to allocate limited
resources and develop solutions that could mitigate the social and economic challenges which a
growing population of older people seemed increasingly likely to impose upon their communities.
By putting together enough data, the study aimed to paint a portrait of older people that would be
both scientifically rigorous and useful for public policy practitioners.
Burgess, Cavan, and Havighurst were not the only academics investigating America’s aging
population. At the University of Michigan, Clark Tibbitts and Wilma Donahue were already deeply
involved in their community studies of older residents in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and surrounding
towns and villages in Washtenaw County. Additionally, Tibbitts and Donahue also led and directed
the University of Michigan’s Institute for Human Adjustment, which, over the course of the late
1940s and into the 1950s, had become a focal point of professional exchange among government
officials, academics, and private welfare practitioners for delving into the numerous issues
generated by the aging of American society. 12
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The Problem of Older Workers in a Growing Economy
In a sign of the Institute’s growing importance as a meeting point between academic
researchers and federal officials, Ewan Clague, the Commissioner of Labor Statistics for the U.S.
Department of Labor, gave an address at the University of Michigan in July 1948. In his speech,
Clague explained the federal government’s emerging understanding of the scope of the issues facing
older Americans, and focused primarily on older workers (a group he defined as those workers aged
45 years or older). As he and other federal officials had come to understand the matter, there was
“no particular problem of aging and employability,” given that older workers had left the overall
labor force during the Great Depression, but many had subsequently reentered the workforce during
the wartime home front labor shortage between 1941 and 1945. 13
In other words, Clague believed that the relative employability of older workers rested less
upon the fact that such workers were old, and more on the overall manpower needs of the economy.
As Clague acknowledged,
[d]uring the depression years one of the reasons advanced for the
passage of Social Security legislation was that it would encourage
retirement of older workers, and thus make room for younger men.
However, the actual scale of old age benefits has never provided a
reasonable choice to the older workers. Most of the retirements under
old age insurance have been forced upon the worker by previous
unemployment…With the higher costs of living existing today, these
benefits are even less of an inducement to retire. 14
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The inadequacy of Social Security benefits had, in turn, led some unions to demand private pension
plans able to close the gap between Social Security benefits and the cost of living and to emphasize
seniority rights in the collective bargaining agreements they forged with corporate management.
Such plans were necessarily tied to gainful employment and frequently based upon years of vested
service, and as a result they favored long-term workers (and therefore workforce stability) over
older workers with fewer years left to work. 15 In the words of a report later published by the Federal
Security Agency,
When the program [Social Security] was adopted in 1935, it was the
intent of Congress that this program should become the Nation’s
primary method of preventing dependency in old-age. This
expectation was not realized, however, because only a little more than
half of the Nation’s jobs were under the program and the millions of
workers who had already retired or did do soon after the program
began had no opportunity to qualify for benefits. 16
Even the subsequent amendments to Social Security enacted in 1939 “proved to be inadequate”
which resulted in “many beneficiaries…living at income levels considerably below those prevailing
for public assistance in a given locality…benefits for a retired worker and his wife averaged about
$41 [per month] in December 1949.” 17
Ultimately, the inadequacy of benefits under Social Security’s old-age insurance provisions
combined with the inability of many older workers to secure gainful employment had again created
a political and social climate in which poverty in old-age was rising by the late 1940s. As had been
the case during the Great Depression, many impoverished older people increasingly turned to public
15
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assistance for help. As a 1950 Federal Security Agency report later noted, “in December 1949, more
than 2.7 million persons, or 241 persons per 1,000 persons in the population 65 years of age and
over, were receiving old-age assistance…in mid-1948 about one recipient in 16 was getting old-age
assistance in addition to his old-age and survivors insurance benefit. 18”
In other words, while more workers (approximately 7.7 million people) were covered by
Social Security’s old age insurance program than by its old age assistance program (approximately
2.7 million people), those covered under the old age insurance program were still resorting to the
old age assistance program, a situation the architects of the Social Security Act had assumed would
be a temporary bug rather than a permanent feature of the system. 19 Additionally, a growing number
of unemployed older workers presented a challenge for policymakers like Clague, who believed that
“if truly adequate and reasonable benefits are established for the oldest workers (over 65), then there
will be pressure to lower the age limits and bring in the unemployed in the next lower age groups.” 20
Invoking the ghost of the Townsend Movement, Clague warned that “in times of severe
unemployment the numbers of these [older] persons may be so great as to constitute a powerful
social and political force.” 21
Rather than wait for that development to transpire, the superior alternative, Clague reasoned,
was for the federal government – in conjunction with local and state governments, as well as
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concerned private organizations – to encourage older workers to remain in the workforce beyond the
age of 65. As Clague argued, “the constructive long-run solution of the problem is the development
of jobs and occupations which can be adequately filled by older workers.” 22 As he recognized,
though, “the major attack on the problem will have to come within industry itself, which employs
the vast proportion of the labor force” even as Clague conceded that “I have no intention here of
saddling businessmen and employers generally with this problem.” 23 Instead, he held out hope that a
coalition of “the community” and industry would forge a workable solution that would meet the
needs of older workers for gainful employment, or else “unemployment and destitution” among
millions of older workers would become chronic, and they might in time become “numerous enough
to force us to some kind of social action.” Otherwise, Clague asserted, “what we may get from such
pressures may be very unsatisfactory – socially, economically and politically.” 24
Neither Clague nor his colleagues in the federal government were alone in their growing
concern over the potential social and political disruption which a growing army of unemployed
older workers might be capable of. A few months before Clague’s speech at the University of
Michigan, the National Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.) had made its views on the subject
clear. Speaking before the New York League of Business and Professional Women on March 7,
1948, Phyllis H. Moehrle, a N.A.M. vice president, noted that “N.A.M. feels that a great deal
remains to be done…Industry has a major responsibility to hire as many older people as possible.” 25
To this end, Moehrle announced that NAM and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce had joined forces
“in a campaign to interest employers in the problem of physically handicapped and older workers,
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and the importance of making every possible effort to provide increased employment opportunities
for these groups of our citizens.” 26 In language redolent of advocates for corporate-sponsored
welfare capitalism in the 1920s, Moehrle stated that “good management does not think it is fair or
good business to let out a long-service employee without some provision for assisting him to
maintain a reasonable standard of living.” 27
Taking aim at the recent efforts by the AFL and the CIO as well as other unions to gain
some measure of control over pension plan administration and funding in collective bargaining
agreements, Moehrle made clear N.A.M.’s hostility to such efforts. The N.A.M. insisted instead on
the right of employers to avoid “having a workforce [that] does not become too heavily loaded with
older people.” 28 While agreeing with federal officials like Oscar Ewing that much work remained to
be done to “change public concepts about age” in order to eradicate “false ideas which people have
about the influence of age on ability,” Moehrle asserted that this task could best be accomplished by
voluntary efforts and suasion within and among members of the business community, and there
were “no panaceas, no formulas” which could rightfully be imposed by either unions or elected
officials on management hiring and firing decisions.
Instead, Moehrle argued that “full employment offers the most effective solution,” but that
“this can’t be achieved without increasing industrial activity and [creating] an atmosphere in which
business can function.” 29 If unions or the government insisted on exerting “an undue or artificial
pressure in behalf of the older aged” that would “result in senseless discrimination against
youth…there is no point in merely transferring the problem from one group of workers to
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another…we can’t set one group against another.” 30 N.A.M.’s strategy was clear: by defining the
problem of aging workers solely as “an individual problem” rather than a collective one, it could
portray itself as a protector of the rights of individual workers and thereby put labor unions on the
defensive. 31
N.A.M. thereby skillfully employed the rights-based language of New Deal liberalism in
order to buttress traditional corporate control over private employer practices. It argued that
government or union interference based on “arbitrary age requirements or physical characteristics”
was impeding employers from providing truly full employment, and if such barriers were removed,
then employers would once again feel confident enough to employ and hire all qualified workers.
N.A.M.’s main objective was to simultaneously preserve the ability of private employers to oversee
their workforces as they saw fit without giving the appearance of discrimination or favoritism, even
if the actual, private day-to-day practices of a significant proportion of its members suggested just
that.
The Desmond Committee and New York’s Campaign against Age Discrimination
N.A.M.’s concerns were not merely with what the federal government might do in the realm
of employment hiring practices. In states like New York and California that had active state-level
legislative committees examining the problems of older workers, evidence was beginning to mount
of widespread discrimination by employers against older and handicapped workers. In December
1949, Ewan Clague appeared before the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems

30

Ibid.
For an example of NAM’s efforts to persuade employers to treat older workers on an individual case-by-case basis,
see National Association of Manufacturers, “The Productive Years – Ages 45-65: A Guide for Employers in Making the
Best Use of the Older Work Force,” New York, 1961. Available via the Online Archive of California at: Accessed via
the Online Archive of California at http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779q6pf/admin/#prefercite-1.3.4.
(Accessed September 8, 2016).
31

193

of the Aging at the request of its chairman, State Senator Thomas C. Desmond. 32 Desmond and his
committee had successfully pushed in the past for important investigations into potentially
discriminatory employment practices in New York, but the amount of information at his fingertips
was confined primarily to New York State. Clague’s task was therefore to help the Committee
ascertain which discriminatory employment practices in New York were also present elsewhere in
the nation, and to provide information collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics about the
employability of older workers. 33 As Clague had explained in his speech at the University of
Michigan earlier that same year, the chief problem confronting older workers was twofold: “on the
one hand, the advances of medical science enabled a growing proportion of the population to
survive into old age. On the other hand, employment opportunities did not keep pace with this
increase in the aged population.” 34
This growing disparity between increased lifespans and decreased employment opportunities
was problematic in Clague’s view because
if we fall short of our full employment goals and if we fail to provide
adequate work opportunities to those older men and women who want
to and are able to work…the increased span of enforced idleness in
old age will place a heavy financial burden…on those in the labor
32
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force who will be contributing to their support, either directly as
individuals, or by increased levies on their current earnings. 35
In contrast to NAM’s insistence that the problems of older workers could best be addressed solely as
an internal matter and on an individual basis by private employers, Clague instead concluded his
statement to the Joint Legislative Committee by observing that the dilemma of older workers “will
command the combined resources of the Federal and State and local governments, of labor and
management, and of many community groups, if it is to be dealt with effectively.” 36 Clague’s
statement lent encouragement to the committee’s efforts to get legislation passed in New York State
which would mandate the use of fair employment practices with regard to older and disabled
workers. The prospects for the successful enactment of such legislation were likely better in New
York State than they were at the national level, where the presence of a powerful conservative
congressional coalition on Capitol Hill militated against the passage of progressive legislation
intended to expand on the Wagner Act or the Fair Labor Standards Act.
In fact, New York State, California, and a host of other major industrial states had already
begun by the late 1940s and early 1950s to address the issue of how to best provide for economic
security in old age. Senator Desmond’s New York State Joint Legislative Committee on the
Problems of the Aging was steadily producing reports, brochures, and other publications designed to
help older New Yorkers find gainful employment, a step that few other states had yet taken. 37
Perhaps more importantly, Desmond’s committee was already beginning the process of shepherding
pioneering proposed legislation to protect the rights of older workers from discrimination into
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tangible law in New York State. 38 Eventually, New York State would enact legislation prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of age in June 1958 by adding older workers (whom the law defined as
persons “between the ages of 45 and 65”) as a protected class of worker. 39 New York thus joined a
small group of states like Massachusetts, Louisiana, and Colorado that had enacted such laws,
though in the latter two these laws had proven to be ineffective at serving their stated purpose
because they lacked enforcement provisions. 40
By contrast, New York’s statute created a process for older workers to file complaints with
the State Commission Against Discrimination (S.C.A.D.), and for state officials to then investigate
the veracity of those complaints. In the months following the enactment of New York’s age
discrimination legislation, hiring practices in the state showed a modest but appreciable change.
Prior to the law’s enactment, roughly ten percent of newspaper employment advertisements in New
York included explicit age requirements or prohibitions, whereas afterwards less than one percent
did. Hundreds of workers also filed complaints alleging either age discrimination in employer hiring
or retention practices with the S.C.A.D., though not all of these cases were resolved in their favor. 41
In order to deal with such claims without inflaming private employers, S.C.A.D. insisted upon a
policy of “direct contact” that emphasized “education and persuasion” rather than “prosecution and
38
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punishment,” a strategy that ultimately yielded modest but measurable compliance. 42 Dr. Elmer A.
Carter, the chairman of S.C.A.D., summed up the commission’s approach by describing its tactics as
an “initial educational period” that aimed less at dictating to private employers and instead sought to
teach employers to set aside preconceived notions about the productivity of older workers. 43 By
building productive relationships with private employers, S.C.A.D., in conjunction with the New
York State Employment Service, sought to build support for its long-term initiative to increase job
opportunities for older workers, which would have the double benefit of reducing both age
discrimination and poverty among older workers in New York. 44
The Elderly Poor and the Rise of Community Services in New York City
New York State’s pioneering efforts during the 1950s represented an important response to
the crisis over economic security in old-age that had reemerged during the late 1940s. In the public
sector, state and local officials tentatively explored new ways to assist older people who lacked
access to Social Security or to private pensions. The situation they confronted would have been
shockingly familiar to old-age pension reformers twenty years earlier. As part of a major five part
series on the problems of aging Americans, the New York Times sent reporter Edith Evans Asbury in
February 1955 to visit the mental hospitals, private nursing homes, and other institutions sprinkled
throughout New York City, which had become the final residence of thousands of elderly New
Yorkers. 45 As Asbury soberly noted in her articles, “most of the havens in which these men and
women have found refuge for their declining years were not designed to handle their problems.” 46
The residents of these institutions, though, were not destitute paupers without any means of
economic support. While many of them had some combination of Social Security, Old Age
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Assistance, and private pensions (“all income groups are struck,” the Times noted), they had still
ended up in institutional care, in no small part because “the average, self-supporting, middle-income
family…finds it impossible in New York City to solve the problem of long-term custodial care for a
senile relative in a way commensurate with its pride and self-respect.” 47 As Asbury wrote, only “by
reducing their own standard of living [could] some middle income families…manage to maintain a
senile parent or grandparent…Usually, as things are now, the senile from the middle and lower
income family eventually goes to a taxpayer-supported institution, despite his family’s financial
sacrifices and pride.” 48 The economic strains felt by many New York City families to support older
relatives were felt elsewhere in the nation. As Michael Harrington would later write in The Other
America,
it is a fact that the problems of the aged are so great that families,
probably the majority of them in the nation, cannot really deal with
them…[d]uring the fifties…all costs on the Consumer Price Index
went up by 12 per cent. But medical costs, that terrible staple of the
aged, went up by 36 per cent, hospitalization rose by 65 per cent, and
group hospitalization costs (Blue Cross premiums), were up by 83 per
cent. These figures have clearly priced the care of the aged out of the
budget of millions of American families.” 49
Asbury’s series on the plight of New York’s elderly poor was just the latest piece of evidence that
programs like Social Security that were designed to keep older people out of economic penury were
becoming increasingly ineffective at performing that task. 50
In the decade before the New York Times ran Asbury’s series, its reporters had covered in
extensive detail the struggle by organized old age groups in California and Colorado to enact
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guaranteed pensions for the older residents of those states – effectively, to legislate the Townsend
Plan into existence on a state-by-state basis. 51 As the Times reported, California’s old-age pension
had eliminated the traditional “support-by-relatives” stipulation which many states (including New
York) insisted upon, and consequently had a far greater number of eligible applicants and recipients,
with the pension’s cost amounting to approximately 17% of a $1 billion budget (1949 dollars) and
rising in its first year alone.
Within a year of enacting this unusually generous old-age pension, California voters in a
November 1949 special election largely rescinded its more liberal provisions, but not before roughly
a third of its citizens over the age of 65 (approximately 250,000 people) had signed up for a pension
(the pensions averaged out to $71 monthly in 1949 dollars). By contrast, less than ten percent of
residents aged 65 years or older received pensions in New York and Pennsylvania; in both of those
states, the pension averaged between $40 and $52 monthly in 1949 dollars, a figure that was
considerably less generous than California. Colorado and Washington State, though, had the highest
overall proportion of elderly citizens over the age of 65 receiving state old-age pensions at 47.71
and 38 percent, respectively.
As the Times coverage of these state-level struggles over old-age pensions hinted, there had
been a political re-awakening among the elderly that had galvanized them into action, a fact that
local welfare officials and experts in New York City were also becoming aware of. 52 In November
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1945, the New York Times sponsored a broadcast radio forum in which Ollie Randall from the
Community Service Society, Dr. Frederick Zeman of the private Home for Aged and Infirm
Hebrews, and Lillian Poses, a regional Social Security representative, discussed the growing “needs
of the aged.” 53 In particular, the three speakers emphasized the demand by elderly people that there
be “better housing facilities…more recreational facilities…and a new public attitude recognizing
their individuality,” all of which were needs that were not being met by the Social Security system.
Furthermore, these new demands suggested how many older Americans had begun to redefine the
parameters of economic and social security programs beyond the principles of basic economic
security that had guided the assumptions made by the architects of the original Social Security
Act. 54
Increasingly, the Times warned in its coverage of state-level pension movements in western
states like California and Colorado that elderly Americans were again becoming increasingly active
in seeking to have their demands met by the political system. 55 The ferocity of the fight in
California between resurgent latter-day Townsend Movement-style old age advocacy groups was
particularly alarming to the New York Times reporters stationed there, who could not help but
wonder if the generational conflict in California was merely the opening act in a new, potentially
much larger national struggle over old-age economic security, much as it had been during the Great
Depression. 56 In truth, though, while the Townsend Movement had largely ceased to be an effective
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force in national politics, it had left a formidable legacy in many western states, where its organizers
had successfully politicized many older Americans on the issue of old-age economic security. 57
Even more troubling, evidence of discontent among older Americans was not merely a regional
phenomenon confined to western states like California or Colorado: a 1953 poll funded by the
Rockefeller Foundation of retired New York City teachers and city employees – many of whom
already had publicly supported pensions – revealed broad dissatisfaction due to “inadequate
income” and an inability to secure continued gainful employment. 58
While the western states roiled with the continuing fights over state-level pensions, private
philanthropic foundations were also taking important steps to investigate the problems of the
elderly. On May 29, 1951, the New York Times reported that the Rockefeller Foundation had given a
$25,000 seed grant to the New York City Mayor’s Advisory Committee for the Aged to fund
research on facilities for the aged in New York. 59 Raymond M. Hilliard, the executive director of
the city’s welfare council, immediately appointed Louis Dublin, a vice president of the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company to carry out the study, which Hilliard hoped would try to determine “what
we can do best to prevent the debilities of old age…[and] how we can enrich the lives of those of
our older people, particularly how we may remove from them the fear of old age, the fear of its
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poverty and its sickness and its uselessness and humiliation and its desolation.” 60 Hilliard’s
ruminations had real meaning in New York, which in 1951 counted approximately eleven percent of
its elderly population on public assistance rolls. 61 Earlier in the year, Hilliard, in a speech before the
Economic Club of Detroit, had warned that “unless the root causes were attacked the United States
would face ‘an almost inevitable straight-line increase in the volume of dependency.” 62 As Hilliard
noted, “we cannot prevent people from reaching old age, but we can prevent them from reaching it
in a condition of dependency.” 63
Hilliard’s campaign throughout 1951 suggested the inadequacy of the existing framework of
public and private security provision, at least for local welfare officials who had to devise creative
solutions to fill the gap between Social Security and the rapidly increasing numbers of impoverished
elderly people with limited options. If the demographic projections put out by the 1950 U.S. Census
were correct – as the New York Times noted, persons over 65 in New York constituted 7.3 per cent
of the city’s population in 1950, but had made up just 2.8 percent in 1900 – then the city would very
likely soon face the unwelcome fact of growing old-age dependency on public assistance, a
development no one particularly welcomed. 64
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Even in 1951, though, a city as prosperous as New York, like other local municipalities,
could only do so much for its elderly residents. The Truman administration’s 1950 National
Conference on the Aging had recognized this reality in its final recommendations, observing that
“while each local community should assume as much responsibility as possible and ‘not pass the
buck,’ many cannot solve the problem alone. Thus planning for the aged should be on a State-wide
basis, with many communities working together.” 65 The emerging partnership between the Mayor’s
Advisory Council and the Rockefeller Foundation thus represented a pioneering model which could
demonstrate that government and philanthropy could productively partner together to solve
important social problems. 66 By developing programs in New York City which could try to improve
the living conditions of the city’s impoverished elderly residents, Hilliard and other city welfare
officials hoped to offer an attractive alternative solution to them that promised to re-integrate them
back into the community as respected members rather than pitied elders, and that would also have
the effect of diminishing the appeal of newly re-energized old-age pension advocacy groups.
In the months which followed the Rockefeller Foundation’s grant, new facilities dedicated to
assisting the lives of older New Yorkers began to appear throughout the city. 67 As he opened up one
recreational center in Harlem, New York Mayor Vincent Impellitteri stated that “it is a tragedy of
our time…that while we have learned how to prolong life, we have not learned how to make the
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later years of life happier and more livable. We may, however, be learning here today how we can
more amply meet our responsibilities to our senior citizens.” 68 Impellitteri’s remarks neatly
encapsulated how public officials and social welfare experts had decided to try and resolve the issue
of old-age economic insecurity at the local level. Implicitly conceding that the wartime and
immediate postwar hopes for Social Security’s expansion into a truly comprehensive program were
unlikely to be achieved anytime soon, municipalities like New York City and major private
philanthropies like the Rockefeller Foundation had decided to work in partnership in order to devise
and provide alternative options which “would make the later years of life happier and more
livable.” 69
The newly opened recreational and vocational centers were soon joined by other city-wide
initiatives. 70 A citywide orchestra consisting of elderly musicians was formed; New York’s mayors
and governors quickly got into the habit of proclaiming city and state-wide “Senior Citizen” month,
Times Square was renamed for a day as “Senior Citizens Square,” and perhaps most importantly,
delayed legislation began to be drafted in Albany which attempted to give real teeth to efforts to
prevent age discrimination in New York State. 71 As Eleanor Roosevelt wrote in her May 15, 1952
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“My Day” column, “I think this work for our really senior citizens is going to succeed and I think
we will learn even to humanize some of our laws. Social Security is not always sufficient for an
older person to live on.” 72 Twice more in future years, Eleanor Roosevelt would highlight New
York State’s “Senior Citizens Month” in her column, urging her older readers in her May 10, 1955
column to write to the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aged to get
copies of the committee’s recently published “bill of rights and responsibilities for senior citizens.”
As Roosevelt observed in her column, “people are living longer than their ancestors lived and it is a
necessity for them to live usefully and happily even if they have to change their type of occupation
at a given retirement age…they should not be made to ‘retreat from life.’ They should be used for
the good of the community.” 73
Eleanor Roosevelt’s insistence on the vitality of older people probably came in part from her
own life experience – she had, after all, remained a vital force in American politics despite her own
age (she was 66 years old in 1950) – but her columns also neatly captured both changing popular
and academic understandings of old age in the 1950s. In June 1951, for example, at a major
academic conference held at Northwestern University, University of Chicago sociologist Philip M.
Hauser lamented the effects of urbanization and industrialization on the American family, which he
argued had led to a shift from a “large family system” in which older people had clearly defined
roles as respected elders to a “small family” model in which older people lacked any clearly defined
social role to play. 74 As Hauser observed, “the modern American family is not what it used to
be…the family has long since lost many of its various historic functions or has shared them with
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new, specialized, urban institutions.” 75 In Hauser’s view, the shift for many families from a rural to
urban living pattern had led to “considerable strain” on “the historic bonds of solidarity, sentiment,
and affection” which had marked many rural communities. Urban living patterns had introduced
“new dangers and new forms of insecurity” for older Americans, and “these changing forms of
hazards and insecurity coupled with the decreasing size of family vitally affect the position of older
persons,” and in his view, “so attenuated have the protective functions of the contemporary urban
family become that it often cannot – even when it wishes to do so – provide security to its aging
dependent members.” 76
In essence, Hauser argued that the declining ability of the American family to supply its
oldest members with their traditional roles had exacerbated the types of insecurity that beset many
older Americans. 77 Summing up his argument, Hauser stated that “although problems of aging are
by no means restricted to the economic sphere, there can be little doubt that the maintenance of
means is perhaps the basic and critical problem of old age.” 78 Hauser’s arguments and assumptions
about the changing nature of the American family and by extension American society had found
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expression a year earlier at the 1950 National Conference on Aging, and increasingly they began to
influence policymakers, newspaper columnists, and social welfare experts. 79
Following from these premises, in Hauser’s view, the “expanding services of the
government directed at meeting the needs and dealing with the problems of old age” could be
“regarded as social inventions designed to deal with the problems of aging no longer being
adequately met by our inherited culture and social institutions.” 80 While conceding that the United
States had a long political tradition of limited government, Hauser ultimately argued that
the wide range and the complexity of the problems of personal
adjustment in old age in contemporary life, the changing role and
uncertain economic position of the older person in our urban industrial
society, together with the rapidly increasing number and proportion of
older persons in our urban industrial society, together with the rapidly
increasing number and proportion of older persons in our population
seem definitely to call for concerted action of individuals and of
private and public agencies to deal with the problems of old age and
to facilitate personal adjustment. 81
While condemning the efforts of the federal government to relieve old-age economic insecurity as
hitherto “a combination of musty inherited social institutions and patch work improvisation under
pressures of severe depression and great political unrest,” Hauser admitted that “from a practical
standpoint it is probably desirable to improve the programs we already have – to work on them as a
point of departure rather than to start in new directions, however sound, de novo.” 82 Instead of
hoping for the federal government to solve the problem of economic insecurity, Hauser expressed
his hope that state and local governments would “make a contribution to the solution of economic

79

Digest of Proceedings, Section 1b, Population Changes and Economic Implications, Morning Session August 15,
1950. Approved by Dr. Philip M. Hauser, Chairman; Immediate Release. Conference on Aging. Population Changes
and Economic Implications, Philip M. Hauser Papers, Box 14, folder 4, University of Chicago Special Collections
Research Center, Chicago, Illinois. See also Lee R. Graham, “Old Folks at Home – Their Own,” The New York Times,
November 9, 1952.
80
Ibid., 14.
81
Ibid., 19.
82
Ibid., 26. Underlining in original.

207

problems of old age.” 83 In sum, a comprehensive approach was necessary to solve the economic and
social problems associated with older people; only in this way could, as Hauser poignantly put it,
American society “add life to years” rather than simply add years to life.
Hauser’s speech at the conference was just one marker of an evolving consensus about the
role the federal, state, and local governments should play in shoring up the social and economic
status of older Americans, given that the traditional non-governmental institutions of family life,
organized religion, and private-sector employment were proving to be increasingly inadequate. That
consensus was powered both by changing ideas in academia, but also by the rising costs associated
with state-subsidized support of the elderly. For example, in late December 1949, the New York
Times had reported that the total annual cost sustained by the federal, state, and local governments
to provide public relief for impoverished elderly people had surpassed $250 million, a figure which
was nine times greater than it had been a decade earlier. 84 Despite this tremendous outlay of funds,
though, 1 in 4 elderly people remained mired in poverty, and the costs of providing relief showed no
signs of slowing down as the number of older people continued to steadily increase.
Strengthening Social Security
This tremendous expenditure of public funds had led, as the Times reported, to “virtually
complete agreement among Democrats and Republicans, federal and state officials, and industry and
labor that the only effective antidote to the handout philosophy in care for the aged lies in measures
to buttress the old-age insurance system by stepping up the benefits and extending coverage to
millions not now protected.” 85 After years of being subject to bitterly partisan fights, Social
Security’s old-age insurance provisions rather than its old age assistance provisions now enjoyed the
limelight as the favored solution to the resurgent issue of old-age economic insecurity. Additionally,
83

Ibid., 26.
A. H. Raskin, “Cost of Aid to Old Rises 250 Millions,” The New York Times, December 26, 1949.
85
Ibid.
84

208

there were mounting concerns made by some social welfare experts that some states were abusing
the Social Security old age assistance program’s cost-sharing feature in order to support their elderly
citizens. For example, in Louisiana, roughly 82 out of every 100 older people in the state were
recipients of benefits provided by Social Security’s old-age assistance program. That figure had
roughly doubled in the four years in between the end of World War II and 1949. 86 Moreover,
because the Social Security’s old age assistance program in Louisiana was subsidized with federal
funds, meant that Louisiana was effectively receiving a generous discount on the costs of supporting
its elderly population at the expense of other states that had far more robust participation by their
older residents in Social Security’s old age insurance system, which did not receive similar federal
subsidies. Several states – including Washington State, Colorado, and California – were already
strongly signaling that this arrangement was not financially tenable for the long term, and were
beginning to invoke the specter of state bankruptcy should Social Security’s old-age assistance
program continue to outpace its old-age insurance provisions.
Making common cause with the uneasy state officials were many of the nation’s private
insurers. While they had been opposed or indifferent to Social Security when it had first been
enacted in 1935, increasingly private insurers worried that Social Security’s old age assistance
program might create a de facto Townsendite-like sense of personal entitlement on the part of the
nation’s older citizens to guaranteed benefits, regardless of how those benefits were actually funded.
In a November 1949 speech before the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Reinhard A. Hohaus, the chief
actuary for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, warned that “the availability of additional
Federal funds for relief would tend to encourage the handout approach to pensions and negate the
benefits to be derived from strengthening the insurance program,” and suggested that more states
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might be tempted to follow Louisiana’s example and redesign their old-age assistance programs so
as to maximize the amount of federal appropriations they could receive. 87
The fiscal fears that both Hohaus and the coterie of state officials had publicly worried about
had their origins in the work of the 1948 Social Security Advisory Council, which had assembled a
broad spectrum of academic, labor, and insurance officials to re-evaluate and examine Social
Security’s increasingly untenable financial condition. After a series of in-depth investigations, the
Advisory Council had found that Social Security’s social insurance model was being undercut and
was ultimately in danger of being swept away by its public assistance provisions. Specifically, the
Council found three major deficiencies in Social Security: “inadequate coverage” of American
workers; “unduly restrictive eligibility requirements for older workers” which resulted in “only
about 20 percent of those aged 65 or over [as] either insured or receiving benefits under the
program”; and finally “inadequate benefits” which were insufficient to prevent retirees from falling
below the official poverty line. 88
In order to remedy these problems, the Advisory Council had recommended the inclusion of
more categories of workers, including the self-employed, farm and household workers and
expanding the eligibility requirements of Social Security’s old-age insurance program, along with
an increase in the benefits paid by its old-age insurance rather than its old-age assistance program. 89
In making these recommendations, the Advisory Council hoped to strengthen Social Security’s oldage insurance program and to weaken its old-age assistance program, with the ultimate goal of
ensuring more even economic protection for older people throughout the United States that would
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be less subject to the vagaries of state-by-state assistance. As the Council frankly admitted in its
report,
the economic and legislative developments of the past year have
served effectively to confirm the Social Security Administration in its
belief that the present limited system of social security, comprising
the various programs operating under the Social Security Act and
under other separate legislative measures, is an inadequate and
inequitable way of providing the basic essentials of economic and
social security for the Nation’s gainfully employed persons and their
families. 90
The changes proposed by the Council would therefore have the effect of putting Social Security
onto a more secure financial footing, given that it would be taking in more revenue from the payroll
taxes levied on newly included groups of workers.
It was becoming increasingly clear that the old-age assistance aspect of Social Security had
metastasized into a program that dwarfed Social Security’s old-age insurance provisions and which
threatened to award the Townsend Movement a posthumous victory. To rectify the situation and
place Social Security back on a firmer footing, the Truman administration, in conjunction with the
CIO’s unions, sought passage of a series of legislative amendments in 1950 to the Social Security
Act in order to translate the 1948 Social Security Advisory Council’s recommendations into law,
even though those amendments largely steered clear of the question raised by Cohen about how to
“provide genuinely productive jobs” for older people. 91 After a fierce political battle, the
administration and the CIO succeeded in their quest; by August 1950, President Truman had signed
the Social Security amendments into law.
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Despite the lack of provision for “genuinely productive jobs” for older people, the Social
Security amendments enacted in 1950 began the process of tipping the balance within Social
Security towards old-age insurance and away from old-age assistance. By January 1952, the number
of people receiving old age insurance exceeded the number receiving old age assistance, and
likewise the “total amount of insurance payments to aged persons exceeded the amount of old-age
assistance payments.” 92 Even as they rejoiced in the expanded protections afforded to Social
Security, some astute New Deal liberals could not ignore the fact that the Social Security system
remained far from universal in its scope or sufficient in its benefits to end the scourge of old-age
economic insecurity. As social welfare expert and New Dealer Wilbur Cohen observed in January
1952, “there are still many aged persons with inadequate incomes, many pressing problems with
respect to income for the aged still unsolved or awaiting consideration, and a need for much more
information on the economic status of the aged.” 93
State Actions to Bolster Economic Security in Old Age
Whilst the fight over Social Security benefits continued to play out in Washington, evidence
of the increasingly muscular response on the part of state and local officials in New York and
elsewhere to provide more firm guarantees of economic security in old age to their elderly
constituents. 94 In 1955, while speaking at a three day conference on the problems of the aging, New
York Governor Averell Harriman expressed his hope that New York State’s government could act
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as “a catalyst in the process of galvanizing a state-wide onslaught against the economic, physical,
emotional and spiritual problems of the aging.” 95
Sensing that the time was right to propose new legislation, in January 1956 New York State
Senator Thomas C. Desmond announced that he would propose a series of forty bills “to help
prevent poverty among the aged.” 96 His motivation was simple. As he declared in an interview with
the New York Times, “it is not enough to feed and house the indigent aged…Society’s basic problem
is to prevent indigency.” 97 Alongside long-sought goals like extension of unemployment insurance
benefits, Desmond proposed to “withhold public contracts from companies that discriminate against
workers of 40 or more in hiring practices” and to “encourage ‘portable’ pension plans under which a
worker retains accrued benefits when changing jobs.” 98 In November 1956, the New York State
Division of Housing directed that “at least 5 percent of apartments in state-aided projects be
designed and reserved for aged persons,” in order to meet the growing demand for suitable housing
for the state’s elderly population, most of whom could not afford “the rents that private builders find
they must charge.” 99 Taken as a whole, these proposals and initiatives represented an unprecedented
expansion of New York State’s role in ensuring the well-being of its older citizens; indeed, with the
possible exceptions of California or Colorado, no state had done more on behalf of its elderly
residents. 100
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Unlike California or Colorado, though, New York State’s role in providing extensive social
services to its senior citizens was a more recent development. Between the end of World War II and
the 1955, New York State’s spending on pensions, welfare, and institutional care for the aged
increased by almost five times. 101 Governor Harriman’s administration expected spending to
continue to rise at a similar rate for the duration of the 1950s and well into the 1960s; as one report
noted, “in 1945 payments by government agencies to all persons in New York 65 and over plus the
public expense of maintaining the aged in hospitals totaled $170,000,000” whereas in 1955 “the
comparable figure was $833,000,000.” 102 The growing concerns about the rising number of elderly
people found resonance throughout New York’s busy private welfare establishment. In February
1957, B’nai B’rith, a major American Jewish organization, publicly declared that “increasing
problems confronting the aged required ‘concerted effort’ on local levels.” 103 Citing what it termed
“principal danger spots for senior citizens,” such as “discrimination in employment…the
concentration of older persons in dense urban areas…insufficient medical care for the aged, and a
decline in the standard of living for the aged,” Philip M. Klutznick, the president of B’nai B’rith,
urged “cooperative action” by federal and local officials to “ameliorate the threats to our aged and
aging population.” 104
These efforts indicated that much of the impetus for resolving the issue of how best to
provide economic security for older people had begun to return to the state and local levels of
government, usually in conjunction with the efforts of private welfare and philanthropic
organizations. In essence, while the effects of the Great Depression had bankrupted or otherwise
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driven many private charities either out of existence or very nearly to the brink, the continuing
stalemate at the federal level over Social Security and other unfinished items from the New Deal
wish list had created a vacuum that needed to be addressed at the local and state levels.
Put somewhat differently, the mere fact that the federal government took only halting action
on the issue of economic security in old age did not extinguish it as an issue. The prospect of
indigent or formerly middle-class elderly people organizing and demanding more direct government
action on their behalf was not a remote one. On October 29, 1955, Albert J. Abrams, the director of
the New York State Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging addressed the Gerontological
Society of America’s annual meeting in Baltimore, Maryland. 105 In his remarks, Abrams asserted
that “the shadow of Mr. [Francis] Townsend still hovers over Congress…his demonstration of the
political potentials of the aged, coming within only a few scanty votes of winning in the House of
Representatives, still manifests itself on the deliberations of the lawmakers.” 106
The Townsend Movement was still taken sufficiently seriously in 1957 that it could
persuade Congressman John A. Blatnik (D-MN) to reintroduce the Townsend bill as a major
modification of the Social Security Act, and for Blatnik’s home-state colleague Senator Hubert
Humphrey (D-MN) to praise the bill on the Senate floor in 1958. 107 The Eisenhower administration
kept close watch on the Townsend Movement as well, and sought to avoid any open conflict with it.
Eisenhower personally met with Dr. Townsend in 1958, which suggests that the Townsend
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Movement might not have been as irrelevant as some students have assumed it had become after the
1930s. The continuing appeal of the Townsend Movement was a stark reflection of the fact that as
late as November 1953, a significant proportion of the nation’s population over the age of 65 was
still receiving some form of publicly funded old-age financial assistance, with the highest state-bystate percentages still concentrated in southern and western states. 108 Additionally, nearly sixty
percent of that same population group remained ineligible for payments under the terms and
conditions of Social Security’s OASI social insurance provisions, with ineligibility particularly
highest among older women. 109
The Eisenhower Administration and the Search for Old-Age Economic Security
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s newly inaugurated administration in January 1953 thereby
confronted a situation in which the future direction of old-age economic security in the United
States remained in limbo. On the one hand, Eisenhower’s disdain for the New Deal’s emphasis on
collective security through governmental action was particularly pointed. In 1949, long before he
had begun to campaign for the presidency, Eisenhower had intemperately remarked that “if all that
Americans want is security, they can go to prison. They’ll have enough to eat, a bed and a roof over
their heads. But if an American wants to preserve his dignity and his equality as a human being, he
must not bow his neck to any dictatorial government.”
Eisenhower later came to regret those words once in office, but his personal disapproval of
the New Deal’s commitment to collective economic security through the use of government power
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was hardly a secret. 110 His 1949 remarks did little to assuage concerns about what an Eisenhower
administration might do to Social Security once in office. The Republican rank-and-file became
sufficiently alarmed that an openly antagonistic stance might cost Eisenhower the election. In a
confidential memo from Major Corliss C. Moseley, a senior executive at the Curtiss-Wright
corporation in Glendale, California to Reuben H. Fleet, an important San Diego businessman, and
subsequently passed along to Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff Sherman Adams by Senator William
Knowland (R-CA), Moseley confided that
[a] careful and confidential study of our approximately 5,000
employees, conducted during the last few months, indicates
conclusively that General Eisenhower has NOT come forth with a
firm position and stand on what he is going to do for the “WORKING
MAN.” Practically every employee of ours, who is opposed to
Eisenhower, states that “The Democrats gave us social security; I
need it for my old age,” “General Eisenhower has said nothing about
it or the working man,” and “If I vote for him we may lose it.” 111
Moseley urged Eisenhower to speak more frequently about Social Security, advice which
Eisenhower’s campaign took to heart. While on the campaign trail throughout October 1952,
Eisenhower spoke often about Social Security and in much calmer, softer tones. As candidate
Eisenhower remarked in Schenectady, New York on October 23, 1952: “we believe in expanded
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and improved social security. We believe in better security for our aged, to make certain that they
do not have fears that come about through things over which they have no control.” 112
Once elected, though, some of Eisenhower’s supporters within and without the Republican
Party expected him to take decisive action against Social Security, though others remained more
circumspect in their attitude. In October 1953, Edward F. Hutton of the stock brokerage firm E.F.
Hutton & Company wrote to Eisenhower urging him to consider drastically revamping Social
Security as a voluntary system. Eisenhower candidly responded in a confidential letter that
I have had an analysis made of our existing system – and the analysts
were among the most hard-headed, conservative individuals that I
know of. In general the conclusions are about as follows: We have
had a compulsory system since 1935. We must keep it on that basis or
else abandon it entirely…if we should put Social Security on a
voluntary basis, we would be in competition with every life insurance
company in the United States…it would appear logical to build upon
the system that has been in effect for almost twenty years rather than
embark upon the radical course of turning it completely upside down
and running the very real danger that we would end up with no system
at all. 113
Behind closed doors, though, Eisenhower revealed a certain amount of open-mindedness on the
issue of Social Security. During a November 1953 Cabinet meeting, as HEW Secretary Oveta Culp
Hobby outlined her department’s proposals to strengthen OASI (Social Security’s old age insurance
program) in order to reduce and eventually eliminate Federal grants for Social Security’s old age
assistance program (OAA), Eisenhower wondered out loud about the relative merits of the
Townsend Plan, only to be firmly dissuaded from it by Secretary Hobby and other assembled
Cabinet members. 114
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That Eisenhower and his Cabinet were even still discussing the Townsend Plan suggested
just how deep an imprint the Townsend Movement had left on national politics as well as the
continuing potential relevance of its proposed old-age pension program. In December 1952, after
Eisenhower had been elected but before he had taken office, the New York Times reported on the
continuing inadequacy of Social Security to keep its recipients above the poverty line. 115 The next
month, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce surprisingly added its voice to a rising chorus of supporters
for Social Security expansion, it planned to do so by increasing payroll taxes on employees and
largely ending Social Security’s old age assistance program. 116 The Chamber’s proposal drew
immediate fire from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.), which agreed that Social
Security needed improvements but did not concur with the Chamber’s method for doing so. 117 At
stake in the fight was approximately $1.5 billion in public spending monies as well as the existing
relationship under Social Security whereby individual states rather than the federal government
determined the criteria for old age assistance eligibility. 118
Refusing to remain on the sidelines, Professor Edwin Witte, the chairman of the original
Committee on Economic Security which Franklin Roosevelt had convened to forge the Social
Security Act twenty years earlier, lambasted the Chamber of Commerce for proposing “a baby
Townsend Plan” under which “the Santa is not the Government, but the employers and employees
who contribute to O.A.S.I.” 119 Refusing to surrender the fight over Social Security, Representative
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Carl T. Curtis (R-NE) responded by declaring at the annual meeting of the National Conference of
Social Work that the program was “a tangle of legalistic snarls and contradictions” and that
“searching inquiry into [it] was needed.” 120 Albert J. Abrams, the director of New York State’s Joint
Legislative Committee on the Problems of the Aging, joined the fray soon thereafter, and
condemned the Chamber of Commerce’s proposals as ultimately more detrimental to the long-term
viability of Social Security rather than beneficial. 121
The fight over old age assistance was not confined to national politics either. California’s
elderly citizens continued to be the recipients of state expenditures which were “greater than the
combined total of old age security payments made by New York and Pennsylvania,” both of which
were states that were comparable in population size; only rapid and sustained influx of younger
people into California kept state old age pension expenditures at a fiscally sustainable rate. 122 In
New York, Welfare Commissioner Henry L. McCarthy declared at a conference of public and
private welfare officials that rampant alcoholism and the rising number of elderly people were the
two biggest problems facing the city’s welfare administration, an argument that brought together
much of the attendees in agreement. 123
McCarthy’s relatively placid assessment was upstaged, though, by the Rev. Milton A.
Galamison, Minister of Siloam Presbyterian Church of Brooklyn, who condemned the lackadaisical
attitude of religious officials in the city towards the problems of the elderly, and acidly observed
that “it is easier to interest churches in a problem at the North Pole than one in New York City.” 124
Mincing no words, Galamison declaimed that “Puerto Ricans, delinquents, the aged, parolees, die
on their [churches’] very doorstep for lack of their help…the institutionalized church needs to be
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reminded that charity, if it is to be effective, begins at home.” 125 Letter writers to the Times groused
over the alleged ill-treatment of old people, with one letter writer demanding that “old people must
organize to help themselves…the only effective organization would be a political organization…an
adequately organized ‘Old People’s Political party’ would soon stop the uncivilized practice of
shutting industry’s doors to the employment of healthy and capable old people.” 126
It was clear in 1953 that neither major political party wanted a return of the Townsend
Movement or of any nascent “Old People’s Political party” to once again emerge. Congressional
Republicans, in particular, had been watching the largely negative reaction to the Chamber of
Commerce’s proposed plan and had surmised that it would be the wiser course of action not to upset
voters in the upcoming midterm elections in 1954. They eventually won administration support for
expansion of Social Security, although their embrace of Social Security came at the price of sowing
seeds of division within their own ranks. 127
The Eisenhower Administration’s Struggle for a Coordinated Response
In truth, though, the Eisenhower administration was beset by differing factions fighting over
how to best handle the issue of old age security, which in turn reflected divisions among different
organizations and individuals advocating on behalf of the elderly. After completing a study of
existing federal initiatives on behalf of the elderly, Assistant Secretary of the newly-formed
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Roswell Perkins found their range to be striking; he
later recalled that it also made coordination of such efforts next to impossible. To counter this
tendency towards fragmentation of services and responsibilities, Perkins later successfully pushed
for the creation of a Federal Council on Aging. The President eventually authorized it in 1956 in the
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hope that it would successfully mediate among the various executive branch agencies that seemed
far more interested in jealously guarding their respective turf. 128
The move to create a Federal Council on Aging revealed some measure of shrewdness on
the part of Perkins and other like-minded administration officials. As Perkins conceded, his desire to
produce a more coordinated approach to the problem of older Americans was motivated partly by
political concerns. He later recalled that “I tried to beef up the Department [of Health, Education,
and Welfare]’s focus on older people because of this very feeling that we were not giving enough
public highlighting to both what was being done and what needed to be done” – but there were other
considerations as well. 129 Perkins, like other Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
officials, was still mindful of the political tumultuousness of the Townsend Movement during the
1930s, and feared that inadequate federal efforts to address the needs of older Americans might
spark a revival of Townsendism:
The startling vehemence of the Townsend movement and other
movements demonstrated to anyone who gave it any reflection at all
the fact that this was dynamite. So I certainly did not minimize in my
own mind the extent to which, given what I would call improper or
wrong leadership, the problem of the aged could get completely out of
hand and could be demagogued to death.
Fearful of the return of political demagoguery, Perkins and his like-minded cohorts in the
Eisenhower administration instead wanted
to see to it that the Department’s approach to the aged was soundly
based and soundly articulated; and by that I mean not separating the
aged out from other population groups but to accept the fact that
scientific aging begins with birth… and to do everything possible to
get the problem of the aging reviewed dispassionately as a continuing
phenomenon throughout life rather than to let the demagogues take
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over and segregate the problems of older people from those of the rest
of society [sic]. 130
Perkins, along with other moderate Republicans ensconced in key policy positions throughout the
Eisenhower administration, therefore came to embrace the expansion of Social Security as the
decidedly lesser of two evils, at least compared to the return of the Townsend Movement. 131
Previously, in September 1954, Eisenhower had signed amendments to the Social Security
Act, which raised benefit payments and expanded eligibility for Social Security to 10,000,000
additional workers. 132 Speaking before an annual meeting of the New York State Welfare
Conference, Perkins conceded that “much must still be done to strengthen the social security
system,” but contended that “we have now completed the laying of an essentially solid
foundation.” 133 Instead of focusing on Social Security reform, Perkins urged the assembled
delegates to devote more attention to the aging of the U.S. population, claiming that it “represents
one of the great social welfare challenges of our times…the principal problem in dealing with the
aged is to change the concept that aging is a problem for society to the concept that old age is a
period of great value to society.” 134 Perkins did not elaborate further on how he thought this change
in thinking about aging could be accomplished, but as developments a decade later would reveal,
federal, state, and local policymakers would be actively engaged in designing and implementing
programs to bring this change into existence.
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Perkins’ publicly expressed concern about the mounting problems of elderly people was
echoed at the same New York conference by Elizabeth Wickenden, a leading figure in both social
welfare policy and liberal Democratic Party circles. In her remarks, Wickenden noted that the
United States’ “abundant economy and unprecedented advances in medical science have permitted
more than 13,000,000 of our countrymen to live beyond…the sixty-fifth birthday…[but] our society
does not offer to this older group the same opportunities for self-realization that it extends to those
that are younger.” 135
Other voices added their concern over the gap between the growing number of elderly
people and the lack of a well-defined social role for many older people. Returning from a trip to
Scandinavia, Ollie A. Randall, the national president of the American Gerontological Society,
reported her impressions of the social role which older people enjoyed in other countries, noting that
“we sensed above everything else a feeling that nothing was too good for the old people. It is
something that we in this country have not acquired to the same degree.” 136 In Scandinavia and the
United Kingdom, elderly people were eligible not only for old age pensions; most also qualified for
government subsidized low-rent housing, free medical care, and were encouraged to remain
working rather than to retire. For those older people who had retired, free hot meals were provided
by mobile food service and a vigorous government-sponsored network of social clubs provided
older people with companionship and purpose. 137 Enviously comparing the paucity of American
assistance to the elderly with that available in western Europe, one American welfare official could
only conclude that “it puts to shame the meager efforts in this country.” 138
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However dilatory the Eisenhower administration may have been during its first term in
dealing with the problems of older Americans, the President did eventually take some actions to
better coordinate and direct federal programs on behalf of the elderly. 139 In 1956, Eisenhower
authorized the creation of a Special Staff on Aging within the Office of the HEW Secretary. 140 In
addition, Roswell Perkins’s newly-established Federal Council on Aging replaced an informal ad
hoc Interdepartmental Working Group on Aging that had bounced around within the administration
without being attached to any particular department or agency.
By placing direct responsibility for the Special Staff on Aging with the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, the Eisenhower administration hoped to demonstrate that it was
taking the problems of older Americans seriously. As the President’s memo creating the Federal
Council noted,
[i]n considering the changed circumstances presented by the
lengthening life span, we must recognize older persons as individuals
– not a class – and their wide differences in needs, desires, and
capacities. The great majority of older persons are capable of
continuing their self-sufficiency and usefulness to the community if
given the opportunity. Our task is to help in assuring that these
opportunities are provided. 141
However, the question of how exactly to define the problems of older Americans and their possible
solutions continued to vex the Eisenhower administration’s domestic policy makers. Even after
Eisenhower signed new amendments to the Social Security Act in 1956 that helped to broaden and
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expand eligibility for the program, officials within the administration continued to debate how best
to deal with the problems of aging people in the long-term beyond expanding Social Security. 142
While these officials agreed that the elderly should not be treated as a “class,” and that state
and local governments (as well as private voluntary organizations) should take the lead, other
questions abounded. What was the appropriate way to “help make it possible for older persons who
desire and are able to work to continue their productive lives through suitable gainful
employment”? 143 Or how could the federal government “help lessen anxiety about economic
insecurity in the later years through an improved income maintenance program,” given the
administration’s reluctance to expand the federal government’s reach by creating new social welfare
programs? 144
As the Eisenhower administration recognized, the federal government could “not enact
happiness” but it could “attempt to reduce barriers to continued social usefulness and a fuller life for
older people,” which included “restricted opportunities for useful employment, insufficient income
for retirement, living arrangements unsuited to real needs or income, ill health, and lack of
preparation for retirement.” 145 Some initiatives to achieve this end were eventually undertaken. The
federal Labor Department, for example, strengthened its nationwide employment service system to
place older workers back into active employment, noting that “individual older workers receive
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special attention in all public employment offices” and “sustained efforts are made to eliminate or
reduce artificial age barriers.” 146
Gradually, the Eisenhower administration came to embrace a public-private approach to
solving the issues of older Americans. By design, its Federal Council on Aging remained limited
both in terms of manpower and resources allocated, which meant that it was unlikely to compete
with larger, better funded entities within the federal government. Instead, the Council used its
limited resources to encourage increased cooperation among state and local governments and
private voluntary groups which were involved in the day-to-day minutiae of dealing with the
problems of older people. 147
Over time, it became clear that the Eisenhower administration’s three top policy priorities
for older Americans were to ensure that older people would be able to find gainful employment,
provide income support for those older people who remained unemployed, and finally to provide
subsidies to the private housing construction industry and thus encourage banks and real estate
developers to increase the supply of housing suitable for older people on fixed incomes. On the
issue of providing access to affordable health care, the Eisenhower administration declined to
support measures designed to use public funds to subsidize the costs associated with medical care
and hospitalization. Instead, it chose to support increased funding for medical research and the
construction of hospitals. In sum, the Eisenhower administration proved at times to be quite willing
to use state power to improve the lives of older Americans, albeit in much more narrowly channeled
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and cramped ways than it probably could have, given Eisenhower’s popularity and favorable
relations with Congress during much of his tenure in office.
Once established, the Eisenhower administration’s Federal Council on Aging seems to have
met infrequently, and produced far more paperwork than policy. 148 The Council did produce some
reports which enjoyed limited circulation within the administration, but was terribly constrained by
the part-time nature of its staff (most of whom were borrowed from other departments), limited
funds, and lack of an effective legislative mandate to investigate, enforce, or propose problems such
as age discrimination in the workplace or the lack of adequate health provision for older people in
many parts of the United States. 149 Increasingly cognizant of the Council’s limitations, Eisenhower
publicly ordered that it be strengthened and given cabinet rank in March 1959, but by then
congressional Democrats and organized labor had seized the initiative from the administration in
defining how best to solve the problem of old-age security. 150 By September 1959, even the Federal
Council had to acknowledge in its official report to the President that “inadequate income can mean
inadequate medical care,” a connection it had heretofore pointedly omitted. 151 Beyond such
relatively plain language the Council dared not go.
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Marion Folsom, the Eisenhower Administration, and the Struggle for Health Security
Once the Eisenhower administration had made its reluctant peace with Social Security, other
proposals began to percolate up through the administration’s ranks. 152 Nelson Rockefeller, then
serving as an Under Secretary in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, urged the
administration in January 1955 to do more to provide subsidized housing for retired workers, though
his counsel was usually politely ignored by other administration officials. 153 Requests made by
outside groups for more concrete action by the administration were met with noncommittal answers.
In one typical response, after receiving a telegram from a Berkeley, California senior citizens
grassroots organization in 1956, pleading for the administration to do something about “the pressing
problems confronting the over 13 million voters 65 years and over in the United States,” Howard
Pyle, a deputy assistant to President Eisenhower, responded by highlighting the “determined efforts
of the Administration to combat inflation” as “perhaps of greatest benefit to citizens who have
pensions and savings accounts,” a response that neatly sidestepped the issue of providing health care
coverage through the Social Security system. 154 The point was clear: while interested in the
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problems of older people, the administration did not support efforts to create expensive new
government programs to assist the elderly; if at all possible, it would try to encourage the creation of
private rather than public solutions to the problems of older Americans.
In this vein, not long after he had taken the oath of office in 1955 as HEW Secretary, Marion
Folsom, a former senior executive with Eastman Kodak and well-connected member of the
Republican Party’s Northeast wing, convened a friendly breakfast with the presidents of the nation’s
leading private life insurance companies. The purpose of the breakfast, Folsom later recalled, was to
try and persuade the assembled insurance industry leaders to underwrite a health insurance policy
for retired people which would offer them adequate coverage once they had ceased to be eligible for
employer-provided health care benefits. Folsom’s proposal was backed by the full support of the
administration, which was increasingly becoming determined to find a solution to the mounting
question of providing health insurance to older Americans without having to employ the Social
Security system or to set up a new government program to do so. The Eisenhower administration’s
preferred solution was to offer financial support in the form of reinsurance to privately underwritten
insurance plans, provided there was sufficient interest and commitment on the part of the nation’s
largest life insurance companies in doing the actual work of creating and administering such a plan.
Essentially, the Eisenhower administration wanted private insurers to offer health insurance
plans to senior citizens, and would reimburse them for any financial losses that such plans might
sustain. The reaction Folsom got to his proposal was not encouraging. As one unnamed insurance
company president told him: “Marion, you’ve got to realize that we are in business. We’re not
politicians here. And being in business, we are responsible to our stockholders, and we’ve got to
make money. It’s just as simple as that.” 155 In the somewhat heated exchange which followed,
Folsom replied to the assembled gathering that “you gentlemen seem to be operating on an ostrich155
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like basis; if you don’t move more rapidly and more effectively in this field, the government is
going to take over, just as sure as the day follows the night.” 156
Though he pointed out that any delay on the part of the insurance companies was likely to
galvanize demands that the federal government intervene in the matter, he met stiff resistance. As
Folsom later remembered:
When the [insurance company] presidents got back to their offices and
got in touch with their lawyers, they were scared to death. Their
lawyers said, “Don’t you have anything to do with Washington. If you
get into anything with anything else in Washington they’re going to
be regulating the whole [life insurance] industry. We want to keep it
under state regulation. We don’t want the federal government
regulating the life insurance companies.” So the big [insurance]
companies were scared off…So that was the end of that plan. 157
Folsom was puzzled by the resistance he encountered. During his tenure as a senior executive at the
Eastman Kodak Company, he had helped oversee the adoption of a medical plan, and had also
worked with the administration of Republican New York Governor Thomas Dewey to adopt a
statewide disability plan to provide coverage to state employees. Both plans had been successful,
and Folsom could not understand why other states and private corporations had not undertaken
similar measures.

156

Ibid.
Oral History Interview of Marion B. Folsom #2 of 2, February 27, 1968, pages 140-141. Interviewer: John T. Mason,
Jr., DDEL. Roswell Perkins, an Assistant HEW Secretary, also recalled that the private insurers viewed the Eisenhower
administration’s plan as “the beginning of a possible road down to federal regulation of insurance that they just could
not, on behalf of themselves, their stockholders, their policy holders, tolerate no matter how worthy even if they were in
sympathy with the general efforts. They simply said to themselves, I’m sure, ‘We don’t care how laudable it is. You’ve
simply got to find another route, and we don’t even care that you’re trying to save private health insurance. We simply
cannot go along with a structure and a program that begins to get the federal government into our books.’ That was a
tremendous factor in the defeat of the [Eisenhower administration’s] re-insurance bill.” See Oral History interview with
Roswell Perkins (April 2, 1966), Social Security Administration Project, pgs. 79-80, Columbia Center for Oral History
Archives, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University in the City of New York. The AFL-CIO and the
AMA also refused to lend their support to the administration’s proposal, which similarly doomed it. See Oral History
interview with Roswell Perkins (1967), Social Security Administration Project, pg. 41, Columbia Center for Oral
History Archives, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University in the City of New York. Folsom’s successor
Arthur S. Flemming also tried unsuccessfully to lobby commercial insurers to step into the breach and provide
affordable health care plans for the elderly, but like Folsom before him met staunch resistance from representatives of
the insurance industry. See Farnsworth Fowle, “Flemming Urges Surety for Aged,” The New York Times, July 29, 1959.

157

231

Disappointed by the refusal of private insurers to be more proactive in addressing the needs
of older Americans, Folsom increasingly sought to put the administration ahead of the issue. At a
Cabinet meeting in early June 1958, he gingerly brought up the subject of adding hospitalization
coverage to the Social Security system, only to be met with Eisenhower’s fervent insistence that
holding down inflation was of paramount importance to older Americans on fixed incomes. 158
Defeated, Folsom would later come out in favor of Medicare in 1961, but his words of caution went
unheeded by the President.
Eisenhower’s insistence upon holding down inflation was not groundless. By 1958, federal
agencies distributed more than $12 billion in funding to programs aimed at helping older
Americans, with the vast majority of these funds disbursed through the Social Security old-age
assistance and insurance programs. The growth of these programs and the lack of coordination
between the various federal departments responsible for administering them meant that the federal
government’s activities were fragmented on the whole and duplicative in many respects. For
example, as a confidential cabinet memo circulated among senior Eisenhower administration
officials had acknowledged in January 1959, both HEW and the Department of Veterans Affairs
sponsored public health and rehabilitative programs, despite the administration’s declared position
that the federal government’s activities remain within “existing fiscal limitations.” 159
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A Modest Record
Despite the lack of coordination amongst the various departments in the Executive Branch,
by the summer of 1959, the Eisenhower administration could boast a successful if modest record of
accomplishment in developing programs to deal with the nation’s aging population. 160 When they
were questioned about this modest record, Eisenhower administration officials tended to emphasize
other domestic policy initiatives insofar as they might be applicable to the problems of older
Americans. For example, in her testimony to the U.S. Senate’s newly-formed Subcommittee on
Problems of the Aging and Aged, HEW Under-Secretary Bertha Adkins stated that “the guarantee
of an assured income, free from the ravages of inflation…has been one of the primary concerns of
the [Eisenhower] administration.” 161
Adkins, an educator and longtime Republican Party organizer from Maryland, had been
appointed Under Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1958. In
that capacity, she worked closely with Arthur Flemming, Marion Folsom, and other moderate
Republicans to devise a social policy framework that would allow the administration to occupy the
political middle ground between the New Deal and the deeply conservative elements within the
Republican Party that sought to undo as much of the New Deal as possible. The Eisenhower
administration’s efforts in this regard, such as the creation of the Federal Council on Aging and
HEW’s Special Staff on Aging embodied this search for a middle way on domestic policy: use of
160
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the federal government’s power, but with limits placed upon the amount of funds to be expended or
manpower to be used, and with a decided emphasis on using federal power in collaboration with
state, local, and private sector organizations in order to solve public policy problems.
In order to meet that goal in the field of old-age economic security, Adkins emphasized the
efforts of HEW’s Special Staff on Aging starting in the mid-1950s to “develop and maintain liaison
with national organizations working in the [aging] field,” including the American Public Welfare
Association and the National Committee on the Aging of the National Social Welfare Assembly.
These links allowed the Special Staff to “render assistance to organizations in development of
activities, planning and conducting conferences, and securing specialized help,” and to operate “an
information clearinghouse and publications service.” 162 Overall, the tone that Adkins struck during
her testimony was one of cooperation and coordination rather than of discord and dissent: the
administration was happy to help assemble the infrastructure necessary to maintain and strengthen
the activities of states, localities, and private welfare agencies in meeting the myriad social problems
of the elderly. 163 Adkins’ tone was matched by that of her boss, President Eisenhower, who in
November 1959 publicly underscored his agreement with the Federal Council on Aging that
“responsibility [for the elderly] must be shared by the individual, his family, the community and the
local and state governments, as well as by the Federal Government.” 164
But perhaps the clearest evidence of the Eisenhower administration’s approach to the
economic and social problems of older Americans inadvertently came from the testimony of a
deputy executive in Department of Labor before the New York State Joint Legislative Committee
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on the Problems of the Aging in late 1957. Speaking to the assembled New York State legislators,
Newell Brown, an Assistant Secretary of Labor, stated that
[t]he Federal Government must give overriding priority to defense
needs, a responsibility it cannot divide. On what bases then can we
expect continued improvement in the conditions under which older
people live? There are essentially two bases: (1) a close partnership
with State and local governments and voluntary groups and (2) our
enormous resources. 165
Lest any of the legislators have missed the point he was making, Brown opined that “I hope that we
will never accept the philosophy that the best and only way to meet problems is always more and
bigger Federal Government.” 166 Instead, Brown argued that “people should consider in each
instance whether it is the Federal action that is most needed and likely to be most effective; or
whether individual effort and private enterprise or local or state governments that bring the best and
most lasting results.” 167 This approach was not without its merits; as Brown argued, “it is the [local]
community to which all our programs must be oriented… [f]ederal and [s]tate governments can
move with more confidence into new activities, if these activities are community-tested and
approved,” but such an approach also made it far less likely that any national solutions to systemic
problems would be brought forward anytime soon.
New York Mobilizes
While the Eisenhower administration debated behind the scenes over how best to approach
the mounting issues surrounding old-age security, pressure continued to build at the grassroots level
in New York for more thorough intervention by the federal government. Despite New York State’s
pioneering efforts during the 1950s to construct a governmental infrastructure capable of more fully
165
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addressing the needs of the state’s elderly citizens, these efforts had produced modest results which
were becoming increasingly ineffective in the face of rising medical costs. These costs had
prompted the state to build its own program of medical care for the elderly, though disputes between
New York City and the state government in Albany had delayed the city’s residents from
participating in the program. 168
Despite the success of the state’s efforts to provide affordable public housing for older
people, this achievement did little to mitigate the growing need for older people to have access to
affordable medical and hospital care. 169As a 1957 report in the New York Times revealed, though the
number of elderly people receiving benefits from the New York City Welfare Department was
decreasing, the amount of public expenditure for the care of older persons continued to rise. 170 In
February 1960, a growing ad hoc coalition of New York City-based voluntary organizations sent a
joint telegram to the President imploring him to improve the federal government’s initiatives for
older Americans. Led by Zalman J. Lichtenstein of the Golden Ring Clubs, the organizations
pleaded their case:
Dear Mr. President, we are grateful and much encouraged by the
concern you exhibited about us senior citizens at the press
[conference] last Wednesday. We look forward with great anticipation
to your favorable recommendations for health benefits for Social
Security beneficiaries…Good health, decent shelter, and knowing
where the next meal comes from are of primary importance to our
peace of mind and enjoyment of retirement. Millions of us, when
serious illness strikes, without adequate protection, face plain
168
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terror…Please Mr. President, use your great influence to expand the
Social Security Act to contain health provisions… 171
As had been the case during the Great Depression, the growing support of the voluntary
organizations for a strengthened federal role in social welfare issues was born of their growing
inability to adequately shoulder the mounting costs of old-age security. As Irving Kane, then serving
as President of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, stated bluntly in a March
1960 letter to President Eisenhower:
The costs of…medical care for the aged places a heavy burden upon
our Jewish voluntary organizations, with inadequate resources, which
they are unable to meet even while diverting funds from other
essential needs. It is the conviction of our Health Services Committee,
our Public Welfare Committee, and our Board of Directors…that
Federal responsibility through the use of the OASDI is required. 172
Within a month of the Golden Rings Clubs’ telegram, congressional Republicans’ offices were
worriedly reporting to the Eisenhower administration that they were receiving vast numbers of cards
asking that they support legislative efforts to enact health care using via the Social Security
system. 173 Despite the growing concerns of Republicans on Capitol Hill about the possible costs of
opposition to enacting the proposed Forand bill, the Eisenhower administration remained steadfast
in its opposition. 174
Surveying this inaction, the administration’s opponents moved into action. A March 1960
rally in New York to demonstrate support for the legislation drew six thousand retired labor
171

Telegram, Adolph Held, President, Golden Ring Clubs of Senior Citizens, 25 E. 78th Street, New York, NY, and
others to Dwight D. Eisenhower, February 5, 1960), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House
Central Files), General File, 1953-61, Box 1041 GF 133-C Social Security 1960 (1), DDEL.
172
Irving Kane to Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 31, 1960, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House
Central Files), General File, 1953-61, Box 1041 GF 133-C Social Security 1960 (1), DDEL.
173
Memorandum, Jack Z. Anderson to Fred Fox, March 25, 1960, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White
House Central Files), General File, 1953-61, Box 1041 GF 133-C Social Security 1960 (1), DDEL.
174
Eisenhower reiterated his opposition to the legislation at a press conference held in March 1960. See “Eisenhower
Bars Wider Aged Care,” The New York Times, March 31, 1960. Among those opposed to the Forand bill was H.E.W.
Secretary Arthur Flemming, who would later change his mind and embrace Medicare once its passage became
inevitable after the 1964 election. See Bess Furman, “Health-Care Bill for Aged Fought,” The New York Times, July 14,
1959.

237

members who lustily booed Eisenhower in absentia was followed by an even larger one in May
1960 at Madison Square Garden. 175 The latter rally, which had been organized by the Golden Rings
Club, drew a crowd of 15,000 older people who listened and cheered on proponents of the proposed
legislation to enact health care via Social Security spoke. 176 Among the speakers were Congressman
Aime J. Forand (D-RI), former Labor Secretary Frances Perkins, Mayor Robert Wagner, David
Dubinsky of the ILGWU, and Walter Reuther of the UAW, all of whom drew raucous cheers from
the assembled crowd as they expounded on the virtues of the legislation. The only Republican
speaker at the rally – U.S. Senator Jacob K. Javits – drew boos as he attempted to defend the
Eisenhower administration.
The administration defended its non-interference on this issue as necessary to safeguard
against government-supported compulsion. As Gerald D. Morgan, Eisenhower’s Deputy Assistant,
wrote to an administration supporter:
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, at the direction of
the President, is exploring approaches to the problem of providing
adequate medical care for the aged which would strengthen existing
protection under voluntary auspices. It is consulting groups inside and
outside the government, including representatives of the insurance
industry. The administration is opposed to the use of a compulsory
governmental system to provide health care for social security
beneficiaries, and, accordingly, opposes the Forand bill and similar
measures. It does not believe that compulsory health insurance
constitutes a sound approach to the problem of providing health care
services for aged persons. 177
The Eisenhower administration was not alone in its opposition; the A.M.A. had long crusaded
against any such federal intervention in the provision of organized medicine. Likewise, the U.S.
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Chamber of Commerce, having lost its earlier fight to prevent the expansion of Social Security, now
took to the press to protest that “the whole Social Security program would be jeopardized if it were
broadened to provide hospital, nursing home, and surgical services for the aged.” 178 Given its past
record of largely opposing Social Security improvements, the Chamber of Commerce’s protests
were not surprising. What was new, though, was how the Chamber attempted to portray itself as a
true defender of Social Security’s financial stability by arguing that attempts to include health care
coverage for the aged would capsize the entire Social Security system.
This line of argument was different from the one used by the Eisenhower administration,
which had initially opposed adding health care for the elderly to Social Security because key
officials within the administration – including Eisenhower himself – believed the best course of
action was to continue to permit private medicine largely free rein in this arena without government
interference. Before the enactment of Medicare in 1965, this argument carried significant weight.
After the enactment of Medicare, though, the Chamber of Commerce’s line of argument would
prove to be far more potent in allowing opponents of expanding the federal government’s role in
social welfare to make their case, namely, that any new social welfare efforts by the federal
government could threaten or harm existing ones. By this logic, opposition to enacting Medicare
while claiming to support Social Security made sense, and as the politics of social welfare played
out over the course of the 1960s, such appeals would become increasingly attractive to opponents of
the Great Society’s attempted reforms of domestic social welfare policy.
Ultimately, the Eisenhower administration would, in its twilight years, embrace a federal
role in providing medical care for the aged, but sought to do so under a program separate from
Social Security, administered solely by individual states, but jointly financed by the federal and state
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governments.
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The Eisenhower administration’s proposed plan also emphasized voluntary

participation by Americans aged sixty-five or older, provided that their entire annual income
remained below $2,500 (or $3,800 for a couple), and sought to “preserve the opportunity for private
insurers to continue to demonstrate their ability to develop major medical expense programs for the
aged.” 180
Sensing that the Eisenhower administration’s reluctance to fully address the issue of
providing health insurance for older Americans had created a rare opportunity to spotlight the issue,
the AFL-CIO began to increase the pressure on Congress to do something. 181 In his April 1960
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Problems of the Aged and Aging, James B. Carey,
secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO’s Industrial Union Department, pointedly stated the AFL-CIO’s
hope that the Subcommittee would “bring forth legislation which will improve the material, health
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and social status of those whose work years are past” because “the position of the Eisenhower
administration, which seems intent upon studying this problem to death.” 182 Carey’s testimony had
come on the heels of a 10,000 member-strong rally of United Auto Workers in Detroit, and was
greeted with jeers from Senate Republicans; the normally staid Senator Everett Dirksen pronounced
it to be “shameful and stinking.” 183 Carey countered “that the greatest fear of our older citizens is
failing health,” an arguable statement given how frequently the issues of decent housing and
adequate income support had cropped up in the letters and telegrams which Eisenhower
administration officials had been receiving for years. 184
From the perspective of the AFL-CIO, though, health costs were the most pressing issue,
especially for many retired workers. The pitchfork battles which the AFL-CIO’s various constituent
unions had fought with corporate America over the course of the previous decade had revealed just
how committed many companies remained to preventing any expansion of negotiated collective
bargaining agreements to cover retirees, and the sheer costs of trying to do so singlehandedly had
the potential to exhaust much of the funds available in organized labor’s coffers. 185 Challenging the
Eisenhower administration’s emphasis on encouraging private insurers to offer health insurance
plans to older Americans, Carey emphasized that “just as private pension plans are not considered a
substitute for old age insurance benefits, neither are private health plans a substitute for an over-all
insurance approach,” and pointedly stated that “so far as I personally am concerned, the
Administration’s shameful surrender to the American Medical Association and to the insurance
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companies is an outright betrayal of the needs of America’s 16 million elder citizens…[a]s these
citizens ponder their fate, they will know full well whom to thank for their plight.” 186
The Eisenhower administration remained split on the question of how to provide health care
for older people, with the President adamantly opposed but some other members of the
administration more open to negotiating on the issue. In a private October 1959 meeting with his
friend and sometime personal advisor Robert Burroughs, Eisenhower was told that
The problem of the cost of hospital and medical care for the retired
aged can be met only through insurance. Very few retired persons
have financial resources sufficient to pay for the cost of illness as it
occurs. The realistic alternative to insurance coverage is that health
care costs of the aged will increasingly be met by relief and public
assistance, with consequent loss of dignity and self-respect to
individuals and large added burdens on the general revenues…Health
protection is the biggest need of the aged and its present lack is the
greatest threat to their security. There is a good solution at hand which
would do a tremendous amount of good and which would finance the
cost on insurance principles, actually saving considerable money from
general revenues... 187
The pressure that organized labor and congressional Democrats were placing on the Eisenhower
administration was beginning to have an effect. As William Mitchell, a former Eisenhower
administration official, later recalled: “in the welfare field, a rather considerable amount of
Flemming’s response was a result of outside pressures of the organized groups in the welfare field,
the American Public Welfare Association (APWA), the National Association of Social Workers,
outfits like that, to whom he responded very sympathetically, and he very promptly courted their
good will.” 188
The closer links being forged between Flemming and the voluntary organizations which
performed much of the actual work in the field of social welfare signified just how much the
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Eisenhower administration had evolved on the issues of Social Security, health care coverage for the
elderly, and a host of other issues related to the welfare of older Americans. Eisenhower had come
into office emphasizing the dangers of government spending in order to corral inflation; while
Eisenhower never fully retreated from these beliefs, high ranking officials in his administration like
Marion Folsom, Arthur Flemming, and Bertha Adkins had come to embrace a far more pragmatic if
cautious approach that sought to work with voluntary organizations like APWA without openly
alienating the American Medical Association or the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 189
Ultimately, the actions taken by the Eisenhower administration strengthened the growing
relationship between federal, state, and local officials with private social welfare experts and
voluntary organizations. Suspicious of the New Deal social welfare programs it had inherited from
twenty years of Democratic rule in Washington, key Eisenhower administration officials like Arthur
Flemming, Marion Folsom, and Bertha Adkins worked to bolster alternative options to increasing
the reach of the federal government in national social welfare.
In order to accomplish this goal, they worked in conjunction with private social welfare
organizations to try and promote solutions to the social and economic problems of older Americans
which de-emphasized federal involvement, a striking reversal from the approach which liberals like
Eveline Burns and Oscar Ewing has emphasized during the 1940s. By de-emphasizing the role of
the federal government as the body primarily responsible for providing economic and social security
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As Arthur Flemming later recalled about Adkins, “We had a Special Staff on Aging…I placed this staff under the
Undersecretary [Adkins] and gave her responsibility for all Departmental planning for the White House Conference on
Aging…these were highly delicate area which were receiving increasing public and governmental visibility. Many
complicated problems had to be worked out involving often antagonistic public and private groups and other
governmental agencies…I can only say that my faith in Miss Adkins was amply justified by her performance.
Considering the fact that the Eisenhower Administration had opposed the authorization of the White House Conference
on Aging, nevertheless, under Miss Adkins’ stewardship, and coordination the government produced a very satisfactory
conference from the standpoint of the many diverse groups invited to participate. See Arthur Flemming to John J.
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to older people, the administration instead placed much of the burden upon local and state
governments as well as private social welfare organizations. Consequently, while the national
debate over public assistance to older people became focused on Social Security, other issues
separate from Social Security were left to be resolved at other levels of government.
The 1961 White House Conference on Aging
The administration’s approach to the problem of economic security in old-age was put on
vivid display during the three years of planning for the 1961 White House Conference on Aging, an
initiative foisted upon the Eisenhower administration by anxious congressional Democrats during
the summer of 1958, and which the administration then successfully delayed to its last days in
January 1961. 190 Despite the administration’s limited approach to using government power to
address the economic and social problems of the elderly, it became apparent that numerous states
had already developed extensive state-level commissions and activities designed to promote the
enactment and implementation of policies that might be proposed at the conference. 191 For example,
forty-seven of the forty-eight states had availed themselves of federal funds to conduct state level
conferences leading up to formal participation in the national White House Conference, which
suggested just how much the mounting problems of the elderly cut across traditional regional
190

See “Reports to the President on Pending Legislation Prepared by the White House Records Office, (Bill File), Sep. 2
1958-Sep. 2 1958” Appr. 9/2/58 To provide for holding a White House Conference on Aging…H.R. 9822 (file), Box
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Times, September 9, 1952.

244

divisions and ideological barriers which normally beset and prevented unified action among the
states. 192
Increasingly, these state-level conferences revealed significant public interest in enacting
some sort of legislation to provide economic relief to older people in the form of background papers
being prepared by delegates to the conference. This deep interest in health-care legislation for older
Americans was likely being driven by the economic effects of inadequate retirement income for
older people and for their families. As the New York Times noted in the months leading up to the
conference, “for many of the elderly, lack of sufficient funds has turned the added years provided by
medical research into a humbling period of prolonged economic dependency. For many of their
grown children, it has become an economically untenable period of prolonged responsibility.” 193
The New York Times’s argument was echoed in the words of one background paper prepared for
delegates to the White House Conference on Aging, which made much the same point: “the capacity
of adult children to provide for all the needs of aged parents is limited by the modest character of
most family incomes, the demands of growing families of children, and the heavy burden of health
care among the elderly.” 194
Regardless of the machinations of individual administration members and the swiftly
growing number of voluntary old-age organizations, what stood out most about the White House
Conference on Aging was the sheer breadth and depth of individuals, institutions, and local
communities involved in its planning and execution. 195 Three thousand delegates were on the
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conference’s invitation list, three hundred national voluntary organizations, and twenty subject areas
covering nearly every possible realm of public and private life were prominent on the conference’s
manifesto. 196
Such diversity of representation was all the more remarkable given the relative paucity of
numbers and attention that had met the unofficially sanctioned Truman-era Conference on Aging in
the summer of 1950. As Eisenhower administration officials repeatedly emphasized, the 1961 White
House Conference on Aging was to be a “Citizens’ Conference” that would “represent the sum total
of the thinking, experience, and recommendations of every section of our country.” 197 Implicit in
this argument were two factors: first, the desire by the Eisenhower administration not to give any
outward appearance of the federal government’s dictating policy to state and local municipalities;
and second, the very real fact that, aside from the scattered reports that the Social Security
Conferences on Aging: Their Implications for Social Change,” Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1984. See
also Henry J. Pratt, “Symbolic Politics and White House Conferences on Aging,” Society 15, Issue 5 (July 1978): 67–
72. Pratt harshly condemned White House conferences on the problems of elderly people as little more than glorified
dog and pony shows, claiming that they are “a means of responding to the incipient demands of a large number of older
voters – and their allies elsewhere among the voting public – and yet to do so in a setting where symbolic reassurances
can be made to appear as action and where rhetoric, skillfully articulated, can seem to be something concrete.” (Ibid.,
68). See also Dale Vinyard, “White House Conferences and the Aged.” Social Service Review 53, no. 4 (1979): 655-71.
Vinyard offers a more positive assessment than Pratt, writing that while “it is clear that the millennium will not be
achieved as a result of a particular [White House] conference or even a series of them. About all that can reasonably be
expected is that some modest, incremental policy gains will be achieved or advanced…most conferences will have some
immediate policy impact” because “White House conferences generally have a fallout effect over the long run which
may lead to a more substantial policy change.” (Ibid., 668). William Bechill, a former U.S. Commissioner on Aging,
supported Vinyard’s interpretation, writing in 1990 that “the White House Conferences on Aging have been
‘directional’ and, as a result, have influenced specific legislation.” See William Bechill, “White House Conferences on
Aging: An Assessment of Their Public Policy Influences” Journal of Aging & Social Policy 2, Issue 3-4 (1990): 13-25.
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Administration was able to make available on an occasional basis, the federal government lacked
any real, permanent apparatus for collecting, collating, and comprehending information about the
nation’s older population.
Ultimately, the long-delayed White House Conference on Aging in January 1961
recommended that the Social Security system should be utilized as the primary framework for
organizing health care for older Americans, a position starkly at odds with the one staked out by the
Eisenhower administration, but one that was consistent with the AFL-CIO and the incoming
Kennedy administration’s thinking on how best to use the federal government’s resources to address
the issue of economic security in old age. While much of the conference’s numerous policy
recommendations would gather dust for the next four years, the advent of the Great Society in 19645 would make them relevant as the Johnson administration searched for new and innovative ways to
address the needs of senior citizens beyond the provision of health care.
Conclusion
In the meantime, localities like New York City and California took the initiative to provide
subsidized housing, to build new community centers, and to enact laws designed to protect the
welfare of older people. In the decade between the first National Conference on Aging in 1950 and
the 1961 White House Conference on Aging, these efforts multiplied and spread as local officials
worked to bridge the gap between the needs of older people and the lack of governmental services
to meet those needs. These efforts enjoyed the verbal blessing but not the financial backing of the
Eisenhower administration, which argued that spending on any new social welfare programs would
merely lead to increased inflation and thus hurt older people living on fixed incomes. Instead, the
administration commended private sector actors to fill the gap between the unmet needs of older
people (which increasingly meant the need for access to affordable health insurance by the end of
the 1950s) and the limited support provided by Social Security. This course of action helped to
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amplify the fragmentation of social services provided to older people, and to ensure that such
services would also vary widely from state to state. Subsequent efforts to rectify this development
by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations like the passage of the Older Americans Act in 1965
would have to address these disparities, even as they attempted to erect a new national framework to
provide essential services to older people, wherever they lived.
By 1959, the shift from old-age assistance to old-age insurance had dramatically decreased
the costs associated with relief while seemingly bolstering economic security. Old-age assistance
rolls had peaked in September 1950 at 2,890,000 enrolled individuals; by April 1959 this figure had
diminished by 450,000, with further reductions expected as assistance recipients were replaced by
social insurance recipients. 198 This trend would continue into the 1960s, as the effects of the Social
Security amendments passed during the course of the 1950s gradually brought more categories of
workers into the system while significantly bolstering the benefits that its social insurance program
provided.
Social Security’s social insurance program expansion was made possible by the Eisenhower
administration’s reluctant conclusion that improving Social Security would be less costly in the
long-run than abolishing it. The disempowerment of southern Democrats between 1953 and 1955,
also made the expansion possible because it removed a key congressional obstacle to reform efforts,
given the traditional proclivity of southern Democrats for growing Social Security’s old-age
assistance program rather than its old-age insurance program. While not originally intending to do
so, the Eisenhower administration strengthened Social Security as a way to ensure that future
administrations and Congresses would not be tempted to overpromise and spend more on public
assistance to older people, a development it feared would prove disastrous in the long-term to the
nation’s fiscal stability.
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While this development was, on the whole, beneficial to many older Americans, it still
sidestepped the crucial issue of health security that had been mounting since the late 1940s and the
early 1950s. For most of its duration, the Eisenhower administration, led personally by the President
himself, had adamantly opposed the enactment of health insurance for Social Security recipients,
and had largely aligned itself with the A.M.A. and some elements within the business community in
viewing such expansion of government power as unnecessary and unwise interference in the realm
of organized medicine and private commercial insurance. Only in 1960 did the administration
grudgingly embrace a limited new government program, the Medical Assistance for the Aged
(MAA) that allowed individual states to use means testing to determine which older people would
qualify for financial assistance in paying their medical bills, with a mixture of state and matching
federal funds to support such assistance. 199
While the Eisenhower administration and its allies battled an increasingly restive
Democratic Congress and organized labor movement during the 1950s over the issue of health
security for older Americans, policy developments at the state and local level began to outstrip the
types of assistance offered by the federal government. State, local, and private welfare officials,
primarily in New York City and California, worked to construct a new social welfare infrastructure,
which would be capable of addressing the growing community and social service needs of their
elderly resident population. While economic and health needs remained of paramount importance,
state and local officials increasingly turned their attention to programs designed to provide
affordable public housing, senior community centers, and educational opportunities designed to help
foster access to part-time employment and voluntary roles within the community.
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Their motivation for doing so was, in part, underpinned by the wealth of new academic
studies that had emerged over the course of the late 1940s and into the early 1950s which offered a
new active and dynamic portrait of older people’s lives than policymakers had been previously
assumed to be the case. Rather than seeking to merely supplement the meager financial resources of
older people, state and local officials celebrated them as elder or “senior” citizens without whose
wisdom and experience local communities would be impoverished. While some of this rhetoric was
at times, vacuous or patronizing, it did signify another evolutionary step in the development of the
senior state. Rather than merely viewing the elderly as undifferentiated mass of citizens who could
be bamboozled or misled by possible charlatans like Dr. Francis Townsend or other such figures,
local and state welfare officials in New York and California began to see them as individuals who
could contribute to society, whether by remaining in the workforce longer (and thereby delaying
their retirement and receipt of Social Security benefits and other funds) or by becoming active
participants in the newly constructed web of programs and initiatives being erected on their behalf,
if not at their beckoning.
Yet even as the senior state developed and deepened in New York, California, and a few
other select places, it remained clear to the community of federal, state, and local welfare officials
that the range and depth of services available to older people continued to vary widely, with
geography, race, gender, and class playing determinative roles. For example, older women
continued to benefit the least from improvements to Social Security’s old-age insurance program,
which mostly benefitted older and retired white men. Elderly African-American sharecroppers in
Mississippi and Louisiana continued to live in impoverished conditions not radically different from
what previous generations had known. Sufficient access to adequate health care and medical
insurance remained a flash point for many older people, including relatively better off Social
Security and private pension recipients, who frequently found that private health insurance plans
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were meager in their benefits and excessively stringent in their demands. These issues would come
to a head during the 1960s, when the Kennedy and Johnson administrations would embark upon a
significant effort to build up federal, state, and local programs designed to assist older Americans
and provide millions of impoverished elderly people with access to services, care, and income in
retirement on a grand scale.
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CHAPTER IV
The War on Elderly Poverty, 1961-1966
Between 1961 and 1973, the senior state simultaneously underwent its most significant
transformation and its most dramatic expansion. Starting in 1961 and continuing through the late
1960s and into the early 1970s, social welfare officials at the federal, state, and local level
collaborated to identify, develop, and sponsor new programs and initiatives designed to promote
economic security in old age and to promote anti-poverty programs aimed at reaching previously
neglected and impoverished elderly people. In particular, the Johnson administration unabashedly
borrowed academic researchers, social workers, and other social welfare experts for its major
taskforces and made ample use of the latest medical and sociological research in order to inform its
policy-making process. Though this strategy sometimes produced more proposals than actual
policy, Johnson administration officials would work to build a national infrastructure capable of
supporting new supplemental income assistance, access to medical care, social service and
community programs that reached into less white, less wealthy, and less fortunate places in the
nation.
In keeping with this approach, the federal government’s embrace of community and social
service programs during this period marked a major transformation of the senior state. Prior to the
1965, the federal government’s initiatives in the realm of old-age policy had been largely confined
to economic security, with the enactment of Medicare as a continuation of the contributory model of
social insurance that had begun under the original Social Security Act three decades earlier. This
limitation came despite the fact that the federal government had sponsored numerous conferences
that had suggested new directions for social welfare policy for older Americans outside of the model
created by Social Security. Until 1965, most of these reforms remained at the state and local level,
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where elected officials in conjunction with social workers, private philanthropies, and
representatives of private social welfare organizations had worked to develop and build up a new
model of public and private partnership capable of addressing the needs of older people beyond
ensuring adequate income in retirement. After 1965, the senior state embraced a threefold approach
to the problems of older people: first, an emphasis on adequate income to avoid the stigma of
welfare; second, regular medical care and access to in-patient hospital services; and finally, access
to new programs designed to improve the education, nutrition, and community integration of older
people. All three initiatives were united by the desire of the senior state’s architects to ensure that
older people could retain as much social and economic independence as they wanted, in contrast to
the traditional poorhouse model of old-age relief that had treated older people as helpless
dependents and sought to quarantine and control them.
As important as the developments of the 1960s and the 1970s were to the development of the
senior state, there were significant limits of the programs created during this period, along with a
few unintended consequences that would have a more dramatic impact in time. The enactment of
Medicaid in 1965, for example, released a torrent of federal funds into the lightly regulated nursing
home industry, and within a few years’ time had stimulated its speedy growth into a major player in
future federal old age policy debates. Additionally, the enactment of Medicare in 1965 did not
directly address the issue of providing affordable long-term care, the rising costs of prescription
drugs, and or the continuing risk that inflation posed to Social Security benefits. During the course
of the 1960s, government spending on the Vietnam War inflated the value of the U.S. dollar and
thereby lowered the purchasing power of thousands of older people living on Social Security and
eroded the ability of that program to provide a basic level of economic security in old age.
The dramatic expansion of the senior state during the 1960s was partly the result of changes
that had been building at the local and state level for years, and partly the result of fortuitous
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circumstances. Beginning in 1961, the chief goal of many federal, state, and local officials was to
secure the enactment of health insurance via the Social Security system for people over the age of
65. After the enactment of Medicare in 1965, though, federal and state officials tackled a new
challenge: ensuring equity in the levels of governmental services and assistance available to older
people across the nation. These services could (and did) vary significantly on a state-by-state basis.
While access to health care remained important, officials increasingly believed that it required
supplementation by additional social and community service programs.
The development of these services co-existed in uneasy tension with the Johnson
administration’s War on Poverty. 1 This tension stemmed from the fact that Sargent Shriver, the head
of the Office of Economic Opportunity (the Johnson administration’s primary vehicle for
conducting the War on Poverty) and his advisers chose to focus their limited resources on
alleviating urban poverty. They had done this in the belief that government intervention could break
up a persistent “culture of poverty” with job training programs and new educational opportunities
for young, predominantly African-American people to become skilled and employable workers. 2
The focus on alleviating poverty in American cities came under harsh criticism from critics across
the political spectrum in the United States, many of whom believed that the Office of Economic
Opportunity’s (OEO) methods and vision were misguided or unrealistic. Harsh criticism, in
particular, came from Congress, where the Senate’s Special Committee on Aging repeatedly tried to
redirect the OEO to do more about elderly poverty in the United States. Such efforts largely fell flat.
Eventually, this shortcoming obliged the Johnson administration in 1966 and 1967 to move more
aggressively to address the issue of elderly poverty.
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Before the War on Poverty
The election of John F. Kennedy to the presidency in 1960 offered the distinct possibility
that efforts to enact health insurance through the Social Security system and to expand the role of
the federal government in formulating and administering programs on behalf of the nation’s elderly
population would receive a more receptive hearing than during the Eisenhower years. During the
1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy and his aides took pains to signal to surviving New Deal and
Fair Deal policymakers that their counsel would be welcome in a Kennedy White House. For
example, in order to formulate its social welfare policy goals, the Kennedy campaign relied heavily
upon long-established experts like Wilbur Cohen, who had first come to Washington in the early
1930s as a young staff assistant to Edwin Witte on the Committee on Economic Security that had
produced the original Social Security Act. Cohen had long been cultivated by Theodore Sorensen,
Kennedy’s chief speechwriter, and had ultimately served as unofficial adviser to Kennedy and his
staff on social welfare measures for several years before the 1960 presidential campaign. 3 As Cohen
recalled,
in 1958 Ted Sorensen asked me to work with Mike Feldman in
developing a program for the Senator on the aged...Mike Feldman and
I eventually constructed a ten-point program which was called “A Bill
of Rights for our Elder Citizens” which Senator Kennedy put in the
Congressional Record on August 19, 1958. This material was used
repeatedly during the 1960 campaign along with material advocating
hospital insurance for the aged through Social Security which was
popularly called Medicare. 4
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4
Ibid.
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Figure 5. Wilbur Cohen at a forum in 1961. Photo courtesy of the Social Security Administration Archives.

Spurred in part by the activities of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on the Problems of the
Aged and Aging’s hearings, which had demonstrated an unexpectedly deep level of interest from
many older Americans, Sorensen had taken an interest in pushing for health care for the elderly and
in the problems of older Americans more broadly. Soon, statistics and testimonies compiled by the
Subcommittee began to find their way into the Kennedy campaign’s strategy, as Sorensen
assembled its domestic policy proposals. 5 On the campaign trail during the Democratic Party
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Kennedy would in May 1960 triumph in the West Virginia Democratic Party primary, a crucial turning point in his
campaign for the presidency.
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primary season, Kennedy repeatedly spoke out in Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin on providing
medical care for the elderly. 6
In doing so, Kennedy was not only seeking to latch onto an increasingly prominent issue that
enjoyed growing grassroots interest, but also to attach himself more firmly to the liberal wing of the
Democratic Party which still venerated the New Deal and Franklin Roosevelt. Joseph Kennedy’s
complicated relationship with Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s and 1940s and the closeness of some
Kennedy family members to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in the 1950s had led Eleanor Roosevelt,
still a leading light in the Democratic Party’s liberal wing, to publicly express her skepticism of
John F. Kennedy’s liberal bona fides throughout 1960. 7 Realizing that he was unlikely to unify the
Democratic Party without Eleanor Roosevelt’s support, Kennedy traveled to Hyde Park, New York,
as a supplicant in August 1960, ostensibly to make a speech commemorating the twentieth-fifth
anniversary of Social Security’s enactment, but also to make peace with Eleanor Roosevelt and
secure her endorsement. 8 After his speech, Kennedy dined with Roosevelt and won her grudging
support, though she remained distant for much of the rest of the 1960 campaign.
In conjunction with the candidate’s visit to Hyde Park, the Kennedy campaign announced a
23-member “Board of Senior Citizens for Kennedy” on August 26, 1960, in order to “emphasize to

6
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the American people the importance of medical care for older citizens based on the social security
principle.” 9 Created at the behest of the AFL-CIO, the board included liberal luminaries like Oscar
Ewing, the former head of the Truman-era Federal Security Agency, Representative John Fogarty,
as well as high-ranking labor representatives like Nelson Cruikshank, James O’Brien, and Charles
Odell. The board also included Sidney Spector, the chief counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on the
Problems of the Aged and Aging and an unofficial representative of Senator Patrick McNamara, the
committee’s influential chairman. 10

Figure 6. John F. Kennedy and Eleanor Roosevelt in New York City, October 11, 1960.
Photo courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

By welcoming the creation of a “board of senior citizens,” something which no major
political campaign had hitherto felt the need to do, Kennedy signaled to liberals and to organized
9
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labor his willingness to give them seats at the domestic policy table in his future administration, and
to also woo traditionally conservative older voters to consider supporting his campaign. 11 Satisfied
that the Kennedy campaign was now in agreement with its stated goal of pushing for the enactment
of health insurance for older Americans through the Social Security system, the AFL-CIO worked
vigorously on the campaign trail to build grassroots support for both Kennedy and the proposed
Medicare legislation sponsored by Congressman Aime J. Forand. 12 In particular, the AFL-CIO
helped to organize huge rallies of senior citizens in New York City to demonstrate public support
for Medicare. Tacticians in both the Democratic and Republican parties noted the enthusiastic
response of many older people to these rallies, which strongly suggested that the potential power of
seniors as an organized group had been galvanized into action once more by the issue of health care
insurance.
After Kennedy’s exceedingly narrow win in the November 1960 election, the AFL-CIO’s
hope that Medicare’s enactment would soon follow the new president’s inauguration proved to be
premature. In part, this development owed something to the Kennedy administration’s cautionary
approach. Kennedy had taken hold of an economy that seemed to be basically sound and in good
working condition, and popular support for broad social or political reforms was decidedly limited
in comparison to the atmosphere that had greeted Franklin Roosevelt’s first inauguration a
generation beforehand. In the words of Joshua Freeman,
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He [Kennedy] recognized that there were some groups plagued by
poverty, like the elderly and residents of Appalachia, for whom he
proposed targeted programs. But he believed that economic growth in
itself would go a long way toward solving social ills, without the need
for redistributive measure or major structural changes. 13
Even if there were no pressing national crisis like the Great Depression or World War II, social
welfare experts believed that more direct action was necessary to alleviate the plight of
impoverished groups in American society. Many were openly dismayed that the highly publicized
fights over providing medical care for the aged in the waning days of the Eisenhower administration
had proved to be inconclusive. 14 For example, at the 1961 annual meeting of the National Council
on Aging (NCOA), an organization whose membership largely consisted of voluntary organizations
involved in services to elderly people, Geneva Mathiasen, the NCOA’s executive director, publicly
expressed her concern that “many matters of interest and concern to her group” had experienced
only “limited” or “spotty” progress, including questions of “employment, retirement, health,
housing, recreation, education, counseling and community organization” for older people. 15
Mathiasen’s concerns were not new; throughout the 1950s, social reformers had repeatedly
expressed their belief that more action was required in order to deal with the problems of the
nation’s growing elderly population. Mathiasen’s concerns, though, gained renewed credence from
the fact that the growth of the nation’s elderly population showed no signs of slowing down or
reversing. In June 1961, the U.S. Bureau of the Census reported that advances in medical
knowledge and social provision had led to dramatically higher numbers of people surviving into
“old age.” 16 By the Census Bureau’s count, approximately 16.5 million Americans were aged 65 or
over, a figure that the Census Bureau estimated had increased by roughly 420,000 each year
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between 1950 and 1960. 17 While not all old people faced the prospect of financial insecurity, a
substantial and growing number of them did so because the costs associated with medical, hospital,
and long-term care continued to outstrip the capacity of Social Security benefits, private pension
payments, in-kind assistance from individual families and other sources of financial support to pay
them.
Members of the nascent Kennedy administration were aware of the potential social and
economic ramifications that might accompany a rising poverty rate for older people. In the spring of
1961, Abraham Ribicoff, the new Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) appointed a panel of experts to advise him on the federal government’s approach to aging
policy. 18 The creation of the HEW panel a few months after the 1961 White House Conference on
Aging reflected the belief of some administration officials that the publicity and interest generated
by the 1961 White House Conference had created an opportunity to press forward on numerous
policy recommendations that could improve the economic and social status of older people. 19
Like the Eisenhower administration’s Federal Council on Aging before it, the Kennedy-era
HEW panel emphasized the inadequacy of income maintenance programs to keep older Americans
from falling into penury. 20 Specifically, the HEW panel argued that Social Security’s coverage
needed to be extended and that earned income restrictions for recipients of old age assistance
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needed to be lifted in order to encourage older workers to remain in the active labor force longer,
and thereby delay their need to rely upon Social Security to make up for lost income. As a result, the
increasing financial pressures placed by a growing number of older Americans on the Social
Security system would be reduced with limited social and political disruption. State governments
and voluntary organizations that had traditionally expended considerable sums on behalf of the
elderly would benefit too, as would individual families supporting elderly members. The panel’s
embrace of this new approach to Social Security represented a significant shift in how the federal
government approached the issue of older workers and the Social Security system.
Specifically, Social Security had been designed by its federal architects to enable some older
workers to leave the labor force without risking destitution or dependence upon private and public
support. While this approach had been more justifiable during the sluggish economy of the Great
Depression, it seemed counterproductive in the economic conditions of the 1950s and 1960s, when a
booming postwar economy meant that workforce opportunities were far more plentiful. Improving
and adapting Social Security to this new economic environment, the approach favored by the
Eisenhower administration during the 1950s, had produced beneficial results, but those
improvements had largely been limited to older people who were already qualified to receive Social
Security benefits. For example, improvements made to Social Security during the course of the
1950s provided coverage for significantly more workers, but Social Security was still not a
universal program. Moreover, the strident efforts of Social Security’s administrators during the late
1940s and early 1950s to keep the program from being lobbed in with welfare programs militated
against attempts to enact broad scale reforms of Social Security such as the HEW panel desired.
Perhaps cognizant of the limitations to the existing Social Security system, the HEW panel
proposed thirty-two new initiatives that aimed to expand federal efforts to assist older Americans.
For example, paralleling the Kennedy administration’s more famous Peace Corps, the HEW panel
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proposed the creation of a new “Senior Citizens Service Corps” designed to provide older
Americans with community service opportunities, provided that such “corps not infringe on other
Federal programs and compete with the labor force” and that “the corps will be used…in the public
interest.” 21 Other proposals envisioned new efforts to regulate the nursing home industry, enhanced
funding to train more doctors to provide geriatric care, and finally, serious federal efforts to
eliminate age-based job discrimination in the workplace. The broad scope of these policy proposals
was unlike anything the federal government had ever previously recommended on behalf of the
elderly.
At the same time, though, the question of where exactly to situate responsibility for these
new potential efforts on the part of the federal government to assist older Americans remained
unanswered. Should such responsibilities reside solely within the executive branch, or should
Congress be somehow involved? And, if these responsibilities were placed solely within the
executive branch, what department should have the ultimate statutory authority to enforce them?
Ultimately, the HEW panel recommended that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
should have the responsibility to administer any new aging programs, but that there should also be
an unspecified “Study Commission to review and evaluate” HEW’s efforts at some future date. 22
Even as the Kennedy administration debated how best to grapple with these issues,
congressional Democrats like Senator Patrick McNamara (D-MI) barreled forward in demanding
swifter action from the administration. On May 15th 1962, President Kennedy, at the behest of
Senator McNamara and others, submitted a comprehensive set of legislative proposals to Congress
that outlined an expansive agenda of more federal research and demonstration grant programs in the
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field of aging. 23 As Wilbur Cohen observed in his May 1962 testimony before the House Committee
on Education and Labor,
[W]e in the Department [of Health, Education, and Welfare] are
cognizant that most of the work with older people cannot be done on
the Federal level…instead, programs and services must be conducted
and offered in the local communities and neighborhoods where the
older people are living…consequently, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare has been moving vigorously to stimulate and
guide States, communities, and organizations toward an everwidening range of action. 24
Herein lay both the greatest strength and weakness of the federal government’s efforts to
improve the material well-being of older Americans. On the one hand, the financial resources of the
federal government greatly exceeded that of state or local governments, but federal administrators
needed the assistance of local officials who were and would likely remain far-better informed about
the actual social and economic conditions in their communities. Consequently, the Kennedy-era
HEW, like its Eisenhower-era predecessor, placed great emphasis on building productive working
relationships with state and local officials, and labored mightily to avoid becoming involved in any
initiatives or activities which would cause grave offense to them.
The dependence upon the goodwill of state and local officials also meant that the federal
government’s effectiveness was ultimately dependent upon officials not directly responsible to it,
and who could, if they desired, cease to cooperate at any moment. Still, as Cohen observed in his
testimony,
Some persons lament what they see as a fragmentation of programs
and services. They get frustrated because there is not some simple
solution for all the problems of aging wrapped up in one neat package
and shipped to them prepaid. Major responsibility for coordination
23
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and provision of community services rests with the States and
localities. It was for this purpose that the Special Staff on Aging has
encouraged the formation of State commissions and has stimulated
these commissions to urge the creation of similar coordinating
mechanisms in the various committees. 25
While Cohen further conceded “our senior citizens are not all right here under the roof of the federal
government,” he noted that the Kennedy administration was still taking steps to better coordinate
the federal government’s efforts. In May 1962, the administration authorized the conversion of the
Federal Council on Aging into a President’s Council on Aging in order to enhance both its visibility
and its mandate. Unlike the Eisenhower-era Federal Council on Aging, the Kennedy Council on
Aging was composed primarily of Cabinet members rather than designated staff representatives.
Furthermore, the administration gave the Council responsibility for providing recommendations to
the President on aging policy. 26 By doing so, the Kennedy administration hoped that the “new
President’s Council on Aging will rapidly increase its effectiveness in assessing national needs,
reviewing, and evaluating current Federal programs, coordinating present activities, and initiating
such policy recommendations as may be indicated.” 27
Amidst the reorganization of the Executive Branch’s efforts to coordinate aging policy, the
Kennedy administration authorized the creation and implementation of new experimental programs
and demonstration projects. These projects included “wide-range experiments in the development of
projects through which older people can employ their energies in serving others and their
communities through voluntary effort,” “comprehensive information, referral, and counseling
services in local communities to assist older people with their complex problems of employment,
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economic dependency, etc.” and “experimental projects in providing part time work.” 28 Most of
these projects – especially the experimental demonstration projects – would grow more substantial
during the 1960s and into the early 1970s, after the Older Americans Act made additional federal
funding available. 29 In New York City, for example, the federal Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare made grant money available in 1962 to local private community service agencies,
which in turn organized new recreation and therapeutic centers designed specifically for the city’s
800,000 senior citizens. 30
If the Eisenhower administration’s efforts had been careful and deliberate to the point of
motionlessness, the Kennedy administration’s efforts burst forth in rapid succession. More needed
to be done – and more would be done, if the administration had its way, to promote economic selfsufficiency among senior citizens, and to ensure that they would remain integrated as active
members of their local communities rather than isolated and confined to its margins. This was the
optimistic faith and spirit that guided many of the Kennedy’s administration’s efforts, along with an
ebullient confidence that the complex problems of aging could, over time and with the application
of multiple initiatives and efforts, be largely reduced to irrelevance.
In May 1962, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare hosted a special daylong program for visiting Japanese Governors. The program was designed to highlight the U.S.
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government’s growing efforts to deal with the rising number of older Americans, and the chosen
speakers for the day offered a brief but still comprehensive overview of those efforts. In particular,
Donald P. Kent, a former faculty member at the University of Connecticut’s Institute of
Gerontology and now the Special Assistant for Aging in the U.S. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare summarized the government’s approach:
Our basic philosophy holds that the individual should do for himself
whatever he can. His second line of defense should be the family,
followed by the level of Government that is nearest to him. The
Federal Government only does those things which cannot be done or
cannot be done as satisfactorily by local or State governments. Yet
another part of the American philosophy is that the Government
works in cooperation with other governmental units, with private
citizens and with voluntary associations. 31
The federal government’s programs, Kent continued, shared “certain basic assumptions,” including
the notion that “all individuals shall have the opportunity to obtain at least a minimum standard of
shelter, food, and medical care,” and that “the goal of government programs should be to help the
individual help himself.” 32 As his colleague Warren Roudebush observed, though, there was “no
single pattern of relationships in Federal programs” because there was “no single pattern or
formula” for “public and private responsibilities in aging.” 33
While the Kennedy administration continued to evaluate possible initiatives it could
undertake, the issue of financial insecurity among elderly people due to rising medical costs
remained frustratingly unresolved. This issue had powered the AFL-CIO’s grassroots efforts to
organize and mobilize significant popular support for the enactment of Medicare. Unfortunately,
that legislation remained securely bottled up in committee on Capitol Hill, courtesy of Congressman
31
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Wilbur Mills, the powerful chairman of the House of Representatives’ Ways and Means Committee.
Mills, who had supported the enactment of more modest legislation in the past designed to provide
health insurance only to indigent older people (rather than the universal coverage which Medicare’s
supporters sought), remained unwilling to allow the legislation to proceed, for fear that its costs
might prove detrimental to the overall condition of the Social Security system.
The Other Americans
While the Kennedy administration, organized labor, the AMA, and Congressman Mills
jousted over the fate of Medicare, the publication of Michael Harrington’s The Other America:
Poverty in the United States in 1962 helped to fix public attention on the multifaceted nature of
poverty in the United States. Besides the growth of urban poverty, Harrington gave significant
attention to the increasing impoverishment of older Americans. 34 Perhaps no chapter in The Other
America was more poignant or heartrending than the ironically titled chapter “The Golden Years,”
in which Harrington claimed that “at least 8,000,000 Americans over sixty-five are poor,” a figure
which represented approximately half of the entire senior population in the United States. 35
Skillfully employing data made available by the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on the Problems of the
Aged and Aging, Harrington emphasized the perilous economic status of many older Americans,
34
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especially those for whom Social Security, personal savings, and other financial instruments
designed to mitigate economic insecurity in old age had proven to be insufficient. 36 As Harrington
delineated the growing concentration of poverty among older Americans, he observed that “it is a
fact that the problems of the aged are so great that families, probably the majority of them in the
nation, cannot really deal with them…there is literally no alternative but governmental
intervention.”
The Rise and Fall of Medicare, 1961-1963
Harrington’s words did not fall on deaf ears. By 1962, the Kennedy administration had
coalesced around Medicare as its preferred solution to the economic problems of the aged.
Consequently, the Kennedy administration’s response to the question of elderly poverty was to
redouble its efforts to get Medicare enacted, in the reasonable belief that publicly subsidizing the
health costs of older people would keep many of them out of poverty and off the public assistance
rolls. 37 In May 1962, Kennedy met with the leadership of the National Council of Senior Citizens
(NCSC) in a public display of his administration’s support for Medicare, and spoke at an enormous
36
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rally later that same month at Madison Square Garden in New York City on behalf of the measure. 38
Kennedy’s nationally televised speech at Madison Square Garden was supposed to be a dramatic
high point for this campaign, and the administration as well as the AFL-CIO hoped a strong
performance by the telegenic Kennedy would strengthen popular support for the campaign to enact
Medicare.

Figure 7. John F. Kennedy meets with National Council of Senior Citizens members,
May 26, 1962. Photo courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library.

38

The AFL-CIO had been instrumental in the creation of the NCSC after Kennedy’s victory in the 1960 presidential
race. In fact, the NCSC was the lineal descendant of the Kennedy campaign’s “Senior Citizens for Kennedy” group
formed after Kennedy’s August 1960 visit to Eleanor Roosevelt at Hyde Park, New York. In order to try and keep the
momentum of the campaign going after Kennedy’s inauguration, the NCSC had spearheaded highly publicized efforts to
organize and rally retired union members as well as other interested senior citizens in New York, Florida, and elsewhere
to support the Kennedy administration’s efforts to enact Medicare. See Natalie Jaffe, “2,646 Over 65 Fill Orchestra’s
Hall,” The New York Times, May 17, 1963; Natalie Jaffe, “Hundreds Attend Hearing for Aged,” The New York Times,
January 19, 1964.

270

Unfortunately, though, many viewers found Kennedy’s speech distasteful and beneath the
dignity of his office. 39 Arthur Krock of the New York Times described it as contributing to
“misinformation” in the increasingly volatile national debate over Medicare because it ignored
private, non-governmental efforts to improve access to health care for older people without
requiring “compulsory” measures. 40 Furthermore, Dr. Edward Annis, a Florida surgeon and AMA
public representative gave an artfully staged rebuttal speech at Madison Square Garden the
following night that skillfully opposed the proposed Medicare legislation by labeling it as a “cruel
hoax and delusion.” Dr. Annis argued that Medicare – far from guaranteeing the economic security
of older people – would instead offer inadequate coverage and threaten the vitality of existing
private health insurance programs. 41 Dr. Annis’s speech received comparatively more favorable
press coverage, and successfully dented much of the momentum that the administration and the
AFL-CIO had built in favor of Medicare.
Several weeks after the Madison Square Garden debacle, the NCSC arranged for hundreds
of senior citizens to be bused to Capitol Hill as a way to demonstrate continued popular support for
the proposed Medicare legislation that would be unavoidable for the numerous Congressmen and
Senators present at the Capitol. 42 As the NCSC had hoped, even anti-Medicare representatives felt
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obliged to meet with the visiting senior citizens, lest they be caught turning away constituents. 43
Such meetings, though, while perhaps mollifying for the senior citizens who had traveled to the
Capitol, did little to dislodge entrenched congressional opposition to Medicare.
Ultimately, the combination of Annis’s well-received speech and Kennedy’s lackluster effort
successfully halted the popular momentum that the administration and the AFL-CIO had labored for
months to build. As a result, both the Kennedy administration and the AFL-CIO watched as
Congressman Wilbur Mills continued to sequester the proposed Medicare legislation in the Ways
and Means Committee. Mills’ successful efforts to block the enactment of Medicare, though, did not
mean that the issue of rising poverty and economic insecurity for older Americans had disappeared
from public view. On the contrary, as a lengthy November 1962 article in the New York Times
revealed, a consensus had emerged among numerous public and private social welfare experts that
“retirement laws” like Social Security that “were meant to be a blessing” were instead “proving the
opposite.” 44 As if to underscore its point, the Times noted, “poorer people are the bulk of the old – if
you weren’t poor before you reached your 65th year, you are likely to be so afterward.” 45 This broad
agreement about the rising specter of old age poverty publicly echoed the concerns which Geneva
Mathiasen and the National Council on the Aging had raised the previous year, and signaled that the
issue was not going away anytime soon.
Mindful of the need to keep its allies in the organized labor movement happy, the Kennedy
administration continued to keep an open channel to the National Council of Senior Citizens, in part
because Kennedy’s advisors wanted him to give the appearance of actively advocating for
Medicare, despite the legislative impasse. In truth, though, the struggle for racial justice by the civil
rights movement in the South had come to occupy far more of the administration’s attention and
43
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energy by the spring of 1963. 46 While Kennedy continued to appeal publicly for action on the issue
of medical care for the aged, it remained unclear how those appeals would become concrete
accomplishments. 47 In essence, despite all the smoke generated by the Kennedy administration and
by the NCSC, Medicare could not make it past the hurdles that Congressman Mills had erected in its
path. 48 In February 1963, Kennedy sent a lengthy Special Message to Congress in which he
proposed legislation to expand the legal and political benefits afforded to senior citizens. 49 After
reviewing minor, recently enacted legislation such as the Social Security amendments of 1961,
Kennedy pressed the case once more for the need for hospital insurance through the Social Security
system for older Americans. 50 Alongside hospital insurance, Kennedy outlined several other areas in
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which he requested swift congressional action. These areas included targeted income tax reductions
for older people, improved Social Security benefits, increased funding for federal efforts to assist
older workers remain employed or secure new employment, and finally a new community action
program designed to assist “State and local agencies and voluntary organizations for planning and
developing services.” 51 However, the press treated the President’s Special Message as a non-affair;
instead, at Kennedy’s next press conference, the President fielded questions almost exclusively
devoted to foreign affairs. 52
In addition to the lackadaisical response that greeted the President’s Special Message, the
President’s Council on Aging, which the administration had organized a year earlier in order to
demonstrate its commitment to the problems of older Americans, continued to meet irregularly and
to produce recommendations, but its efforts appeared to be for naught. 53 By late October 1963,
Kennedy’s Council on Aging had churned out numerous reports, it appears that hardly anyone was
taking heed of them, with the possible exceptions of Theodore Sorensen and Wilbur Cohen.
Despite this apparent neglect, though, the Council’s work was quietly reviving and drafting
new recommendations designed to use the power of the federal government to assist older
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Americans that would shape the federal government’s efforts over the course of the next decade.
Specifically, the Council’s sixteen main recommendations included a broad list of proposals, such
as improvements to subsidized housing, Social Security, and nursing homes, as well as new
recommendations designed to prevent age discrimination in the workplace and to assist displaced
older workers who had become unemployed due to unspecified “economic shifts.” 54 The report also
emphasized how these objectives could be realized by using existing federal laws and mechanisms
rather than via securing congressional enactment of proposed legislation, an approach that had
proven to be far more difficult and fruitless than the administration had originally anticipated. The
Council’s recommendations therefore tended to rely upon powers vested in the President and the
various Executive Branch agencies. 55
Searching for a Focal Point
The Council’s report also recognized the claims that Michael Harrington had made in The
Other America about the persistence of old-age poverty in the United States. 56 As Harrington had
argued, it could not be honestly said in the early 1960s that the Social Security system had achieved
its true potential of eradicating poverty among older Americans, especially since the poverty rate for
Americans over the age of 65 still hovered between twenty-five and thirty percent. 57
Recognition of the growing inadequacies of the Social Security system, which Harrington
had highlighted, was not limited solely to the Kennedy administration. In particular, the Senate’s
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Special Committee on Aging remained busy building the case for a more sustained federal presence
in funding and promoting the creation of programs designed to deal with the problems of older
Americans. Originally, some more liberal members of the Senate’s Democratic caucus had intended
the Special Committee on Aging to be a tool for publicly applying political pressure on the
Eisenhower administration during the late 1950s to enact health insurance for the elderly through
the Social Security system.
After the end of the Eisenhower administration, the committee held a series of hearings in
1961 and again in 1962 across the nation that revealed a rising groundswell of concern among older
Americans, who repeatedly pleaded with committee members for the federal government to address
both health care and other issues like unemployment. 58 As a 1963 Special Committee report argued,
despite the oft-expressed concern of the Nation as a whole, the
executive branch of our Government, even through changes of
administration, has dragged its feet for over a decade and still refuses
to create an agency that can give full time and attention to the broad
range of interrelated needs and potentials of older people. 59
After the Committee’s nationwide hearings as well as the popular tumult that had surrounded the
Kennedy administration’s push for the enactment of Medicare, the Senate Special Committee on
Aging’s members came to believe that there was a sufficient deep reservoir of popular demand for
more federal action. Accordingly, they began publicly to demand the creation of a new federal
agency for the sole purpose of addressing the economic and social concerns of older Americans. In
the words of one Special Committee on Aging report released in early 1963,
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[t]he experience of the past decade, culminating in the White House
Conference on Aging in January 1961, has clearly indicated the need
for a focal point within the Federal Government for providing
information, guidance, and support to the rapidly growing number of
agencies and organizations eager to shoulder part of the
responsibility. 60
As conceived by the Senate Special Committee on Aging, this “focal point” agency would
allow the Federal government to more effectively “share in the responsibility” with individual states
and local communities. This shared responsibility was necessary, in the view of the Committee,
because while many of those subnational levels of government had expressed interest in or had
taken steps towards creating programs for their older residents, their programs and approaches
remained on the whole “spotty, often inadequately conceived, and generally undernourished.” 61
Moreover, the committee argued that there existed “ample evidence of the desire of the
States and communities to carry out their vital roles in this partnership,” but that “effective
performance of their roles…is dependent on effective performance of those functions which are the
responsibility of the Federal partner.” 62 In other words, the committee argued that the time was
opportune for a “Federal partner” to intervene and assist the states and local communities, lest the
“variety of approaches and programs developed” multiply beyond any reasonable or recognizable
limit to organize and coordinate them. All that was lacking was the leadership necessary to bring a
“Federal partner” into being.
Of course, as the committee was also aware, there were other factors to consider. The
Eisenhower and then the Kennedy administrations had each attempted to coordinate the federal
government’s activities on programs for older Americans. In its report, the committee highlighted
the real barrier to effective progress: namely, the lack of cooperation among feuding agencies and
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departments within the Executive Branch. Observing that the task of coordinating federal activities
had previously been “left up to the coequal agencies involved” and that “no one agency is willing to
release a shred of its authority to the others,” the committee strongly lambasted the “repeatedly
undertaken pretense of resolving such difficulties in bringing together the Secretaries of the various
departments in a Federal Council on Aging or a Presidential Council on Aging” as “hav[ing] been,
are, and always will be meaningless.” 63 “It is absurd,” the committee concluded, “to expect that key
officials in existing agencies with sufficient authority and prestige to give leadership and continuing
support to the effort needed to the effort needed can devote attention to such a task.” 64 Rather, the
committee observed, “quite naturally, but unfortunately for the aged, they have other weighty and
statutory responsibilities which preclude more than occasional and tangential personal involvement
in the field of aging.” 65
The only solution, therefore, was to create a new agency that would be responsible for
Federal efforts. Existing programs and initiatives would be reassigned to the new agency, which
would have the effect of establishing a dedicated office staffed by trained experts who could
administer programs and coordinate with state and local officials with far less interference from
other executive branch agencies eager to guard their bureaucratic turf.
Such a plan, though, met with a studied lack of interest on the part of the Kennedy
administration. Despite Congressman John Fogarty and Senator Patrick McNamara’s repeated pleas,
the administration largely ignored them, and offered little or no support to help win passage of
legislation that would achieve the goal of creating a new federal agency dedicated to the problems
of older Americans. Instead, the Kennedy administration continued to focus on securing passage of
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Medicare, a legislative goal that it shared with Fogarty and McNamara, and one that promised to
win the administration plaudits (and votes).
Consequently, though Fogarty and McNamara would introduce legislation in Congress in
1963 to achieve the goal of creating a dedicated federal agency to coordinate efforts with state and
local governments, that legislation ultimately did not advance beyond Capitol Hill. The failure of
the Fogarty-McNamara legislation found its complement in the legislative impasse between the
Kennedy administration and Congressman Wilbur Mills over Medicare. Ultimately, the only victory
the Kennedy administration could claim by mid-1963 on the legislative front for old-age health
insurance were a series of minor new amendments to the Social Security Act that were not radically
different from those enacted during the Eisenhower administration. The battle over Medicare would
continue well past Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963; so, too, would the efforts of Fogarty
and McNamara to put the senior state on a firmer footing. 66
From Kennedy to Johnson
The unlikely sequence of events that catapulted Lyndon Johnson to the presidency in 1963
would also dramatically reshape the political fortunes of social reformers who sought to use the
federal government’s wallet and muscle to strengthen and build up a much broader welfare state for
older Americans. As in so many other areas of American domestic policy, the Johnson
administration’s efforts to strengthen and build up the senior state between 1964 and 1968
represented an unprecedented expansion of the federal government’s role in areas of social welfare
policy that had long been primarily the concern of local and state governments. Before 1964, the
federal-level senior state resided primarily within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
66
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and the Social Security Board. At the state and local level, it had been significantly uneven; in some
states like California and New York, a well-developed apparatus of public and private welfare
officials had come into being and had pursued the creation of new programs and initiatives designed
to secure not only the economic but also the social well-being of older people. 67
New York and California were exceptions. Before the renewed emphasis on anti-poverty
programs in the 1960s, the federal government’s role had been largely limited to providing
matching funds under Social Security’s old-age assistance program and to ensuring the regular
payment of Social Security benefits under the program’s old-age insurance program. While these
expenditures were significant, especially those of the Social Security old-age assistance program
before reforms in the late 1940s and into the 1950s shifted the balance of enrollees towards its oldage insurance program, the federal government’s efforts had aimed primarily at enhancing the
economic security of older people.
In the 1960s, though, these efforts began to broaden significantly to include not only
economic security but also the health and social well-being of older people, with federal officials
frequently turning to state and local officials for inspiration and example. While much of the
scholarship of this period has traditionally emphasized the Johnson administration’s achievements
in getting Medicare and Medicaid enacted, these two important laws formed only part of the
Johnson administration’s legislative agenda for older Americans. In addition to Medicare and
Medicaid, the Johnson administration secured passage of several other measures, such as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Older Americans Act, both of which found their way
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from chicken scratch scribbles on coffee-stained yellow legal pads into the bold, crisp, confident
legal font of enacted legislation. 68
Securing passage of this broad agenda remained tentative in late 1963. Over Christmas 1963,
Lyndon Johnson huddled down with his family and chief aides at his ranch in rural Texas. Keenly
aware that the near-unanimous national goodwill that had been showered upon him in the aftermath
of President Kennedy’s assassination would not last, Johnson was determined to formulate a
legislative strategy for the coming congressional session that would show that he did not intend to
be a mere caretaker president until the 1964 presidential election. He turned to his characteristic
methods of sly persuasion and domineering coercion in order to ensure that his aides would produce
a plan for giving form to the still largely nebulous war on poverty that had existed primarily on
paper for much of the last year of the Kennedy administration. 69 The task facing Johnson’s aides
was therefore to translate words into actionable items. As senior Johnson aide Jack Valenti later
recalled,
[d]uring the Christmas holidays at the [LBJ] Ranch in 1963,
[President Johnson] closeted Kermit Gordon, Walter Heller, Bill
Moyers and myself to his little guest house…and he said, “We’re
going to abolish poverty in this country, and I’m going to lock this
door and you guys can’t come out until you bring me a plan to do just
that…So we labored and we labored and we came out. We didn’t have
68
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the details but we had a cause, and we had a plan, and we had a name,
“The War on Poverty.” 70
While Johnson took such unusual steps to compel his aides to devise a more coherent plan to
tackle poverty in the United States, the War on Poverty really began to take a more concrete form
with the public release of the 1964 Economic Report of the President in late January 1964. 71 The
Economic Report conceded the difficulties inherent in defining both “poverty” and “the poor,” but
ultimately argued that while “measurement of poverty is not simple, either conceptually or in
practice,” by the poor “we mean those who are not now maintaining a decent standard of living –
those whose basic needs exceed their means to satisfy them.” 72 Insofar as establishing what exactly
a “decent standard of living” was, the Economic Report relied upon statistics provided by the Social
Security Administration which defined a “low-cost budget for a nonfarm family of four…in 1962 to
have been $3,955 [approximately $31,657 in 2016 dollars].” 73 After taking these statistics as well as
various other sources into account, the Report concluded that the actual poverty line stood at
roughly $3,000 in annual money income, or approximately $60 per week (both figures in 1962
dollars). Using this metric to define the poor and poverty, the Economic Report concluded that
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approximately “one-third of all poor families are headed by a person over 65, and almost one-half of
all families headed by such a person are poor.” 74
In response to the Economic Report’s findings, the Johnson administration proposed the
enactment of a broad tax cut, which it hoped would stimulate further economic growth sufficient to
raise impoverished families out of poverty. While this policy solution promised to lower taxes on
the nation’s upper and middle classes, it had less to offer older people living on fixed incomes who
already paid a low amount of federal income tax. Additionally, the Economic Report stressed the
importance of enacting health insurance through Social Security as “the first order of business” for
the aged, but did not offer much substance in terms of what the second, third, and subsequent terms
would be. 75 Prior to 1964, the pattern of previous administrations had been to broaden Social
Security’s old age insurance provisions. But these moves to strengthen Social Security had limits.
The old-age insurance system’s actuarial math was based on the principle that benefits paid out
should be correlated to earnings contributed into the system. As a result, millions of elderly people –
especially elderly women – who had not “worked” in the sense of participating in compensated
employment remained unprotected by Social Security’s old age insurance system.
Furthermore, while Social Security’s old-age assistance program remained in operation, it
still varied widely from state-to-state, with some states paying benefits as high as $95 per month
(1962 dollars) and others dispensing far less (in some states, the figure was as low as $37 per
month). 76 While conceding that there were potentially other sources of monetary support such as
private pensions and private in-kind income transfers within and between families, the Economic
Report argued that “families with a history of low earnings are also likely to have little of such
74
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supplementary income” and that these alternative sources of support would be insufficient for most
poorer families. 77
Despite recognizing these limitations, the Economic Report ultimately concluded that “high
employment and vigorous economic growth are still of major importance for this group,” though it
did not explain how achieving high employment and sustained economic growth would lead to a
reduction in poverty for older people, especially those who were not able to return to the active
workforce. The Report did highlight the need for “continued long-run improvement of social
insurance benefits, along with expanded programs to cover hospital-related costs for the aged” and
“augmented construction of housing to meet the particular needs of the aged” as “necessary steps in
a continuing campaign against poverty.” Overall, though, it was not radically different in substance
(save for its embrace of Medicare) from the policy proposals that had been tossed around
Washington since the Truman-era National Conference on Aging.
“Our Society Can Well Afford the Funds Involved”
While the Johnson administration’s public commitment to eradicating poverty was a historic
breakthrough, on the issue of elderly poverty, it remained committed to strengthening the hybrid
federal-state approach that had developed during the course of the previous decade. 78 This cautious
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approach reflected the administration’s desire to build on issues for which there was already a broad
political consensus rather than risk alienating potential allies. Evidence of the relatively
uncontroversial nature of using the federal government’s vast toolbox to address the issue of elderly
poverty had presented itself in January 1964 during a hearing convened by the U.S. Senate’s Special
Committee on Aging in which multiple public and private welfare officials repeatedly pleaded for
an increased federal role in provisioning services for the elderly. While acknowledging that the
federal government had not remained entirely aloof from the needs of state and local welfare
agencies, federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare officials pointed out that more
action could be taken. In the words of Dr. Ellen Winston, the U.S. Commissioner of Welfare and a
former North Carolina state welfare official,
[t]he Federal Government has done and is now doing much to assist
States and localities with respect to the aging. We have a strong
pattern of relationships from the Office of Aging to State and local
groups. We have reached a point, however, where further significant
advances require new legislation and grants-in-aid. Several bills are
now before Congress which could provide stimulus to an advance by
States and localities along a broad front. Our society can well afford
the funds involved. 79
Dr. Winston further testified that the federal government had established contacts with the thirtyseven states that had statewide commissions or committees on aging as well as the more than eight
hundred cities and counties that had similarly established planning and coordinating committees on
aging. However, as she stressed in her testimony, only twenty-eight states “have an appropriation,
but the range in this appropriation is very great, from really a token contribution on the part of the
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State to a sufficient appropriation to have a reasonable staff,” an issue that also bedeviled numerous
local-level committees dedicated to addressing the issues of older people. 80
In essence, despite the growing number of state and local level governments that had begun
to provide services to the elderly, the fact remained, in the words of Dr. Winston, that “the
availability of services to the elderly is spread unevenly throughout the country. More plans and
programs are on paper than in practice.” 81 Dr. Winston’s testimony neatly encapsulated the
approach that the Johnson administration would undertake in its war against elderly poverty over the
course of the next several years. Working in partnership with existing state and local agencies, the
federal government would try to bolster these lower-level offices, and would seek to equalize the
availability of services throughout the nation by setting up new agencies in state or localities that
desired them. Sustained economic prosperity would underwrite these efforts; all that was required
on the part of the federal government was for Congress to appropriate the necessary funds. 82
As Dr. Winston had argued in her testimony, the most helpful role that the federal
government could play in the realm of old-age economic and social support would be to provide
more ample funding to the states and localities which lacked sufficient monies to maintain their own
state and local agencies. 83 Testifying after Dr. Winston before the assembled senators, William
Fitch, the Executive Director of the AARP, echoed many of her observations, and stressed the need
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for Congress to enact the proposed Older Americans Act, a reworked version of the legislation
originally proposed by Congressman Fogarty and Senator McNamara that had met with lukewarm
support by the Kennedy administration in 1963. 84 Echoing President Johnson’s recent declaration of
an unconditional war against poverty in his January 1964 State of the Union Address, Fitch
connected the nascent War on Poverty to the AARP’s efforts to promote voluntary self-sufficiency
among senior citizens:
The Older Americans Act…offers great promise of assistance in the
development of new or improved programs to help older persons
through grants for community planning and services for training,
through research or training project grants. The bill would also
establish…an operating agency to be designated as the
“Administration for Aging”…[that] would separate the programs on
aging out of the welfare setting in which they are presently
considered. It is urgent that, as we are asked to “pursue poverty
wherever it exists,” we must distinguish between the elderly who are
independent and self-sufficient and those who are in need of public
welfare. 85
As Fitch continued, “the Older Americans Act makes possible a balanced program in aging to
enable our older people to secure equal opportunity, to the full and free enjoyment of income,
health, housing, employment, and the pursuit of meaningful activity.” 86 Aside from his support for
the Older Americans Act, Fitch’s testimony also suggested how the AARP and other similarlyminded voluntary organizations viewed themselves as essential actors in the emerging relationship
between federal, state, and local officials to deal with the problems of older Americans. While
conceding that government at all levels had an important role to play, Fitch noted that
[i]t is not possible [n]or would it be desirable to separate the
responsibility of the Federal, State, and community services from the
role of older persons themselves. Each has a vital part to play and the
need for a coordinated approach is the challenge to every force
working in the best interest of older persons…I pledge to your
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committee the support of our members in implementing the findings
of your committee and in the creation of programs that will place the
needs of older Americans in proper perspective to make the later years
truly a period of reward and achievement. 87
Fitch and Winston’s respective testimonies found a receptive audience with the Senate’s Special
Committee on Aging. When the Committee released its report in September 1964 on the need for
“establishing and expanding public and private services for our senior citizens,” it placed the
“enactment of an authorization to provide financial assistance for statewide and community
planning and coordination of programs in the field of aging” as its top recommendation, and urged
the enactment of the Older Americans Act. 88
That recommendation, though, like the other fourteen that the Committee eventually made,
proceeded to languish. The Johnson administration remained uninterested in rocking the boat until
after the November 1964 presidential election, and even a relatively uncontroversial law like the
Older Americans Act remained a low legislative priority. The Older Americans Act as proposed in
1963 therefore died a quiet death, though it was clear that a broad consensus of private and public
welfare officials would support similar legislation if it was reintroduced in the new Congress set to
convene in January 1965. 89
A few weeks before the November 1964 election, Johnson aide Frederick Panzer was busy
preparing a memorandum documenting the administration’s “accomplishments in the field of aging
since 22 November 1963.” 90 The list of accomplishments Panzer collected, though, was relatively
thin and perfunctory, and amounted to page or two at best of minor Social Security amendments and
87

Ibid., 41-42.
Senate Special Committee on Aging, Services for Senior Citizens – Recommendations and Comment: A Report by the
Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, Together with Minority and Individual Views, September 11, 1964,
pg. 2. 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., U.S. Senate. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
89
See Senate Special Committee on Aging, Major Federal Legislative and Executive Actions Affecting Senior Citizens,
1963-1964: A Staff Report Prepared for the Special Committee on Aging. 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., October 1964, U.S.
Senate. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
90
“Accomplishments in the Field of Aging Since 22 November 1963,” October 12, 1964, Box 521, Office Files of
Frederick Panzer, LBJL.
88

288

other related legislation. In light of this relatively slender record, Panzer drew attention in the
memorandum to the still largely untouched list of objectives that the 1961 White House Conference
on Aging had assembled and not too subtly hinted that, if the President or the Democratic Party
were in need of campaign issues for the 1964 election, the White House Conference on Aging’s
recommendations might prove to be a good starting point. 91
Eager to distinguish themselves from the Eisenhower administration’s record (one internal
memorandum described the Eisenhower years as a period when “the Government [was] lying down
on the job”), Johnson administration officials took stock of the nearly twenty recommendations
made by the 1961 White House Conference on Aging. Viewed as a whole, the recommendations
were broad, wide-ranging, even ambitious: the federal government could help senior citizens to
secure the “right to freedom from want in old age” by encouraging the development of sufficient
health insurance coverage and Social Security, old-age assistance, and other pension programs
capable of “provid[ing] adequate minimum income in old age related to changing economic
conditions. 92 Other, more prosaic recommendations emphasized the need to guarantee the elderly
“the right to a fair share of the community’s recreational, educational, and medical resources” as
well as “the right to live with dignity.” 93
But there was another reason for the administration’s growing concern with the elderly. As a
1964 Department of Health Education and Welfare Research Division report argued in language
reminiscent of The Other America, “the old and the frail have also been bypassed – given enough of
the fruits of progress to prolong their lives, but deprived of opportunities to fill the added years with
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satisfactions…having no real role in the modern economy, all these people enjoy few of its
assets.” 94
In other words, the federal government could help to carve out a “real role in the modern
economy” for older people, and if it so chose, the 1961 White House Conference on Aging’s
recommendations offered a blueprint to do so. As the same HEW report optimistically concluded,
the last several years have witnessed emphasis on Federal legislation to help people overcome
social, health, educational, and other problems which keep them from becoming self-sufficient…all
of these Federal activities are designed to help communities develop coordinated programs, using
their local social institutions to supplement and reinforce the effort individuals can make to find
their way into the mainstream of American life. 95
The message was clear: now was the time to act. The effort to alleviate poverty, especially
among the “old and frail” had languished for too long. By undertaking methods both novel and
known, the Johnson administration could launch a full-scale assault on elderly poverty in the United
States. The necessary resources were present to do so. The question remained how best to achieve
this goal. Assuming that legislation providing medical care for the elderly was enacted into law,
what other areas of life for older Americans should the government place its emphasis upon? Issues
like housing, guaranteed basic income security, as well as fair and equitable access to the workplace
all seemed to be equally compelling options, and as 1964 and 1965 unfolded, it became clear that
the administration meant to take on all of them in some fashion or another.
Senator Barry Goldwater’s overwhelming defeat in the 1964 presidential election handed
liberals within the Democratic Party a working majority on Capitol Hill, and the Johnson
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administration was determined to utilize this rare window of opportunity. The ability of
Congressman Wilbur Mills and other conservative southern Democrats to block the administration’s
way was, at least for the moment, halted. As a supreme micromanager, Johnson took an interest in
nearly every domestic policy initiative of his administration. Perhaps no issue in 1964 and 1965 –
aside from civil rights – occupied as privileged a position on the President’s crowded schedule as
the struggle to enact medical care for older Americans. As Johnson aide Jack Valenti recalled,
Johnson had once exclaimed that
“I’m going to make Harry Truman’s dream come true. Old folks are
not going to be barred from a doctor’s office or a hospital because
they don’t have any money for medical attention. They are never
again going to have to be sick and hurt and cry alone. It’s a
goddamned crime,” he said, “we’re never going to have that happen
again in this country. When this bill is passed, I’m going to
Independence, [Missouri] and I’m going to sign it in Harry Truman’s
presence.” He did exactly that. 96
Of course, Medicare did not begin or end with Johnson’s personal desire to make former President
Harry Truman happy. The enactment of Medicare in 1965 represented a long-stalled and partial
triumph for political liberals that they passionately savored in light of the AMA’s hitherto successful
efforts to block any such legislation.
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Figure 8. Lyndon Johnson (l) and Harry S. Truman (r) after Johnson signed Medicare into
law. Lady Bird Johnson (obscured), Hubert Humphrey, and Bess Truman stand in the
background. Photo courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

While Medicare was probably the most important piece of social legislation enacted in the
United States since the original Social Security Act in 1935, it represented but one piece of an
emerging policy agenda that the Johnson administration believed was necessary to buttress the
economic and health security of older Americans. This emerging policy agenda had its origins in the
efforts of transplanted officials from the organized labor movement like Charles Odell and James
O’Brien, who had served on the 1960 Kennedy campaign’s “Board of Senior Citizens for
Kennedy.” This reliance on organized labor as a source of ideas for social policy was perfectly in
keeping for the Johnson administration. 97 In the case of the “Board of Senior Citizens for Kennedy,”
its eventual evolution into the National Council of Senior Citizens, an AFL-CIO aligned and funded
organization was done primarily for one reason: to educate and persuade senior citizens to support
the enactment of Medicare. The enactment of Medicare thereby presented something of a quandary
97
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for both the National Council of Senior Citizens and the Johnson administration, since that
crowning legislative victory also took off the table an issue which had singlehandedly come to
dominate discussions at the local, state, and federal levels of government over how to assist older
Americans.
The OEO and the War on Elderly Poverty
The future direction of federal initiatives to assist the aged was also opaque, courtesy of the
administration’s War on Poverty, a major initiative that had begun under highly improvised
circumstances. Reflecting Johnson’s preference for speedy implementation and action, the
bureaucratic contours of the War on Poverty came together quickly over the early months of 1964. 98
James C. Gaither, a former Special Assistant to President Johnson, remembered that “OEO was set
up really without a program, [but with] a very ambitious goal, and a charter to go out and innovate
and experiment and see if somehow we could provide an opportunity and give people a chance to
escape poverty” 99 As Gaither further observed, the OEO’s ambitious mandate of eliminating
poverty immediately confronted a major philosophical issue: namely, what, in fact, was poverty?
Who were the poor, and how they best be helped? Broadly speaking, Johnson and his aides were
deeply influenced by broadly shared ideas about poverty in the 1960s, which held that
poverty...once thought of as largely a problem of exploitation at the
workplace, increasingly had come to be seen as an issue of economic
and social marginalization, of exclusion from work…Lyndon Johnson
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believed that the plight of the poor could be and should be
ameliorated, without taking anything away from those better off. 100
This conceptual abstraction of poverty worked reasonably well at first in what the historian Randall
Woods has labeled the “Johnsonian world,” in which “enemies were abstract – disease, ignorance,
racism – [and] not concrete – economic royalists, segregationists, doctors, the ‘Upper Ten’, radical
immigrants.” 101
This nebulous concept of poverty would create problems as the War on Poverty progressed,
as critics on both the right and left of the administration questioned the effectiveness of its methods
and the rationale behind its assumptions. Rather than untangle the full ideological dimensions of
poverty in America, the Johnson administration instead opted to bolster existing social services
infrastructure and to fund the creation of new initiatives. Indeed, Johnson’s main ideological
contribution to the War on Poverty, now taking shape as the newly formed Office of Economic
Opportunity, or OEO, was his insistence that “there be no doles”, and newly appointed OEO
director Sargent Shriver concurred in this belief. Shriver rushed to put together a working staff for
the new agency, a process both helped and hindered by its newness.
Strikingly, the OEO was designed mainly to bypass the established infrastructure of social
workers and welfare administrators and to work directly with local communities in the hope that its
initiatives would not get caught in the thicket of local politics. 102 The 1964 Economic Opportunity
Act, which authorized and funded the OEO, thereby “allowed tremendous federal discretionary
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power over a meaningful amount of resources.” 103 However, bypassing groups with a vested interest
in their states and communities helped strengthen opposition to the War on Poverty as an
unwarranted intrusion by the federal government into affairs beyond its constitutional purview.
In contrast to the OEO’s modus operandi, the model of partnership between all different
levels of government that had come to mark the development and administration of government
programs for older Americans ensured that, unlike the Community Action Programs (CAP)
sponsored by the OEO, it did not suddenly disrupt pre-existing patterns of power and patronage in
local governments. 104 Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago may have viewed the OEO’s community
action agencies as unwelcome meddlers in his political machine, but his highest city-level
administrator for aging affairs was perhaps the most faithful and cooperative local official between
New York and California that the Johnson administration could rely upon. 105
Many of these local officials had established working relationships with local philanthropic
and private social welfare organizations as part of long-standing historical pattern of public-private
cooperation that had preceded the enactment of Social Security in 1935. After the enactment of
Social Security, the need to administer federal funds at the state-level had led many individual states
to create state agencies, whose primary bailiwick remained the monthly disbursement of Social
Security benefits as well as applicable state-based public assistance funds.
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The expansion of Social Security during the 1940s and 1950s had expanded the size and
scope of these agencies as more categories of workers became eligible for coverage under Social
Security, and had the effect of “encourage[ing] state agencies to accept responsibility for providing
or securing specific social services required by the needy aged.” 106 Working in conjunction with
these state level agencies were national welfare organizations like the American Public Welfare
Association (APWA), that aimed to help those agencies develop a more robust set of social and
community services designed to ensure satisfactory attention to the needs of older people. 107 These
needs were both economic and non-economic. In the words of the APWA,
in the future, public welfare will be increasingly concerned with a
large number of people who are not in need of public assistance, such
as beneficiaries of an adequate old age and survivors insurance or
private insurance benefit...public welfare has a responsible role to
assume in the provision of services to older people throughout the
community having social service needs which may or may not include
economic want. 108
The APWA’s words reflected an evolving consensus in the nation’s social welfare community. The
needs of older people were no longer “simple and static;” rather, they were growing and dynamic.
“Public assistance administration must not accept the belief that old people are always selfsufficient and that therefore…they do not need help in resolving social, economic, and
psychological problems.” 109
These changing sentiments about the needs of older people in American society strongly
undergirded and militated in favor of an expanding role for policymakers at all levels – local, state,
and eventually federal – and the need to develop and expand social services for the elderly. Public
and private welfare officials labored mightily to use the resources of the state to put in place new
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agencies, services, and initiatives that would replace or supplement the supporting roles traditionally
played by families or by active employment in the labor force. As the National Council on the
Aging (a daughter organization formed by members of the private National Social Welfare
Assembly) noted in a 1962 report,
[o]ne of the major personal and social problems of today is emerging
from the number of years people spend in retirement without a work
schedule to utilize the greater proportion of their time and without
means to participate fully in the life of the community. Both the
individual and society have yet to understand the significance of this
situation and the enormous toll resulting from the community’s failure
to utilize the potential of its older people. 110
It was this “potential of…older people” that the National Council on the Aging (NCOA), in
conjunction with other public and private welfare institutions, sought to direct into well-defined,
socially useful functions like volunteer work. 111 In doing so, the NCOA sought to mitigate the largescale effects of population shifts and changes in employment patterns, both of which it and other
like-minded organizations such as APWA believed to be responsible for the worsening social and
economic conditions faced by older Americans in many communities.
While neither the NCOA nor APWA sought to rewind the clock back to a more rural, less
industrial past in which older people supposedly enjoyed higher social status, both believed firmly
that solutions to the problems of older Americans could be discerned through careful research in the
nation’s leading universities and then applied and implemented by policymakers throughout the
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country. It was a fundamentally optimistic approach to the problems of older Americans, and
NCOA embraced this approach with gusto. In the organization’s words,
NCOA must continue to exercise leadership by helping the young to
understand and prepare for the later years; to promote sound relations
among the four generations…It must continue to work with others to
develop healthy attitudes on the part of the public towards
aging…[and] to create…a climate in which age itself will be looked
upon as a natural phenomenon, not as an economic, physical, and
social disaster. 112
A public-private infrastructure was already in place at the local and state levels and ready to receive
funding for new programs and initiatives and to help federal officials identify new areas of concern.
Thus, unlike many of the OEO’s antipoverty initiatives, some of the infrastructure needed for
coordinated effort between local, state, and federal government already existed for some of the
programs designed to assist older Americans. It existed in cities like New York and Chicago, and in
some states like North Carolina and California, but it remained woefully underdeveloped in other
places.
The administration’s approach therefore aimed to strengthen anti-poverty initiatives for the
elderly where they already existed, and to scale successful local-level programs like subsidized
public housing and access to social and rehabilitative services to the national level, all while
promoting new demonstration and experimental projects in communities throughout the nation. In
other words, the administration had committed itself to a hugely ambitious agenda, one that sought
to enmesh the federal government in social welfare policymaking for older people to an extent that
exceeded the expansion of the federal government’s role that had taken place during the New Deal.
This expansion of infrastructure at the state and local level before the advent of the Great
Society drew its strength in part by changing ideas about the relative capacity of older people to
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remain productive workers and participants in the social life of their communities. Thirty years
earlier, the Social Security Act had been enacted in order to promote the economic independence of
older people by removing them as a financial burden upon either their families or their communities.
In practice, though, it had frequently fallen short of this goal, mostly because its benefits had not
kept pace with inflation and the rising cost of living.
Moreover, the inadequacy of Social Security had, during the postwar years, created a
vacuum that was filled by private social welfare agencies eager to reassert their traditional role as
the keystone of the American social welfare system, a role that they had lost due to the Great
Depression. The resurgence of local and state-based assistance had created growing disparities in
the levels of assistance that older people could expect to receive, with wealthier states like New
York and California more willing to fund state-level government assistance programs that were
considerably more slender in places like Louisiana and Mississippi.
The challenge facing the Johnson administration, therefore, was how to square the
President’s insistence that there be no new “doles” created with the need to assist desperately
impoverished communities that in some cases lacked even the semblance of a social welfare
infrastructure. Rehabilitative and social service programs thereby provided a solution to this
conundrum, because they were not simply another form of cash assistance like the old-age
assistance payments made by Social Security or by individual state pension systems such as those of
California or Colorado. Instead, the programs that the Johnson administration’s war on elderly
poverty favored were ones that promoted the creation of employment opportunities, especially for
younger members of traditionally disadvantaged communities.
Manpower for Medicare
While the enactment of Medicare in 1965 and its subsequent implementation in 1966 had the
salutary effect of subsidizing the medical costs of many older Americans and thereby helped to keep
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many of them out of near-certain poverty and off federal, state, and local public assistance rolls, it
also had another, less well-known, consequence. In effect, by making it possible for older
Americans to purchase and afford more medical care, the law led to a steadily growing demand for
sufficient health care professionals to meet the heightened demand for medical care among the
elderly. 113 In July 1966, just a few weeks after Medicare went into effect, Dr. George A. Silver, a
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, wrote to HEW Secretary John Gardner
with regard to the need for a “long term health manpower program.” 114 In his letter, Silver noted
“while a policy discussion is still under way as to priorities and programs for long term alleviation
of the health manpower shortage…an immediate effort to have a definite impact can be
proposed.” 115 In particular, Silver wrote that tabulations provided by the American Hospital
Association showed that there was “a uniform grave shortage in the area of professional nurses: half
of the demand overall…according to this about 100,000 people are required to meet the most urgent
need; 50,000 professional nurses, country wide are needed.” 116
In response to this manpower shortage, Silver recommended that the administration act as
quickly as possible by formally directing “the Public Health Service [to] undertake a program…of
financing recruitment and refresher courses…for professional nurses and medical technologists
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estimated to draw 25,000 to 30,000 qualified people back into the field.” 117 In addition, Silver
recommended that the federal government should disburse $45 million in funds (approximately
$334 million in 2016 dollars) to provide “practical nursing training, particularly in States designated
as having the greater need.” 118 These funds to provide for additional nursing training would
represent a mere expansion of an existing arrangement between the American Hospital Association
and the Johnson administration. 119
Besides these two major funding initiatives to support the training and recruitment of new
health care professionals, Silver proposed four additional minor ones, which totaled $13.5 million
(1966 dollars) and 14,500 new nurses’ aides, orderlies, laboratory assistants, medical record aides,
and additional dietitian aides. Effectively, Silver recommended a broad spectrum of all the different
types of workers who would be necessary to meet the increased demand for medical care. 120 While
Silver acknowledged that adequately funding all of these proposals might be a challenge, he urged
Gardner to take advantage of the ample funds already allocated by Congress. In particular, Congress
had attached significant funding to several pieces of legislation, including the Manpower
Development and Training Act ($400 million in 1966 dollars), the Vocational Education Act ($200
million in 1966 dollars), as well as funds scheduled to be allocated to the Office of Economic
Opportunity ($88 million in 1966 dollars). 121
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Originally, Silver’s letter to Gardner had come after a frenzied exchange of letters between
Sargent Shriver, the head of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), and Douglass Cater, a
Special Assistant to President Johnson. Shriver had written to Cater at the end of May 1966 in an
administratively confidential memorandum to highlight what he believed were the most effective
ways to create jobs for the various impoverished constituencies that were now within the OEO’s
bailiwick. 122 In particular, Shriver stressed to Cater the need for new public employment
opportunities for the impoverished that “develop meaningful jobs with advancement potential for
persons seeking economic opportunities” and which would simultaneously “expand services in
areas of public need through the innovative use of non-professional personnel.” 123 Significantly,
Shriver argued “one may think of the many ‘new careers’ (e.g., home health aides) that can be
developed in the health field in response to the growing public needs arising from the Medicare
program” as an example of this virtuous cycle, lest the connection between Medicare and OEO’s
efforts be lost. 124 Shriver reasoned that the enactment of Medicare and the consequently heightened
demand for trained health care professionals presented a perfect opportunity to wage both the war
on poverty and the fight for better health care. As he further noted in his letter to Cater, “the special
capabilities of public employment” included
…[the] ability to practice nondiscriminatory hiring and promotion
practices without fear of economic consequences…to provide an
entry-point into the mainstream of economic participation for the
poor. This involves a temporarily sheltered and supportive work
environment within which the poor can develop and prove their ability
to earn an adequate income, [and]…to expand badly needed services
in the public sector in those areas in which highly trained professional
personnel are in short supply. 125
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While Shriver conceded in the memorandum that “it is not expected that all of the long-term
unemployed will want public employment jobs” he underscored that “others both within and outside
the labor force will find these jobs attractive as they will represent a means of upward mobility for
them.” 126 Shriver ended his memorandum by observing that “the estimated cost of a public
employment program for 180,000 people is $720 million (1966 dollars).” 127 Perhaps realizing that
OEO was unlikely to receive that level of funding, Shriver conceded that “we believe…that a
program having considerable impact could be started at one-fourth to one-third the 180,000
level…at levels of 45,000-60,000, the program would cost from $180-$240 million (1966
dollars).” 128
The Older Americans Act
Shriver’s concession did not deter congressional critics of the War on Poverty, who
increasingly believed that the OEO had a far too narrow conception of poverty, and that its efforts
were therefore ignoring impoverished communities that deserved more attention. Such concerns
bolstered the efforts by congressional Democrats to enact new legislation that would specifically
address the issue of elderly poverty, an issue that Michael Harrington and others had helped to
resuscitate as a public concern during the early 1960s. Picking up on this groundswell of interest, a
May 1965 article in the New York Times stated “this is the age of the aged,” and intoned that
[t]he most visible group of Americans today is the aged…there are
more than 18,000,000 men and women in the United States who are
65 years old or older…Eight hundred persons a day are added to the
separate, the often frightening world of the aged. The aged have no
economic status. The aged have no household status...And their
special problem is survival in a society that finds their minds and
bodies superfluous. 129
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Before taking readers on a tour through the potential trail of horrors that old age seemingly had to
offer them, though, the Times drew attention to the efforts of Congressman John Fogarty (D-RI) to
temper the seemingly harsh attitude of American society towards elderly people by enacting the
Older Americans Act. Reflecting on previous attempts to enact the Older Americans Act, Fogarty
commented that
I’ve been involved in legislation for the aging for the past 14 years
here in the House. We’ve got a President’s Council on Aging; we’ve
got an Office of Aging in the Health, Education and Welfare
Department; we’ve got a mountain of paper on old people and
somehow we haven’t been able to bring the mountain of paper to the
old people. Maybe this bill [the Older Americans Act] will do it. I
hope so. Because the whole problem of aging is something that
shouldn’t be a problem. 130
Of course, neither Fogarty nor his Senate co-sponsor Patrick McNamara of Michigan believed that
the “whole problem of aging” would be changed by the passage of a single law, but their proposed
legislation nevertheless aimed high in its stated goals. Similar to the 1964 Economic Opportunity
Act’s funding for programs primarily designed to assist unemployed young men, the Older
Americans Act proposed the authorization of “$13,000,000 in grants to the states for community
planning, demonstration programs and the training of personnel.” 131 As Congressman Fogarty
added, the bill’s declaration of objectives for older Americans included federal assurances of “an
adequate income,” “the best possible physical and mental health,” “suitable housing,” and
“opportunity for employment with age discrimination.” 132
Sensing the power of the popular groundswell that had helped carry Medicare over the finish
line, the Johnson administration eventually acquiesced to the Older Americans Act, and Johnson
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signed it into law in July 1965. 133 Despite the broad promises made by the legislation’s objectives,
the amount of funding allocated to the new law made accomplishing those objectives a tall order.
Given the fact that there were 18,000,000 people who were aged 65 years and over in the United
States in 1965, that meant that the federal government was theoretically proposing to spend $0.72
(approximately $5.50 in 2016 dollars) per person over the age of 65 to help achieve the goals of the
Older Americans Act.
Even in victory, though, the Older Americans Act was thin gruel compared to what its
congressional backers had hoped for before its passage. 134 For example, instead of creating a
cabinet-level agency dedicated to promoting the welfare of older Americans, the Older Americans
Act instead provided for a new, sub-Cabinet Administration on Aging, and charged it with the
mundane task of making grants to various state programs designed to assist older Americans. 135 The
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Administration on Aging was provided with an appropriation of roughly $8 million (1967 dollars)
and had just eight-seven employees; by contrast, the Welfare Administration, which administered
Aid to the Blind, Old Age Assistance, Medicaid, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children
programs was granted an appropriation approaching $4.5 billion (1967 dollars) and had over 1,300
employees. 136
In other words, the Older Americans Act was a drop in the bucket, especially when
compared to federal expenditures on long-standing programs like Social Security’s old-age
assistance program. Even though the new Administration on Aging was off to a slow start, the law
had some underlying potential. The Older Americans Act’s architects had intended the new law to
fund “community planning and coordination of programs” and to support “demonstrations of
programs or activities which are particularly valuable in carrying out such purposes [of the Act].” 137
These activities included, among other things, assisting older people to “secure equal opportunity to
the full and free enjoyment of…an adequate income in retirement,” “the best physical and mental
health…without regard to economic status,” affordable housing, and finally increased employment
opportunities. This broad set of goals that would likely take far more funding and personnel than
Congress had thus far been willing to grant to the Administration on Aging. 138
In essence, though, the Older Americans Act committed the federal government to improve
the lives of elderly people by amplifying the ongoing efforts of state and local governments to do so.
While the law appeared to herald a new era in the federal government’s efforts to combat the myriad
number of social and economic problems facing older people, it was also clear to federal
policymakers that the success of such efforts relied heavily upon the existing infrastructure built by
136
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state and local officials. The Johnson administration admitted as much. As HEW Secretary John
Gardner affirmed in a May 1966 to state officials, “you know better than anyone else that the
enactment of Federal programs – for aging, health, education, or any social endeavor – does not
mean a lessened responsibility on the part of the States or local communities or the many
nongovernment institutions and agencies.” 139 Gardner further observed that
[w]e provide the resources. It’s your responsibility to use them. The
Federal Government can’t bring about the final result in
Washington…Our programs won’t work unless there is real vitality at
the State and local end of the partnership – and that’s where you come
in. 140
While Gardner conceded that although there had been a significant legislative expansion of federal
responsibility on behalf of older Americans, the success of those programs still fundamentally rested
upon the willingness of state and local officials to participate.
In New York and California, state officials welcomed the added assistance from the federal
government in dealing with their growing welfare rolls by shifting older recipients away from
receipt of public assistance funds and towards rehabilitation for work or compensated community
service projects where possible. 141 Their rationale for doing so was straightforward. As an
inducement to state and local officials, the Older Americans Act provided federal officials with a
powerful tool: namely, millions of dollars’ worth of federal money ready to be disbursed starting
immediately in 1965, with more funds to be made available by future appropriations every year for

139

U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Introduction: A New Day for the Older American: Selected
Papers of the 1966 National Conference of State Executives on Aging by John W. Gardner.. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1966.
140
Ibid.
141
Just as they had once pioneered the expansion of welfare services, so too would California and New York eventually
lead the way on reversing and limiting public assistance. See Bill Kovach, “States Act to Curb Welfare Expansion:
States Moving to Reverse Wide Expansion of the Nation's Welfare System by Cutting Back Programs,” The New York
Times, August 16, 1971.

307

the next seven years. 142 Ultimately, the law aimed to foster and support the creation of state and
local community-level plans and programs for the aging rather than to create a new, centralized
federal agency that catered solely to the needs of the aged. Congress had initially considered that
latter option, sought by Senator McNamara and Congressman Fogarty, but ultimately rejected it
because of underlying concerns that such an agency could overreach into affairs that were the
domain of individual states and local communities.
The largely decentralized framework erected by the Older Americans Act, though, quietly
redounded in its favor. Essentially, by keeping the emphasis on state and local level plans, the law
successfully supplemented existing state and local activities, programs, and initiatives and provided
new federal seed monies for previously unfunded demonstrations and experimental projects that
could conceivably improve the lives of older people. This formulation enjoyed support not only
from organized labor, senior citizen advocacy groups, but also from a nationwide coalition of
private welfare and state and local officials throughout the country. Indeed, the funding provided by
the Older Americans Act eventually spurred the creation of new state-level plans in every American
state and territory (save for American Samoa) over the course of the next five years, with most plans
brought into being within the first year of the Act’s existence. 143 In addition, the state plans created
by the law offered the means to cement the nascent alliance between welfare officials at all levels of
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government with the growing number of private organizations like the National Council of Senior
Citizens that promoted the expansion of government assistance to older Americans. 144
The skillful ability of the 1964 Johnson campaign to turn the issue of protecting Social
Security into an effective cudgel against Barry Goldwater did not go unnoticed by other politicians
in Washington, many whom suddenly became more attentive to the plight of older Americans. In
June 1965, the Senate Special Committee on Aging held hearings investigating the War on
Poverty’s relationship to alleviating elderly poverty, and several members of the committee alleged
that the Office of Economic Opportunity had neglected older Americans in favor of other
impoverished groups. 145 From the very beginning of the hearings, the assembled senators made
clear their belief that “OEO programs can do far more than presently in behalf of the Nation’s
elderly poor.” 146 A long list of representatives from the growing number of old-age groups
(including the NCSC and the AARP) largely concurred with that assessment. John W. Edelman, a
longtime labor union organizer and now NCSC president, observed that
most of the OEO programs lean heavily toward the concept of
education and training as instruments of breaking the cycle of poverty
– hence the emphasis on youth. For most persons aged 65 and over,
preparation for jobs other than short-term, on-the-job training would
be unrealistic…the National Council of Senior Citizens wishes
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America to undertake vital new programs to fight poverty among the
Nation’s youth – but we must fight more aggressively to defeat
poverty among the aged. We cannot fight half the battle. If we do –
we may lose the whole war. 147
Other leaders in the field of old-age advocacy echoed his criticism. Geneva Mathiasen, the
Executive Director of the National Council on Aging (NCOA), stated her organization had received
“correspondence and personal inquiries…from those people who are concerned with the problems
of older people at the local level…because of the lack of interest shown by the local office of
economic opportunity organization [OEO] in the needs of the elderly poor.” 148
After several more witnesses echoed the points made by Edelman and Mathiasen, Sargent
Shriver, the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, testified before the committee,
admitting “none of us at the headquarters of the war against poverty is satisfied with what we are
now doing for the benefit of the aged.” He blamed the agency’s shortcomings on a variety of
factors, including the lack of “concrete, specific programs or suggestions about how we can carry
the war on poverty effectively to the aged.” 149 Defending his agency’s work up to that point, Shriver
pleaded “we have believed that in setting up a war against poverty Congress wanted us to work on
the most disadvantaged, the poorest people, in our Nation, not to take the easy ones, you might say,
the relatively easy ones, but to work on the worst.” 150 When pressed by senators as to why OEO had
not worked to develop partnerships with state and local agencies that assisted the elderly poor,
Shriver could offer no compelling answer. Instead, he blamed Congress for failing to insert a
mandate in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 requiring the allocation of funds to programs
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dealing with the elderly poor, an argument that, while true, did little to alleviate Congress’s
concerns about the OEO. 151
In truth, while the Office of Economic Opportunity had already funded some programs for
the elderly such as the Foster Grandparents Program, which offered older people the opportunity to
serve as mentors for poor children in select cities like New York and Chicago, its efforts were
designed primarily to help impoverished urban communities escape the “cycle of poverty” by
offering vocational education and training to unemployed, working age youths.

152

This

programmatic emphasis was obvious to observant state and local welfare officials. As Garson
Meyer, the chairman of New York’s advisory committee for its state-level Office for the Aging
wrote in response to congressional inquiries about the relationship between the OEO’s antipoverty
efforts and New York’s initiatives: “although many communities [in New York State] are engaged
in other phases of the antipoverty program, or are providing programs and services for the elderly
through the State and community-aided programs, there is, almost without exception, no
involvement of the older population in these antipoverty programs.” 153
The senators gathered at the 1965 OEO hearings were not terribly pleased with Shriver’s
answers. During the subsequent testimonies of other witnesses who followed Shriver, they
repeatedly highlighted the Older Americans Act as a necessary corrective to OEO’s emphasis on
youth unemployment and poverty. 154 In a final report published a year after the hearings, the Special
Committee on Aging lambasted the Office of Economic Opportunity for its paltry efforts, and
151
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approvingly quoted Geneva Mathiasen’s testimony on the need for the war on poverty’s programs to
relieve the poverty of both the young and the old:
[W]e are well aware of the needs of children and youth. But we
believe a government must show concern for the needs of all its
people, and that older people who are spending the closing years of
their lives in poverty deserve their fair share of the funds allotted to
the elimination of poverty deserve their fare of the funds allotted to
the elimination of poverty in our country. 155
Rebuking Shriver, the committee emphasized in its findings that “the war on poverty can only be
successful to the extent that it succeeds in lifting the elderly out of poverty” and that “when it passed
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964…Congress intended that the programs authorized benefit
the elderly as well as other age groups.” 156 The committee urged that a “high-level position or
positions” be established with the Office of Economic Opportunity in order to “assure adequate
consideration of the needs of the elderly in conducting the war on poverty” and that OEO “develop
to their full potential the elderly-oriented programs which it has already begun.” 157 However, there
were only four OEO’s elderly-oriented programs: the Foster Grandparents, Medicare Alert, Project
Green Thumb, and Home Health Aides. The committee further urged that OEO fund more
community action programs oriented around the needs of the elderly, including employment
programs, nutrition programs, housing programs, and senior centers. 158
Despite the Special Committee on Aging’s disapproval, though, OEO’s activities to combat
elderly poverty remained limited throughout 1965 and 1966. 159 As an internal OEO task force report
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concluded in August 1965, the agency had hitherto devoted insufficient staff and resources to
combatting elderly poverty. 160 The OEO task force ultimately argued that, despite the important
limitations of funding, staff resources, and competing federal authorities, “much can be done for the
older poor” under the existing Economic Opportunity Act legislation.
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The task force

recommended that “consideration be given to establishing a program for a neighborhood senior
corps paralleling the neighborhood youth corps” which would “provide part-time work
opportunities” and “would not be competitive with youth for available jobs.” 162 In particular, the
task force report argued that “the passage of Medicare will result in greater utilization of a variety of
health services and add to existing shortages of personnel,” and that this shortage represented a
tremendous opportunity for the OEO to fill with a “senior health corps.” 163
Essentially, the proposed senior health corps would solve two problems at once: it would
alleviate elderly poverty through public employment while filling a critical manpower need which
the enactment of the Johnson administration’s health program had greatly augmented. As the task
force report noted, “this [program] offers unusual opportunities for the middle-aged and older poor
and others…many could qualify with short-term on-the-job training…educational prerequisites will
not be an obstacle in most situations” with the additional bonuses that “discrimination based on race

aged 65 or over), noting that “it may be politically easier to devise a new program to eliminate poverty in this group
than for others, despite the existence of OASDI and old-age assistance,” but cautioned that “it is administratively
difficult to designed alternative programs for aiding the aged poor without substantial spillover to the 5.2 million aged
families and 1.9 million unrelated aged individuals whose incomes are above the poverty level.” Ultimately, the Task
Force concluded that adopting a new minimum income program for older Americans “might endanger progress in
improving the Social Security program,” and the suggestion for a targeted income maintenance program for older
Americans was dropped until it was later revived by the Nixon administration seven years later. See Report of the Task
Force on Income Maintenance, September 18, 1965, pg. 11, in Box 19, Office Files of Joseph Califano, LBJL.
160
“Poverty and the Older American: Findings and Recommendations,” First Report of the Office of Economic
Opportunity Task Force on Programs for Older Persons, August 1965, in Box 13, Personal Papers of Robert Hardesty,
LBJL.
161
Ibid., 13.
162
Ibid.
163
Ibid., 16.

313

has been substantially overcome in these services [and] opportunities for employment will be
available everywhere – rural and urban.” 164
Jobs for the Elderly?
As presented by the OEO task force, the proposed senior health corps was a solution that
sounded almost too good to be true. The refusal on the part of some southern hospitals and primary
care providers to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to be eligible for financial
reimbursement from Medicare for services rendered meant that there was a distinct possibility that
elderly African-Americans would be unable to receive better medical care or hospitalization in
formerly all-white southern hospitals, thus subverting the ability of the Civil Rights Act to
desegregate American medicine. In addition, in order to circumvent complaints about federal
interference in local affairs, the OEO task force proposed that the senior health corps be “sponsored
or operated by a Community Action Agency, a Visiting Nurse Association, a Public Health or
Welfare Agency, a Hospital” – i.e., not directly by the federal government, though it highlighted
that “close collaboration with [the] Social Security Administration, Public Health Service…would
be necessary in planning and implementing this project.” 165
But the proposed senior health corps never made it past the initial proposal stage. It was not
until 1966 that Johnson administration officials, concerned about the growing blowback to the War
on Poverty, decided to formulate a strategy to develop policies aimed at alleviating elderly poverty.
These new efforts also proved necessary because the OEO, despite Sargent Shriver’s pledges to
Congress in 1965 and again in 1966, remained more firmly committed to youth programs than those
that favored the elderly. 166 As disorganized as its beginnings had been, the OEO’s guiding
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philosophy had eventually coalesced around the belief that expending limited federal funds on youth
programs was a more effective way to break “the cycle of poverty” rather than programs for the
elderly, who presumably would remain largely mired in poverty due to limited employment
opportunities, public assistance, and personal resources.

Figure 9. Sargent Shriver (l) and Lyndon Johnson, March 1965. Photo courtesy of the
Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

These suspicions were confirmed when Shriver, testifying once more before a Senate panel
in late January 1966, “conceded that there was very little his poverty agency could do to help the
elderly poor” and instead “recommended expanded Medicare and larger direct cash payments under
Social Security to ‘reach the majority of older people who need more money and need it now’ to
live ‘in decency and dignity.” 167 For his part, Shriver blamed external factors for the OEO’s

combat elderly poverty, his agency did not deserve Congressional censure for its limited efforts to deal with elderly
poverty because that responsibility lay elsewhere. He observed “older people have special maintenance and assistance
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shortcomings in dealing with the elderly poor, and singled out the lack of interest on the part of
local communities in “problems and programs involving the elderly poor” as well as the fact that
two-thirds of elderly poor people over the age of 65 were “women, almost half of whom had never
worked before” and who possessed low educational levels that prevented them from effectively
competing for employment opportunities. In other words, the OEO’s lack of engagement with the
problem of elderly poverty was not caused by internal factors at the OEO; nor would the OEO be
willing to expend much of its limited resources to tackle the issue. 168
While Shriver was right to point out that employment opportunities for older women were
starkly limited, his arguments to explain the OEO’s lack of success in combatting elderly poverty
were a bit too self-exculpatory. They overlooked the fact that there were local communities that
were interested in dealing with the problems of the elderly poor; New York City, southern
California, and Florida offered plenty of examples to counter Shriver’s statements. Shriver also did
not take into account the possibility of working in conjunction with the newly-created
Administration on Aging, which had been authorized by Congress to award $17.5 million in
appropriations to “states and public and private nonprofit organizations to develop programs for the
aged and to train personnel to teach the aged new skills,” a broad mandate which had the potential
to mesh well with OEO’s commitment to local community participation in its programs. 169
Still, Shriver had a point that expanding Medicare and raising the amount of direct cash
payments under Social Security had the potential to be more effective in combatting elderly poverty
than any individual program sponsored by the OEO, given the OEO’s limited resources and
personnel. As Wilbur Cohen, the Under Secretary of HEW, observed in an August 1965 interview
with the New York Times, U.S. poverty rolls “could be reduced by 25 to 33 percent through Social
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Security by raising benefits for the aged and disabled,” though Cohen believed that even with
sustained economic growth to fund such increases, elderly poverty would not be fully eradicated. 170
Rather, Cohen argued that any such increases in Medicare and Social Security would require
supplementation by “broad programs of education, the elimination of discrimination in employment,
rehabilitation of the disabled, counseling, and other measures.” 171
Instead of trying to prod the OEO or Shriver, other Johnson administration officials during
the course of 1966 increasingly realized, in the words of one confidential memo, that “there is a
need for a program designed specifically to employ the skills of the Nation’s elderly…a program
which does not tap these skills on the basis of need or income level alone.” 172 Additionally,
administration officials were also moving to bolster other existing federal efforts to alleviate elderly
poverty, a subject that took on increasing urgency as the Older Americans Act and Medicare were
being implemented throughout the nation in 1965 and 1966. By May 1966, nearly a year after the
enactment of the Older Americans Act, thirty-one states launched new programs with the support of
grants of the Administration on Aging. In some instances, these programs strengthened existing
programs. In New York, for example, funds disbursed by the Older Americans Act would
eventually enable New York City to increase funding for roughly three hundred separate programs
for aging city residents. Smooth administration of these programs, in turn, fell upon almost two
hundred “private and voluntary health, welfare, and leisure-time agencies.” 173 In New Jersey, state
officials took advantage of the newly available federal funds to add badly needed personnel to its
Division of Aging, in preparation for the development of a new state-wide plan for older citizens. 174
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As the state’s governor described it, the New Jersey plan aimed to “encourage…the establishment
of local community councils to aid the elderly in a broad spectrum of new programs… [including]
how to obtain the fullest benefits for older citizens under the new Federal Housing Act.”
The Johnson administration also launched the first-ever presidential task force dedicated to
exploring the lightly regulated private nursing home industry. 175 The administration’s renewed
emphasis on elderly antipoverty programs reflected a growing unease among senior officials that
public opinion was curdling against the Great Society, and that some visible demonstration of the
Great Society’s commitment to alleviating poverty along a color-blind basis was necessary. As
Henry Owen, a senior State Department official wrote to Bill Moyers in May 1966:
I was struck, in the Lou Harris poll, by the fact that the sharpest drop
in administration popularity was in the suburbs…I suppose most of
this is Vietnam and fear of inflation, but maybe there is also the
concern expressed by Senator Barkley’s constituent: “What have you
done for me lately?” Perhaps people in the suburbs feel that the main
thrust of administration policy (the war on poverty, civil rights, etc.) is
now addressed to the urban poor, and that they are on the outside
looking in. 176
As Owen wondered, “could new initiatives dramatize the administration’s concern with issues that
worry people in the suburbs?” Owens suggested that the administration focus on health-related
issues, given that “most families have seen members struck down by heart disease or cancer; people
in the suburbs, being less oppressed by poverty, probably have more time to worry about this than
most…any administration which could hold out the prospect of action to reduce this toll would be
viewed with favor.” 177 If the administration emphasized health-related programs, Owens believed
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that it “would help to dramatize the fact that the administration’s Great Society programs are
designed to help all the people, not just the under-privileged.” 178
Demonstrating that the Great Society’s programs were helping a wide rather than narrow
cross-section of Americans constituency seemed to be a tricky proposition, given the increasingly
dramatized efforts of the OEO’s community action programs in organizing impoverished AfricanAmerican communities in many of the nation’s cities, but the administration’s allies were happy to
suggest ways to do so. In June 1966, the National Council of Senior Citizens’ (NCSC) leadership
wrote to Robert Hardesty, a White House speechwriter, to report on the mail it had been receiving
from older Americans. 179 In particular, the NCSC reported that its incoming mail had revealed three
major categories of problems: income maintenance, inability to participate in society, and health. To
combat these problems, the NCSC recommended that the Johnson administration undertake three
steps posthaste. In particular, the NCSC argued that it should first “continue to strengthen the Social
Security system” and raise its benefits to a level that would “end poverty among the elderly;”
second, that it fund more preventive care for older people as a way to relieve hospital space
limitations; and finally, that it should “utilize a series of on-going programs (and initiate new ones
as soon as possible)” which will use the wasted skills of older Americans.” 180
The NCSC’s recommendations overlapped with internal data collected by the administration
about the OEO’s programs for the elderly poor. As limited as OEO’s efforts to combat elderly
poverty had been, administration officials were aware that “the experience in the [OEO’s] Foster
Grandparent Program has shown that there have been 8 applicants for every position available.”
This level of popular demand suggested that there was a sizable reservoir of potential older workers
for part-time employment or service opportunities, should the Federal Government be able to devise
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one in conjunction with existing public and private welfare agencies. 181 Moreover, by expanding
employment opportunities for the elderly, the Johnson administration hoped to relieve pressure on
the Social Security system and the private sector to provide increased employment opportunities.
Despite years of rhetoric from N.A.M. and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce about internal efforts by
American industry to retain older workers, Labor Department statistics told a different story. As one
Johnson administration Task Force report noted, “there has been an average of 850,000 people 45
and over unemployed in recent months…older workers are only 5 percent of ‘new hires’ but
account for 27 percent of all unemployed.” 182 Johnson administration officials estimated that
expanding the OEO’s programs could potentially provide up to 100,000 older people with part-time
employment. While that would not solve the problem of unemployment among older workers, it
offered the possibility of “increas[ing] the emphasis given to the needs of the elderly poor under
OEO programs…present OEO programs for the elderly poor have provided employment for only a
comparatively few thousand persons.” 183
Conclusion
The debate over the OEO’s role in alleviating elderly poverty would continue to bedevil the
Johnson administration, despite its otherwise highly impressive legislative record on domestic
policy issues for older Americans. In a span of a few months during 1965, the administration had
successfully broken a legislative logjam that had prevented the enactment of Medicare, and had then
successfully implemented Medicare over the course of the following year with the assistance of the
Social Security Administration. In doing so, it had partially fulfilled the aspirations of New Deal
liberals that extended back for over three decades. Triumph though it was, Medicare was only one
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piece of a much larger legislative agenda that social reformers both within and outside of the
administration successfully enacted into law. The passage of the Older Americans Act in July 1965
had indicated that congressional advocates wanted the federal government to take a more active role
in providing adequate funding to social services provided to older Americans. The Johnson
administration, though, was considerably less sanguine about the Administration on Aging created
by the Older Americans Act for this purpose, preferring instead to direct such efforts through other
existing channels such as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In light of the
administration’s opposition, congressional advocates placed a tighter scrutiny on the newly created
Office of Economic Opportunity, which they believed did not place sufficient emphasis on the
problem of elderly poverty.
Responding to this scrutiny, the Johnson administration began to ramp up internal efforts in
1966 to nudge the OEO towards addressing elderly poverty, both as a way to bolster the fledgling
agency’s popular support and as a way to expand the breadth of federal initiatives to ameliorate
poverty among older Americans. Increasingly, the administration was beginning to realize that the
problem of elderly poverty was not simply the product of inadequate income and unavailable
medical care. Rather, it was linked to inadequate community and social services as well.
This realization led the administration to acquiesce to the Older Americans Act, but not to
fully embrace it. Some officials within the administration, most notably, Wilbur Cohen, the HEW
Under-Secretary, believed that the administration needed to advocate a more aggressive agenda to
tackle a broader range of issues like employment discrimination, prescription drug prices, and the
growing private nursing home industry. Already, major states like New York and California had
begun to address some of these concerns, especially employment discrimination, but these efforts
still varied widely from state to state. The administration would turn more fully to these subjects
after Medicare’s successful implementation in mid-1966. Until that time, though, most of the
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administration’s energies remained focused on a smooth roll out of Medicare, including its efforts to
ensure the full desegregation of southern hospitals and nursing homes.
Starting in late 1966 and extending into 1967, the administration would devote more time
and attention to supplementing Social Security and Medicare with additional programs and
initiatives for older Americans. This pivot had its origins in the administration’s numerous task
forces, which were largely composed of external experts borrowed from academia and government
think tanks. Over the course of the preceding three years, these task forces had examined a broad
range of issues, including private pension reform, consumer protection, the nursing home industry,
income maintenance, and other needs of older Americans, and had produced numerous reports
proposing and explaining new initiatives which the administration could undertake. 184 Most of these
initiatives would fail to progress beyond the proposal stage, but as the administration sought to
identify and enact new domestic policy goals after the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, it
leaned upon the accumulated proposals to articulate its vision for a continuing activist government
on behalf of older Americans, especially those who remained mired in poverty.
By 1966, the Johnson administration could boast a record of domestic policy achievements
that rivaled the New Deal. The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, in particular, were savored by
administration officials eager to bask in the overwhelming acclaim that the new legislation enjoyed,
save for the opposition of the American Medical Association and far right-wing groups who
believed that the administration had taken the nation one further step down the road to serfdom. The
variety of advocacy groups that had successfully organized and mobilized elderly people to push for
Medicare also celebrated, with the National Council of Senior Citizens cheering the loudest.
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In particular, Medicare would also help to set the stage for the next phase of the senior
state’s development. As part of the process of implementing Medicare, the Social Security
Administration had worked in conjunction with the Office of Economic Opportunity to locate nearly
500,000 senior citizens throughout the nation and enroll them in Medicare. 185 This initiative, titled
“Medicare Alert” had made obvious that the problems of the elderly were not limited solely to
access to medical care or hospitalization; rather, as a report sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy
(D-MA) observed, there was a gaping chasm between the provision of social and community
services and the ability of older people to access them. 186
Figuring out how to fill this chasm would occupy a more significant portion of the Johnson
administration’s time between 1966 and 1968 than it had during the previous two years, when the
administration focused firmly on securing the enactment of Medicare. Even before the enactment of
Medicare, though, voices outside the Johnson administration on Capitol Hill had lobbied hard for a
more comprehensive approach to the problems of the elderly that envisioned Medicare as part of a
larger, more ambitious agenda. Senator Patrick McNamara (D-MI) and Congressman John Fogarty
(D-RI) were the chief proponents of this broader approach, and their ambitions found partial
realization in the enactment of the Older Americans Act.
However, the administration kept the Older Americans Act at a distance, and the law’s
promise of providing more federal funds, supporting new research into the problems of older
Americans, and setting up a new coordinating mechanism for future federal and state collaboration
in this policy area remained largely neglected during its early years. Additionally, the administration
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displayed lukewarm enthusiasm for more unconventional proposals to create public employment
opportunities for older people. This reluctance stemmed partly from the expenses involved, and
partly because of the administration’s fear of the potential objections that private employers and
organized labor might raise to such proposals. The administration ultimately chose to sidestep the
issue and opted instead to copy the statewide efforts of New York and California to ban age-based
discrimination in private employment. 187 The course that it chose aimed to avoid unnecessary
confrontations with an increasingly skeptical Congress, but at the price of enacting legislation that
produced limited results. 188
Instead, the administration preferred to work through existing bureaucratic mechanisms like
HEW and to prod the OEO to take a more active role in combatting elderly poverty through
sponsorship of community action programs primarily designed to meet the needs of older
Americans. In light of OEO’s reluctance to do more, and the competing needs and other needy
constituencies that HEW also had to serve, the Johnson administration began to embrace the Older
Americans Act after 1966 along with a more aggressive expansion of Social Security as its preferred
way of dealing with the issue of elderly poverty. 189
Starting in late 1966, the administration began to prioritize issues related to elderly poverty,
and to invite outside opinion from academic experts, professional gerontologists, social workers, as
well as state and local welfare officials to help it devise anti-poverty programs specifically designed
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for the elderly. These new programs would emphasize access to additional sources of income, health
care, improved nutrition, and access to institutions that were capable of preventing them from
becoming socially isolated. Work to bolster these efforts would accelerate after 1966, and the senior
state’s development would continue to accelerate as the federal government refocused some of its
antipoverty efforts in conjunction with its partners at the local and state level and in the private
sector.
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CHAPTER V
Entitled But No Longer Pitied, 1966-1975
By 1966, the senior state had begun to enter a new phase in its development. During the
previous thirty years, federal efforts to ensure economic security in old-age had gradually evolved
from a Social Security-centered model whose cornerstone lay in contributory social insurance on a
national scale. This model had only come into partial fruition by the late 1940s. Instead, other actors
such as private employers, voluntary social welfare organizations, and state and local governments,
had tried to fill the gap left by an incomplete Social Security system. While a proliferating number
of employer-sponsored private pension systems offered a stable source of retirement income for
some older Americans, a universal solution to the problem of old-age economic security remained
stubbornly elusive. As a new public-private hybrid welfare state began to take shape during the
postwar years, local and state officials found to their dismay that concentrated levels of poverty
among older people continued to persist, and had in fact begun to rise once more to levels not seen
since the depths of the Great Depression.
The failure to enact national health insurance in the late 1940s and during the 1950s had
further exacerbated this issue. As economist Dora L. Costa has pointed out, between 1960 and 1965,
“state and local expenditures on medical assistance for the aged rose by more than 1000 percent.” 1 It
was not too surprising, then, that state and local governments eagerly supported Medicare in the
years leading up to its enactment in 1965. While medical assistance for the elderly had become an
increasingly large portion of many state and local budgets before the enactment of Medicare, after
the enactment of Medicare, the costs associated with providing social and community services
1
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became a more significant budget item on more than one state and city budget. Social welfare
advocates thereafter began to press for more federal assistance in this area as a way to alleviate the
fiscal strains faced by many communities. In response, the Johnson administration and Congress
responded at first by attempting to redirect the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to spend
more of its funds and devote more of its time to the problems of the elderly poor.
These attempts produced mixed results. Consequently, the Johnson administration turned to
its task forces of outside experts in order to devise new strategy for the administration to follow as it
tackled the multitude of interrelated issues associated with elderly poverty. As part of its search for
a new path forward, the Johnson administration began to more fully embrace the framework of
federal, state, and local cooperation laid out in the Older Americans Act. It did so because the law
offered an existing structure for federal, state, and local welfare officials to work together to identify
and fund social and community service programs that could improve the lives of older people
without doing so in a demeaning fashion to recipients of government assistance or that threatened to
usurp local prerogatives. 2 Though the programs sponsored by the law and the OEO were not on the
same fiscal scale as either Social Security or Medicare, they demonstrated a new level of
commitment on the part of the federal government to try and equalize the level of public assistance
provided at the local level to older Americans, and to make it possible for more states and localities
to provide services that otherwise might have gone unsupported. 3
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Additionally, the Johnson administration aggressively raised Social Security benefit levels,
in part to compensate for Vietnam War-related inflation, and in part as an antipoverty measure that
did not require the creation of a new governmental program, a necessity after the 1966
congressional midterm elections decimated the progressive working majority that the Johnson
administration had enjoyed on Capitol Hill after the landslide Democratic electoral victory in the
1964 presidential election. The Johnson administration’s emphasis on improving social and
community services and its push to raise Social Security benefit levels would be extended by the
Nixon administration, which would work with a Democratic Congress after 1969 to build on the
newly expanded foundation for federal, state, and local cooperation on social welfare services for
older Americans that had been bequeathed to it. The Nixon administration’s ideological emphasis
on “New Federalism” (effectively a devolution of power from the central government back to the
states) meant that it experienced little difficulty in embracing the Johnson administration’s adapted
approach to dealing with the issue of elderly poverty or the continuing effort to shore up existing
federal and state mechanisms for providing economic and health security in old age. This bipartisan
commitment helped to further solidify the senior state as an essential function of government, albeit
in a haphazard fashion.
Perhaps the greatest boost to the senior state after the enactment of Medicare came out of the
failure of the Nixon administration to secure enactment of its Family Assistance Plan (FAP), which
it had first proposed in August 1969 as a form of universal guaranteed annual income designed to
replace the patchwork of categorical assistance programs that had evolved since the New Deal era.
FAP had some antecedents in the Johnson administration, which had likewise weighed the virtues of
simplifying the nation’s increasingly complex, chaotic, and duplicative social welfare system but
had opted against doing so. But the Nixon administration soon found that FAP engendered fierce
opposition from both the political left and right, whose opposition ultimately doomed it to failure.
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Instead, the Nixon administration was able to salvage the Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program from the wreckage of FAP. Like FAP, the SSI program proposed a new level of
guaranteed annual income, albeit limited solely to selected categories of recipients, the most
prominent of whom were elderly people. Unlike FAP, though, the SSI program secured easy
passage in Congress. Taken together with other major improvements to the existing Social Security
system that significantly raised benefits, the triumph of the SSI program signaled an unlikely
culmination of efforts by liberal reformers and old-age advocacy groups during the course of the
previous decade to broaden and deepen the level of federal commitment to the welfare of the
nation’s elderly population. 4
Moreover, despite the Nixon administration’s demonstrated hostility towards the OEO and
traditional welfare programs, it acquiesced to three significant amendments to the Older Americans
Act between 1969 and 1974, which broadened the original legislation enacted in 1965 and steered
significant new sums of federal funds into the programs supported by the now amended law. 5 The
successful enactment of these amendments put into place the last major piece of the postwar senior
state, with the federal government and the states acting in concert to financially support and sustain
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community and social service programs and initiatives that were frequently anti-poverty programs
with a respectable veneer on them, so as to avoid incurring the wrath of old-age advocacy groups
(and senior citizens themselves) that did not want to be stigmatized as welfare recipients. 6 As
Lyndon Johnson remarked in a February 1968 ceremony inaugurating a new program of community
service programs for older Americans:
In March, more than 17 million older citizens will receive a Social
Security increase of some 13 percent. When the benefit checks go out,
another 1 million Americans will be lifted above the poverty line--a
goal that we are working toward. Medicare--that for many, many
years was not seriously considered and after it was considered and
passed, many said would not work at all--is now flourishing…But
beyond all of this, we all have another goal. That goal is to guarantee
to every older American not only security, but the pride of being able
to be active and being able to be productive. 7
The three core components of the senior state – economic security, health security, and, finally,
social and community service provisions – had come together by 1975 into a formidable juggernaut,
one which, aside from defense spending, accounted for an increasingly prominent part of the federal
government’s overall expenditures, and one that dwarfed other, much more high profile and
increasingly controversial social assistance programs such as the AFDC (Aid to Families with
Dependent Children).
In sum, while the overall War on Poverty declared in 1964 by Lyndon Johnson and headed
by Sargent Shriver and the OEO may have produced mixed results, the more subdued war on
elderly poverty waged by lower level officials within the Johnson and Nixon administrations, as
well as by select members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, proved to be far more
successful at institutionalizing mechanisms for the alleviation of poverty for many of the nation’s
6
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elderly. Nevertheless, this result did not appear likely in 1965-6, when the Johnson administration’s
actions seemed to be lagging at best, and the overall direction of the War on Poverty seemed to have
more critics than supporters. 8
The Johnson Administration, Older Americans, and the War on Poverty
At a meeting in early September 1966 to discuss the administration’s agenda for older
Americans, a host of senior administration officials, including Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz,
HEW Secretary John Gardner, OEO head Sargent Shriver, as well as senior Johnson aides Douglass
Cater and Joseph Califano, examined the options before them. 9 After concluding that federal health
programs for the aged like Medicare were adequate, the assembled officials then proceeded to look
at the Older Americans Act to see how it could be better utilized. A quick review of the legislation
revealed that while it “provide[d] a statutory base for the development and initiation of programs
aimed at offering an opportunity for a more meaningful life to the elderly,” no “clearly defined
programs” had been developed. 10
Instead, “insufficient appropriations, lack of imagination, and internal differences” had led to
federal inaction. The assembled group agreed that “consideration should be given” to new
approaches to “improve the life of the elderly,” that included removal of “restrictions on continued
employment of the aged,” reducing the “negative impact of social security and private retirement
plans on the disposition to work,” and utilizing the elderly “in community service projects” such as
the Foster Grandparents program, beautification, and “services for the elderly by the elderly.” 11
Moving quickly to begin the process of translating these proposals into policy, Califano sent a
confidential memo in late September 1966 to HEW Secretary John Gardner, the recently appointed
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chairman of the administration’s Task Force on Older Americans, to urge him to pursue an
ambitious, four part agenda that included “ways to expand employment opportunities for the
aged…ways to improve the life of the elderly…ways to improve housing for the elderly…[and to]
examine present division of responsibilities among Federal agencies for programs for the aged,” and
to return his findings within a month’s time. 12
The sudden seriousness of the administration in its approach to elderly poverty could be seen
in the lineup of the Task Force’s members. Unlike some other administration task forces, the Task
Force on Older Americans featured a broad representation of federal departments; Califano
explicitly requested that Gardner choose “the finest possible talent on this Task Force,” given the
administration’s “deep concern for the problems facing older persons in our society.” 13 Working
quickly to respond to Califano’s command, Gardner and the rest of his task force pored over
existing administration achievements and actions as well as unrealized ideas, plans, and proposals
which had languished for some time. In its subsequent recommendations to Califano, the task force
urged as one of its top priorities that the administration consider “[f]ederal aid…to communities for
the employment of older people in public service activities on a part-time basis with public and
private nonprofit organizations.” 14 That proposal immediately led to an interagency turf war
between HEW and the Department of Labor, both of which wanted administrative control over the
proposed program. Refereeing in the conflict between HEW and Labor, Phillip S. Hughes, the
Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, argued that the program be placed within HEW, but
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that it be limited to a “demonstration project” rather than made into a full-scale “new categorical
program of HEW.” 15
The task force’s other proposals similarly ran into bureaucratic domain conflicts elsewhere.
As a contemporaneous internal administration report noted, the Task Force’s proposals would
[p]rovide for administrative and/or legislative modification of existing
people-oriented programs in order to achieve a better accommodation
of services and facilities to the needs of the elderly. However, the
unavoidable proliferation of responsibility for such programs among
several Federal agencies requires extraordinary measures to assure
adequate coordination and the adaptation of all programs to the
changing needs of all population groups. 16
In late November 1966, a few weeks after a midterm election that had been disastrous for the
administration and its liberal congressional allies, officials within the Johnson administration began
to pivot on the federal government’s approach to old-age policy and to try and carry out the task
force’s recommendations. Prior to this moment, the administration’s efforts to enhance federal
programs and initiatives on behalf of impoverished older Americans had largely been centered on
Medicare (i.e., its enactment and subsequent efforts to ensure adequate access to health care for
senior citizens). As the testimony of multiple private welfare agency leaders and experts during
congressional hearings in 1965 had made clear, though, the Office of Economic Opportunity had not
placed much emphasis on efforts to combat elderly poverty, an outcome which reflected the
strategic decision made by OEO head Sargent Shriver and his staff that youth unemployment –
especially in America’s cities – was a far more pressing issue and better use of the federal
government’s funds. 17
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Even before the electoral shellacking which the Democratic Party suffered in 1966,
President Johnson had made clear his intent to seek significant increases in Social Security. 18 In the
aftermath of political backlash, this objective took on higher priority as the administration began to
refocus on less controversial policy items that could attract bipartisan support on Capitol Hill.
Writing to senior aide Joseph Califano in late November 1966, HEW official Wilbur Cohen sent a
memo detailing a proposed “Older Americans Opportunity Program of 1967,” that compiled many
of the recommendations made by the Task Force on Older Americans chaired by HEW Secretary
John Gardner a few months beforehand. 19
The recommendations, broadly speaking, called upon the federal government to eliminate
age discrimination in employment, expand employment and community service opportunities for
older people, and to augment the Older Americans Act with additional funding sufficiently adequate
to fund the Act’s already authorized community service, training, and planning grant programs. 20 In
addition to the already extant high priorities of securing an “adequate income and medical care” for
older Americans, the task force explicitly recommended that there be “a broad objective of national
policy for older Americans,” which would ensure that every older person have “available means
which provide opportunities for useful work in the economy…access to community services and
facilities…[and] a broader choice of housing and living arrangements.” 21 Ultimately, the task force
argued that there was “a critical need for public policy to create more positive economic and social
roles for older people in our Nation.” 22
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In order to make this new public policy real, the task force urged the Johnson administration
to undertake nine major expansions of existing federal programs or legislation, including the
Economic Opportunity Act (“to increase the numbers of middle aged and elderly poor who are
either served by or employed in the varied programs under the Act”), the Manpower, Development
and Training Act, and the Older Americans Act.

23

The total projected cost of these

recommendations stood at $97 million, and notably did not include any recommendations to
increase Social Security benefits or to build more features into the recently implemented Medicare
program. Rather, the recommendations collected the disparate elements from existing administration
initiatives and attempted to repackage them as a more coherent program, which it labeled as “The
Older Americans Opportunity Program of 1967.”
The Older Americans Opportunity Program represented an attempt to expand the normal
ambit of the federal government’s activities on behalf of older Americans. As an earlier internal
administration report on the Task Force on Older Americans had noted, there was a “need for public
policy that will create opportunity to the elderly for more positive economic and social
roles…generally, these proposals provide for administrative and/or legislative modification of
existing people-oriented programs in order to achieve a better accommodation of services and
facilities to the needs of the elderly.” 24 However, the report cautioned that “the unavoidable
proliferation of responsibility for such problems among several Federal agencies requires
extraordinary measures to assure adequate coordination and the adaptation of all programs to the
changing needs of all population groups” and therefore recommended a “revitalization of the
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President’s Council on Aging and a strong staff input by HEW’s Administration on Aging…[to]
serve this purpose for the aged clientele.” 25
Besides pointing out the need for “adequate coordination” and a more dedicated agency or
group within the Executive Branch to advocate for programs for older Americans, the report also
highlighted other problems with the task force’s recommendations, starting with the “general
absence of a precise, age-related definition of the target group – Older Americans…this absence is
most crucial within the context of ‘employment opportunities.’” 26 Proposed federal efforts to
combat age discrimination received particular censure: “the alleged costs stemming from
institutional requirements… [and] employer reluctance to comply could render the enforcement
aspects of this proposal infeasible.” 27 Other efforts like the proposed older workers employment
referral services were derided as “unnecessary” or “inadvisable.” 28 Not all of the proposed measures
received such condemnation, though. The proposed expansion of rent supplement programs and
nutritional services for older people were rated as “essential,” a recommendation which would help
lay the groundwork for their survival and incorporation into the federal government’s apparatus.
Despite the mounting criticism on both the political left and right of the administration for its
handling of the Vietnam War and of domestic unrest in many of America’s cities, President
Johnson’s aides pressed forward with the administration’s agenda for older Americans. The midterm congressional elections of 1966 had robbed the President of the progressive working majority
which he had been able to use to get Medicare, the Voting Rights Act, and other long-delayed
legislation through the usual congressional gauntlet of committee hearings, votes, and backroom
wheeling and dealing. Starting in January 1967, a newly re-energized and considerably less
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progressive congressional majority would take their seats in the House and Senate chambers and
wield the gavels once more, and not a few of those gavels were bound to be aimed like battering
rams at the Great Society.
Against these worsened odds for legislative success, though, the Johnson administration
advanced an aggressive policy agenda on behalf of the elderly. In late January 1967, Johnson sent a
comprehensive message to Congress outlining an ambitious agenda of new initiatives for the federal
government to undertake in the coming Congressional session. 29 Unlike President Kennedy’s
similarly lengthy message in 1963 which had emphasized the need to enact Medicare, Johnson’s
1967 message focused primarily on the need to secure an adequate level of income support for older
Americans. 30 Johnson’s message met with wide support in the press, with even Life magazine going
out of its way to praise the President, noting that “Lyndon Johnson is at his best when he is talking
about ways to help people out of misery…his message on older Americans sent to the Congress last
week was moving, and in a year when he will have to curtail many dreams…there was a convincing
simplicity in the language of his statement.” 31
Included in the many goals laid out in the message were concrete proposals to dramatically
increase Social Security benefits by twenty percent, raise minimum public assistance standards
across the fifty states, significantly overhaul the federal tax code in order to lower the effective tax
rate on millions of senior citizens, and finally “a proposal to prohibit discrimination in employment
because of age.” 32 Speaking to the press at a briefing about the message, HEW Secretary John
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Gardner emphasized the scope of the recommendations made in the President’s message, noting that
“this breadth and variety reflects very strongly our conviction that the problems of older Americans
are extremely complex and will have to be tackled from a lot of different angles.” 33
Within a week of dispatching the message on older Americans, the Johnson administration
reached out to its allies in the labor movement – especially the leadership of the AFL-CIO – to
attract the attention and support of union rank-and-file members. Administration officials also
reached out to friendly journalists to try and drum up extended, favorable coverage of the
President’s message. 34 Their efforts were successful. The New York Times praised it, and positively
editorialized that “the elderly do need some kind of intelligent help” from the federal government. 35
Peering deeper into the presidential message, though, revealed that the type of help which the
federal government was now prepared to offer to older people suggested a mixture of new and old
approaches to elderly poverty. On the one hand, the President had called for a significant 20 percent
increase in Social Security benefits levels as well as a major overhaul of the existing public
assistance programs that would “bring the levels of public assistance for all the States at least up to
the minimum levels those States themselves provide should be paid,” an explicit recognition that the
fragmented character of Social Security’s Old-Age Assistance program as well as other existing
federal, state, and local initiatives had either exacerbated or created disparities in publicly supported
income maintenance from state to state. 36
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Moving Away from Great Society Liberalism
On the other hand, the President’s proposals would also for the first time “require the States
to use the Federal provisions to encourage older Americans who are on welfare to become trained
and get jobs, and get off welfare” and would completely overhaul “Federal tax provisions relating to
older Americans” in order to lower the overall amount of taxes paid by most elderly people. These
two proposals – the first, a requirement that individual states shift older people off of welfare rolls
and back into the workforce, and the second, a substantial reduction in taxes collected rather than
funds expended on behalf of older people – represented the contours of a new federal approach to
resolving economic insecurity in old age, and one which would pick up greater steam in the future.
The proposed tax cut for senior citizens only suggested just how far the administration how
come in its embrace of what Michael Harrington had derisively labelled “reactionary
Keynesianism.” 37 Three years earlier, the Johnson administration had pressed a large reduction in
tax rates through Congress despite strong objections at the time, and had presented them as
necessary to stimulate economic growth. Now, the administration recommended targeted tax cuts as
a faster and more expedient way to assist older Americans than the frustratingly slow pace of the
OEO. Evidence of the administration’s displeasure with OEO’s efforts came during the press
briefing announcing the tax cuts when senior Johnson administration officials publicly directed “the
appropriate people in the government, most notably the Director of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, to encourage older Americans…to join in the variety of programs available to provide
services to our fellowman.” 38
The second proposal, to get older Americans “off welfare,” also struck a different public
tone than the administration had ever previously expressed. While HEW Under Secretary Wilbur
37
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Cohen emphasized that “this package that the President is recommending is the most historical since
the original law [referring to the 1935 enactment of the Social Security Act]…It is not only the
largest in dollars, but I also want to point out that it is the most significant because it has the effect
of taking 1.4 million people out of poverty. It is the largest single anti-poverty program that has yet
been developed”, it was difficult not to interpret his statement as an implicit rebuke of both Sargent
Shriver and the OEO. 39 By raising Social Security benefit levels, Cohen emphasized that the
Johnson administration’s overarching goal was to “eliminate overnight 200,000 aged people from
welfare rolls. They will be transferred, in other words. They will drop their welfare and they will
pick up their Social Security,” a move which, Cohen argued, would result in substantial savings for
the States providing old age assistance payments.
While Johnson administration officials were unwilling to expressly admit it, the proposals
unveiled in January 1967 signified just how inadequate the administration’s efforts to combat
elderly poverty had been. While the enactment of Medicare in 1965 had represented a tremendous
step forward, it had become clear that subsidizing the medical and hospitalization bills of people
over the age of 65 was insufficient to deal with the other economic issues faced by older people,
such as increasingly unaffordable housing, limited access to gainful employment, or social
integration into the urban and rural communities in which so many of them lived.
Recognizing that OEO’s efforts to deal with these other problems had, at best, been limited,
the Johnson administration decided in January 1967 to focus on broad gauge improvements. OEO’s
Foster Grandparents program might only reach a few thousand elderly people, but improvements to
Social Security would reach many more. The still-debated senior volunteer corps might reach a few
thousand more, but tax cuts would reach millions, and would do so without getting caught in the
bureaucratic tripwires which had ensnared and ultimately strangled dozens of other proposals to
39
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alleviate the economic and social problems of older people. By embracing these fiscal tools,
moreover, the Johnson administration was also rejecting the experimental initiatives which the OEO
had embraced to deal with elderly poverty. Notably, the administration did not announce
significantly increased funding or new programs to supplement OEO’s already existing slate;
instead, it retreated back to methods which were mostly tried and true: expansion of Social Security
and targeted tax cuts.
Senior administration officials like Douglass Cater began to take a more in-depth interest in
the administration’s efforts to combat elderly poverty. In particular, they began to more critically
examine the role that the OEO played in fighting elderly poverty. While the administration could
boast substantial achievements, such as the enactment of Medicare and the expansion of Social
Security in 1961 and again in 1965, its other legislative accomplishments were considerably more
modest. The promise of the Older Americans Act remained largely unfulfilled. Efforts via the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to create rent supplement programs that
would allow senior citizens to continue to rent good housing showed encouraging signs of success,
but overall the administration’s efforts to combat elderly poverty had remained fragmented and
tenuously connected to the OEO and the War on Poverty. 40
Eager to change this state of affairs, Cater began the process of reaching out to private
voluntary organizations to help the administration advance a more comprehensive domestic policy
agenda on behalf of older Americans. 41 Rushing to take advantage of this new openness on the part
of the Johnson administration, the National Council of Senior Citizens (NCSC) advocated once
more for the creation of a senior volunteers corps, a proposal that the Department of Labor as well
40
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as HEW had been fighting over since the fall of 1966. 42 As proposed by the NCSC, the senior
volunteer corps would consist of a “comprehensive volunteer program to identify individual needs
among the older poor.” 43 In order to accomplish this goal, the NCSC proposed creating “part-time
employment for the elderly poor and volunteer community where a large potential of recruits exists
through the membership of the well-established, affiliated clubs of the National Council of Senior
Citizens.” 44 Essentially, the program aimed to provide employment to a small number of senior
citizens (approximately 2,000) to “locate and identify the needs of 2,000,000 elderly poor,” an
ambitious goal but one which built on the success of Project Medicare Alert, a surprisingly
successful program hastily assembled by the Johnson administration that had hired several thousand
volunteers to enroll senior citizens in Medicare during the year between its enactment in 1965 and
its formal launch in 1966. 45
Like Project Medicare Alert, the proposed senior volunteer corps would locate and assist
elderly poor people and put them in contact with public welfare agencies so that they could register
and qualify for government assistance. As an additional benefit, the senior corps would also greatly
improve the OEO’s lackluster record combatting elderly poverty; by the NCSC’s reckoning, “in
spite of their disproportionately high numbers among the poor – one in five – the elderly poor
remain the least visible and the least served by OEO...it is the feeling of the National Council of
42
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Senior Citizens…that not enough has been done to meet the needs of the elderly poor.” 46
Positioning itself as the organization best suited to meet these needs, the NCSC emphasized that its
2,000 affiliated clubs “have benefited from the organizations democratically-governed structure
assuring autonomy of older people in harmony with the national interest,” perhaps harkening back
to the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act’s original legislative aim of promoting “maximum feasible
participation” by poor people. 47
Even as the administration continued to debate the merits of the NCSC’s proposed plan,
similar initiatives were being rapidly implemented. In March 1967, in conjunction with the OEO,
the National Council on Aging launched Project FIND, a new program designed to reach “the
friendless, isolated needy and disabled” (per its name). 48 Project FIND employed older men and
women to go “door-to-door and farm-to-farm” to help locate impoverished elderly people and to
educate them about the “kind of health and welfare services…available to them.” 49 Project FIND
was the brainchild of Jack Ossofsky, an OEO official, who expressed his hope that “based on the
experiences of FIND, some community services may be revised and senior centers may be
established to meet the health, educational and recreational need of the elderly.” 50
In essence, by using the elderly to help the elderly, Project FIND aimed to solve two
problems at once. It would provide a limited number of employment opportunities for some older
Americans, and in so doing it would allow local, state, and federal welfare officials to locate
thousands of elderly people who might benefit from the growing number of programs designed to
lift them out of poverty. Project FIND’s reach was limited by both its small size and limited funds –
even the OEO expected that it would at most reach 200,000 people out of an estimated total
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population of 5.3 million elderly people living below the poverty line – but as Mr. Ossofsky’s
statement to the New York Times had hinted, officials in OEO and elsewhere hoped that it would be
an important first step in the right direction.
Meanwhile, the administration, in conjunction with the AFL-CIO, sought to drum up support
for other measures designed to alleviate elderly poverty. AFL-CIO sponsored rallies featured a
filmed talk of President Johnson stressing the need to raise Social Security payments by 20%, “with
a minimum of at least $150 a month for retired couples and $100 for individuals with 25 years of
coverage” that would, by the estimate of the Social Security Administration, lift “1,400,000
citizens” out of poverty within a year’s time. 51 Unlike the few millions of dollars given to OEO for
Project FIND, the administration’s proposals to expand Social Security amounted to roughly $4.1
billion, a figure which Johnson took pains to remind the press was “nearly five times greater than
the major increase in 1950 and almost six times greater than the increase of 1961.” 52
The administration’s renewed interest in elderly poverty may have been stimulated by
mounting evidence that, despite the hopes of Medicare’s architects that that program would provide
a new baseline of economic security for older Americans, the problem of old-age poverty had
proven to be significantly more intractable than it had first appeared to be. In part, the dramatic
contrast between the massive amount of spending for the war in Vietnam and the relatively lower
amount of funds being expended on behalf of the Great Society’s domestic programs had also
unexpectedly propelled the issue of old-age poverty back to the front pages of the nation’s
newspapers. Congressional hearings held in May 1967, for example, had revealed that the rising
costs of prescription drugs had created another widening financial gyre that many senior citizens
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were falling into; it would not be the last time that the Senate would hear about older people having
to choose between “having enough to eat and getting the medicine they need.” 53
While declining to criticize the administration’s spending priorities, HEW Secretary John
Gardner echoed similar sentiments during his testimony before a House subcommittee hearing in
early May 1967. Speaking to the assembled congressmen, Gardner pressed the administration’s case
for a series of amendments to the Older Americans Act to help combat the “many and varied”
problems faced by older people. 54 As Gardner observed, “the problems faced by older people today
are many and varied: low income, poor housing; inadequate access to medical, health, and other
community facilities; and a separation from…the rest of our mobile, work-oriented, youth-centered
society.” 55 In response to these problems, Gardner argued that
[w]e must meet these needs in an interrelated way. Health services
must be buttressed by adequate housing, and adequate housing
assured through income security. And there must be educational,
recreational, and community services that afford substance and
meaning to life for the older person, his neighbors, and his
community. 56
In order to “meet these needs in an interrelated way,” Gardner argued that the proposed Older
Americans Act Amendments of 1967 would greatly assist in this task by providing for an extension
of the grant provisions of the original Older Americans Act of 1965, and by increasing the amount
of authorized funding available to carry out the grant programs which operated under the original
law. Such increases were necessary, Gardner stated, “to continue the constructive action by all
levels of government and voluntary organizations that has taken place during the first nineteen
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months of the program.” 57 As Gardner further explained, the funding provided by the legislation had
made possible a fruitful collaboration between the federal government and local institutions
throughout the country, and had assisted “the States in their responsibilities to meet and stimulate
community action.” 58 In other words, the legislation was supporting successful community action
programs, and enjoyed support and cooperation from the local government officials and private
voluntary organizations that possessed the power to make or break the efficacy of such programs.
Speaking before the NCSC two weeks later, Gardner reiterated the case he had made before
Congress for the expansion of the Older Americans Act. In colorful prose, Gardner explained the
administration’s philosophical approach to the problems of older Americans:
People love to talk about the good old days when every family “took
care of its own” aged members. But an honest account of the good old
days would have to include reference to the number of old folks who,
in the phrase of the times, went “over the hill to the poorhouse.” It
would have to include reference to the large number of old people
who were, in fact, unwilling and unhappy mendicants in their own
family. In the good old days we had the gift of hypocrisy and we
could close our eyes to uncomfortable facts. 59
Condemning these “good old days,” Gardner argued that “if we’re not going to be hypocritical
about these things, then we must admit that we still have much to accomplish…we like to think that
we’ve broken the ancient and universal link between age and poverty, but we haven’t.” 60
It was therefore necessary, Gardner argued, that Social Security and other programs for the
elderly be improved: “Social Security was designed to be our first line of defense against poverty.
That line has become shockingly thin…We all know that in spite of social security, one-half of our
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older people have incomes below or near the poverty line – close to 10 million people.” 61 Imploring
the assembled NCSC members, Gardner plainly stated “we need your involvement and participation
– at the national level and in every community.” 62 Gardner’s words came at an opportune time, and
helped to build the administration’s case for its agenda by reinserting the issue of elderly poverty
back into general circulation. Sign of the growing interest in elderly poverty cropped up in
prominent places: in early June 1967, for example, the New York Times reported that “inflation and
the failure of pensions to keep pace with rising pay are causing such deterioration in the living
standards of retired persons that at least half exist below the poverty line. 63
After receiving signals from Capitol Hill that the administration’s proposed Older
Americans Act Amendments legislation would find minimal opposition, Gardner and the
administration pressed ahead. 64 While not nearly as high-profile as the enactment of Medicare two
years earlier, the amendments signified the success of the administration’s low-key, incremental
approach to using the power of the federal government to address economic insecurity in old age.
Despite the lack of flair, this quiet approach to policy enactment represented “a very major attack on
the problems of poverty in our older group,” in the words of Wilbur Cohen. 65 As Cohen explained
during a 1967 press briefing, “this package that the President is recommending is the most historical
since the original [Social Security] law…it is the most significant because it has the effect of taking
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1.4 million people out of poverty. It is the largest single anti-poverty program that has yet been
developed.” 66
Cohen’s words suggested that administration had not yet given up on the War on Poverty.
Rather, it was belatedly taking the advice of liberal critics such as economist Leon Keyserling that it
was more likely to win both popular backing and congressional approval for social welfare
legislation that built on successful past track records (i.e., Social Security). That the proposed
improvements to Social Security did not challenge either local political autonomy or existing
arrangements of racial power was not overtly stated by Wilbur Cohen or others, but an increasingly
weary Johnson administration was probably eager to shift the focus of the War on Poverty away
from OEO and its controversial community action programs that had attracted intense criticism in
the press and from some local politicians who viewed the agency as an unwelcome interloper.
By mid-July 1967, Cohen could happily report to Johnson that “we are doing very well” and
that “Chairman Mills has been most cooperative” with regards to the administration’s pending
Social Security legislation, which proposed that Social Security benefits be increased by 13% but
also authorized “a much stronger program to encourage assistance recipients to become independent
through work and training.” 67 Cohen noted that “it will be a big and comprehensive bill,” and
assured Johnson that “I am confident that it will be a bill you will be very proud of and want to take
credit for in 1968,” a not so subtle nudge to the president’s still unresolved plans for the 1968
presidential election. 68
As it turned out, Johnson ended up signing legislation that authorized a 20% rise in Social
Security benefits, far higher than the 13% figure that Cohen had cited in his earlier report to the
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President. 69 Additionally, Johnson signed the Older Americans Act Amendments in July 1967, thus
realizing the goal set in motion the previous fall by Joseph Califano. The new amendments
authorized $43 million in new federal spending (approximately $300 million in 2017 dollars) and
funded the creation of hundreds of new research, community, and pilot projects throughout the
nation “to improve the quality of life for their aged [populations].” 70 These community projects
included “the establishment of centers for senior citizens for recreation, education, and counseling
activities,” that built on the long-established success of such centers in combatting elderly loneliness
and forging safe, communal spaces for older people in municipalities like New York City. 71
Alongside efforts to improve employment opportunities for older workers as well as
individuals already in retirement, other proposals circulating within the Johnson administration
envisioned a further bolstering of the Older Americans Act to launch new initiatives in the areas of
leisure, education, and community service for older Americans. These proposals, while modest in
individual funding and size, collectively suggested a new comprehensive federal approach to the
problems of older Americans that did not view them simply as sickly wards of the state. Rather, the
new approach shepherded by Califano, Cohen, and Gardner emphasized the potential productivity
of older Americans as an untapped source of manpower that, if properly utilized, could do a
tremendous amount of good in communities throughout the nation, regardless of race or socioeconomic background.
Not content to rest on their laurels after the successful enactment of the 1967 Older
Americans Act Amendments, administration officials continued to quietly prod the various task
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forces examining the problems of older Americans to devise proposals for short and long term
policy solutions that went beyond Social Security and Medicare. The newest administration Task
Force on Older Americans, for example, was advised that the Johnson’s administration’s primary
concern “is with the opportunities which are available to retired persons during the 10, 15, or 20
years of productive life which they have after retirement…this is becoming increasingly important
as life expectancies increase and retirement ages are lowered.” 72 In particular, the Task Force was
urged to “look at the abilities and disabilities of older persons” as well as the “steps which the
Federal Government should take to increase the opportunities” available for older persons. 73
Besides lobbying the Task Force, Joseph Califano urged HEW Secretary John W. Gardner to
begin preparing “a detailed outline of new initiatives which might be proposed in 1968 for Older
Americans,” and suggested items such as better health care for the elderly, educational programs for
the elderly, improved health and safety standards in public housing projects for the elderly and
finally the growth of the underdeveloped Senior Centers program originally created by enactment of
the Older Americans Act in 1965. 74 Other memoranda dispatched by Califano to Gardner urged the
“development of model systems providing comprehensive social, medical, and rehabilitative
services for the elderly,” preferably using “existing authorities” rather than by creating new ones. 75
The American Community Services Force
Increasingly, key Johnson administration officials began in 1967 through 1968 to coalesce
around a proposed American Community Services Force (ACSF), which, as gerontologist Robert H.
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Binstock, the chairman of the administration’s 1968 Task Force on Older Americans observed, “will
emphasize its service function, not its employment function” in the hope that it would not be
rejected as a kind of degrading dole for older people. 76 Binstock argued that “the ACSF not only
holds more potential for actually helping people, but also is likely to be more politically sounds for
meeting Great Society goals.” 77 In essence, the ACSF was a service program loosely modeled in
part on the Peace Corps and billed as “an innovative program for providing older persons with a
genuine opportunity to make constructive contributions to community and national life while
earning adequate income.” 78 The ambitions which the Task Force attached to the proposed ACSF
were expansive. If all went according to plan, the ACSF would “create a manpower force,
ultimately comparable in scale and priority to our defense forces that can take its place in American
life as a basic resource for meeting the critical personnel shortages facing all major human service
institutions and agencies.” 79
Ultimately, the proposed ACSF would be a “nationwide confederation of community
programs,” suggesting the Johnson administration’s continuing commitment to a locally based
efforts to mitigate elderly poverty, albeit in a way that echoed but did not directly use the now
controversial “community action program” model employed by the Office of Economic
Opportunity. 80 If the goal of achieving a “major improvement in the effectiveness and operations of
social service provision” was to be met, the ACSF would have to consist of “a new, locallyincorporate nonprofit organization which would function as a major resource in its community for
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providing human services,” with those services to be provided by trained and compensated staff. 81
In addition, the “national ACSF would have special mechanisms to ensure participation and
protection for disadvantaged groups in each community,” with “long-run funding [to] come mostly
from coordination of resources already available through existing federal grant programs.” 82
Examined as a whole, the proposed ACSF effectively promised to accomplish two
objectives: first, it would distance the Johnson administration’s efforts to combat elderly poverty at
the local, community-level away from the OEO’s now racially-tinged community action program.
Secondly, it would indirectly create new employment opportunities for older, unemployed workers
with otherwise limited options. It did not propose to create jobs via direct hiring by the federal
government; rather, by using the middleman of “community programs” funded by “existing federal
grant programs,” it would camouflage such efforts, so as to steer carefully around arousing concerns
that the ACSF was little more than a dole or unwarranted charity for old people with limited
capacity to be productive workers. In order to avoid doing so, the ACSF “would give many persons
who are at the height of their productivity and maturity a dignified opportunity to work side-by-side
with Americans of all ages and backgrounds, in contributing high-quality, widely-respected, and
critically-needed public services.” 83 What exactly this meant remained undisclosed; it was far more
important that the program present “dignified opportunities” if it was to be politically viable as
public backlash to the War on Poverty continued to mount throughout 1967 and 1968.
While the ACSF’s backers had high aspirations for the proposed program, it actually
represented a truncated version of a public employment proposal that had been circulating within
the administration for nearly two years. In late October 1966, administration officials had debated
whether or not to push for a more aggressive public program designed to provide employment for
81
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older workers between the ages of 45 and 64. 84 This unnamed and unrealized program would have
offered full-time employment for
[a]ll men and women who are heads of households, who have been
unemployed for long periods (a half year or more) or who are in the
lowest income farm groups, and who are not enrolled in MDTA
[Manpower and Development Training Act of 1962] or other remedial
programs would be offered employment in constructive public
projects operated by local, state, or federal agencies. 85
The estimated cost for the proposed mass public employment of these older workers was
substantial, with a range of $225 to $700 million annually (1966 dollars), depending on the wage
rate and the number of people re-employed. Depending on the final cost, the program would have
potentially represented between four to ten percent of the entire federal budget; for the sake of
comparison, the U.S. spent approximately $747 million on defense expenditures during the 19661967 fiscal year. 86
Despite the high price tag associated with such a program, there remained a case to be made
for it: “the principal immediate victims of advancing technology and the shifting occupational
pattern are the unemployed whose ages range from 45 to 64…they have the least education, the
fewest skills of a transferrable nature, and they often reside in the regions of least economic
development potential…for many, a decade or two remain before hope of ‘retirement’ on Social
Security.” 87 Continuing in the same vein, “the government now has an impressive number of
economic development, anti-poverty, and manpower development programs, some of which include
direct public employment of youth and adults,” but “older workers are not benefitting at rates

84

“Organization and Interagency Coordination of Programs and Advisory Committees for the Aging and Related
Program Areas,” October 20, 1966 in Box 61, Office Files of Joseph A. Califano, LBJL.
85
Ibid.
86
World Military Expenditures 1966-7, World Military Expenditures and Related Data: Calendar Year 1966 and
Summary Trends 1962-1967, Table I: Military Expenditures and Related Data by Country, 1966, pg. 9. Research Report
68-52, December 1968, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1968.
87
Ibid.

353

anywhere near their proportionate share of need.” 88 If implemented as proposed, the program would
open up new employment opportunities for both rural and urban workers, and would build on the
limited success achieved by earlier initiatives to retrain workers which had been carried out under
the provisions of the Public Works Acceleration Act signed by President Kennedy in 1962. 89
At the same time, the fact that these programs were so disparate and fragmented across
numerous agencies in the federal government made it much more difficult for them not to get lost in
the mix. In 1965, the original Older Americans Act had authorized the creation of an Administration
on Aging (AoA) for precisely this purpose of supervising the federal government’s initiatives, but
most of the existing Executive Branch departments and agencies seemed far more committed to
advancing their own programs rather than to surrendering valuable policy turf or limited funds to
the AoA. 90
There had been a similar pattern of resistance to the creation of the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO), that some administration officials had questioned the need for, but unlike the
AoA, the OEO enjoyed the direct support of President Johnson as well as a high-profile, wellconnected leader in Sargent Shriver, the former director of the Peace Corps. AoA, on the other hand,
was led by William Bechill, a well-meaning social worker and public servant who was largely
unknown outside of select governmental circles in California, where he had formerly been
employed in that state’s large public welfare apparatus. 91 In addition to being an outsider to national
politics, Bechill did not enjoy the strong support of organized labor, which had pushed instead for
Charles Odell or James O’Brien, both of whom had strong links to the AFL-CIO’s leadership.
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Unlike the attention he gave to the OEO, Johnson appears to have barely paid any attention to the
AoA; likewise, most of his senior aides frequently seemed to be indifferent or passively hostile to
the AoA’s very existence.
Such bureaucratic indifference helped ensure that the AoA’s efforts to impose some sort of
order or coherence to the federal government’s approach to aging policy would be a thankless task
for all those involved. The mid-level staff in the well-established Departments of Labor and Health,
Education, and Welfare – the two departments whose turf was most threatened by the existence of
the AoA – largely sidelined the AoA in favor of pursuing their own agency plans. No attempt to
correct this willful construction of administrative silos was made for the first two years of the AoA’s
existence. The death of Senator Patrick V. McNamara, the main senatorial sponsor of the Older
Americans Act, in April 1966 accelerated the AoA’s plunge into irrelevancy. Without any powerful
voice to speak on its behalf, the conversation about old-age poverty and economic insecurity in the
Johnson administration remained firmly welded to fickle swings of senior-level administrative favor
or disfavor.
It was not until after the successful implementation of Medicare in 1966 that the Johnson
administration turned its attention more fully to investigating how the Older Americans Act could
be used in a more effective manner to address elderly poverty. Johnson administration officials,
many of whom were eager to seize an opportunity to demonstrate the Great Society’s commitment
to older Americans, began to swiftly integrate the AoA into domestic policy initiatives which the
administration was already pursuing. In short order, its staff members soon found themselves posted
to various Johnson administration task forces on older Americans, nursing home reform, income
maintenance, among others. 92 In particular, William Bechill, the AoA’s commissioner, was placed
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on nearly every administration task force that could conceivably recommend policy proposals for
older Americans, which left him little time to actually administer the AoA and help steer it among
the rocky shoals of the federal bureaucracy. 93
While the Johnson administration at times seemed to equate the proliferation of presidential
task forces with concrete policy achievements, by 1967 the administration decided to begin utilizing
the AoA more fully. As a 1967 confidential executive memo outlined, the Johnson administration
planned to increase the AoA’s staffing by a third, and to nearly triple its dedicated budgetary
appropriations by 1970.
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Such a prediction, of course, assumed that either the Johnson

administration (or some other similarly-inclined administration) would still be in power by 1970 to
ensure that the AoA’s funding and staff were increased, but it is still indicative of the way in which,
by 1967, the Johnson administration had come to embrace an agency which had largely been foisted
upon it by Congress. Moreover, the executive memo suggested why the AoA was now being
embraced: namely, the ability to use it to allocate state grants for “community planning, services,
and training,” activities which might have been performed by the OEO, had that agency not already
under heavy fire and in growing disrepute among elected officials and the general public. However
belatedly, the Johnson administration was coming to endorse a method for providing assistance
which it had tried to avoid when it had launched the War on Poverty three years earlier in 1964.
Indeed, even as other administration anti-poverty initiatives faltered, the Johnson
administration’s plans for new programs and initiatives on behalf of older Americans showed no
signs of slowing down. By September 1967, the administration had identified a list of policy
priorities for older Americans that it would pursue during the upcoming congressional session. The
administration opted to push for the expansion of “comprehensive social-medical-rehabilitative
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facilities and services for the aged” as well as a nonspecific “expansion of grant programs under the
Older Americans Act” as its highest priorities. 95 The previously much debated Older Americans
Community Service program occupied the lowest place on the list of the administration’s priority
proposals, buried beneath increased federal funds for “university based institutes of gerontology”
and “elimination of environmental and architectural barriers to the handicapped and elderly.” 96
The administration’s priorities reflected a continuing shift towards local-level programs and
demonstration projects rather than a grand, unified vision of national programs. The proposed
“comprehensive social-medical-rehabilitative facilities and services for the aged,” for example,
sought to establish model systems of comprehensive community, social, medical, and rehabilitative
services for the elderly by “coordinating existing community facilities and services, adding limited
construction and modest program development where necessary.” 97 The administration hoped that
these model systems would offer a workable solution to the “inadequate” number of facilities and
services for the aged and chronically ill throughout the country, a situation which it termed “an
urgent necessity.” 98
By funding the construction of experimental newly enhanced facilities which incorporated
“innovative approaches to both design of facilities and development of programs,” the Johnson
administration then hoped to successfully promote these models as “capable of extension to other
communities.” 99 At its heart, this proposal emphasized local government and community efforts at
the forefront, with the federal government playing a background role as a facilitator to coordinate
existing community facilities and services without subsuming those roles. Ultimately, the Johnson
administration hoped that this system of federal-local cooperation and coordination to improve
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services could be extended nationwide, and would “enable all older Americans to have access to
facilities and services which will sustain independent living.” 100
Shifting Gears
This new direction in federal policy suggested that the Johnson administration had, for the
most part, decided to channel its efforts into low-profile, local-level efforts rather than high-stakes
and controversial national legislation like Medicare. By quietly funding grant programs under the
Older Americans Act and other related pieces of legislation, the Johnson administration aimed to
give the federal government the means to support the growth of a social service infrastructure in
communities throughout the country, and to thereby build on the existing framework of state and
local welfare agencies. In the case of programs funded under the provisions of the Older Americans
Act, the federal government would fund up to 75% of a project’s cost on a continuing basis; as an
internal administration report noted, “continuing support is necessary since the communities do not
have sufficient financial resources to maintain these services without assistance” and would help
achieve “the goal of readily available services for older people at the community level.” 101
At a November 1967 meeting, top Cabinet officials pondered new programs for older
Americans. 102 The meeting had its origins in a highly confidential “eyes only” memorandum that
Joseph Califano had sent to HEW Secretary John Gardner three months earlier in August 1967, in
which Califano subtly suggested to Gardner that
It would be helpful if you would submit…a detailed outline of new
initiatives which might be proposed in 1968 for Older Americans.
Consideration should be given to items such as better health care for
the elderly…educational programs for the elderly…health and safety
standard in public housing projects for the elderly and in housing
occupied by public assistance recipients…expansion of the Senior
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Centers program. Furthermore, you are encouraged to add any other
proposal which you feel is worthy of consideration. 103
In response, Gardner submitted a list of fifteen proposals, with the highest priority placed on
“comprehensive social-medical-rehabilitative facilities and services for the aged,” which an internal
report summarized as a “specialized CAP [Community Action Program]-type agency similar to that
proposed under juvenile delinquency bill” on a pilot basis with modest funding from the federal
government to see if there was sufficient support to sustain it.

104

Additionally, Gardner

recommended that funding be made available to provide better training to nursing home
administrators and overall increased support to the Older Americans Act’s grant-making
program. 105
While none of these recommendations had the broad, dramatic sweep of Medicare or Social
Security, the administration’s determination to try and rework the community action program
suggested that it was searching for a way to relaunch and reframe the War on Poverty, and to do so
in a way that would elicit public support rather than derision and condemnation. As HEW’s senior
leadership was well-aware, the nation’s facilities and services for the aged and chronically ill were
“inadequate in number and distribution throughout the country, inadequately staffed where they
exist, and poorly coordinated.” 106 To remedy this situation, the administration therefore proposed
the establishment “at the local level [of] a coordinating agency which can receive and disburse
private and public funds from local and State governments and also act as a conduit for Federal
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funds.” 107 The establishment of this new, local-level coordinating agency would “tie together
existing community facilities and services, and add necessary elements where lacking.” 108
In other words, the administration seemed to have finally recognized that it would have to
work with state and local officials if it wanted its reboot of the War on Poverty’s Community Action
Program to succeed, but the modest amounts of funding (approximately $10 million in 1969 dollars)
and support (a 3-5 year initially funded lifespan for the agency) allocated to this new initiative
suggested that the administration had accepted more limited achievements instead of the broad
abolition of poverty it had sought nearly four years earlier when Johnson had declared an
“unconditional war against poverty.” 109
At the same time, while the administration may have backed off of its embrace of the War
on Poverty in order to more fully pursue the Vietnam War, its more limited domestic policy
ambitions still contained hints of its former and broader ambitions. John Gardner’s 1967 proposal to
remake the nation’s facilities and services for senior citizens explicitly aspired to “enable all older
Americans to have access to facilities and services which will sustain independent living; assure that
each elderly person receives the right care, at the right place, at the right time; provide better and
more appropriate social, medical, and rehabilitative facilities and services for the elderly; and reduce
the cost of services to the elderly and the community by the use of appropriate alternatives to
institutional care.” 110 As Gardner and other Johnson administration officials recognized, “many
agencies public and private, business and labor, will need to be involved to make the program
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work,” but that it was a program which only the federal government with its broad national reach
could tackle with at least a modicum of hope for success. 111
Moreover, such an expansion of federal activity on behalf of older Americans at the local
level would also finally give a semblance of purpose to the AoA, which had occupied a kind of
legislative limbo somewhere in between what its congressional sponsors had intended for it and the
chaotic mess which the Johnson administration had left it in. 112 The breadth of programs and
agencies involved was formidable, and the administration’s determination to convert the Older
Americans Act via legislative amendments into a much more significant piece of legislation than it
had been when it was enacted in 1965 was increasingly obvious. 113
By mid-December 1967, the Johnson administration had assembled its list of legislative and
budgetary items that it would use to advance its agenda on behalf of older Americans in 1968.
Gardner’s original list of fifteen items had been narrowed down to five, but still retained key
proposals to “expand demonstration program especially for nutrition (no means test), transportation
services, and rehabilitation centers,” with the stipulation that “most of these items should be directed
toward low income and minority-group elderly.” At the same time, the administration’s more
cautious instincts were also vividly on display. The same memo identifying the administration’s top
111
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five policy priorities for older Americans also cautioned that while the proposals “give expression to
a Federal-State partnership role which focuses attention on the problems of the elderly,” it was
understood that such expression was made “without committing us, at this time, to a permanent
large-scale categorical program of services.” 114
In essence, the administration had decided to take a more experimental approach to the
problem of old-age poverty by supporting existing state and local level programs as well as a few
demonstration projects, the latter of which it hoped would renew interest in using the federal
government’s tools and resources to ameliorate poverty. 115 Behind closed doors, administration
officials hoped that this limited policy agenda would permit “a general introduction of the idea
during 1968, for the purpose of orienting that nation to a vision of the future, in which American life
is characterized by a full scale mobilization of human resources for service to one’s fellow man,” a
sentiment that remained largely confined to the private memoranda circulated internally among
Johnson aides. 116
That such sentiments were largely not acted upon reflected both on the limited ambit for
movement that the administration now possessed, but it also suggested mounting difficulties within
the administration itself over how best to proceed. The Bureau of the Budget, in particular, was
increasingly pugnacious in its confrontations with HEW and other departments over how to
alleviate poverty among older Americans. In a confidential memo to James Gaither, a Special
Assistant to President Johnson, Irving Lewis of the Bureau of the Budget bluntly stated that
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[w]e recommend against most of the specific HEW legislative
proposals for 1968. In essence, they would add up to an
Administration commitment to a permanent categorical program of
services for the elderly. Such a program is not needed and could be a
budgetary nightmare. The Administration should be stimulating and
promoting the development and expansion of programs by public and
private agencies – providing “glue” money through HEW – not
proliferating new grant programs…We recommend instead a more
tightly targeted program with two objectives.” 117
Lewis argued that the Administration would be most likely to succeed if it “strengthen[ed] the
ability of State agencies on aging” with enhanced funding that would permit them to “survey and
plan comprehensively and continuously for the needs of the elderly, utilizing ‘glue’ money from
HEW to plug gaps in existing efforts and demonstrate new approaches” and to “give programs for
older Americans an opportunity to become better established in local communities” by extending
the lifespan of subsidizing grants made to such programs under the provisions of the Older
Americans Act. 118
In other words, the Bureau was recommending that the administration permanently back
away from the more aggressive proposals made by Gardner and others to expand the direct role of
the federal government in addressing the needs of the elderly poor. Instead, the Bureau was urging
that the federal government buttress its indirect role by supporting existing state, local, and private
agencies concerned with the problems of the elderly poor. In the Bureau’s view, such an approach
would allow the federal government to avoid duplicating and possibly rendering redundant the
efforts of state, local, and private agencies, and would also leave the federal government with a freer
hand to decrease or withdraw from this policy area as needed.
Ultimately, the infighting between the Bureau, HEW, and the Department of Labor over the
administration’s priorities delayed the kind of broad, sweeping action that John Gardner and Joseph
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Califano had hoped for. One by one, HEW’s recommendations – whether they were for a
comprehensive senior community service program, comprehensive work centers for older people, or
sponsoring the construction of multi-purpose senior centers – met with the same unforgiving
response by the Bureau: “we oppose.” 119 The Bureau could not be dislodged from its insistent and
oft-repeated position that the broad initiatives proposed by other executive branch agencies would
commit the administration to “another permanent categorical grant program of vague and unformed
purpose and content,” which the Bureau feared would not pass muster in an increasingly skeptical
Congress. 120
Despite the Bureau’s opposition, Wilbur Cohen, who had replaced John Gardner as
Secretary of HEW in early 1968, was determined to press forward with his list of proposed actions
that the administration could take. In order to do so, Cohen turned to the recommendations made by
the administration’s Task Force on Older Americans. 121 As originally proposed, the main objective
of the Task Force was, in Joseph Califano’s words, to “take a look at ‘second career’ opportunities
for retired persons during the 10, 15, or 20 years of productive life after retirement.” 122
Consequently, the Task Force’s main recommendations emphasized expanding employment
opportunities to retired persons as well as stronger action to address the income needs of older
Americans. 123 Specifically, the Task Force recommended that the Johnson administration press for a
“federal retirement supplement to guarantee a minimum annual income” as well as stronger
regulation of private pensions and “expanded training programs for older workers.” 124
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In early October 1968, after exchanging correspondence with Califano, Cohen had readied
his list of new initiatives to assist older Americans. 125 As Cohen wrote in one of his memos to
Califano, the main priorities were to strengthen Social Security and Medicare. “The most farreaching and significant proposals are those made with respect to improvement of the Social
Security cash benefit program and Medicare,” Cohen wrote, though he also added that “one of our
national goals for older people should be the building of a national network of opportunities and
services to enhance their participation in community life.” 126 In order to build this network, Cohen
argued that the administration continue availing itself of the recently strengthened Older Americans
Act.
Continuing in that vein, Cohen proposed a “Bill of Rights for Older Americans” that offered
up a grand vision of the federal government using its vast resources to nearly singlehandedly resolve
the problems facing older Americans, ranging from providing adequate retirement income and
extending Medicare to cover the cost of prescription drugs to improving housing programs and
employment opportunities for older Americans. Many of these proposals had been debated within
the various parts of the Johnson administration for years. Cohen’s proposal therefore represented the
latest attempt to tie them together as a comprehensive plan. Strikingly, the assembled items were
projected to cost the federal government at best a marginal amount of money, with some prominent
exceptions such as raising Social Security benefits and expanding Medicare’s range. The costs for
those two items, though, were considerable. Expanding Medicare to include prescription drugs
would cost the federal government an additional $300 million per year (1968 dollars), and raising

125
126

Wilbur J. Cohen to Joseph Califano, October 5, 1968, in Box 39, Office Files of Joseph A. Califano, LBJL.
Ibid.

365

Social Security’s benefits level would require raising payroll taxes or taking money from elsewhere
in the federal government, neither of which were particularly attractive options. 127
Aside from Social Security and Medicare, though, Cohen pressed for a dramatic expansion
of the Older Americans Act. Observing that during the past three years the federal government had
already begun funding over eight hundred local programs in communities scattered throughout the
nation, Cohen argued that significant increases to the Older Americans Act would “enable States
and communities to improve and expand projects in such areas as community planning, senior
centers, homemaker services, special transportation services, recreation and leisure time, in-service
training, and counseling services,” – essentially, a wish list of local, anti-poverty programs. 128
Cohen pegged the proposed amount to be expended to fund such increases at a range between $37
and $50 million (1968 dollars), a significant sum but one that still stood at roughly one-tenth of the
amount proposed for expanding Medicare.
Taken together, Cohen’s proposals embraced a vision of vigorous, activist government
working on behalf of the nation’s elderly, and providing them with opportunities to contribute to
society which dwarfed the possibilities on offer by private voluntary organizations as well as state
and local governments. For Cohen, the elderly were not merely sickly pensioners; rather, they had
the potential to be a vast reservoir of manpower that the nation could call upon to help solve other
pressing social problems. For example, Cohen envisioned a dramatic enlargement of the Foster
Grandparents Program, a hitherto small program which matched isolated, elderly people with
abandoned or neglected children in hospitals, orphanages, and other institutions. Cohen proposed
that the Foster Grandparents program be subsumed under the “Service Roles in Retirement”
program first established by the Older Americans Act three years earlier. As he wrote in a memo to
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Joseph Califano, “there is substantial evidence that large numbers of older people living in
retirement are capable and interested in contributing their skills and services to various areas of
community betterment and services,” and, ideally, the Service Roles in Retirement program would
“meet the tremendous needs that exist in this area.” 129 In other words, enlarging the Older
Americans Act with an expanded Service Roles in Retirement program would create a virtuous
cycle in which retired, older people would assist at-risk younger people under the benevolent
leadership of the federal government as well as other public and private welfare agencies.
Even as Cohen was making his case to Califano for a broad, sweeping use of federal power
on behalf of older Americans, other voices within the administration were registering their dissent
over some of the more far-reaching reforms which Cohen and others had proposed for years.
Internal reviews of Cohen’s list of proposals suggested that it would face strong headwinds from the
Bureau of the Budget. The proposed increases in Social Security benefits were considered to be
“relatively harmless,” but other initiatives, such as HEW’s proposal to require individual states to
establish and maintain health and safety standards for rental housing occupied by recipients of
Social Security’s Old Age Assistance program were rejected because of the “impossibility of
enforcing such standards.” 130 Major proposals such as expanding Medicare to include prescription
drug coverage were ruled out as too expensive or too inefficient; placing older workers in
manpower training programs received particular censure as “administratively inefficient,” possibly
to the point of undermining the effectiveness of the federal government’s entire manpower training
program system. 131 Expanding the Older Americans Act, even in a manner more limited than the
one prescribed by Cohen, was placed as a “lower priority” than improving Social Security, partly
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because some of the suggested improvements to the Older Americans Act like constructing senior
citizen centers as part of the Model Cities program would likely bring additional, undesirable
criticism of the Model Cities program. 132
In sum, the Johnson administration’s efforts ultimately reinforced both existing programs
like Social Security, while also opening up new avenues in how the federal government engaged
with the issue of elderly poverty. Earlier, the federal government’s efforts had been limited largely
to economic security for older people, with the fight over Social Security’s old age insurance versus
its old age assistance program occupying much of the time and energy of federal policymakers
between 1935 and 1965. After 1965, the federal government’s purview broadened considerably to
include health security programs like Medicare and Medicaid but also initiatives that had been
pioneered at the local and state level, such as legislation to ban discrimination on the basis of age in
the workplace and increased federal funding for affordable housing, community health centers, and
other antipoverty initiatives.
As a result of the Johnson administration’s efforts, the working relationships forged between
federal, state, and local welfare officials working on issues related to older Americans were greatly
strengthened, as were the linkages between government, academia, and private social welfare
organizations. The senior state, which had existed in an uneven and loosely organized form before
the 1960s would become more formally structured, as the federal government began to fund and
administer social services, rehabilitative programs, and other services that it had previously not
played a significant role in before. The senior state thereby came to embrace not just economic
security but also other types of security for older people which would have been unlikely just a
decade beforehand. After the end of the Johnson administration in January 1969, the Nixon
administration – not infrequently at the behest of congressional Democrats – would build upon and
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reinforce the federal government’s commitments in this new arena, even as it began the process of
rolling back other facets of the public welfare state and the War on Poverty’s community action
program.
From Johnson to Nixon
While largely disdainful of the War on Poverty’s efforts to ameliorate poverty among
African-Americans, the Nixon administration showed itself quite willing to accommodate and
expand upon the Great Society’s efforts to reduce poverty among older, whiter Americans. 133
Notably, Nixon had on the campaign trail in 1968 included older Americans as part of “an entire
generation of forgotten Americans.” 134 While such rhetoric represented an attempt on Nixon’s part
to capture the ideological language that Franklin Roosevelt and other political liberals had once
placed at the center of the New Deal’s promise of collective economic security, there was
considerable evidence available to support Nixon’s claim. The enactment of Medicare in 1965
militated against claims that older Americans had been “forgotten” by the rest of American society,
but the incomplete record of the Johnson administration on issues related to strengthening economic
security for older Americans meant that there remained much work still to be done. 135 As William
Oriol, the Staff Director for the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, observed at a 1970
academic conference of gerontologists, “Americans have not yet fully decided what they think life
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should be like for our aging and aged population” and asked “what do we really want for our aged
and aging population, now and in the future?” 136 Data from the newly-released 1970 Census lent
statistical credence to Oriol’s observation about the improved but still fragile social and economic
condition of many of the nation’s older citizens. The 1970 Census found that the proportion of the
elderly had reached 9.9% of the overall U.S. population (up from 8.1% in 1950 and 9.2% in 1960)
and that the number of elderly people numbered well over 20,000,000. 137 At the same time, 1970
Census’s data also vividly displayed how the overall economic status of the elderly had improved
between 1960 and 1970: by 1970, 33% of all older women were living alone and still maintaining
economically independent households; in 1960, that proportion had stood at only 25% (the number
of elderly men in a comparable position had only slightly improved from 13% in 1960 to 16% in
1970). 138
However, before the release of the Census’s report, there remained clear evidence that the
problem of poverty and economic insecurity in old age remained far from solved. 139 As the New
York Times reported in June 1969, nearly half a million elderly residents of New York City still
lived below the poverty line, and city welfare officials were increasingly concerned about the
emergence of “senior power groups” that had already begun to wring increased benefits such as
“half fare for the elderly on the city transit system” from New York’s Metropolitan Transportation
Authority. 140 Such rumblings were matched elsewhere in cities like Chicago, San Francisco, and
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Boston, where local officials were becoming increasingly cognizant of “senior power” groups’
ability to persuade and petition for improvements to publicly provided services (including
discounted access to public transportation). 141
Unlike during the Great Depression, when the combination of unemployment and
catastrophic failure of many banks (and consequently the loss of personal savings) had helped
radicalize older Americans and propel them into organizations like the Townsend Movement, in the
late 1960s, rising inflation and eroding personal purchasing power had led many retired people to
become significantly more politically active and organized than they previously had been. 142 With
only limited access to the labor market, older people organized in order to exert pressure on elected
officials to find ways to reduce their costs of living, whether via access to subsidized public
transportation, recreation, nutrition, or tax relief. 143 It was no coincidence that Margaret Kuhn’s
Gray Panthers organization was founded in 1970, or that in New York State alone, some 500 cities,
towns, and villages (including New York City) adopted laws reducing property tax laws for the
elderly in the five year period from 1965 to 1970. 144
The grassroots efforts by older Americans to demand improved government services stood
in stark contrast to the continuing confusion, duplication, and incoherence which seemed to mark
federal programs and initiatives. The high hopes during the Great Society that the Older Americans
Act might one day serve as a centerpiece for a truly comprehensive federal effort to assist older
Americans increasingly were not fulfilled. As New York Senator Charles E. Goodell would admit
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during a 1970 meeting with some of his older constituents, all the expenditures authorized by
Congress under the Older Americans Act in 1965 through 1970 would have been sufficient to
finance the cost of the Vietnam War for less than two days. 145
Further evidence of the relative paltriness of federal efforts emerged during a series of
hearings convened by Senator Harrison A. Williams of New Jersey in October 1969, which revealed
that there was a “worsening retirement income crisis” in the United States because of a lack of
“positive comprehensive action” on the part of lawmakers in Washington and elsewhere. 146
Testifying before the committee, Jack Ossofsky, the Project Director for Project FIND and the
Deputy Director for the National Council on the Aging, observed that “almost two-thirds of the
elderly couples” which Project FIND had identified “fell below the 1966 Social Security
Administration poverty index level…what we have found indicates that many older poor people live
below the poverty line and, secondly, that with increasing age there is a decrease in the income
available to the people involved.” 147 Other speakers at the same Senate hearings expressed their
agreement with Ossofsky and Project FIND’s conclusions. Speaking on behalf of retired auto
workers in Detroit, Olga Madar, a UAW executive board member, bluntly told the committee that
“we cannot do a darn thing until we get a basic annual income for all people and let’s start with the
group that has been hurt the most, as Project FIND has found out, and let’s start with the seniors.” 148
Echoing Madar, Beverly Diamond, a social welfare consultant in New York, identified the source of
the problem as a lack of clearly defined policy at the national level:
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The compelling fact is that we lack an over-all, consistent approach, a
comprehensive plan, a national commitment to implement it. We have
no established priorities to tackle the most critical needs, no realistic
appropriations, no orderly steps to assure effectiveness and continuity.
Instead we have spastic response by the [federal] Government to
pressure, piece-meal approaches, too little, reaching too few. These
sporadic responses to crisis, at best result in tokenism, at worst, in
waste. 149
Despite the significant limits to federal assistance for the aging which the 1969 U.S. Senate
hearings had exposed, public perception of the status of the elderly had markedly improved with the
passage of Medicare and other legislation designed to buttress the economic security of older
people. In a sign of just how much the rhetoric used to describe older Americans had changed since
the Great Depression, the 1970 Census’s report on them described them in upbeat tones as “a vast
untapped natural resource” and pondered “how we use this vast potential is one of the great
questions facing American society in the remaining decades of the 20th century.” 150
The situation in 1969 was therefore a mixed one. The economic security of millions of older,
middle-class Americans had undoubtedly improved thanks to the enactment of Medicare and
Medicaid, and the increase in Social Security benefit levels put into place during the last two years
of the Johnson administration had healed some of the wounds that inflationary spending had
inflicted. At the same time, millions of poorer older Americans – especially those living in decaying
inner cities and rural communities – remained at or below the official poverty line. Given both the
growing proportion of older Americans relative to the size of the general population, it is hard to say
whether the incoming Nixon administration’s efforts were primarily guided by political calculations
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or by genuine concern for older Americans; in all likelihood a combination of the two factors was
responsible. As Joshua Freeman has written,
Nixon entered the White House without much of a mandate, having
been elected with a minority of the popular vote after a campaign in
which he largely mouthed generalities…Nixon hoped to win over
some traditionally Democratic constituencies to ensure his reelection
and rebuild the Republicans as a national majority party. To woo
them, he supported the core New Deal economic and social programs
from which they benefitted, even as he took conservative positions on
other issues. 151
Nixon’s efforts to woo older Americans by showering attention and money on them were
readily apparent in his repeated messages to Congress demanding more legislative action on their
behalf. 152 While Nixon was not known for his deep interest in domestic policy – like his predecessor
John F. Kennedy, he was primarily concerned with foreign policy – his domestic policy legacy for
older Americans was quite enviable in light of developments in later years. 153 As Joshua Freeman
has pointed out,
During Nixon’s first term, Social Security old-age benefits went up 52
percent, with future benefits indexed to the cost of living, a huge
structural change. The federal government also took over from the
states supplementary, needs-based income guarantees for the elderly,
blind, and disabled. Elderly Americans, who once made up a major
component of the poor, all but ceased living in poverty. 154
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Despite the President’s rhetoric during the 1968 campaign criticizing the Great Society for
excessive spending and misplaced priorities, the Nixon administration would retain and bolster the
strong working relationship that the Johnson administration had helped to build with the voluntary
sector and individual state welfare agencies in the realm of aging policy. 155
The Nixon Administration and Older Americans
Nixon’s embrace of this issue owed much to the personnel whom he had installed to
administer and supervise federal policies for older people. Primarily, he turned to several surviving
veterans of the Eisenhower administration to organize and execute a domestic policy agenda
designed to appeal to the hearts and votes of older Americans, and to do so in a way that would
quell concerns about overt partisanship on the part of the administration. 156 To this end, he invited
Bertha Adkins, a former HEW Under-Secretary, and Arthur Flemming, a former HEW Secretary, to
take up posts within the administration, as well as other former members of the Eisenhower
administration. 157 This coterie of moderate, centrist Republicans thereafter held the vital levers of
power, with Nixon largely content to defer to them. Adkins, in particular, proved to be a diligent
and valuable foot soldier. In 1969, Nixon appointed her to a newly-created Presidential Task Force
on the Aging, and charged the Task Force with the overall responsibility of “determin[ing] how best
to achieve for the elderly maximum security, dignity, and independence” by “apprais[ing] the
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effectiveness of present programs affecting the aging” and finally “suggest[ing] how such programs
might be improved.” 158
Nixon’s creation of a new Task Force on Aging within his administration seemed peculiar
given the fact that the Johnson administration had sponsored a similar task force only a few years
prior, and the recommendations and findings of those task forces had only been partially
implemented. It became apparent over time that while Nixon was largely content to sign off on
continued improvements to the programs for the elderly which the Johnson administration had
initiated, he also desired to put his own stamp on them, and thereby earn some measure of credit
from older voters. 159 The reason for the new task force came therefore less from deep intellectual
engagement than from the need not to be caught flatfooted by either congressional Democrats or
watchful national old age advocacy groups, both of whom closely monitored the administration’s
actions. Democrats in Congress, in particular, were especially eager to take a leading role in
determining the course of federal policy on this subject, just as they had ten years prior in prodding
the Eisenhower administration to take action on the question of health insurance for the elderly. In
March 1969, the U.S. Senate’s Special Committee on Aging had released a lengthy report that had
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thoroughly lambasted the inadequacy of the federal government’s efforts for older Americans, and
which proposed a wide range of initiatives to more thoroughly address the issue. 160
In response, the Nixon-appointed Task Force conceded that “the [federal] government
should act with and on behalf of the elderly much more vigorously than it currently does,” 161 but
instead of endorsing the programs desired by Senate Democrats, the Task Force offered twenty-four
recommendations in a broad range of areas, starting with the urgent need to reorganize and
coordinate the federal government’s activities, and dutifully presented its report to President Nixon
in February 1970. The Task Force’s Report clearly echoed the President’s campaign rhetoric and
labeled elderly Americans as “the silent majority” that risked being overlooked in the rising student
and youth discontent which had arisen over the Vietnam War, and emphasized the need for the
administration to improve its solicitation of the needs of older Americans. 162
In addition to the Task Force’s efforts, the administration began undertaking the necessary
planning for a second White House Conference on Aging, which it scheduled to be held in 1971, ten
years after the first one that had convened in the last days of the Eisenhower administration. Like its
1961 predecessor, the 1971 White House Conference on Aging brought together an enormous crosssection of experts, elected officials, and private citizens to prepare and propose policy
recommendations for the administration. 163 Administration officials like HEW Secretary Arthur
Flemming hoped and believed that the conference would allow the federal government to
fundamentally reorganize and rationalize its increasingly fragmented and incoherent approach to
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dealing with the problems of older Americans. As a confidential list of talking point questions
prepared by the Administration on Aging for use in conjunction with congressional hearings stated,
We hope [that] the White House Conference will give us
recommendations or proposals from which we can formulate a broad,
comprehensive, systematic policy or set of policies with respect to the
older population…What we mean by Toward a National Policy on
Aging, then, is the identification of the elements from which we may
develop comprehensive, explicit policies as to how American society
should adapt itself to the presence of larger and larger numbers of
retired people living into advanced years. 164
Yet for all the publicity the administration tried to generate in the press, the conference
ultimately seemed to be much ado about nothing, despite high hopes that it might produce some
important breakthrough, much as the 1961 conference had helped galvanize support for
Medicare. 165 Specifically, the 1971 conference organizers hoped that it would allow the federal
government to “pinpoint more realistically and comprehensively the actions needed to solve these
problems [of the aged] and to move toward the development of an achievable national policy on
aging,” a high-minded goal which had eluded the federal government for nearly forty years. 166
President Nixon, in his remarks to the assembled conference delegates, made publicly
known his wish that the conference endorse H.R. 1, the administration’s controversial bill designed
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to transform the nation’s welfare system by moving towards a universal basic income and away
from the patchwork system of categorical federal aid programs which had accumulated since the
New Deal. 167 H.R. 1 was not originally intended to primarily benefit older Americans, but it did
offer important reforms like making Social Security benefits inflation-proof and raising the amount
of annual income that Social Security recipients were permitted to earn without risking a
commensurate reduction in their existing benefit payments.
In the end, though, the 1971 White House Conference failed to achieve the lofty goals of its
organizers. While it was followed by some increased funding to the Administration on Aging as
well as other Executive Branch agencies with programs designed to help the elderly (such as the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Housing and Urban Development), it was not
clear if this increase was a result of the conference or if the administration was simply planning on
making such increases anyway as the 1972 presidential election year approached.
Even if the conference did not produce much in the way of tangible results, it did reinforce
the existing federal and state relationship in combatting the economic insecurity faced by many
older Americans. As Ray Swartz, a Nixon administration official who was involved in the
conference’s planning later recalled, the 1972 conference had once more reaffirmed the primacy of
state and local governments in actually dealing with the issue of old age poverty. 168 The Nixon
administration had placed great emphasis on the need to devolve power from a supposedly out-ofcontrol federal government back to the states, and the conference turned out to be an excellent
forum to showcase this objective.
Swartz further recalled that “the government views the conference process as the community
being the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end of conference activity…therefore, the
167
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thrust of programs now being planned and getting under way, whether they are out of the
Administration on Aging … or some other federal program, is at the community level.” 169 While
some administration officials (in particular, Arthur Flemming and Bertha Adkins) had hoped that
the conference would lead to a “real philosophy of aging” or a “real national policy [on aging],” the
conference ended up reinforcing state and local level plans and policies as the best way to address
the tremendously varied needs of older Americans – in essence, that there could not be a “one size
fits all” national solution to the economic, social, and psychological needs of the elderly
population. 170
To some extent, this failure to find a new or more coherent way to shape old age policy in
the United States represented a crucial missed opportunity to break free from the cage of categorical
assistance to which old age policy at the federal level was increasingly relegated. Rather than being
linked to broader attempts to reinsert it as part of a broader program to provide economic security to
the entire American family, the 1971 White House conference reinforced existing, fragmented
efforts that frequently duplicated each other. As John B. Martin, then serving as the head of the
Administration on Aging observed, old age policy had been limited to a kind of “crash survival
program” focused largely on immediate concerns. Instead, Martin believed that what was really
needed was “clear, specific, long- and short-range goals and a program for reaching these goals,” a
set of objectives that the conference had spectacularly failed to produce. 171
The Failure of FAP and the Politics of Old-Age Economic Security
The Nixon administration’s growing focus on older Americans during this time period came
in the wake of its failure to secure the enactment of its proposed Family Assistance Program (FAP)
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in 1969. 172 As proposed, FAP was a broad, sweeping reform of the unwieldly accumulation of
federal social welfare programs that the Nixon administration had inherited from its collective
predecessors. Briefly summarized, FAP promised to remake such programs in a way that hewed
much closer to the guaranteed annual income model which liberal economists like Leon Keyserling
had advocated during the Great Society’s heyday, and in order to do so, it proposed to scrapping
“categorical” aid programs and implement a “universal income supplement program financed and
administered by the Federal government, making payments based on income needs to all members
of the population.” 173 Effectively, “needs-based” assistance programs like the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) would no longer be subject to means testing, and would be merged
with other assistance programs like Social Security’s Old Age Assistance program, whose levels of
assistance had by the 1970s become highly variable due to the ability of states to determine how
much they wished to contribute to such payments. Respecting the popularity of Social Security’s
old-age social insurance system, the Nixon administration pledged to leave it untouched by the
proposed FAP legislation. 174
Despite President Nixon’s rhetoric on the subject of welfare programs, his administration
unexpectedly embraced these proposed reforms of the nation’s income maintenance programs.
Nixon’s unconventional embrace of FAP came as a surprise to his political allies and opponents,
most of whom greeted the proposal with tepid support at best. 175 However, while the Nixon
administration explored the problems facing elderly people, it did so in part because of
governmental competition from the U.S. Senate’s Special Committee on the Problems of the Aging.
172
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Founded in the late 1950s by Senator Patrick McNamara, the committee had been
responsible for dramatically focusing the nation’s attention on the rising medical costs and increased
poverty among older people in the years immediately before the enactment of Medicare and
Medicaid in 1965. 176 The Committee had also emerged as a crucial meeting point between senators
and emissaries from local and state governments, as well as voluntary organizations like the AARP,
and its hearings had frequently helped to identify and propose legislation to address the issues faced
by older Americans. By the late 1960s, the committee remained firmly in the hands of congressional
Democrats, many of whom were openly suspicious of the Nixon administration’s motives for
embracing domestic policy initiatives like old age assistance that had hitherto been the heart and
hearth of the Democratic Party. 177
In order to ensure that the Nixon administration would not be able to steal its thunder, the
committee began to produce numerous reports documenting the federal government’s shortcomings
in the area of old-age policy, and frequently used these reports to publicly castigate the Nixon
administration’s efforts, much as it had during the 1960s to highlight the meager efforts of Sargent
Shriver’s Office of Economic Opportunity to address elderly poverty. 178 Senator Russell Long (DLA), in particular, emerged as one of the Nixon administration’s harshest critics, and repeatedly
railed against the administration’s proposed guaranteed annual income program throughout 1971. 179
Long, now the powerful chairman of the Senate’s Finance Committee, condemned the proposals as
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leading to “a permanent welfare subculture,” and vowed to do everything he could to prevent its
enactment. 180
Long proved to be good to his word. In November 1971, he publicly declared that “elderly
Americans could already be enjoying increased Social Security benefits if it were not for the ‘illadvised welfare expansion proposed by the President.’” 181 Long’s colleagues on the Senate Finance
Committee followed his lead. Senator Wallace Bennett (R-UT) addressed the conference as well,
and pointedly noted in his statement that “Senator Long and I – indeed, the full [Senate Finance]
committee – share a common desire to establish reasonable minimum income levels for the aged,
blind, and disabled under welfare and for those dependent upon Social Security.” 182 In other words,
both Long and Bennett had re-emphasized their support for public assistance, but only along
categorical lines. Their endorsement of aid to the elderly and other groups therefore rejected the
guaranteed, universal approach which FAP had proposed.
At first, the Nixon administration refused to back down. In March 1972, Nixon sent a
lengthy message to Congress asking for significantly improved funding for federal programs to help
the elderly, and reaffirmed his support for the controversial welfare reforms which both Senators
Long and Bennett had rejected the previous fall. 183 In his message, the President sent a lengthy list
of recommendations, many of which derived from either the administration’s Task Force on older
Americans or the 1971 White House Conference on Aging. Notably, Nixon identified numerous
legislative initiatives included in his message as deserving of the “highest priority on this year’s
Congressional agenda” because “it is the elderly who have the best reason to be impatient” rather
than what he derided as “the impatience of youth,” a reference perhaps to the student anti-war
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movement. 184 Nixon urged the Congress to “stop treating older Americans as a burden and to start
treating them as a resource,” and argued instead for the need to “fight the many forces which can
cause older persons to feel dependent or isolated” and to “provide…continuing opportunities for
them to be self-reliant and involved.” 185
Perhaps more surprisingly, Nixon urged Congress to significantly increase Social Security
benefits, make the program inflation proof, and to “establish a floor under the income of older
Americans for the first time.” 186 In fact, Nixon identified the protection of the “income position of
older Americans” as his highest priority, and alongside his proposed expansion of Social Security,
he embraced even further “the role played by private pension plans,” which he argued should
receive “tax deductions to encourage their expansion, requiring the vesting of pensions, and
protecting the investments which have been made in these funds.” 187 Had this measure been
submitted by the Johnson administration instead, scarcely a word of it would have needed to be
changed. 188
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The striking similarity of the approach taken by the Johnson and then Nixon administrations
on the issue of old age economic security suggested just how deeply the bipartisan consensus on the
parameters of the senior state had become, despite periodic attempts by administrations on both
sides of the aisle to reform its chaotic development and lack of coordination. Increasingly, it seemed
as though a tacit acceptance of the fragmented character of the senior state had emerged as the
defining consensus of the federal government’s efforts to address old age poverty, with a decided
emphasis on sending the issue back to the states and local communities if at all possible.
In the end, Nixon got only part of what he had originally asked for in his message to
Congress. In July 1972, the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly voted to expand and
extend the 1965 Older Americans Act, and flooded the long-beleaguered law with $1.5 billion in
appropriations, a sum that easily dwarfed anything it had previously received, even during the
heyday of the Great Society. 189 The Senate followed suit in October 1972, voting unanimously to
approve the House’s dramatic monetary improvements to the Older Americans Act, and Nixon
signed the final legislation in late October 1972, right before Election Day. 190
Nevertheless, the legislation Nixon signed bore little relation to the far-reaching reforms
originally proposed under the aegis of the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). 191 In place of FAP, Nixon
signed an omnibus piece of legislation that reinforced Social Security and Medicare and also created
a new program called Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 192 While Nixon expressed his “great
pleasure” in signing the significantly modified H.R. 1 bill that the Senate had sent back to him, in
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truth, the new legislation consisted mostly of halfway measures that had been debated for years. 193 It
did create a basic income program, but that program was strictly limited to selected categories of
recipients. Furthermore, while SSI was designed to replace and equalize state-level programs of aid
to the aged, blind, and disabled, it was paid for out of general tax revenues rather than Social
Security’s trust funds, a violation of the social insurance model that the original architects of Social
Security had so strenuously favored as a way to win lasting popular support and acceptance. 194
In its own strange way, though, the SSI program fulfilled long-standing calls for expanded
action by the federal government to assist older Americans. Extending back to the first days of the
Nixon administration – and further still, into the heyday of the Great Society – an emergent
consensus had held that both the voluntary and governmental sectors were necessary to alleviate the
problems of older Americans, but that the federal government was not pulling its weight. 195 In the
aftermath of the highly politicized and racially charged controversy surrounding the War on
Poverty’s focus on minority youth unemployment in America’s cities, the Nixon administration
recognized that the political ground had shifted more strongly in favor of using the federal
government’s resources to benefit older, white citizens rather than younger, black ones. 196 President
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Nixon had alluded to this shift in his opening remarks to the 1971 White House Conference on
Aging, when he had noted that
[i]n recent years all of us know a gulf has been opening between older
Americans and the rest of our people. This gulf is the product of a
great social revolution which has weakened the traditional bonds of
family, neighborhood, and community. For millions of older
Americans, the result has been a growing sense of isolation and
insecurity. We have to change that. 197
While promoting intergenerational connection was not the highest domestic priority for the
Nixon administration, Nixon and conservative southern Democrats like Russell Long could find
common ground on the subject of using the federal government’s resources to reduce poverty
among older Americans. Despite his emergence as a stalwart critic of the nation’s public welfare
system, Long, like many other southerners on Capitol Hill, had long favored improvements to
Social Security’s old age assistance program because it effectively subsidized the meager monthly
payments made by many poorer southern and western states to older people using the federal
government’s general tax revenues.
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By contrast, expanding Social Security’s old age assistance program once more presented
the administration with a proposal that was likely to win the support of Senator Long and his likeminded colleagues in Congress. Nixon’s own Task Force on the Aging had endorsed the principle
that “restructuring and refinancing Old Age Assistance is imperative” and had only endorsed “the
Family Assistance Act as it applies to the elderly,” a careful qualifier that revealed how the issue of
elderly poverty remained divorced and separate from broader discussions of poverty and welfare in
the United States. 199
In further defiance of the Nixon administration, the Senate authorized additional spending
under the Older Americans Act in February 1973, thus daring Nixon to again veto a piece of
legislation that was both badly needed and sure to provoke significant popular discontent against the
administration should the President refuse to sign it into law. When Nixon had previously vetoed the
additional funds for the Older Americans Act, he had done so on the grounds that “the range of
narrow, categorical service programs” like the Older Americans Act “would seriously interfere with
our efforts to develop coordinated services for older persons.” 200 Ultimately, the administration
would successfully pare back Congress’s proposed February 1973 bill to $551.6 million in
expenditures for programs under the Older Americans Act, rather than the $2 billion which
Congress had originally sought, before Nixon signed the bill into law. 201
Gray Panthers and Senior Power
Despite the administration’s legislative victory over Congress, the nascent “senior power”
movement that had had its first, unorganized stirrings in major cities like New York and
Philadelphia were now being harnessed by established old-age advocacy groups to advance a more
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ambitious agenda. In June 1973, approximately 3,000 elderly citizens, “many wearing oversized
‘Senior Power’ buttons” gathered on the steps of the Capitol building to “petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.” 202 Nelson Cruikshank, now the president of the National Council of
Senior Citizens, had helped to organize the dramatic display of disgruntled senior citizens, who, like
a previous generation of older activists during the fight over Medicare in the early 1960s, proceeded
to roam the halls of Congress to cajole anyone who happened to be in their offices that day.
Cruikshank had organized the rally because he believed that the Nixon administration had largely
disregarded and ignored the findings of the White House Conference on Aging in 1971. In his
words, “that conference was billed as the basis for developing programs for the seventies for older
Americans…but what do we see in fact – serious budget cutbacks, increases in Medicare costs and a
housing moratorium.” 203
While Cruikshank was likely speaking out in part due to partisan reasons – he had long been
affiliated with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, and had been the head of the AFL-CIO’s
Social Security Department – the presence of thousands of elderly protestors suggested that his
criticisms of the Nixon administration carried a fair amount of popular heft. Elderly poverty clearly
remained a persistent problem in the United States, especially in cities like New York, where
newspaper stories of impoverished elderly people stealing food from supermarkets or trapped in
decaying tenement buildings abounded. 204 Despite the enactment of SSI as part of the Social
Security system and increases in Social Security social insurance benefit levels, elderly poverty
rates remained frustratingly stable, at least at first. Slowly, though, old age assistance caseloads
began to drop as fewer elderly people filed for public assistance. 205
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In New York, city officials were particularly keen to move elderly residents off public
assistance. Mayor John Lindsay’s administration contracted with the private Community Council of
New York to help it find and register elderly people who were otherwise eligible for SSI but had not
yet enrolled in the program. As Lindsay stated, “we know that many elderly have lived in desperate
poverty rather than apply for old age assistance…the stigma of applying for welfare should be
greatly reduced by the transfer of income assistance to the Social Security Administration.” 206
Lindsay’s words neatly encapsulated how “Social Security” had become a semantically and
ideologically separate realm of public assistance from “welfare” over the course of the previous
thirty years, and the placement of SSI (which was not radically different from the long-established
Old Age Assistance title of Social Security) under the rubric of Social Security probably represented
an attempt to overcome the fear of many older Americans that they would be grouped together with
socially stigmatized “welfare” recipients. The improvements to Social Security benefit levels and
the creation of SSI therefore represented an attempt to simultaneously move older people off of
local and state public assistance rolls by offering them significant improvements to Social Security
and the provisions of SSI, and to do so in a way that would encourage their cooperation rather than
resistance. 207
In the end, despite the 1970 Census’s description of older people as “untapped natural
resource,” the policy prospects at the federal level were considerably less promising than they had
been only fifteen years beforehand. In her testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Aging
in July 1974, influential Michigan Rep. Martha W. Griffiths skeptically noted that
[i]n our efforts to help the aged, we often have acted more on the urge
to do good than on the basis of hard facts. Before we act, we should
know the characteristics of who will benefit, by how much they will
206
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benefit, who will pay, and how much it will cost. Otherwise, we may
again – as we have in the past – spend many millions, yet see that only
a few dollars trickle down to the persons we intend to aid. 208
While Griffiths had been a supporter of expanded Social Security benefits as well as Great Society
initiatives to improve the lives of older Americans, she concluded her testimony by urging the
assembled senators to devote more attention to the needs of “non-aged persons.” 209 Despite
Griffiths’ suggestion that Congress devote more time to welfare reform and health care, the
generous increases in Social Security which Nixon had signed into law only a few years previously
had only arrested but not completely halted the powerful forces of inflation that had eroded the
purchasing power of millions of older Americans. As an Administration on Aging staff background
paper noted in the fall of 1974, “over 3.5 million persons 65 and over – over 17% of the total
population 65 and over – have incomes below the poverty level.” 210
While the Nixon administration had achieved notable successes in expanding Social Security
and creating SSI, its inability to persuade Congress to adopt the FAP would come back to haunt
future efforts to impose rational order upon the nation’s complicated and fragmented public social
welfare system. By the time Richard Nixon left office in 1974, it was becoming clear that rising
inflation and faltering economic growth would likely challenge future efforts to improve public
social welfare programs, including Social Security, Medicare, and the broad suite of lesser programs
created to assist older people. 211 Despite the Nixon administration’s efforts, old age economic
insecurity continued to be a pressing issue in communities throughout the country. As one New
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York City welfare official noted in March 1974, “fifty or sixty or even a hundred dollars a month
isn’t enough for [old] people to live on…what they need is a guaranteed income, special housing
and elimination of the rip offs of old people like the high prices of drugs.” 212
Why Survive? The Changing Political Calculus of Old-Age Security, 1975-1980
The continuing struggles of many older people received further amplification in 1975, when
the publisher Harper & Row released Why Survive? Being Old In America, a jeremiad authored by
Dr. Robert Neil Butler, a renowned gerontologist. Clocking in at nearly 500 pages in length, Why
Survive? offered its readers a stinging critique of the federal government’s efforts to provide true
economic security for older Americans. In language reminiscent of Michael Harrington’s The Other
America, Butler pointedly argued that “old age in America is often a tragedy…the truth is that we
cannot promise a decent existence for those elderly now alive.” 213 While conceding that Social
Security and Medicare had helped to alleviate elderly poverty, Butler forcefully condemned the
federal government for not doing enough; in his words, the task of alleviating elderly poverty “has
not been finished and the efforts do not match the needs.” 214
Despite its dense, forbidding prose, Why Survive? received wide acclaim the year it was
published, and won the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction in 1975. While the book likely
benefitted from increasingly skeptical post-Watergate attitudes towards public institutions like the
federal government, its criticisms could not be so easily dismissed, given Butler’s record as the first
director of the National Institute of Aging. Why Survive? captured public attention and focused it on
the problem of poverty in old age, but offered little in the way of solutions, other than to decry past
efforts as inadequate. While the numerous criticisms made by Butler in Why Survive? were not
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new, the mere fact that they had persisted for forty years after the enactment of Social Security and
ten years after the enactment of Medicare suggested just how incomplete and partial the foundations
of the senior state remained, despite the efforts of two generations of dedicated efforts among social
reformers, union leaders, and public welfare officials to eliminate economic insecurity in old age.
A weakening national economy during the mid-1970s and higher than expected costs of
Medicare helped to erode the assumptions of economic growth that had guided the modest
expansion of federal social welfare programs during the postwar era. Instead of searching for ways
to expand existing programs or to enact new ones, federal officials began to look at ways to pare
back existing programs. This shift began not with Ronald Reagan, but with the Carter administration
during the late 1970s. Throughout his administration, Jimmy Carter took pains to rhetorically and
programmatically distance himself from the legacy of the New Deal. 215 As William Leuchtenburg
has observed:
Jimmy Carter had won office by capitalizing on distrust of the
government leviathan that had emerged in the Roosevelt era, and as
chief executive he self-consciously acted out the role of a man with
different perception of power from FDR’s. 216
Carter’s rejection of the New Deal was not simply a matter of how he perceived power; rather, his
spurning of the Democratic Party’s twentieth-century patron saint was far more substantive. In his
1978 State of the Union address to the Congress, Carter pointedly observed that
[g]overnment cannot solve our problems, it can't set our goals, it
cannot define our vision. Government cannot eliminate poverty or
provide a bountiful economy or reduce inflation or save our cities or
cure illiteracy or provide energy. And government cannot mandate
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goodness. Only a true partnership between government and the people
can ever hope to reach these goals. 217
Carter’s administration bore out his belief that government spending had become excessive.
Tellingly, after his presidency Carter recalled that “my main political problem was with the socalled liberal wing of the Democratic Party. I went into office demanding deregulation of the private
enterprise system, and balancing budgets and…cutting back on some of the excessive social
programs that I thought were overly costly. This was my biggest political problem when I was in
office.” 218
Carter’s recollection matched up with the experience of Joseph Califano in the Carter
administration. Califano, who had served as Lyndon Johnson’s top domestic policy aide, later
served as Carter’s Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare until he was
summarily dismissed by Carter in 1979. Before his dismissal, Califano had been one of the key
architects of the Carter administration’s policies for older Americans. In July 1978, Califano
testified on the subject of “U.S. Policy for the Aging” before the Senate Special Committee on
Aging. In his remarks, Califano painted a dire picture for the assembled senators by highlighting
four distinct factors, which he argued could eventually prove to be problematic: longer life
expectancies, a growing population of older Americans (a “senior boom”), earlier retirement, and a
decrease in the number of active workers. 219
When these four factors were combined, Califano noted that they had “a significant impact
on the federal budget…[p]rograms for the elderly are claiming an increasing share of our
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resources.” 220 In practical terms, the federal government was spending $112 billion (1978 dollars) or
“5 per cent of the gross national product and 24 per cent of the federal budget for fiscal year 1978,”
an amount that Califano emphasized would only continue to grow in the future. 221 Though Califano
stated that “these figures are subject to the hazards that afflict all estimates…I cite them not to
alarm, simply to inform,” the dire fiscal picture painted by Califano earlier in his testimony belied
this qualifying statement. 222 In light of this “fiscal pressure,” Califano urged his listeners to face the
facts and “make sure it has the capacity to meet future obligations.” 223
While Califano’s message was not a new one – fiscal conservatives had long decried Social
Security, Medicare, and other senior state programs as being far too expensive and far too
ineffective at achieving the goal of providing true economic security in old age – the messenger was
what made it remarkable. Califano had in many respects been Lyndon Johnson’s right hand man
during the Great Society, and the Johnson administration had shown only limited concern about
fiscal pressures; if anything, it had happily disregarded them for a time in order to try and
simultaneously fund the Great Society’s programs and a generous personal income tax reduction at
home as well as the conflict in Vietnam.
That a message stressing the dangers of domestic programs should come from a faithful
soldier of the Great Society was noteworthy, for it signaled the evolving consensus within the
Democratic Party. As Califano would later concede in an interview ahead of his participation at a
1985 conference marking the twentieth anniversary of the Great Society, the fatal flaw of the Great
Society was that “the Government simply got into too many nooks and crannies in American
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life.” 224 The Carter administration had come into power without the support of much of the
traditional New Deal coalition, and Carter himself had remained disdainful of the New Deal’s
ideological heritage of embracing government as a shield for guaranteeing the economic security of
average Americans. Because he was a Carter administration official, Califano’s words provided a
bipartisan imprimatur to criticism of programs like Social Security and Medicare. Such criticism
had once been largely confined to the political right. Now, a bona fide liberal Democrat had latched
onto formerly partisan critiques of the New Deal and the Great Society’s institutional heritage. In
doing so, Califano and the Carter administration would pave the way for more strident attacks on
these programs in future years.
This was surely not Califano’s intention; as a faithful public servant and loyal Democrat, he
probably hoped that attempts to reform the federal government’s domestic programs could be made
that would prevent a painful fiscal reckoning in the future if government spending were not
curtailed. For example, in his 1978 remarks before the Senate, Califano had underlined the
unexpectedly high costs of Medicare and Medicaid, which had not been foreseen in 1965 when
those programs were originally enacted. He did not wish to see these programs repealed; rather, in
his testimony to the Senate Special Committee on Aging, he stated that “we must build a more
rational, comprehensive, efficient and human system for delivering health services.” 225
In light of these growing fiscal pressures, as well as the unlikelihood that the Carter
administration would either propose the creation of expensive new programs or request increased
funding for existing ones to help older Americans, Califano seemed to suggest that American
families would, by and large, be expected to pick up the slack. 226 As he observed in his testimony,
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Many people contend that the American family is disintegrating or that it no longer cares for its
elderly members. The reality is, I believe the opposite…Too often in the past we have designed our
programs for the elderly with the individual in mind but not the family unit. We have failed to tap
the strength of the family in caring for the elderly. We need to establish programs that help families
care for their aged members. 227
While Califano concluded by stating that “a healthy and growing economy” was necessary
“to accommodate generously the needs of rising numbers of older citizens,” his argument that
American families needed to take a more active role in providing care and support to their oldest
members represented a repudiation of much of the thinking which had guided the New Deal’s
architects and their intellectual heirs in both political parties. For decades, Social Security and other
programs had existed and been supported because of their role in preventing exactly what Califano
was proposing – i.e., allowing some of the most vulnerable members of the American family from
falling into penury, and truly becoming a financial burden on their families and their communities,
as had been the case during the years of the urban poorhouse and the county poor farm. In an age of
stagflation and economic crisis, the Carter administration had chosen to jettison the New Deal’s
ideological commitment to broad collective economic security through the apparatus of the federal
government.
Nor was Califano the only veteran of the Johnson administration to criticize the existing
arrangement of federal spending on programs for the elderly. Joining him was Robert H. Binstock,
an academic expert from Brandeis University who had served as the executive director of the
Johnson administration’s Task Force on Older Americans. Writing in the pages of the prominent
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weekly magazine National Journal, Binstock asserted that the federal government’s considerable
spending on programs for older Americans had failed to accomplish much:
The remarkably large proportion of federal spending that is devoted to
programs for the elderly is becoming well known…What has not been
emphasized sufficiently, however, is the extent to which the current
expenditures of $112 billion on programs for the aging represents an
indictment of the American style of domestic public policy. One
might expect that if the federal government allocates one-quarter of its
budget to a particular target population of 23 million citizens, then
that population’s economic, health, and social problems would be
substantially alleviated. Yet, that is not the case. 228
As Binstock further observed, “our current agenda of public programs toward the aging is truly
incredible for it includes virtually every aspect of human existence,” with the federal government
alone responsible for 134 programs designated for older people. 229 The Older Americans Act, while
still slender in size compared to Social Security and Medicare, accounted for $500 million in federal
spending by 1978, and had fostered the creation of a “national network on aging anchored by 600
area agencies on aging.” 230 The national network on aging also included 1,000 senior centers, 9,000
nutrition programs for elderly people, “as well as research and education programs,” most of which,
Binstock concluded, “would not exist or would be devoting their attention and efforts to matters
other than aging.” 231
Despite his praise of the federal government’s efforts to bolster the social and economic
security of older Americans, Binstock qualified his judgment, observing that “these positive features
of the Older Americans Act go hand-in-hand with a series of weaknesses,” including his assertion
that “the extensive range of programmatic responsibilities has been elaborated without much sense
of priority…consequently, the small amount of available funds is distributed relatively thinly among
228
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many objectives and is far from sufficient to make a substantial impact on any given problem.” 232
More bitingly, Binstock argued that “the programmatic agenda and the bureaucratic network have
been developed with sufficient fanfare to create a cruel illusion that a variety of problems can
eventually be solved through funding and implementation under the Older Americans Act.” 233
In other words, the Older Americans Act, despite its good intentions, had helped spawn a
fragmented and dysfunctional national network of agencies designed to help older people, and this
network had proven to be only modestly successful, given its sparse funding. Binstock therefore
concluded that while “the Administration on Aging and a number of other agencies scattered
throughout the federal government…are doing what they can to deal with an extensive agenda of
social service and facility needs of older persons…the number of people these agencies can help is
limited, given meager funding, lack of priorities, and cumbersome mechanisms for program
implementation.” 234 Instead of effectively tackling the problems of older people, Binstock argued,
these programs were instead a form of window-dressing, “enacted and implemented by public
officials in a fashion likely to solve the problems of public officials.” 235
In addition to castigating the officials responsible for the enactment and administration of
the federal government’s programs, Binstock advanced the argument that these programs served to
shelter elected officials from the wrath of old age advocacy groups, whose membership “represent
an implied electoral force that politicians are not eager to alienate.” 236 The Carter administration’s
war on “excessive social programs” marked an emerging sea change in American attitudes towards
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the infrastructure of federal programs which had been constructed a few years earlier. As Robert B.
Hudson, a professor of social welfare at Brandeis University observed in 1978,
the aging, long a favored social-welfare constituency in the United
States, are in the early stages of being confronted with a series of
obstacles which may put their favored status – and its concomitant
material and symbolic benefits – in jeopardy. Rapidly rising public
policy costs for meeting the needs of an aging population, a nascent
but growing reassessment of policy benefits directed toward the
elderly, and competitive pressures from other social-welfare
constituencies are now threatening two of the aging’s longstanding
political resources – their singular legitimacy and their political utility
to other actors in the policy process. 237
Hudson predicted that the “rapidly rising public policy costs” would increasingly give way to
“competitive and cost-based pressures,” with the ultimate effect “being to produce a more inclusive
and zero-sum politics of aging.” 238 Put differently, Hudson was arguing that federal programs for
the aging would soon be subjected to more stringent criticism, and that any new or costly policy
initiatives would face determined opposition. The forty years between the passage of the Social
Security Act in 1935 and the Carter administration had witnessed a haphazard movement in the
direction of new and more expanded federal programs on behalf of the elderly; now, as was the case
for other public assistance programs, the politics of old-age economic security had shifted more
towards cost-cutting rather than program development. This development was partially attributable
to the cost overruns associated with Medicare, which had caused the costs associated with that
program to balloon to levels which had not been predicted by its architects.
But the primary culprit was the end of the sustained economic prosperity that had existed
since the end of World War II. The expansion of Social Security after 1945, the enactment of
Medicare, the Older Americans Act, and the creation of the SSI program had all been underwritten
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by the assumption that economic growth would allow the federal government to fulfill its promises
to America’s older citizens. Taken together, these laws had also spurred the growth of a vast
infrastructure of local and state offices and agencies designed to deal with the economic and social
problems of the elderly. Collectively, they formed the senior state, a development of governmental
power in twentieth century America that, dispersed broadly throughout the nation thanks to its
emphasis on local administration and increasingly generous federal funding, proved to be far more
resilient and better disguised than other public assistance programs. This distribution of power,
while lending the senior state significant strength, also made it susceptible to duplication,
fragmentation, and, ultimately, incoherence.
Additionally, the senior state had also benefitted from the near-monolithic racial background
of its core constituency. Extending as far back as the original Social Security Act in 1935, older
white middle-class people had been the most significant beneficiaries of the senior state, which
effectively transferred significant sums of national wealth into specialized government assistance
programs that tended to benefited them. As Ira Katznelson has highlighted, life expectancy rates
during this period differed significantly between whites and African-Americans. In 1947, for
example, whites could expect to live an average of eleven years longer than African-Americans. 239
By 1975, this gap had narrowed somewhat, but the average life expectancy of African-American
men remained 63.7 years – old enough to qualify for early retirement under Social Security’s rules,
but not old enough to qualify for full retirement benefits. In contrast, the average life expectancy for
white men in 1975 stood at 69.5 years – long enough to take advantage of Social Security’s full
retirement age, then pegged at 67 years of age. 240
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This racial disparity remained an increasingly sore point for minority elderly advocacy
groups. As Hobart C. Jackson, the director of the National Caucus on the Black Aged bitterly
complained in 1973, “nothing of a substantive nature of any consequence” had been accomplished
for many elderly African-Americans, despite the significant new amounts of federal funding that
had been poured into the senior state. 241 Instead, Jackson claimed that elderly African-Americans
lived in a situation of “multiple jeopardy” because of their age, race, and poverty, and pointed out
that one-third of elderly African-Americans lived at or below the federal poverty level, whereas
24.6% of the overall elderly population (including all racial groups) lived at or below the federal
poverty level. 242
Jackson’s criticisms highlighted one of the less obvious elements crucial to the success of
the senior state. Beginning with the struggle for Social Security and old-age pensions in the 1930s,
reformers had sought to create a form of retirement security that would preserve the “dignity” of
male white workers by preventing them from becoming financial dependents upon either their
families or their local communities, and to thereby ease the transition to retirement from the active
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work force and the social role of family breadwinner. The Townsend Movement had seized upon
this impulse and broadened it to include both men and women, though with implicit understanding
that the most deserving of the nation’s elderly population were its native-born, white, Protestant
members.
In its initial design and operation, Social Security had replicated some of these assumptions
by privileging the labor of some selected categories of predominantly white male workers, and the
postwar flood of private pensions implemented in numerous industries had further reinforced this
orientation. The expansion of social and community services in select localities like New York and
southern California had advanced under the aegis of private and public welfare agencies there, but
the enactment of the Older Americans Act and its subsequent expansions during the late 1960s and
into the mid-1970s had helped to separate anti-poverty programs for the elderly from the far more
controversial efforts of the Office of Economic Opportunity and longer-established “welfare” units
such as the Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
In effect, the federal government, in conjunction with state and local governments,
consciously worked to camouflage and disguise these programs and thereby distinguish them from
“welfare.” This artificial distinction allowed politicians and old-age advocacy groups, as well as
senior citizens themselves, to accept them while avoiding the stigma of receiving “handouts” or
being on a “dole,” and to do so in a way that did not seriously threaten to upset the existing balance
of political power and distribution of wealth in American society.
The different results that the senior state produced – despite the efforts during the War on
Poverty to broaden assistance to elderly minorities – was evident by the early 1970s, as Hobart
Jackson’s criticisms suggested. Elderly white poverty had significantly declined during this period,
so much so that the county poorhouse or poor farm became a distant if not entirely forgotten
memory in many white communities, especially in the new suburban housing developments of the
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postwar era. As thin and stretched as the nation’s social safety net for the elderly sometimes was, it
had largely succeeded in assuring a modicum of economic security for many older white, middleclass Americans, but this success had been implicitly predicated upon active federal assistance and
assured economic growth.
By the mid-1970s, economic growth could no longer be assured, and programs for the
elderly, even those for middle-class, white people, began to experience the kind of political censure
and opprobrium once reserved for the Civil War veterans’ pensions and for the state level old-age
pension movements that had cropped up in many western states during the 1930s and 1940s. That
Social Security and Medicare were designed to function like contributory, social insurance
programs became a programmatic distinction that was increasingly lost in the fray as anti-statist
conservatives directed their ire at federal welfare programs. While overt challenges to the stability
of either Medicare or Social Security proved to be too politically dangerous – as Ronald Reagan
learned in 1981 when his proposals to “reform” Social Security spurred a furious public backlash –
the less well-known local and state programs inaugurated under the Older Americans Act remained
far better shielded because of their relative anonymity and because of the vested stake so many local
communities had in their continued existence.
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CONCLUSION
Between the Great Depression and the onset of the new protracted economic crisis of the
mid-1970s, the relationship between the government – federal, state, and local – and older
Americans underwent a dramatic transformation. Brought together by an unlikely and at times
unwieldy coalition of public officials, representatives of the organized labor movement, and
specialized academic experts, government at all levels of the United States sought to provide social
and economic support to older Americans sufficient to raise them out of poverty. In doing so, public
officials assumed a primary role in a field of social welfare policy which had previously been
considered the exclusive realm of either individual families, private voluntary organizations, or
other parts of American civil society. The creation of this new governmental role was haphazard and
subject to bitter, conflicting arguments over what the proper role of government should be in this
area, but ultimately it produced a stable and lasting outcome by the 1970s, namely, a significant
expansion of federal social welfare activities, programs, and initiatives on behalf of older
Americans, which I have collectively labeled the “senior state.”
Viewed from the vantage point of the 1920s, the creation of the senior state over the course
of the next forty years could not have been foreseen, save for a handful of marginal advocates like
Abraham Epstein who believed that the United States needed to develop an old-age pension system
if it was to take its place as duly modern society. Epstein’s belief – really, his hope – ran against
powerful currents in American society, which militated against the enactment of any such system.
As Theda Skocpol has shown, the United States developed a de facto old age pension system in the
five decades following the end of the Civil War, as national and state Republican politicians in the
victorious northern states successfully joined hands with various Union veterans’ organizations to
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The belief that public old-age pensions were susceptible to corruption, whether political or
moral, was coupled with an increasing emphasis by Progressive thinkers on the virtues of old-age
social insurance, whereby workers helped to fund their own future needs as retirees no longer
actively participating in the workforce. This model of old-age provision, which was modeled on
private commercial insurance concepts, enjoyed growing popularity among Progressive academics
and politicians, who wanted to eradicate old-age poverty without running the risk of bankrupting
local, state, or federal governments with overly generous, non-contributory pensions derived from
general revenue streams that, unlike the Civil War veterans’ pensions, might prove impossible to
repeal or curtail once enacted.
This debate over the merits of old-age pensions versus old age insurance remained largely
confined to more progressive political circles in the United States during the 1920s. By contrast,
many corporate leaders and their allies in elected government and the legal system viewed both oldage pensions and old-age insurance as abhorrent and an unjustified usurpation by government of
functions which it was not entitled to undertake, and which could, if left unchecked, threaten the
ability of corporations to govern their internal affairs as they saw fit. While some of these
corporations embraced a model of corporate welfare that was at times unabashedly paternalistic in
how it viewed the plight of older workers, that paternalism was grounded in the belief that relations
between employers and employees should be marked by a genial reciprocity and immune from
external intrusion by third party actors, be it government or labor unions. While many corporate
leaders embraced old-age pensions as part of their collective responsibility to their workers, these
pensions reached only a fraction of the overall population, and even then they were usually
insufficient to maintain an adequate standard of living. Many older people – especially those who
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could not fall back on agricultural employment to sustain them – continued to rely on a mixture of
savings and assistance from either their kinship networks or voluntary organizations like mutual aid
societies or religious institutions. Those who could not found themselves with few options for
survival, and this fragile, insecure network of assistance ensured that county poor farms and city
poorhouses remained busy in the United States well into the twentieth century.
The Great Depression upset this existing balance of affairs, and helped to radically redefine
understandings of old-age poverty and economic insecurity in the United States. The catastrophic
spread of unemployment between 1929 and 1933 led to an unprecedented strain on existing
channels of public and private relief, and the collapse of the stock market and subsequent failure of
banks throughout the nation had essentially wiped out the savings of thousands of people, a point
underscored by Franklin Roosevelt in his first inaugural address. Because unemployment was so
widespread – and because the collapse of so many banks triggered crippling ripple effects on the
economic life of numerous communities – it became increasingly implausible to argue that
unemployment and poverty in old age were merely the fault of lackadaisical individuals.
Recognizing the need to provide some kind of emergency assistance to the growing number of
impoverished elderly people within their borders, individual States – including previously reluctant
states like New York – now embraced old-age pensions as both a needed measure to sustain
individuals who through no fault of their own had become impoverished and who had little prospect
of competing for employment against younger workers.
The level of support provided by these newly created state-level pensions, though, was
frequently inadequate, and such pensions varied from state to state. Moreover, as late as 1932, only
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seventeen of the forty-eight states had enacted pensions, though that number rose to thirty by 1935. 1
As the Depression worsened, it remained an open question whether the states which had enacted
old-age pensions would continue to have either the revenues or the political resolve sufficient to
adequately fund the pension obligations they had legally committed themselves to. With traditional
sources of assistance either desiccated or in the process of collapse, and new sources of assistance
largely unequal to the burden being placed upon them, the way forward remained unclear for
Americans of all ages, though older Americans arguably had fewer options than most. The election
of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 brought with it hope that the Depression might soon be lifted,
provided that the instruments necessary for the well-functioning of the nation’s economy be restored
to good working order. As the Roosevelt administration worked to tackle these issues, though, the
issue of alleviating old-age poverty remained largely unaddressed, despite some Congressional
efforts to compel action.
The administration hoped that Social Security’s old-age assistance program would remain a
temporary feature of the law, at least until the old-age insurance system was fully operational, after
which time the old-age assistance program would diminish over time as more and more younger
workers shifted into the old-age insurance system once they retired from the workforce. This
gradual approach, though, while highly pleasing to state officials who could now call upon a much
larger source of monetary support to augment existing state-level pensions, did not fully extinguish
the popular discontent which had fueled the Townsend Movement to national prominence. Right up
to the period of America’s entry into World War II in 1941, the Townsend Movement and other
like-minded groups continued to agitate for the repeal of Social Security and the institution of a
more generous universal old-age pension system, and the continuing implicit threat of popular
1
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support for a newer, better organized version of the Townsend Movement helped the Roosevelt
administration to persuade Congress in 1939 to enact the first of numerous amendments to the
Social Security Act which were designed to accelerate the operation of the old-age insurance system
and increase the amount of benefits to be paid out under the old-age insurance system.
The appeal of the Townsend Movement and other similar groups in California and Colorado
was temporarily dampened by the wartime mobilization of the American economy, which had
commenced in earnest well before formal American entry into World War II. The tightening labor
market, fueled by rapidly increasing defense spending, helped to drive national unemployment back
down to levels not seen since before the onset of the Great Depression. Many older Americans
benefitted from this tightening labor market, which allowed them to either continue working or to
find new employment opportunities. The effect of the improving economy on the old-age pension
movement was reflected by the significantly diminished stature of the Townsend Movement and
other similar groups, which found that their central demand for a guaranteed old-age pension now
enjoyed at best a middling amount of support on the national level. At the state level, efforts
continued in California and Colorado to enact broader state-level old-age pensions, with mixed
results to show for it.
The breathtaking productivity of the American economy during World War II, only
temporarily lessened the popular support that had been essential to groups advocating a broader oldage pension system in the United States. Mindful that the war would sooner or later end and that
significant reforms of the American social welfare state were still required, the Roosevelt
administration had commissioned the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), a small
government agency, to undertake a study of needed measures in order to build on the still halfcomplete foundations laid by the Social Security Act. As the nation recovered economically from
the Depression, its zeal for the sort of broad experimentation which the New Deal embodied,
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including the Social Security Act, began to wane, and between 1938 and 1942, a Congress that had
been amenable to the Roosevelt administration was gradually replaced with a more skeptical one
that was eager to hold the line on any further social policy experiments. Watching the political
winds shift, and still dependent upon Southern Democrats for their support of measures needed to
fight World War II, the Roosevelt administration effectively sidelined the NRPB, and with it the
hope that Social Security might be broadened and expanded along the lines of the Beveridge Plan
then taking shape in the United Kingdom.
In addition to recharging business interests in the United States, World War II also greatly
amplified the overall membership strength of many labor unions, as workers flooded into factories
across the nation. Despite growing membership numbers, unions were unable to press for increased
wages, having vowed not to strike for the duration of the war. Instead, modifications made to the
federal tax code beginning in 1942 encouraged private employers to supplement wages with other
fringe benefits tied to employment, such as health insurance and private pensions. After the end of
World War II, a wave of strikes by unions to demand increased wages met with fierce counterresistance on the part of corporate interests, who successfully pushed the Taft-Hartley Act through
Congress in 1947. Taft-Hartley restricted numerous union activities and made it easier for hostile
employers to hinder union organizing efforts. A bitter, protracted conflict between numerous labor
unions and major corporate employers like General Motors during the late 1940s resulted in the
development of new collective bargaining agreements that fueled the growth of private health and
economic security benefits tied to private employment, which in turn served as a template for other
industries.
The growth of a private welfare state was also made possible by the failure of the Truman
administration to revive a New Deal-style reform agenda for socially progressive legislation.
Despite the valiant efforts of Truman administration officials, efforts to secure enactment of national
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health insurance failed due to the implacable opposition of the American Medical Association
(AMA) and various business groups, which conducted a highly successful public relations campaign
that persuaded many Americans that national health insurance represented an unjustified expansion
of the federal government’s power which would inevitably pave the way to Soviet-style statism in
the United States.
After the failure to enact national health insurance, officials within the Truman
administration as well as outside experts in organized labor and academia began working on a new
legislative proposal designed to enact universal health insurance, but only for older Americans, in
the hope that such a program would meet with a less hostile response from the AMA and from the
general public and would therefore stand a better chance of being enacted.
Enactment of any sort of national health insurance plan, though, was forestalled by the
election of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency in 1952; despite his latter-day reputation as a
political moderate, Eisenhower was a self-described political conservative who remained obdurately
opposed to the enactment of national health insurance until near the end of his administration, when
he begrudgingly acquiesced to the enactment of the Kerr-Mills Act. Kerr-Mills provided some
federal funding to individual state programs designed to assist indigent elderly people in need of
medical assistance, but it was not universally available to all senior citizens. Quiet backroom
attempts by senior Eisenhower administration officials like Marion Folsom to persuade private
commercial insurers to offer health insurance plans geared towards older people were rejected by
those insurers as unprofitable ventures, even after the Eisenhower administration offered to “reinsure” such plans in order to safeguard against possible losses by private insurers. 2
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While the Eisenhower administration did battle with congressional Democrats over the fate
of numerous health insurance proposals, it proved more willing to sign important amendments to the
Social Security Act into law. These amendments expanded the categories of workers covered by the
Act, raised monthly benefit payments, and ultimately strengthened the old age insurance system’s
finances while helping to halt and reverse the growth of Social Security’s old age assistance
program, an ostensibly temporary Depression-era measure that had continued to survive well past its
intended termination thanks to the support of southern Democrats.
These developments at the national level, a gradual expansion of Social Security coupled
with an impasse over national health insurance, intensified the pressures on state and local officials
to deal with a growing and frequently financially insecure cohort of older Americans. Localities like
New York City, which had perhaps the largest single concentration of older people within its
borders by virtue of being the nation’s largest city, resorted to public-private partnerships with
philanthropic organizations based in the city. Other places such as California witnessed the reignition of old battles over improved state-level old age pensions.
By the late 1950s, a new alternative to both of these approaches had appeared in southern
California. The American Association of Retired Persons (A.A.R.P.), a private voluntary
organization founded by Dr. Ethel Percy Andrus, a former high school principal in Los Angeles,
was the first major national organization to offer a low-cost health insurance plan open to older
Americans without requiring a prior medical examination. This innovative plan, along with a mailin prescription drug service, attracted a membership that quickly swelled into the hundreds of
thousands as older Americans flocked to the A.A.R.P. The nascent organization also benefitted from
close ties to the Eisenhower administration and support from the American Medical Association,
both of which were eager to demonstrate that legislation to provide health insurance for older
Americans via the Social Security system was an unnecessary expenditure of public funds.
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The rise of the A.A.R.P. was complemented by an emerging partnership between public
officials and academic experts to examine the living and economic conditions of older Americans.
In case studies throughout the nation, academic researchers demonstrated that many of the existing
assumptions about the lives and needs of older Americans were either outdated or unwarranted, and
argued that a new, proactive approach on the part of local communities could help remedy a
significant portion of the social and economic problems faced by older people.
Similarly, new biomedical and social science research demonstrated that many older people
could remain productive members of society, but that many lacked the opportunity to do so.
Beginning in New York, Ann Arbor, and Minneapolis-St. Paul, local officials implemented new
social service programs in conjunction with local academic and social welfare experts, a process
that depended upon an infusion of funds from private sources and state aid. By and large, these
programs offered assistance to older people that was designed to help them find affordable housing,
enjoy access to continuing education and vocational training opportunities, or to serve as volunteers
in their communities. Many of these programs were relatively small in nature, but they frequently
enjoyed support from local officials, labor unions, and religious institutions, most of whom saw
them as expression of the local community’s capacity to serve the needs of vulnerable citizens.
The gradual emergence of these local and state level programs and the sudden appearance of
the A.A.R.P. during the 1950s augured a new direction for policy initiatives designed to assist older
Americans. These efforts also enjoyed an unexpected boost from the federal government. In 1950
and again in 1961, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had hosted national conferences
ostensibly dedicated to examining the problems of older Americans. Hovering over both
conferences, though, was the issue of providing health insurance for older people, an issue which
increasingly became the prime objective of many reformers during this period.
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More importantly, at both conferences, federal officials worked painstakingly to assemble an
array of experts from a wide variety of disciplines at each conference, in essence helping to
construct a new defined community of experts who could then exchange knowledge and expertise.
These experts, in turn, produced new proposals for areas in which the federal, state, and local
governments could cooperate, and while many of these proposals did not get enacted into law, their
very existence marked the emergence of a new, coherent body of experts upon whom federal
officials would draw from during the course of the 1960s and into the 1970s in order to evaluate
existing federal programs for the elderly and to devise new ones as needed.
For the moment, the election of John F. Kennedy to the presidency in 1960 suggested that it
might be possible to break the federal impasse over national health insurance which had solidified
over the course of the previous decade and a half. The Kennedy administration worked closely to
cultivate senior citizens as a voting bloc during the 1960 campaign and after its narrow electoral
victory, numerous labor and social welfare experts were placed into important domestic policy
positions throughout the new administration. Persuaded by the AFL-CIO that supporting the
enactment of health insurance for senior citizens via the Social Security system could broaden his
appeal to older voters, Kennedy publicly committed himself in 1960 to the enactment of Medicare,
and consequently his administration lobbied hard for the passage of Medicare repeatedly between
1961 and 1963.
These efforts were largely in vain. Congressional opposition, especially that of Rep. Wilbur
Mills, the powerful Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, withstood the attempts by
both the Kennedy administration and organized labor (including the National Council of Senior
Citizens, an AFL-CIO funded group whose main purpose was to advocate for the enactment of
Medicare). It was not until after Kennedy’s assassination, and Lyndon Johnson’s sweeping victory
in 1964, that the Kennedy-Johnson administration could count on a working legislative majority that
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was amenable to the passage of Medicare. Even with healthy congressional majorities, though, the
Johnson administration withstood the wrath of the American Medical Association (AMA) and its
congressional supporters. In order to placate the AMA, the Johnson administration and its coalition
of allies (including the American Hospital Association and Blue Cross & Blue Shield) embraced a
compromise solution that folded existing federal health care legislation (the Kerr-Mills Act) along
with new legislation designed to provide universal health care insurance to all Americans over the
age of 65. The new legislation was explicitly modeled on Social Security’s contributory old age
insurance model, and ultimately proved largely satisfactory to the complex and conflicting demands
of the various groups involved in its enactment. 3
While the years-long fight to enact Medicare had dominated much of the political agenda at
the national level, it also had the effect of galvanizing broader interest in the problems of older
Americans. The publication of Michael Harrington’s The Other America, as well as numerous
newspaper stories and investigations revealed just how financially precarious the lives of many
older people remained, despite the gradual improvement of the Social Security system and the
proliferation of private pension systems since the end of World War II. While the living standards of
some older Americans had undoubtedly been improved by these changes, for many others –
especially minority older Americans and older Americans in more rural, agricultural communities –
these improvements were less pronounced
The growing attention that rising old age poverty attracted during the early 1960s helped to
justify the enactment of Medicare, and it also helped spur congressional interest in new initiatives
besides Medicare to arrest rising poverty rates among older Americans. Through a series of wellpublicized hearings and investigations, congressional committees – especially the U.S. Senate’s
Special Committee on Aging – helped bring to light the manifold economic problems which
3
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confronted many older people, which included not only access to affordable health care, but also
inadequate housing, insufficient employment opportunities, and growing social isolation. Existing
state and local programs – especially in New York City – had been able to assist many older people,
but as repeated hearings made clear, such efforts were not enough. Congress in 1965 therefore
enacted legislation designed to provide additional federal funding to state and local level agencies,
with the intention that such funding would be used to support existing community social service
programs and to promote the creation of new ones. Additionally, Congress directed that a new
government agency, the Administration on Aging, be created in order to coordinate and monitor
federal involvement in these state and local programs, and to serve as a clearinghouse for
information and new initiatives at the federal level. The Congress also attempted to apply pressure
on the newly-created Office of Economic Opportunity, the Johnson administration’s hastily
assembled lead agency in the War on Poverty, to do more to combat elderly poverty.
Unfortunately, Congressional efforts to cajole the Office of Economic Opportunity to take a
more proactive stance in battling elderly poverty proved largely for naught for two reasons. First,
the key decision-makers within the Office of Economic Opportunity had decided to direct their
efforts on breaking the “cycle of poverty,” which they not unreasonably believed to be most acute in
urban communities throughout the nation. They therefore directed their time and energies to
supporting vocational training and local Community Action Agencies with the intention of
empowering traditionally disempowered poor and working-class people. More often than not,
though, the “poor” whom the OEO tried to assist were young people, in the belief that helping
young people acquire the skills and training necessary to participate in a competitive labor market
would enable them to escape from poverty and set them on the path to upward economic mobility.
This conception of the “poor,” therefore had less to offer the elderly poor, whom OEO officials
assumed received sufficient assistance from existing government agencies like the Social Security
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Administration and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (the predecessor of the
present-day Department of Health and Human Services).
Secondly, the OEO’s belated efforts in the late 1960s to support local-level initiatives aimed
at eradicating poverty met with significant backlash from increasingly well-organized senior
citizens’ lobbying groups, who feared that OEO’s involvement in such programs would taint them
as being a form of undesirable welfare. Frustrated with the OEO’s slow progress in addressing
elderly poverty, the Johnson administration began to explore alternative methods for using the
federal government’s resources to develop programs oriented around the needs of older people. The
Administration on Aging, which had been created in part to serve this purpose, remained largely on
the bureaucratic sidelines as various Executive Branch departments – including the Departments of
Health, Education, and Welfare, Labor, and Housing and Urban Development – jousted for control
of the administration’s agenda on this issue. Eventually, much of the agenda fell into the hands of
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Beginning in 1967, the administration successfully launched a renewed push to enact a broad
agenda on behalf of older Americans, which included significantly increased funding to federalstate programs originally supported by the Older Americans Act of 1965, additional improvements
to the Social Security Act, and the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, which attempted to replicate state-level laws against age discrimination at the national level.
Taken together, these laws greatly enhanced the role of the federal government in supporting a wide
variety of programs for older Americans, many of which effectively functioned as de facto antipoverty programs in local communities by providing part-time employment and social service
opportunities to older Americans that would otherwise have been unavailable. On the whole, these
programs were designed to re-integrate senior citizens into their local communities by providing
them with socially desirable functions that allowed them to assist other at-risk individuals (as in the
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case of the Foster Grandparents Program, whereby elderly people served as mentors and surrogate
family to neighborhood children). For the most part, however, these programs did not tackle a lot of
the systemic, root causes of elderly poverty, but rather sought to act as palliatives.
Alongside these new programs, the Johnson administration also convened multiple task
forces in 1966 and 1968 to examine the issue of income maintenance. These Task Forces helped
drive the administration’s push to increase Social Security and public assistance benefits, and also
suggested that the administration’s receptiveness to growing demands on both the political left and
right that the government institute a universal, guaranteed income program in lieu of the patchwork
of existing aid programs which provided assistance largely on a categorical basis. The growing
movement behind the guaranteed income program, though, would receive an unexpected boost of
support from the frequently unorthodox administration of Richard Nixon, who succeeded Johnson
as President in 1969. In August 1969, Nixon proposed replacing the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program, along with a host of other welfare programs, with a new guaranteed
basic annual income program that would make federal assistance more uniform throughout the
country. 4 Nixon’s proposal, the Family Assistance Program (FAP) – originally authored by Daniel
Patrick Moynihan – ran into stiff resistance from Congress and advocacy groups on both the
political left and the right who remained unpersuaded that FAP represented a better model than the
existing social welfare system framework. Attempts to enact FAP in 1970 and again in 1972 failed
due to this opposition.
While the Nixon administration pressed for the enactment of FAP, it embraced federal
support for Great Society-era initiatives for older Americans. The administration conducted
vigorous outreach to older Americans, and also revived the template for federal-state cooperation on
4
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issues related to older Americans which the 1961 White House Conference on Aging had helped to
set. By skillfully employing many of the veterans of the Eisenhower administration, the Nixon
administration worked diligently to improve and support the existing infrastructure of federal
programs for older people, even as it worked to erode other anti-poverty programs which had been
created as part of the Great Society. After the failure of the Nixon administration to secure the
enactment of FAP, Nixon ultimately signed into law major improvements to Social Security,
including the creation of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, a new means-based
program that supplemented Social Security’s old-age assistance program. 5
SSI represented a partial enactment of FAP, and its helped to further solidify the patchwork
infrastructure of government programs and initiatives which had been erected over the course of the
previous forty years. Its reaffirmed the willingness of federal officials to support programs designed
to improve the economic security of older Americans as well as their lack of enthusiasm to do the
same on a universal basis for all Americans. This commitment would wax and wane at times after
the mid-1970s, when the relatively stable period of postwar economic growth that had made the
bipartisan enlargement of the American welfare state politically plausible began to fade.
In its stead, a new bipartisan coalition began to emerge which prized paring back the
programs of the American welfare state, including programs for the elderly, which were
increasingly deemed to be an unreasonable burden upon the federal government. Attempts to act on
these criticisms were not always successful, as Ronald Reagan’s failed attempt to significantly
reduce Social Security benefits in 1981 revealed. Yet a new ethos had emerged by the mid-1980s,
which argued that government programs for the elderly were essentially assistance bestowed upon
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an “undeserving” group, a stark reversal from the assumptions that guided the creation and
extension of such programs for the previous half century.
Yet, because of the manner of its creation and the practical demands associated with its
administration, the senior state proved to be surprisingly resilient, despite the rise to power of a
postwar conservative movement in the United States whose appeal has been predicated in part on
anti-statist rhetoric and actions. In particular, the senior state drew its strength from several core
factors. First, while it was largely funded by the federal government, much of its administration has
been done at the state and local levels. This design has helped to inoculate it from anti-statist
political criticism and to confer legitimacy upon it in the eyes of state and local politicians whose
willingness to participate in federal-led initiatives could not necessarily be assumed, a fact borne out
by the far less successful experience of the Office of Economic Opportunity’s Community Action
Program during the heyday of the Great Society. Unlike the anti-poverty initiatives launched as part
of the senior state, the OEO’s Community Action Program’s community action agencies frequently
lacked institutional support at the state and local level sufficient to buttress it from criticisms, and its
direct threat to established local sachems ensured that once federal support was removed, both the
OEO and the Community Action Program’s days would be numbered.
By contrast, the senior state’s anti-poverty initiatives were considerably lower profile, and
did not seek to displace or directly challenge existing configurations of power in a way that would
threaten local politicians or pose a threat to existing economic conditions. Instead, the senior state’s
programs increasingly aimed to replicate functions which might have performed privately by
individual families, that is to say, outside of the realm of market relations. While these functions had
traditionally not been performed by the federal government, local officials welcomed them as a way
to amplify limited financial resources.
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In fact, the key to the success of the senior state has been its ability to neatly sidestep the
political and social tension between popular demands for local political autonomy and the ability of
the federal government to formulate workable national solutions to pressing social and economic
problems in American society. As Barry Karl observed over thirty years ago in The Uneasy State,
“Americans have had a peculiar problem when it comes to identifying themselves as a nation,” and
this problem owes much to the tension in American life between the competing forces of
nationalism and localism as well as the impasse between the “autonomous individual” and the need
for collective action to resolve systemic social issues. 6
Instead of beginning as a federal initiative, the senior state arose gradually, organically, and
in disparate pieces throughout the United States, and did so in a manner and at a pace largely
dictated by local and state officials. It began in localities like New York City and California where
the numerous problems created by inadequate existing social safety nets meant that local officials,
usually in conjunction with funding assistance from private philanthropic organizations, were
obliged to respond first, and to devise policy solutions in areas as varied as housing, regular medical
care, employment assistance, and access to long-term assisted living facilities for the significant
number of senior citizens who lived there. Local officials, working in conjunction with a growing
network of private social welfare experts and philanthropic organizations, developed experimental
solutions in order to try and resolve the social and economic problems of older Americans. Some of
these solutions, like subsidizing public housing for the elderly and enacting legal protections to
prevent discrimination in the workplace against older workers, eventually percolated upwards to the
national level as federal officials searched for solutions that would be both constitutional and
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financially feasible, given limited staff expertise in many federal agencies and modest funding
allocated by Congress.
The senior state owed its origins to more than just the needs of local and state officials trying
to make adaptations to the range of municipal services offered to their older citizens. It also came
into being because of larger societal changes in the United States that were unique to the post-World
War II era. The mass suburbanization of the American population during the postwar era and the
continued out-migration of younger people from rural areas of the American South, the Great
Plains, and New England meant that numerous rural and urban communities were facing the
prospect of a dwindling local population as well as a correspondingly declining number of younger
workers capable of supporting both a growing older population’s needs and other necessary
governmental services. This redistribution of population and economic resources meant that local
and state officials who in other circumstances or contexts might have been suspicious of or might
have rejected any federal role in setting social welfare policy were far more receptive to it,
especially if participation in federal programs or initiatives included eligibility for federal funds
without necessarily being subject to federal oversight.
For this reason, Social Security’s noncontributory old-age assistance program proved to be
remarkably popular among southern Democrats who were otherwise deeply skeptical that any
expansion of the federal government’s power might impinge upon the existing social and economic
structure of the American South, despite the fact that it was originally intended to only be a
temporary, Depression-era measure to bolster the meager financial support that many individual
states provided to their older citizens. Instead, southern Democrats happily supported the program,
which provided matching federal funds that generously supplemented comparatively meager state
pensions for older people. In many instances, Social Security’s old age assistance program was
erected on top of existing state level pension programs, thus providing those programs with a flush
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new source of guaranteed support, which helped to endear the program to traditionally impoverished
agricultural Southern states that hitherto had only been able to appropriate limited funding to their
state pensions. Additionally, the de-centralized administration of Social Security’s old-age
assistance program meant that southern states like Louisiana and Mississippi could shape it largely
according to their own racial prerogatives, which frequently meant that older whites benefitted from
the program more than older African-Americans did. 7 In effect, Social Security’s old-age assistance
program became a prime means of support for older, impoverished white people in many Southern
states, which helped to win it lasting support among both elected officials and the public.
It was not until the late 1940s and into the early 1950s that this imbalance by design in favor
of Social Security’s old-age assistance program rather than its old-age insurance program began to
be corrected, but that only came after southern Democrats found themselves temporarily shut out of
power during the years of unified Republican control of the White House and Congress between
1953 and 1955 and thus unable to prevent the expansion and shoring up of Social Security’s old-age
insurance program.
It was not just Southern Democrats, though, who stood to benefit from an expanded federal
role in providing relief to older people. Key western states like California and Colorado were
subject to a long-running battle during the 1930s and 1940s between old-age pension advocacy
groups like the Townsend Movement and their opponents, with the balance of power frequently
seesawing between each side. As discussed in chapters two and three, state level pensions were
frequently enacted one year, only to be repealed the next, a cycle which helped to keep sustain and
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amplify popular fears elsewhere that the American polity might be overtly susceptible to the appeals
of unscrupulous demagogues. 8
The prospect of more generous pensions being enacted by individual states also led the
National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to begrudgingly
embrace the expansion of Social Security’s old-age insurance program as a more responsible and
less costly alternative. Essentially, the business community believed that it faced a choice between
higher pensions paid for out of general revenue streams (and therefore higher taxes) or
improvements to the part of Social Security which required workers to contribute to their own
retirement security. Fearful of inflation and higher taxes to support a broader welfare state than
already existed, the business community chose to throw its support behind Social Security’s old age
insurance provisions, thus validating and protecting it from its opponents. Likewise, the Eisenhower
administration dutifully supported expansions to the Social Security program, which placed its oldage insurance rather than its old-age assistance program at its core, a stark reversal from the
programmatic evolution which had taken place in the twenty decades since Social Security was first
enacted in 1935.
These expansions of Social Security’s old age insurance program were welcomed by local
officials in urban localities like Chicago and New York, which had historically received at best a
modest amount of support from Social Security’s old-age assistance program, despite the fact that
the old-age assistance program was financed out of more general revenues. In these cities, as well as
in other areas with a large population of industrial workers, local officials continued to lobby for
further improvements to Social Security. However, expanded eligibility and benefits under the
Social Security old-age assistance program, while helpful to many older people, did not necessarily
benefit all older people, especially those individuals who had not contributed into Social Security
8

See chapter 2, 51-52 and chapter 3, 24-26.
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either because they had not “worked” (as was the case with many older women) or because they
were not included in the classes of workers eligible to receive benefits from Social Security. For
these older people, who faced diminished prospects of access to the workforce (usually due to a
combination of lack of formal education or relevant prior experience), local officials found that
more efforts on the part of government were needed in order to prevent relief rolls from swelling up
with older people.
The growth of these programs and services designed to meet the needs of older Americans
without resorting to more dramatic solutions like the creation of a public jobs program for older
people represented a curious compromise: a broadening range of services and programs were
enacted in order to assist older people, programs that might have been far more controversial had
they been enacted in order to benefit other groups of people within American society. Many of the
programs enacted to assist older Americans tended to benefit a constituency that remained both
whiter and poorer than the country as a whole. While other programs such as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) were tarred as a form of support to a racially undeserving group,
programs designed to assist the elderly enjoyed a much happier fate. For example, even after the
slow dissolution of the OEO had begun in 1969, its decidedly modest anti-poverty programs for the
elderly were folded back into other existing executive branch agencies such as the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare. While many of these programs were financed out of general tax
revenues, a key sore point in many of the critiques surrounding other War on Poverty programs as
well as the AFDC program, no such critique attached itself to government programs for the elderly.
Rather, such programs enjoyed the cozy insulation provided not just by an increasingly vocal
lobby on their behalf (chiefly the AARP), but also by a healthy bipartisan consensus that viewed
them as essential to the well-functioning of local communities. This consensus had its origins in the
enactment of the original Social Security Act, but its development accelerated between the end of
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World War II and the 1960s. Experts on the problems of aging and older Americans formed a nexus
of academic research and investigation at the University of Chicago and the University of Michigan
and other leading universities, and the collective output of these individuals helped to legitimate
government programs for the elderly. Not infrequently, many of these researchers moved back and
forth between the academy and various levels of government, and working with elected officials
they were able to develop policies that could be tailored to local communities and funded from a
mixture of public and private sources. This close relationship between policymakers and academic
experts helped to ensure that the programs of the senior state enjoyed a social legitimacy – even
prestige – that other social welfare programs were not able to acquire.
In sum, the combination of these distinct factors: bipartisan support at the local, state, and
federal levels of government, sustained academic interest and research, and backing from organized
labor, which helped to make the emergence of the senior state possible, and which protected its
programs from the strong anti-statist currents of American politics. While relatively modest in
comparison to the benefits and programs provided by other industrialized nations to their older
population, the protections extended by the American state to older Americans are markedly more
generous than those afforded other categories of needy people in the United States. The
development of the senior state, even in the face of historical hostility to both assistance programs
and to the active, in-depth involvement by the federal government in local and state social welfare
matters, is a mark of the success of the unlikely coalition of social welfare experts, elected officials,
and organized labor leaders who brought it into being. Even when the economic conditions that had
supported its expansion began to disappear, the relatively low-profile, indirect nature of assistance
ensured that it would survive, even as other government programs did not.
The significance of the senior state in postwar American history lies in how it allowed
federal, state, and local officials to provide needed public assistance to the elderly, and to do so in a
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way that successfully camouflaged the true nature of that assistance by placing it within the confines
of community service and part-time employment programs. Taken together with the broad
expansions to Social Security between 1939 and 1973 and the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid,
the amount of federal action on behalf of the nation’s elderly population was all the more
impressive, given the relatively small percentage of Americans over the age of 65 during the period
between 1930 and 1970 as a portion of the overall national population. 9 It also reflected a significant
evolution in how the federal, state, and local governments had dealt with the issue of providing
support (economic and otherwise) to older people. The poorhouse and the county poor farm system
that predated the New Deal had been predicated upon a dual mission of uplift and deterrence, and in
that spirit, the few old-age pension laws that had existed before the Great Depression and the New
Deal had provided fairly minimal levels of assistance, and even that assistance was usually
predicated upon continued individual family contributions to the upkeep and maintenance of elderly
family members.
Within the framework of this system, many elderly effectively became dependent wards. As
Hendrik Hartog’s study of wills and inheritances in New Jersey during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century suggests, elderly people who were able to went to significant lengths to try and
guarantee their continued economic independence, and did so by entering into formal and informal
contractual relationships with friends and family members to effectively trade care in their old age
for compensation from their estates upon their decease. 10 In essence, those elderly people who could
afford to swap financial assets for some modicum of security did so, while others who could not
found themselves confronted with far less attractive options.
9

In 1930, Americans aged 65 years or older constituted 5.4% of the total U.S. population; by 1970, this figure had risen
to 9.9% of the total U.S. population. See U.S. Census Bureau, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century: Census 2000
Special Reports, by Frank Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, Figure 2-4, Percent Distribution of the Total Population by Age:
1900 to 2000, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 56.
10
See Hendrik Hartog, Someday All This Will Be Yours: A History of Inheritance and Old Age (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2012).
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The growth and development of the senior state during the course of the twentieth century
significantly revised this formulation. The economic security, health security, and necessary social
services for many elderly people were gradually shifted away from individual families and
localities, and the financial risks and costs of old-age were subsidized instead by the general
population in the form of both specialized payroll taxes and general revenues. This shift released
many but not all elderly individuals and their families from the concerns that had dogged earlier
generations of older people in the United States, and as the nation’s elderly population grew during
the course of the twentieth century (thanks to decreased child and infant mortality rates, improved
nutrition, and increased availability of higher quality medical care), so too did these programs.
However, not all elderly people benefitted from the development of the senior state’s three
core components of economic security, health security, and social service provisions. From its very
beginnings, older white men in certain employment categories tended to be the greatest
beneficiaries, despite the fact that older women (due to increased longevity and less participation in
formal compensated employment) were generally in greater need of assistance in old-age. Along
racial lines, whites tended to benefit far more than non-whites, given the significant disparities in
life expectancies for white men and women versus, respectively, that of black men and women
during much of the twentieth century.
The development of community and social services also helped to replicate and reinforce
existing racial disparities in wealth into old-age. Wealthier, middle-class suburban communities in
postwar America that could afford to support community and social programs for older residents
benefitted from the significant expansion of the Older Americans Act in the late 1960s and into the
early 1970s that directed tens of millions of new federal appropriations into these programs,
frequently in the form of subsidies, but programs that served less wealthy rural and urban elderly
populations were not always as fortunate. In New York City, the combination of a concentrated
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elderly population and a local labor movement that was remained strong enough to organize and
mobilize older people ensured that local government services for the elderly remained robust, but
the same could not be said for less-fortunate cities like Detroit and St. Louis.
Consequently, as the senior state was developing, it attracted less unwelcome attention and
organized political opposition than did other public assistance programs or initiatives. Compared to
the racial polarized politics that ultimately doomed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), for example, the largely gradual, quiet
expansion of government services to the elderly that marked the development of the senior state
proceeded in a natural, organic manner that usually enjoyed the enthusiastic support of key players
like state and local governments and private voluntary organizations that exercised significant
power and influence within America’s widely dispersed system of government. If anything, the
architects of the senior state took advantage of anti-welfare animus to build the case for enhanced
government services for the elderly. The public and private pension crisis of the late 1940s helped
fuel demands for changes to the Social Security system that ultimately shifted that system away
from its originally more popular old-age noncontributory assistance program and towards its old-age
contributory social insurance program. Other potentially worthy social initiatives for other age
groups, such as proposed universal health care for infants and young children, were not enacted or
were delayed for decades. 11
11

For example, as both former Johnson senior assistant Joseph A. Califano and former Social Security Commissioner
Robert M. Ball independently recalled, Medicare was merely the opening salvo in the long-standing fight to enact
national health insurance. As Robert M. Ball remembered, “we all saw insurance for the elderly as a fallback position,
which we advocated solely because it seemed to have the best chance politically…we expected Medicare to be the first
step toward universal national health insurance, perhaps with ‘Kiddicare’ [federal insurance for children] as the next
step.” Robert M. Ball, “Perspectives on Medicare: What Medicare’s Architects Had In Mind,” Health Affairs 14, no. 4
(Winter 1995): 62-72. Cited in Jonathan Oberlander, The Political Life of Medicare (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2003), 33. Likewise, in April and May 1968, economist Eveline Burns HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen had
unsuccessfully advanced the case for a comprehensive prenatal care program. See Alan Dickerson, Health Security For
All: Dreams of Universal Health Care in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 135. See also
Colin Gordon’s discussion in Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003), 108-109.
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Essentially, in the forty years between the enactment of Social Security and the mid-1970s,
the hopes and hard work of social reformers to build a public social welfare state in the United
States that would modernize and humanize how the nation provided assistance and aid became
increasingly channeled into the development of a lopsided welfare system that offered a modicum of
protection against the vicissitudes of old age, but did so in a fragmented and incomplete manner.
Driving this change was the need for the nation to provide at least some minimal measure of support
and assistance to older people that would clearly mark that assistance as not a form of welfare or
government handout, but which could also be reconciled with the nation’s historic reluctance to
concentrate power in the national government or to engage in the public redistribution of wealth to
support needy individuals or groups.
The senior state that took shape starting in the 1930s reflected this ambivalence by rationing
assistance to older Americans along racial and gender lines in order to stave off the possibility of
more radical or far-reaching reforms. Curious among government programs, Social Security
enjoyed limited popular or elite support at the time of its inception; only the insistence of the
Roosevelt administration and a mixture of congressional fear of the Townsend Movement and
desire by southern Democrats for financial assistance supporting otherwise negligible southern state
old-age assistance programs enabled the Social Security Act to clear otherwise unfavorable odds.
The passage of the Social Security Act, and subsequent attempts to amend and expand it, generated
fierce opposition from much but not all of the nation’s business community, which successfully
sought to limit the expansion and improvement of the Social Security system throughout the 1940s.
This pause in the development of Social Security merely shifted the burden of providing oldage public assistance back to individual states and local communities, a development that virtually
guaranteed continued inequality in the provision of that assistance. The growth of a private welfare
state during the immediate post-World War II years and into the 1950s siphoned off a significant
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amount of popular support for the continued expansion of the senior state by ensuring that an
employment-centered model of social provision would continue to exist and compete with the social
provision offered by the public welfare system. It was only when public methods to support older
Americans once more entered into a crisis during the late 1940s and into the 1950s due to
inadequate benefits paid by the old-age insurance system that public support for expanding the
senior state at the national level became a pressing issue once more.
By this point, though, a growing body of academic literature as well as practical
programmatic administrative experience by local and state officials had begun to redefine the
economic and social problems associated with growing old in the United States. Popularized by
Michael Harrington and other social commentators, this new orientation in public assistance for
older people insisted upon a more multi-dimensional conception of the lived experience of elderly
people in the United States that could not be solved simply by improving access to sufficient income
in retirement (though that continued to be a goal for social reformers throughout this period).
Instead, this new, growing body of social science research emphasized the need for
improved medical care and nutrition by arguing that the effects of biological aging could be arrested
under the right circumstances, thereby enabling older people to remain active participants in the
workforce, and by extension, lessening the need for them to become economically dependent upon
public assistance. The steadily increasing overall population of older people in the United States, as
well as the fact that older people were a proportionately rising portion of the overall general
population, spurred popular and elite fears that the elderly would become a permanently expensive
burden upon limited state and local welfare resources that would limit or prevent public assistance
from being directed to other deserving recipients. 12
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In 1920, the proportion of people aged 65 years or older stood at 4.7% of the overall U.S. population. By 1970, this
figure had more than doubled and stood at 9.9% of the overall U.S. population. Source: U.S. Census Bureau,
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Therefore, starting in the 1940s and gradually picking up speed in the subsequent two
decades, reformers and old-age advocacy groups pushed for the enactment of new government
programs designed to assist older people in living active, independent lives, rather than easing them
out of the workforce and thereby rendering them dependent upon either public or private assistance.
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, a distinctive social policy network of local, state, and federal
officials had emerged that aimed to use state power and resources to build a comprehensive welfare
state for older people. The enactment of Medicare/Medicaid in 1965 and subsequent amendments to
Social Security throughout the 1960s further bolstered the senior state.
This state-building process reached its culmination during the War on Poverty in the 1960s
and continued into the 1970s as the Nixon administration ratified and expanded initiatives begun by
the Johnson administration to combat elderly poverty. The senior state thereby brought together
social welfare officials at all levels of government, private voluntary organization representatives,
and academic experts into a new, unified effort to build an infrastructure capable of dealing with the
myriad needs of older people. The outpouring of national legislation, including Medicare, the Older
Americans Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, during the 1960s to deal with these
needs, along with subsequent legislative amendments to these laws, represented the culmination of
these efforts. By the mid-1970s, the federal government had assumed a new, permanent role as an
essential partner to state and local governments in supporting the nation’s growing elderly
population, and that shift represented a reversal of traditional concerns about enlarging the reach of
the national state’s power in American society.

Demographic Trends in the 20th Century: Census 2000 Special Reports, by Frank Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, pg. 56,
Figure 2-4, Percent Distribution of the Total Population by Age: 1900 to 2000. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of
Commerce. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002). Accessed at U.S. Census Bureau website
(source URL: https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf, April 5, 2017). In terms of absolute population, in
1920 there were 4.9 million people aged 65 years or older in the United States (out of a total population of 106.5
million). By 1970, there were 20.1 million people aged 65 years or older in the United States (out of a total population
of 205.1 million). See: Ibid., 60.

432

In supplying federal assistance with minimal disruption to local and state autonomy, the
senior state was able to win the support of traditionally wary local and state officials, and by
demonstrating the ability of government to be a force for promoting improved economic and social
security in old age, the senior state secured the crucial backing of New Deal and Great Society
social reformers who remained eager to improve public assistance without encouraging increased
individual dependence upon limited state resources. These two elements enabled the senior state to
become an essential part of the day-to-day life of millions of older people and hundreds of
communities in the United States, and to ward off subsequent attempts to repeal it. The creation and
continued existence of the senior state during this period signified that public assistance for the
elderly had become socially acceptable and politically legitimate in American society, especially
when compared to the wide-scale popular resistance that had greeted earlier reform efforts in the
twentieth century to institutionalize a permanent role for the American state in the provision of old
age assistance.
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